Tag World War II

U.S. Tank Losses and Crew Casualties in World War II

Attrition-CoverIn his 1990 book Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War, Trevor Dupuy took a look at the relationship between tank losses and crew casualties in the U.S. 1st  Army between June 1944 and May 1945 (pp. 80-81). The data sampled included 797 medium (averaging 5 crewmen) and 101 light (averaging 4 crewmen) tanks. For each tank loss, an average of one crewman was killed or wounded. Interestingly, although gunfire accounted for the most tank and crew casualties, infantry anti-tank rockets (such as the Panzerfaust) inflicted 13% of the tank losses, but caused 21% of the crew losses.

Attrition, Fig. 50Casualties were evenly distributed among the crew positions.

Attrition, Fig. 51Whether or not a destroyed tank caught fire made a big difference for the crew. Only 40% of the tanks in the sample burned, but casualties were distributed evenly between the tanks that burned and those that did not. This was due to the higher casualty rate in the tanks that caught fire (1.28 crew casualties per tank) and those that did not (0.78 casualties per tank).

Attrition, Fig. 52Dupuy found the relationship between tank losses and casualties to be straightforward and obvious. This relationship would not be so simple when viewed at the battalion level. More on that in a future post [Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now].

Trevor Dupuy and the 3-1 Rule

rulesDr. Reina Pennington, a professor of history at Norwich University, recently published an analysis of the Eastern Front during World War II which made the case that the Soviet superiority in manpower over Germany was not as large as is often claimed. In support of her argument, Pennington provided a table comparing the total number of Soviet and German combat forces and force ratios at different times during the conflict. She pointed out that for much of the war, Soviet forces were either outnumbered, or achieved modest numerical superiorities that did not exceed 3 to 1 until late in 1944. “A 2:1 advantage is significant,” Pennington argued, “but falls short of the 3:1 force ratio that is generally regarded as necessary for attacking forces, and it’s a long way from the double-digit advantage that is often claimed.”

To support her assertion of the relevance of the 3-1 force ratio, Pennington linked to an article by Trevor N. Dupuy, “Combat Data and the 3:1 Rule,” published in the summer 1989 edition of International Security. The problem with citing Dupuy is that his assessment of the 3-1 rule contradicts her assertion of it.

Dupuy criticized the 3-1 rule on empirical grounds. The so-called “3-1 rule” is a military aphorism that holds that attacking forces require a 3 to 1 advantage over defending forces in order to succeed. Although this rule has become widely-known and widely-held, especially in Western militaries, its origin is unknown and unattributed. It is not exactly clear to what exactly it refers, and there is no known original statement of the rule that can be consulted for clarification.

Dupuy questioned the ambiguity of the rule, which in turn undermined its relevance.

[W]hat is the force ratio to be used with the 3:1 force ratio planning factor? Is it numbers of men, or weapons? Is it firepower? Is it some other calculation of a combat power ratio? In any event, it is clear that neither numbers nor firepower tells us much unless we know the circumstances under which these numbers face each other and the manner in which the firepower is applied.[1]

In 1984, Dupuy’s Historical Evaluation Research Organization (HERO) compiled a database of battles from 1600 to 1973 for the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA; now known as the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis). CAA’s examination of the numerical force ratios in the database showed that attackers with advantages of 3-1 or more in manpower succeeded 74% of the time. It also showed that attackers won between 58% and 63% of the time when attacking with between a 1.5-1 numerical disadvantage and less than a 3-1 advantage. Attackers also managed to obtain a manpower advantage of 3-1 or greater in just 106 of 598 cases (17.7%) examined.[2]

CAA, Battle Outcome vs. Force Ratio

Dupuy concurred that a 3-1 ratio based on a simple numerical total of troop numbers had limited use as a general rule-of-thumb guide for military planning, but asserted that it was useless for analytical purposes Simply put, while there are many historical cases where an attacking force with a 3-1 numerical advantage succeeded, there are also many cases where attackers won with less than a 3-1 advantage, and even with a numerical inferiority. On the Eastern Front during World War II, for example, the German Army regularly conducted successful attacks against numerically superior Soviet forces.

Dupuy was so certain of the validity of the data on this that he made it an aphorism of his own: In the average modem battle, the attacker’s numerical strength is about double the defender’s.

This is because the attacker has the initiative and can initiate combat at a time and place of his choosing and in the manner of his choosing. The attacker can mass his forces at critical points on the battlefield to gain the advantage in strength which he believes necessary to assure the success of the attack.

A battle usually does not take place unless each side believes it has some chance for success. Otherwise, the attacker would avoid taking the initiative. The defender, if he could not avoid battle by withdrawal, would make every possible effort to reinforce the prospective battle area sufficiently to have a chance for successful defense. One circumstance in which a battle occurs without the tacit agreement or acceptance of the defender, is when the attacker achieves surprise. Alternatively, surprise by a defender (for instance, by ambush) may result in a battle taking place before the prospective attacker is ready.

Most military men are aware of the rule of thumb that an attacker can count on success if he has a three-to-one numerical superiority, while a defender can expect success if his inferiority is not less than one-to-two. But the side achieving surprise can count on the effects of surprise multiplying its force strength by a factor ranging between 1.5 and 2.5 (or even more in some cases). Thus, an attacker expecting to achieve surprise would be willing to attack with less than a three-to-one superiority.

Another factor which can influence an attacker to seek battle with less than a three-to-one superiority is confidence in the superior quality of his troops. This accounts for many instances in which the Germans attacked in World War II with less than the desirable numerical superiority, and for the similar instances of Israeli attacks in the Arab-Israeli wars without great numerical superiority.[3]

Dr. Pennington is on fairly firm ground in rejecting the idea that numerical superiority was the sole reason the Red Army defeated the German Army in World War II, but numbers did play an extremely important role in the Soviet success. The lack of a 3-1 manpower advantage did not preclude the Soviets from battlefield success; 2-1 was sufficient. By the time the Soviets achieved a 3-1 advantage, success was well in hand and the end in sight.

NOTES

[1] Trevor N. Dupuy. Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles. Indianapolis; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979, p. 13

[2] Joshua M. Epstein, “Dynamic Analysis and the Conventional Balance in Europe,” International Security, Spring 1988, p. 156; Robert Helmbold and Aqeel A. Khan. “Combat History Analysis Study Effort (CHASE): Progress Report for the Period August 1984-June 1985,” Bethesda, MD: U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency, August 1986

[3] Trevor N. Dupuy. Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War. Falls Church (VA): Nova Publications, 1995, pp. 98-99

Learning From Defeat. Or Not.

British Mark III Tank in ditch, 1917 [Wikimedia Commons]
British Mark III Tank in ditch, 1917 [Wikimedia Commons]

Defence-in-Depth, the blog of the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, is highlighting presentations from the Second World War Research Group’s recent “1940-1942: Fulcrum of the Twentieth Century Conference.”

An interesting contribution by Philip McCarty examined the creation of a committee by the War Office, chaired by retired general Sir George Bartholomew, to assess the lessons of British defeat in France in 1940. This quick and dirty effort resulted in a series of recommendations that varied in military validity, as well as acceptability within the British Army establishment. This is an interesting case study of the actual mechanics of evolution in warfare and how military establishments evaluate military experience. Implications of tactical success or failure are not necessarily readily apparent, nor is it always possible to act immediately on them when identified. Sometimes the right conclusions can still produce wrong solutions.

Trevor N. Dupuy argued that “the application of sound, imaginative thinking to the problems of warfare (on either an individual or an institutional basis) has been more significant than any new weapon.” The preconditions for successfully assimilating changes required:

  1. Imaginative, competent, knowledgeable leadership.
  2. Effective coordination of a nation’s economic, technological-scientific, and military resources.
  3. Opportunity for evaluation and analysis of battlefield experience.[1]

Successful change and innovation is both difficult and rare. It is seldom a smooth process.

NOTES

[1] Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1980), pp. 338

Human Factors in Warfare: Measuring Morale

Figure One: Second Army, Weekly Admissions per 1,000 to General Hospitals and Casualty Clearing Stations for Sickness, Battle Exhaustion and SIW, 11 June 1944 to 5 May 1945. Morale scale equivalents are presented on the right hand Y-axis. (Dr. Jonathan Fennell)
Figure One: Second Army, Weekly Admissions per 1,000 to General Hospitals and Casualty Clearing Stations for Sickness, Battle Exhaustion and SIW, 11 June 1944 to 5 May 1945. Morale scale equivalents are presented on the right hand Y-axis. (Dr. Jonathan Fennell)

One of Trevor Dupuy’s more important and controversial contributions to a theory of combat was the assertion that outcomes were dictated in part by behavioral factors, i.e. the human element. Among the influential human factors he identified were leadership, training, experience, and manpower quality. He also recognized the importance of morale.

Morale is an ephemeral quality of military forces and is certainly intangible. Yet even though it may not be easily defined and can probably never be quantified, troop morale is very real and can be very important as a contributor to victory or defeat. The significance of morale is probably inversely proportional to the quality of troops. A well-trained, well-led, cohesive force of veterans will fight well and effectively even if morale is low… Yet for ordinary armies, poor morale can contribute to defeat.[1]

Dr. Jonathan Fennell of the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London recently set out to determine if there were ways of measuring morale by looking at the combat experiences of the British Army in World War II. Fennell proposed

that the concept of morale has no place in a critical analysis of the past unless it is clearly differentiated from definitions associated solely or primarily with mood or cohesion and the group. Instead, for morale to have explanatory value, particularly in a combat environment, a functional conceptualisation is proposed, which, while not excluding the role of mood or group cohesion, focuses its meaning and relevance on motivation and the willingness to act in a manner required by an authority or institution.

Fennell constructed a multi-dimensional model of morale

By drawing on studies made across the social sciences and on primary archival evidence from the British and Commonwealth Army’s experiences in North Africa in the Second World War… It suggests that morale can best be understood as emerging from the subtle interdependencies and interrelationships of the many factors known to affect military means.

Fennell tested his methodology by developing a weekly morale score using bi-weekly censorship summaries of letters and correspondence from members of the British Second Army in the Northwest Europe Campaign in 1944-45.

These summaries proved a useful source to describe and ‘quantify’ levels of morale (through the use of a numerical morale scale). Where morale was described as ‘excellent’, it was awarded a score of 3. ‘High’ morale was given a score of 2 and ‘good’ morale was scored 1. ‘Satisfactory’ morale was given a score of 0 (neither positive or negative). Morale described as ‘severely tried’ was scored -1, while ‘low’ and ‘very low’ morale were scored -2 and -3 respectively.

He then correlated these scores with weekly statistics compiled by the British Second Army and 21st Army Group on rates of sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, absence without leave (AWOL) and self-inflicted wounds (SIW).

The results of the correlation analysis showed that the tabulated rates (the combined rate of sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion, AWOL and SIW) had an extremely strong negative correlation with morale (-0.949, P<0.001), i.e. when morale was high, sickness rates etc. were low, and when morale was low, sickness rates etc. were high. This is a remarkably strong relationship and shows that these factors when taken together can be used as a quantitative method to assess levels of morale, at the very least for the Army and campaign under discussion.

The results are shown on the graph above. According to Fennell,

This analysis of morale supports the conclusions of much of the recent historiography on the British Army in Northwest Europe; morale was a necessary component of combat effectiveness (morale in Second Army was broadly speaking high throughout the victorious campaign); however, morale was not a sufficient explanation for Second Army’s successes and failures on the battlefield. For example, morale would appear to have been at its highest before and during Operation ‘Market Garden’. But ‘Market Garden’ was a failure. It is likely, as John Buckley has argued, that ‘Market Garden’ was a conceptual failure rather than a morale one. Morale would also appear to have been mostly high during operations in the Low Countries and Germany, but these operations were beset with setbacks and delays.

Fennell further explored the relationship between morale and combat performance, and combat performance and strategy, in his contribution to Anthony King, ed., Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). An earlier version of his chapter can be found here.

NOTES

[1] Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding Defeat: How To Recover From Loss In Battle To Gain Victory In War (New York: Paragon House, 1990), p. 67

Kursk Book Availability

Kursk

Amazon.com is now charging $275 for my Kursk book. For some reason, they had always discounted it to below list price. Last week, the discounted ended and it now cost well above list price. We have no say in what Amazon.com does or does not do. We have watched the odd price fluctuations on the book prices there with considerable bemusement.

It is available from Aberdeen Bookstore at the list price of $195. If you click on the image of the book to the right of this post then it will lead you there.

The link is: Aberdeen Bookstore