Mystics & Statistics

Dr. Wheatley requested me to list out the losses for the 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943. They were the two attacking tank brigades on the right flank of the XXIX Tank Corps, with the 32nd Tank Brigade in the first echelon and the 31st in the second echelon. Next to the 32nd Tank Brigade was the 25th Tank Brigade and they were supported by the 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade. Here are their reports (the text in italics are the direct translations of the reports, done by Dr. Richard Harrison):

Operational Report #90, 0800 July 11, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

Corps material and supply situation:

25th TBde: 32 T-34s, 39 T-70s, 103 cars, 4 45mm guns, 3 37mm guns, 6 82mm mortars

31st TBde: 31 T-34s, 39 T-70s, 103 cars, 4 45mm guns, 2 37mm guns, 6 82mm mortars

32nd TBde: 63-T34s, 102 cars, 4 45mm guns, 2 25mm guns, and 6 82mm mortars

53rd MotRBde: 293 cars, 17 BA-64 armored cars, 12 76mm guns, 12 45mm guns, 30 82mm mortars and 6 120mm mortars.

271st Mortar Rgt: 69 cars and 36 120mm mortars

1446th Self-Propelled ArtRgt: 28 cars, 9 76mm SP guns, 12 122mm howitzers

108th ATArtRgt: 37 cars, 12 76mm guns and 8 45mm guns

75th Motorcycle Bn: 10 BA-64s, 13 cars, 72 motorcycles, and 4 82mm mortars

38th Armored Bn: 7 T-70s, 12 BA-10s, 10 BA-64s and 12 cars

363rd Ind Communications Bn: 74 cars, 10 BA-64s, and 3 T-34s.

193rd Sapper Bn: 31 cars

69th (?) Reconnaissance Bn: 15 cars

72nd (?) Reconnaissance Bn: 10 cars

1st (?) Co: 45 cars

7th (?): 6 cars

Combat Report #73, 1600, July 11, 1943, HQ: 29th TC:

Type……………………….25th TBde…..31st TBde…..32nd TBde…..1446th SP Art Rgt

T-34…………………………31………………29……………….60………………-

T-34 (in repair)…………..1……………….3…………………..4……………….-

T-70………………………..36……………….38………………..-………………..-

T-70 (in repair)…………..3………………..1…………………-…………………-

KV……………………………1………………………………………………………..-

122mm SAU………………1……………………………………………………….11

76mm SAU………………..1………………………………………………………….8

Corps Strength 123 T-34s, 81 T-70s, 11 122mm SAUs, and 8 76mm SAU.

Note that this Corps Strength list does not match the list above in any category. In part because there were 7 T-70s with the 38th Armored Bn and 3 T-34s with the 363rd Ind Communications Bn.

Combat Report #75, 2400, July 12, 1943, HQ 29th TC:

25th Tank Brigade losses: 140 men killed, 180 wounded. 13 T-34s and 10 T-70s were irretrievably lost; 11 T-34s and 10 T-70s were knocked out or hit mines; 7 T-34s and 4 T-70s are out of action due to technical breakdowns.

32nd Tank Brigade losses: 100 men killed and 130 wounded. Overall, 54 T-34s were either burned, knocked out, or are in need of repair.

31st Tank Brigade losses: 20 T-34s and 18 T-70s knocked out and burned. Tanks in line: 3, with the location and condition of the remainder being investigated.

During the night 3 T-34s and 1 122mm SAU were repaired.

The evacuation of knocked-out tanks is being carried out by 3 turretless T-34s and a single M-3 “Grant”. Four brigades are working to restore damaged equipment, with one working to repair self-propelled guns; 2 brigades working to repair 32nd TBdes equipment, and 1 working for 31st TBde.

Note the reference to evacuation of tanks, which does have some definite impact on the photo reconnaissance pictures taken on 16 July and 7 August 1943.

Operational Report #2, 0700, July 13, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:

29th TC: Losses: 95 T-34s, 38 T-70s, 8 self-propelled platforms, 240 men killed and 610 wounded.

Combat Report #76, 1300, July 13, 1943, HQ 29th TC:

31st Tank Bde: Material Supply and condition: 8 T-34s and 20 T-70s in line; during the night 8 T-34s were evacuated from the field.

Losses for 12 July: 14 men killed, 27 wounded, and 15 missing. 1 45mm guns wrecked, 1 heavy MG, 2 SMGs and 1 rifle.

25th Tank Bde, consisting of 50th MotRBn, 11 T-70s and 2 guns from an antitank battalion, are defending 1 km east of Storzhevoye.

32nd Tk Bde: Tanks in line: 12 T-34s

1529th Self-Propelled Art Rgt is in Prokhorovka.

Operational Report #91, 0400 July 14, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

25th TBde losses: 40 men killed, 87 wounded, 2 T-70s burns, and 1 knocked out.

53rd MotRBde: Losses for July 12: 517 men killed and missing, and 572 wounded; 16 heavy MGS, 25 AT rifles, 2 45mm guns, 13 light MGs, and 2 cars.

1446th Self-Propelled ArtRgt turned over 2 guns to 25th TBde and 6 to 32nd TBde. Losses for July 12: 19 men killed, 14 wounded; 8 122mm SAUs and 3 76mm SAUs destroyed.

108th ATArtRgt is the corps commander’s reserve without losses

271st Mortar Rgt has been subordinated to 53rd MotRBde. Losses for July 12: 5 men killed and missing, with 4 wounded.

On July 12 1 man was killed and another wounded.

Material Condition:

On hand: 31 T-34s, 40 T-70s, 3 122mm SAUs, and 5 76mm SAUs

Losses: 58 T-34s, 23 T-70s, 8 122mm SAUs, and 3 76mm SAUs

Undetermined location: 18 T-34s and 9 T-70s

Needing major repairs: 11 T-34s and 5 T-70s

Needing lesser repairs: 13 T-34s and 8 T-70s

 

Operational Report #4, 0700, July 14, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:

29th TC: Losses: 3 T-70s, of which 2 were irreplaceable; 40 men killed and 87 wounded. Tanks on hand: 31 T-34s, 40 T-70s.

Operational Report #92, 1600 July 14, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

25th TBde losses: 1 T-70 burns, 1 man killed and 5 wounded.

Equipment Strength:

On hand: 33 T-34s, 39 T-70s, 3 122mm SAUs, and 5 76mm SAUs.

 

Combat Report #77, 1900, July 14, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

25th TBde: Losses 1 T-70 burned, 1 man killed and 5 wounded.

Operational Report #5, 1900, July 14, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:

29th TC: Losses: 1 T-70 burned, 1 man killed and 5 wounded. Tanks on hand: 33 T-34s and 39 T-70s.

Operational Report #6, 0700, July 15, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:

29th TC: Tanks in line: 35 T-34s and 40 T-70s

Operational Report #94, 1600 July 15, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

31st TBde: Tanks on hand: 15 T-34s and 20 T-70s. Losses: 1 man killed.

53rd MotRBde: Losses 1 man killed, 17 wounded.

25th TBde: Tanks on hand: 5 T-34s and 19 T-70s. Loses: 1 T-70 knocked out, 1 man killed.

32nd TBde: Tanks on hand: 15 T-34s.

Operational Report #7, 0400, July 16, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:

29th TC: Losses: 1 T-70 knocked out, 1 man killed. Tanks in line: 40 T-34s and 45 T-70s.

Combat Report #80, 1900 July 16, 1943 HQ 29th TC:

25th TBde: Losses: none. Material Status: 5 T-34s and 17 T-70s in the line; 4 antitank guns; 5 82mm mortars; 3 37mm AA guns.

31st TBde: Material Status: 16 T-34s and 21 T-70s in the line; 3 45mm guns, 2 37mm guns, 2 MBGs, and 3 82mm guns [probably mortars]

32nd TBde: Losses for July 16: 5 men killed, 5 wounded, 1 T-34. Enemy aircraft, in groups of up to 60 planes, bombed the brigade’s positions 4 times.

One notes that in most wargames, attacking a tank brigade with 120 or more Ju-87s and Fw-190s would probably result in more than 13 casualties (see below).

53rd MotRBde: Losses 2 men wounded. Material status: 11 76mm guns; 7 45mm guns; 51 AT rifles; 19 HMGs, 41 LMGs.

1446th Self-Propelled ArtRgt: Equipment on hand: 4 122mm SAUs and 6 76mm SAUs.

271st Mortar Rgt: Losses: 3 men wounded due to bombing and 3 cars damaged. Material condition: 33 120mm mortars.

108th ATArtRgt: Material status: 12 76mm and 8 45mm guns.

38th Armored Bn: Material status: 7 T-70s, 12 Ba-10s and 10 Ba-64s.

75th Motorcycle Bn: 9 BA-64s and 60 motorcycles.

Operational Report #95, 2400 July 16, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

Losses for July 16: 6 men killed and 19 wounded, 1 T-34, 3 cars knocked out and 3 damaged.’

Material Condition: 42 T-34s, 47 T-70s, 1 KV, 4 122mm SAUs, 6 76mm SAUs, 23 76mm guns, 26 45mm guns, 5 37mm guns, 3 25mm guns, 39 120mm mortars, 44 82mm mortars. By 0600 on July 17 5 T-34s and 3 T-70s will be restored.

Operational Report #96, 2400 July 16, 1943. HQ 29th TC:

Material Status: 42 T-34s, 50 T-70s, 1 KV, 4 122mm SAUs, 6 76mm SAUs, 23 76mm guns, 26 45mm guns, 5 47mm guns, 3 25mm guns, and 44 82mm mortars.

Operational Report #8, 0400, July 17, 1943. HQ 5th Gds Tank Army:

29th TC: Losses: 1 T-34, 5 men killed and 10 wounded. 6 cars smashed or knocked out. Tanks in line: 39 T-34s and 45 T-70s.

XXIX Tank Corps (Fond 332, Opis: 1943, Delo: 80, Pages 2-3):

Information on Equipment Loses and Strengths, July 12-16

Equipment Strength: July 12-16

T-34s: 56

T-70: 52

KV: 1

SU-122: 4

SU-76: 6

Irreplaceable loses (burned)

T-34: 60

T-70: 31

SU-122: 8

SU-76: 3

Transportation Equipment Strength

1.5 tons: 572

2.5-3 tons: 205

Irreplaceable Losses:

1.5 tons: 15

2.5-3 tons: 8

Jeeps: 2

Artillery Strength:

76mm: 23

45mm: 26

37mm AA: 5

25mm AA: 3

120mm Mortar: 39

82mm Mortar: 44

Irreplaceable Artillery Losses:

76mm gun: 1

45mm gun: 1

120mm mortar: 3

82mm mortar: 5

Readiness of Rifle Companies:

25th TBde: 50%

31st TBde: 55%

32nd TBde: 85%

53rd MotRBde: 40%

 

Note that I had to retype all these entries, and I am ham-fisted, so there might be typo  or two in them.

By the way, reviewing this just reinforces my opinion that the 31st Tank Brigade was in a second echelon position and used as such. May not have ever gotten past Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz.

In Valeri’s Zamulin’s book, the map on the page before page 385 shows the 170th Tank Brigade (XVIII Tank Corps) and the 1/32 Tank Brigade (XXIX Tank Corps) driving all the way to the village of Ivanovskii Vyiselok. I am not sure either of those units got that far. It shows their attack being halted by the 2nd SS Panzer Regiment, which is the Panzer Regiment of the neighboring Das Reich SS Division.

The records I have from the XVIII Tank Corps records has the 170th Tank Brigade by 1200 losing 60% of its equipment, taking Okyabrskii Sovkhoz “despite these losses” and 1200 are fighting along the line “the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka.” As of the Corps’ 1400 daily report the 170th Tank Brigade is still fighting along the line of the ravine southeast of Mikhailovka. ” The records then state that: “the corp’s units, continuing to carry out their mission, by the end of the day had reached the line 200 meters east of the Bororodiskoye church–southern outskirts of Vasilevka-Andreyevka-two windmills at Prelsstnoye–further along the northern slopes of the ravine southeast of Andreyevka–the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz.“

Some of the quotes from those records are in this post:

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

In the XXIX Tank Corps records I have, there is no mention of this either. For the 1900 report from the corps, they report that the 32nd Tank Brigade “…is attacking the enemy along the line Okyabrskii Sovkhoz, where it was halted by enemy artillery and tank fire, and by his aircraft.” and from the 2400 report they reported that “32nd Tank Brigade, having encountered stubborn enemy resistance, at 1300 forced to go over to the defensive along the line of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz.”

The Fifth Guards Tank Army 1900 daily report shows a little more forward movement, with the XVIII Tank Corps reported to have captured Mikhailovka by 1400. It notes that “The Corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.” That same report has the XXIX TAnk Corps by 1400 taking the Komsomolets Sovkhoz and then notes: “…having encountered an enemy counterattack supported by 200 tanks from the Yar Zoslonnyi-Komsomolets Sokhoz, the corps abandoned the Sovkhoz. Units fell back to the line Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz–Storozhevoye, repelling enemy tank counterattacks.”

The Fifth Guards Tank Army’s 0700 13 July report has the XVIII Tank Corps taking the eastern outskirts of Vasilevka by the end of the 12 July, “…but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank fire from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilevka.” The report has the XXIX Tank Corps “…on the line Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz (excl.) Storozhevoye and is repelling enemy counterattacks by a large group of tanks from the Komsomolets Sovkhoz area.”

The Fifth Guards Tank Army’s summary report for 12-24 July has “the 170th and 181st Tank Brigade “…by 1430, after fierce fighting, had taken the Okyabrskii Sovkhoz and had reached Andreyevka and Vasilevka, an advance of 6-7 kilometers (which is putting a good face on a disastrous attack). This is also the report that states “In Andreyevka 181st Tank Brigade met a large column of enemy tanks.” For the XXIX Tank Corps they have “At 1300 32nd and 31st Tank Brigades, following a fiece meeting engagement with enemy tanks along the approaches to the road south of the Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz, were halted by strong enemy tank and AT fire, as well as by aerial bombardment; the brigades went over to the defensive along this line and repulsed four strong tank counterattacks, which resulted in heavy enemy losses.”

So there is simply no mention of such an advance all the way to Ivanovskii Vyiselok in the XVIII Tank Corps records we have, nor in the XXIX Tank Corps records, nor in the Fifth Guards Tank Army records.

I don’t recall the SS records (which are very sparse this day) ever mentioning this.

The Germans have one intelligence map which shows two penetrations. One, probably by the 181st Tank Brigade, on the left flank of the LSSAH Division, and one, probably by the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade later in the day at the Storozhevoye woods. I don’t have a convenient version of this map that I can put at the top of this post, but it is on page 950 in my original Kursk book and page 343 in the Prokhorovka book.

I do have a contemporary II Guards Tank Corps map that shows Ivanokskii Vyiselok on 12 July. It shows no action there, although this is not particularly meaningful. As the attacking units were with the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps, it is not surprising that their operations were not shown on the II Guards Tank Corps maps.

So, where does this claimed attack come from? Well, the only description I know of such an effort is in Zamulin’s book, page 351. He says:

At the same time [1430 or 1600 Moscow time], the forces of the left wing of Bakharov’s corps (the 170th Tank Brigade, part of the 181st Tank Brigade, several tanks from the 31st Tank Brigade mounting infantry from the 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade) struck out along the gully leading from Andreevka to the southwest in the direction of Hill 241.6. The group attacked resolutely. Taking advantage of the terrain and the dense smoke of the battlefield, the tanks broke through the line of the Leibstandarte’s reconnaissance battalion and unexpectedly burst into the firing positions of the division’s artillery regiment….Within a short time, the 170th Tank Brigade was already fighting in the area of Ivanovskii Vyselok….Hausser immediately concentrated panzer elements from both SS Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte and SS Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich against both our tank groups at Komsomolets State Farm and Ivanovskii Vyselok.

So this does put elements of the 170th Tank Brigade at Ivanovskii Vyiselok sometime after 1430. There are a few problems here: First, there are no footnotes on this page. So not sure of the source of this account. Second, it not quite match his map. The map shows the 1/32 Tank Brigade also there, whereas the text on page 351 clearly leaves them stuck in Komsomolets Sovkhoz (“At this moment, the crews of Major Ivanov’s 1st Tank Battalion and the motorized riflemen of Lieutenant Colonel Lipichev’s 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade from the 29th Tank Corps were still fighting for their lives on the State Farm.”). Third this is a late afternoon attack and a late afternoon penetration of the LSSAH position. This does differ in time from other accounts (as does his putting the Soviet T-34s hitting the tank ditch story after 1300).

Not sure what to make of this account. I assume it is based upon some evidence, but I have no idea what that evidence is.

I am still trying to imagine the composition for a single four medium panzer company and one heavy company panzer battalion in LSSAH on 4 July 1943. The division had 173 tanks, more than the other two SS divisions in the corps. These other two divisions both had two panzer battalions, one created from an antitank battalion. Das Reich had its 166 tanks deployed in 7 medium and light companies and one heavy tank company; while Totenkopf had it 165 tanks in 6 medium and light companies and one heavy tank company. LSSAH may have only had four medium panzer companies (the heavy panzer companies with 12 Tigers and 5 Panzer IIIs are ignored for this discussion).

A German panzer company’s maximum authorized strength was 22 tanks. Rarely do you see overstrength panzer companies. Rarely did you actually see a panzer company at full strength. For example, the Das Reich SS Division with its 7 medium and light panzer companies would have averaged around 14 tanks per company at the start of the offensive. The Totenkopf SS Division with it 6 medium and light panzer companies would have averaged around 17 tanks per company at the start of the offensive. For the four panzer company construct to work the LSSAH, they pretty much have to be at authorized strength. So 4 tank companies = 88 tanks.

The LSSAH had on 4 July: 79 Pz IVs, 9 Pz III Command, 9 Pz III long, 2 Pz III short, 4 Pz IIs and 3 Pz Is.

So 66 Pz IVs in companies 5, 6 and 7 (22 each) and 13 Pz IVs, 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz III longs and 2 Pz III short in company 8 (22 tanks). This leaves 3 Pz III Command for the battalion command and for the regiment headquarters 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz IIs and 3 Pz I (and the other 5 Pz III longs are with the Tiger company).

It works. Not sure this is what was done. The problem is that come the evening of 11 July we have LSSAH with 47 Pz IVs, 7 Pz III Command, 4 Pz III long, 1 Pz III short, 4 Pz II and 2 Pz I. Ribbentrop says his 6th company had 7 Pz IVs. So:

Company 5: 18 Pz IVs (guess)

Company 6: 7 Pz IVs

Company 7: 18 Pz IVs (guess)

Company 8: 4 Pz IVs, 1 Pz III Command, 1 Pz III short (guess…with Pz IV losses being proportional to the Pz III losses)

Bn HQ: 3 Pz III Command

Rgt HQ: 3 Pz III Command, 4 Pz II and 2 Pz I

Tiger Company: 4 Pz IIIs (guess) and 4 Pz VIs

I have two issues with this:

1. Why would you put the weakened 6th company forward (7 tanks) and hold the healthy 5th and 7th companies in the rear?
2. The division’s Pz IV strength had declined around 40% from 79 to 47.
   1. This means that 6th company lost 70% of its tanks while company 5 and 7 lost 20% or less. This seems odd.
   2. It also appears to put the 8th company with very high losses also (as they lost 4 of their 6 Pz IIIs and I assume a proportional number of Pz IVs).

It is also possible that they had removed all the tanks from the 8th panzer company and put them in the 5th and 7th. I believe this is Ben Wheatley’s claim. This would leave these two companies with 21 tanks and the 6th panzer company with 7.

On the other hand, if the 6th panzer companies losses were in equal proportion to the division’s losses, then a company of 7 tanks started with 12 tanks (79/47 = 1.68 x 7 = 12). If LSSAH had two battalions of 3 panzer companies each with 12-13 tanks then this equal 72-78 tanks. The 9 command tanks are split equally between two battalions and the regiment HQ. This is an organizational arrangement more in line with other two SS divisions.

So, we are back to the construct that either LSSAH had one battalion of four medium panzer companies or two panzer battalions of around six medium panzer companies. But regardless, it does not appear that the LSSAH had just one battalion of three medium panzer companies. It is debatable that there were only three medium panzer companies at Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943.

This discussion on Prokhorovka has been going on for a few weeks. It has included a collection of well thought out comments from Dr. Ben Wheatley. These are worth reading, so please scroll down to the comments at the end of each article. Let’s take a moment and account for what are the open issues:

1. Did the attack start at 0830 or 1000?

08:30 or 10:00 at Prokhorovka?

Now, I think Dr. Wheatley, based upon Roman Toeppel’s speculation, favors 1000. The documentation is pretty clear on this. The weight of the evidence leans towards at 0830 start time, including a reading of Ribbentrop’s and Schuele’s post-war accounts.

2. Was there one or two tank brigades in the initial attack that hit the tank ditch (32nd and 31st)?

So did the Soviet 31st Tank Brigade attack on the morning of 12 July 1943?

I think as it was a typical Soviet echeloned attack, it was only initially the 32nd Tank Brigade. The 31st Tank Brigade may never have gotten that far.

3. Did the attack on the tank ditch occur in the morning or after 1300 (Moscow time)?

Was the Tank Ditch encountered in the morning, the afternoon, or both?

I think it occurred in the morning. Someone probably needs to talk to Zamulin and find out why he thinks it occurred in the afternoon (and what his sources are).

4. Were there other tank units in LSSAH Division besides the 3 companies of II Panzer Bn and the Tiger company of 4 tanks?

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 – II

I am pretty certain there was at least additional medium panzer company, as there is no way the organization works out for LSSAH Panzer Regiment otherwise. They had more tanks than the other two SS panzer grenadier divisions, and both of those had two battalions. Dr. Wheatley does have them with an 8th medium panzer company, but mysteriously disappears it before the battle. I think there was either an 8th medium panzer company or an ersatz panzer battalion (like Das Reich has done).

5. Who all was facing XVIII Tank Corps attack?

Who all was facing the XVIII Tank Corps?

Some accounts seem to have gotten a little fanciful in this discussion. It is clear that there was a number of other battalions in the area, and probably other armor (including StuG IIIs and Marders).

6. What other tanks and tank-like vehicles were engaged:

So What Were the LSSAH Tigers Doing?

So What Were the Assault Guns Doing at Prokhorovka?

7. Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades?

Where were the 181st and 170th Tank Brigades on 12 July 1943?

8. Did the events we are discussing even occur as they are claimed?

Basis of the Tank Ditch Story of 12 July 1943

Basis of the LSSAH Tiger Story on 12 July 1943

Ben Wheatley did post up a third post-war account of the tank ditch story, which is good. The actions of the Tiger company appears to be based upon one post-war account. Now Dr. Wheatley’s work with the photo recon pictures may help confirm the veracity of these stories.

And the post that started this latest round of discussion:

Comments on the Photo Recon Article

And the previous summation post that lists 9 other blog posts:

Summation of the Prokhorovka Blog Posts

And this summary is 7 blog posts is worth looking at:

TDI Friday Read: Tank Combat at Kursk