Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

Some Dam Thoughts

As many are aware, the Kakhovka Dam was seriously breeched Tuesday, 6 June, flooding the Dnipro River to its west. This is almost a 60 mile (97 km) stretch of river. The dam holds back a large 150 mile (241 km) reservoir. Description is here: Destruction of the Kakhovka Dam – Wikipedia

Of course, the Ukrainians blame the Russians and the Russians blame the Ukrainians. The Russian claims don’t carry much water. 

It appears that the dam was destroyed to either help the Russian defense of this area or as an act of revenge for drone attacks on Moscow. Not sure which.

I never considered the area along the Dnipro River to be an effective line of attack for the Ukrainians, as the river was crossed by only three bridges, and two were down. The road across the dam was the only open road. It is now down. The Russians struggled in the fall of last year to maintain forces of up to 20,000 on the north side of the river and were forced to withdraw. If the Ukrainian attacked across this river, they would be suffering similar problems. Therefore, I assume that any Ukrainian attack across the river would be a diversion, and the real attack would occur elsewhere. 

Certainly the flooding of the river temporarily shuts down any major operations in that area, but I don’t think the Ukrainians were yet conducting any major operations anywhere. For example, see:  Update from Ukraine | Is it the start of the Ukrainian Counterattack? New Achievements – YouTube.

Therefore, the collapsing of the dam does not seem to be directly related to any major military operations, unless Ukraine was planning one in the area and Russian flooded the river to stop it. So unless there was a major Ukrainian operation in the area about to start, I do question the military value of this. It is something that can only be done one time, and the current campaign season is still like six months long. Flooding the Dnipro will certainly shut down operations there for weeks, but… the waters do subside. So, there just doesn’t seem to be a strong military reason for this. 

Maybe it was an act of revenge. If so, it was poorly considered. It just adds the narrative of Russians as brutal orc-like creatures and further diminishes their international reputation and standing. Furthermore, in the U.S., neither of the two leading contenders for the Republican Party presidential nomination are supporters of Ukraine. The image of the destroyed dam and of the places downstream being deliberately flooded are making the arguments put forward by their opponents. As has been the case since the start of the war, the Russians are their own worse PR. They complain about Russo-phobia, yet they are going out of their way to create it. This is just incompetent, and that is not addressing the inhumane nature of some of their actions.

Anyhow, I think the military advantages gained from this are limited. I am mystified how they came to the conclusion that this was a good idea.

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 464

Lots of interesting things continue to happen but there is still no big spring offensive, yet.

Russia has sent a dozens of drones for several days to strike Kyiv. Most are shot down or miss their target, but a few get through. At least four civilians have been killed in Kyiv in multiple attacks this last week. 

Meanwhile, night of 29/30 May, someone fired at least eight drones at Moscow. Five were claimed to be shot down to the west of Moscow and three were jammed, causing them to miss their targets. Three of them landed in the southwest part of the city, outside the ring road, but two landed inside the second ring road. Two civilians were injured.

A little difference in scale here. Kyiv has been attacked 17 times in the last month while this only the second attack on Moscow. We shall see if this devolves into a War of the Cities, like we saw with the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88).

At the same time, Russia was reporting that 200 shells had hit Belgorod province in the last 24 hours. The Shebekino district was hit at least 155 times. 

Bakhmut was clearly completely under Russian control by 24 May. Ukraine is making small advances around the outside of Bakhmut. The Wagner Group is withdrawing from Bakhmut and handing their prize over to the Russian Army. They sort of accomplished what they said they would, but it took them many months and some heavy casualties. The head of the Wagner Group has said he lost 20,000 killed.

Meanwhile a group of Russians invaded Russia. The cross-border attack into Belgorod province started on 22 May and lasted a couple of days. The invasion force appears to have consisted of 4 MaxxxPro MRAPs and two HMMWVs. Maybe two or three dozen riders. One MRAP and one HMMWV were captured while the Russian invaders captured a BTR-82A. They basically got to Grayvoron (pop. 6,179 – 2021 census), which is only 10-15 kilometers from the border in the SW corner of the province. It is to the NW of Kharkiv. This action was not militarily significant but was politically so. Not only did it show that the considerable Russian border with Ukraine was undefended, but more significantly, Russia did not have a reserve maneuver battalion available to respond to the invasion within 12 hours of it. This is kind of surprising. It appears that they have committed all their maneuver battalions to Ukraine and have little spare. One wonders what would happen if Ukraine invaded Belgorod province with some of the 12 brigades it is holding back for the spring offensive? Anyhow, the Freedom of Russia Legion (it claims to have two battalions) said they lost no one in this operation, while Russian is claiming they killed 70. I will go with the first estimate on this one. The neo-Nazi Russian Volunteer Corps was also involved and had previously conducted the raid in Bryansk province in March 2023. 

25 May the Russian 4,000 ton SIGINT intelligence collection ship, the Ivan Khurs, was hit in the Black Sea by Ukrainian drone boat. Any damage appears to be minor.

The classified Joint Staff briefing book did talk about 12 “combat credible” brigades being generated for the “spring counteroffensive.” They report on the status of 9 new brigades being raised (“trained and equipped by US, Allied and Partners”). Six will be ready by 31 March (page was dated 23 February) and 3 by 30 April. Eight of these newly raised brigades are mechanized-like brigades, which nominally have one tank battalion of 31 tanks per brigade. A NATO rep. said in late April that 98% of the vehicles scheduled are now in Ukrainian hands. This is a very qualified statement.

The status of these nine new brigades is discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Basically, eight of them have 28 – 32 tanks, seven have 90 to 101 other AFVs, IFVs, APCs and MRAPs, and six of them have between 8 to 16 artillery pieces and three have between 22 to 24 artillery pieces. Three other brigades will be added to offensive force, although there are no reports on their status. 

The DOD count of opposing forces is discussed here: Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and combat effectiveness is discussed here: Unstructured Comments on “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. has announced on 21 April that it will began training Ukrainian forces on their new Abrams tanks. The 31 tanks will arrive in Grafenwoehr at the end of the May and the training will last for around 10 weeks. On 28 April the Germans are saying that over 100 Ukrainians are now training on Leopard Is (the older version). That does indicate that some of these newly raised Ukrainian brigades are still going to receive more equipment. So while the weather may be clear in early May, that does not mean that Ukraine will initiate a major offensive operation in May. One notes that Zelenskyy is now saying they are waiting until fully prepared.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia mapIt is dated 2 June. The last dated update on the map is Soledar on 16 January, although they are showing Bakhmut in Russian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secureThe grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 01 June, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 30,596,101 metric tonnes carried in 958 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 46 days left to the agreement. 

Russia is claiming that they destroyed the Ukrainian 1,192-ton landing ship Yury Olefirenko, which is supposed to be Ukraine’s last warship. It was launched in 1970.

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. Ukraine did bombard Russian troops in the village of Tsapovka in early April, in Russian territory in the Belgorod Oblast. Ukraine published pictures of this. It is right on the border, due south of Borisovka. The village is reported to be unpopulated since 2013.

On 17 April, the Ukrainians did attack two Russian power stations in Belgorod oblast using drones. The following week the Russians also accidently dropped two bombs on Belgorod. On 1 May, a Russian ammo dump was hit near Tomorovka, in Belgorod province.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The early morning on 22 March (at 04:43:58 according to videos), there was another attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol harbor using seaborne naval drones. The last time they tried this (29 October 2022), they (lightly?) damaged the 4,035-ton frigate Admiral Makarov. It appears that one got close to one rather large ship and exploded near its rear. Not sure if a Russian ship was damaged. At least three drones were used in the attack. One was stopped by the booms at the entrance to the harbor, and two were destroyed in the harbor.

There was also a car blown up on 23 March in Melitipol that injured a Ukrainian accused of collaborating with the Russians. There was an IED exploded in Melitipol on 3 April.

Apparently, back in October, in conjunction with the Kherson offensive, there was a failed attempt by Ukraine to retake Zaporizhia nuclear power plant with an amphibious operation across the large reservoir there.

There was Ukrainian crossing on 20 or 21 April at the village of Dachi. This is just across the Dnipro near Kherson where the damaged Antonivka Road Bridge crosses. 

I do think this is a diversion, vice the preparation for a major offensive. The problems with conducting operations across the Dnipro work both ways. The Russians were forced in November to withdraw from north of the river because of supply issues. There are only three bridges across the river in the best of times. If the Russians could not support 20,000 troops to the north of the river, I suspect the Ukrainians will have a similar problem south of the river, especially as Russia has air superiority.

The Ukrainians two weeks ago hit three oil tanks in and around Crimea (one near Sevastopol early in the week, one in Krasnador province on 2 May that was only 7 km from the bridge to Crimea, and another attack on 3 May in Krasnador near the bridge). Also on 29 April it is claimed that the Russian village of Suzemka was shelled. It is 6 miles (10 kilometers) from the border in Bryansk province. The Russians report two, and later four civilians killed. On 2 May a train was derailed by a bomb near Bryansk. Finally, two drones attacked the Kremlin in Moscow on 4 May, with one hitting a flag on a dome. 

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 4 PM: It is 79 degrees (26 Celsius) and sunny. Rain is expected on Saturday and following Saturday. Sunrise is at 4:29 and sunset is at 8:36, giving them more than sixteen hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 80 degrees (27 Celsius) and mostly sunny. No rain is expected for the next ten days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Do not know the current strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army but am guessing that it is over 300,000 deployed troops. They clearly are going to have to build it up to 400,000 or more in response to Russia’s partial mobilization. There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They were reporting their ground forces at 198,000 in July 2022. 

Do not have a good estimate of the total number of foreign volunteers now in Ukraine, although it is clearly thousands.

The U.S. and many countries in and around Europe are now providing tanks to Ukraine. This includes 31 Abrams (M1A2) from the U.S. that were not expected to arrive until 2024, but the U.S. has now announced that they will be in Germany as of the end of May. It also includes the previously announced 40 AMX-10 light tanks from France, the previously announced 14 Challengers from the UK and 14 new Challengers from the UK, 14 Leopards (2A6) from Germany announced on Jan. 25 plus they are going to provide 14 more later, 14 or so Leopards (2A4?) from Poland, maybe 20 Leopards (2A4) from Spain, but so far only 6 have been confirmed (they are planning to train 55 Ukrainian crew members), no Leopards from Netherlands (previous rumors said 18), Portugal is sending 4 (2A6) out of their 37, 8 (2A4) from Norway out of their 36, and 8 2A4 Leopards from Canada out of their 80. The 8 Canadian Leopards have already arrived in Poland. Non-NATO members Finland is providing 3 Leopards and Sweden is providing 10 2A6s along with 8 Archer 155mm SP Artillery. Also, Morocco is providing Ukraine with 173 T-74s EA, 70 are already in Ukraine. It does appear in a number of cases the announcements are lagging behind the actual shipments of tanks. Poland is providing Ukraine with another 60 upgraded T-72s. It has already sent Ukraine some 260 or more tanks. 

Twelve countries in NATO have Leopards. Germany is saying that a total of around 80 will be sent between them all. My count currently shows at least 77 Leopards from eight different countries (two not yet in NATO). It now looks like many of the older 40-45 ton German Leopard Is are being refurbished and will be sent. Germany has 88 of them it could send and Belgium has 50. Between Denmark, Netherlands and Germany, they are putting together a package of 100 1A5s, although the details of the deal keep changing.  It will be a while before most of them arrive. An initial package of 29 is being refurbished and are supposed to arrive in the summer (enough for one more brigade). There are a lot of them out there, with Greece supposedly having 520 (and 392 U.S. M-48s and 100 U.S. M-60s) and Turkey having 355 or 397 (and 750 M-48s and 785 M-60s). Opportunity to replace old stocks. Switzerland has 230 Leopard 2 tanks of which 96 are not in operation (in storage). Germany has asked for them but on 7 March the Swiss Parliament voted not to export tanksMeanwhile reports are saying some of the 100+ Leopard Is will still arriving in Ukraine starting May. Meanwhile, the U.S. is now planning on providing older M1A1s instead of M1A2s are it can be arranged to get there this fall. Not sure if the count of tanks provided will remain at only 31 (one battalion’s worth).

Meanwhile, Russia has been seen transporting T-54Bs from Siberia to somewhere (probably Ukraine). That particular model dates from 1955, so a little older than a Leopard I or M1A1. On 30 April, T-55s and T-62 were reported in the Berdiansk area.

From a practical point of view, it means that around four or so Ukrainian tank battalions will be armed up with Abrams/Leopard 2/Challengers. Ukraine has over 30 tank battalions. Some should probably be in place for the spring offensives. Some of the Canadian Leopard 2s have already arrived in PolandAt least 18 of the Leopard 2A6s have arrived in Ukraine. Challengers will be arriving in Ukraine during March.

Slovakia announced on 23 March that they have transferred 4 MiG-29s to Ukraine. It now appears that all 13 Slovak MiG-29s have been handed over to Ukraine. On 8 May, it was confirmed that 10 Polish MiG-29 have been delivered to Ukraine. On 5 May, it was confirmed that Croatia is providing 14 Mi-8 helicopters, of which 9 are already in Ukraine. Looks like Ukraine will be receiving F-16s also. Numbers to be determined. It may be six or more months before they are operational.

Some weapons have been supplied that have not been announced. For example, Finnish ex-Soviet 152K89 152mm field guns recently have showed up on the battlefield in Ukrainian hands, even though Finland has never announced that they were being provided. Danish artillery has also recently showed up in Ukraine.

Russian Army Build-up:  

In the fall of last year, Ukraine was reporting that around 280,000 Russians were deployed in Ukraine. This seems a reasonable estimate. On 4 November Putin stated at 318,000 reservists and “new volunteers” have been mobilized and 49,000 are in combat zones. I assume the Russian army in Ukraine was at about 200,000 at the start of this mobilization.

The U.S. and UK estimate that the Wagner Group had 50,000 people in December 2022. Have no idea if this estimate is accurate. John Kirby (U.S. DOD spokesman) said that Wagner has lost 30,000 people, at a wounded-to-killed ratio of maybe 2-to-1, implying 10,000 deaths. Around 20 May, the head of the Wagner Group said they had lost 20,000 killed. We have doubts about the accuracy of Prigozhin’s claims.

Ukraine stated on 22 Feb. that Russia has deployed more than 350,000 troops to Ukraine. This sounds about right.

Russia is now starting its spring conscript draft of 147,000. It does this twice a year. Conscripts are for one year and are not allowed to serve outside of Russia.

The Russian defense budget for 2023 is $159 billion, up from $111 billion in 2022. This appears to now be around 9% of GDP.

According to one article, which I suspect is a little biased, Russian tank production at Uralvagonzavod is currently over 900 armored vehicles a year, including 35-40 T-90s a month. In contrast, the U.S. is producing two M-1A2 a month in Lima, Ohio. The German Leopard 2 is also still in production. 

Russia is getting some support from China, possibly spare parts and more important, microchips. They are reportedly not currently providing Russia with weapons. This is a source of discussion between the U.S./EU and China.

As of 26 February, Russia has announced that the DPR has raised a new battalion entirely composed of Ukrainian prisoners of war, called the Bohdan Khmelniksky Battalion. It was claimed that the unit consists of 70 Ukrainians. 

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia has added at least 41,000 troops to the front line from their new partial mobilization effort and will be adding more. Potentially up to 300,000. Most likely by the spring, both armies will be sporting 400,000 or more troops. It does appear that by spring, the level of intensity and casualties from this war will be a count twice as high as it currently has been.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 75.68 as of 9:16 AM EST. Ruble remains low at 81.08 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including over 20,000 killed (implying a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 15 May at least 8,895 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 138 civilians killed from 1-28 February and 178 for 1-31 March and 169 killed from 1-30 April.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 22,644 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,895 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR) = 52,315. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000.

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: The second and third to last paragraphs in The Times (UK) article referenced in the Day 394 blog post says:

However, Barrons argues that Ukraine needs ammunition even more than it needs soldiers. It fires 90,000 155mm shells a month and sometimes 6,000 shells a day but combined US and European production is less than 30,000 a month. “There is a mathematical mismatch,” he says. The US is tripling its output but “Europe has been too slow”.

Russia, which has been firing 20,000 shells a day and is thought to have used up ten years’ worth of production in 12 months, has the same problem. In recent weeks they have reduced the numbers by 75 per cent.

So 6,000 shells a day vice 20,000 shells a day, have no idea if that is true or what percent of the rounds fire are “smart” versus old style. One would expect the side firing the most rounds would be causing more causalities. On the other hand, if U.S. production is less than 30,000 a month Ukraine will be forced to eventually reduce their expenditures to 1,000 or 2,000 shells a day. If Russia has to reduce their numbers by 75%, then they are firing 5,000 shells a day. Don’t know if any single number in this discussion is close to reality but suspect that both sides will have to reduce their artillery expenditure at least until May. This war could be very quiet for a couple of months.

Anyhow, Ukraine is requesting 250,000 shells a month from the EU.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is clear that the Russian attempt to cut off Ukrainian power and freeze them out over the winter has failed and they have not done any of those massive missile strikes since 9 March.

There has been some increase in airstrikes and drone attacks this month, partly in response to Ukrainian strikes, but nothing that looked like a major strike. The last major Russian airstrike was on 9 March. The previous one was on 10 February. Meanwhile, on 4 May a Russian hypersonic missile was reported to have been shot down by a Patriot missile. This was not supposed to be possible.

Attack on Kyiv on 15/16 May result in 18 out of 18 attacking claimed to have been shot down. One Patriot launcher was damaged. The Patriot missile battlery was the target of the attack.

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Completer write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Russia continues their display of Orc-like behavior with a video coming out of the execution of the POW tentatively identified as Oleksandr Ihorevich Matsievskiy of the Territorial Defense Forces. His last words were “Slava Ukraini.”  This execution probably occurred sometime in early February.

Another video was released on 11 April of a Russian-speaking Ukrainian soldier being beheaded, ISIL-like. This appears to have occurred last summer. I gather this was done by Wagner.

You would think at some point the Russian senior command would understand that this is working against them politically and is resulting in wide-spread international support for Ukraine, which is resulting in increased shipment of arms and ammunition. It also continues to show a real lack of discipline among the rank and file. In addition to being an inhumane war crime, it is just plain stupid. 

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Itis going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction. 

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there..

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and TurkeySee Day 443 for more info. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. We shall see if he is now willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

York Historical Warfare Analysis Group (YHWAG)

Was forwarded this link by Dr. Niall MacKay: Weighing the Fog of War – quantifying counterfactual military history (wordpress.com)

He presented at our last conference: Presentations from HAAC – Killing Captain Hindsight: Quantifying Chance in Military History | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org); and will be doing a virtual presentation at this year’s conference: Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

He is working on organizing a revival of HADSS (the UK Historical Analysis for Defense and Security Symposium, which ran until 2018) at York in 2024, dependent on securing funding.

Soviet Propaganda Leaflet, July 1943

Daniel Horvath, the author, has passed to me a copy of a Soviet propaganda leaflet from July 1943. He said it came from a crashed plane in Orel province.


It is the same thing on both sides of the two-sided printed leaflet. Translation: Russian Propaganda Leaflet (2)

Translation:

A New
Adventure by Hitler

German soldiers!

On the morning of July 5, Hitler again threw you into a senseless offensive. In two days, this adventure in the Kursk-Belgorod-Orel region cost the German troops 314 aircraft, 1019 tanks and several tens of thousands of soldiers, and

brought no success to the Germans.

Soldiers! With the example of your dead comrades you should be convinced:

The offensive means inevitable death!

Yesterday your comrades fell, tomorrow will be your turn for a reckoning. In the two years of war in the East, Hitler has already destroyed 6,400,000 soldiers and officers in this way.

Soldiers! Think of your families! Refuse to attack!

Go into Russian captivity!

The offensive means death!

Captivity is your salvation!

This leaflet is valid as a pass for German soldiers and officers who surrender to the Red Army.

,<The same in Russian>

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 457

Lots of things going on but no big spring offensive yet.

As of 20 May, Bakhmut has fallen, except Ukraine was still holding onto the SW corner where the MiG-17 monument is. It clearly was completely under Russian control by 24 May. Ukraine is making small advances around the outside of Bakhmut. The Wagner Group is now withdrawing from Bakhmut and handing their prize over to the Russian Army. They sort of accomplished what they said they would, but it took them many months and some heavy casualties. The head of the Wagner Group has said he lost 20,000 killed.

Photos from Ukrainska Pravda, March 10, 2023.

Meanwhile a group of Russians invaded Russia. The cross-border attack into Belgorod province started on 22 May and lasted a couple of days. The invasion force appears to have consisted of 4 MaxxxPro MRAPs and two HMMWVs. Maybe two dozen riders. One MRAP and one HMMWV were captured while the Russian invaders captured a BTR-82A. They basically got to Grayvoron (pop. 6,179 2021 census), which is only 10-15 kilometers from the border in the SW corner of the province. It is to the NW of Kharkiv. This action was not militarily significant but was politically so. Not only did it show that the considerable Russian border with Ukraine was undefended, but more significantly, Russia did not have a reserve maneuver battalion available to respond to the invasion within 12 hours of it. This is kind of surprising. It appears that they have committed all their maneuver battalions to Ukraine and have little spare. One wonders what would happen if Ukraine invaded Belgorod province with some of the 12 brigades it is holding back for the spring offensive? Anyhow, the Freedom of Russia Legion (it claims to have two battalions) said they lost no one in this operation, while Russian is claiming they killed 70. I will go with the first estimate on this one. The neo-Nazi Russian Volunteer Corps was also involved and had previously conducted the raid in Bryansk province in March 2023. 

The unit badges for the Freedom of Russia Legion and Russian Volunteer Corps.

25 May the Russian 4,000 ton SIGINT intelligence collection ship, the Ivan Khurs, was hit in the Black Sea by Ukrainian drone boat.

The classified Joint Staff briefing book did talk about 12 “combat credible” brigades being generated for the “spring counteroffensive.” They report on the status of 9 new brigades being raised (“trained and equipped by US, Allied and Partners”). Six will be ready by 31 March (page was dated 23 February) and 3 by 30 April. Eight of these newly raised brigades are mechanized-like brigades, which nominally have one tank battalion of 31 tanks per brigade. A NATO rep. said in late April that 98% of the vehicles scheduled are now in Ukrainian hands. This is a very qualified statement.

The status of these nine new brigades is discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Basically, eight of them have 28 – 32 tanks, seven have 90 to 101 other AFVs, IFVs, APCs and MRAPs, and six of them have between 8 to 16 artillery pieces and three have between 22 to 24 artillery pieces. Three other brigades will be added to offensive force, although there are no reports on their status. 

The DOD count of opposing forces is discussed here: Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and combat effectiveness is discussed here: Unstructured Comments on “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. has announced on 21 April that it will began training Ukrainian forces on their new Abrams tanks. The 31 tanks will arrive in Grafenwoehr at the end of the May and the training will last for around 10 weeks. On 28 April the Germans are saying that over 100 Ukrainians are now training on Leopard Is (the older version). That does indicate that some of these newly raised Ukrainian brigades are still going to receive more equipment. So while the weather may be clear in early May, that does not mean that Ukraine will initiate a major offensive operation in May. One notes that Zelenskyy is now saying they are waiting until fully prepared.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia mapIt is dated 26 May. The last dated update on the map is Soledar on 16 January.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. The grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 25 May, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 30,290,085 metric tonnes carried in 953 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 53 days left to the agreement. 

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. Ukraine did bombard Russian troops in the village of Tsapovka in early April, in Russian territory in the Belgorod Oblast. Ukraine published pictures of this. It is right on the border, due south of Borisovka. The village is reported to be unpopulated since 2013.

On 17 April, the Ukrainians did attack two Russian power stations in Belgorod oblast using drones. The following week the Russians also accidently dropped two bombs on Belgorod. On 1 May, a Russian ammo dump was hit near Tomorovka, in Belgorod province.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The early morning on 22 March (at 04:43:58 according to videos), there was another attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol harbor using seaborne naval drones. The last time they tried this (29 October 2022), they (lightly?) damaged the 4,035-ton frigate Admiral Makarov. It appears that one got close to one rather large ship and exploded near its rear. Not sure if a Russian ship was damaged. At least three drones were used in the attack. One was stopped by the booms at the entrance to the harbor, and two were destroyed in the harbor.

There was also a car blown up on 23 March in Melitipol that injured a Ukrainian accused of collaborating with the Russians. There was an IED exploded in Melitipol on 3 April.

Apparently, back in October, in conjunction with the Kherson offensive, there was a failed attempt by Ukraine to retake Zaporizhia nuclear power plant with an amphibious operation across the large reservoir there.

There was Ukrainian crossing on 20 or 21 April at the village of Dachi. This is just across the Dnipro near Kherson where the damaged Antonivka Road Bridge crosses. 

I do think this is a diversion, vice the preparation for a major offensive. The problems with conducting operations across the Dnipro work both ways. The Russians were forced in November to withdraw from north of the river because of supply issues. There are only three bridges across the river in the best of times. If the Russians could not support 20,000 troops to the north of the river, I suspect the Ukrainians will have a similar problem south of the river, especially as Russia has air superiority.

The Ukrainians two weeks ago hit three oil tanks in and around Crimea (one near Sevastopol early in the week, one in Krasnador province on 2 May that was only 7 km from the bridge to Crimea, and another attack on 3 May in Krasnador near the bridge). Also on 29 April it is claimed that the Russian village of Suzemka was shelled. It is 6 miles (10 kilometers) from the border in Bryansk province. The Russians report two, and later four civilians killed. On 2 May a train was derailed by a bomb near Bryansk. Finally, two drones attacked the Kremlin in Moscow on 4 May, with one hitting a flag on a dome. 

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 7 PM: It is 71 degrees (22 Celsius) and partly cloudy. Rain is expected on Thursday and Saturday. Sunrise is at 4:35 and sunset is at 8:28, giving them more than fifteen hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 69 degrees (21 Celsius) and cloudy. Rain is expected for the next four days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Do not know the current strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army but am guessing that it is over 300,000 deployed troops. They clearly are going to have to build it up to 400,000 or more in response to Russia’s partial mobilization. There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They were reporting their ground forces at 198,000 in July 2022. 

Do not have a good estimate of the total number of foreign volunteers now in Ukraine, although it is clearly thousands.

The U.S. and many countries in and around Europe are now providing tanks to Ukraine. This includes 31 Abrams (M1A2) from the U.S. that were not expected to arrive until 2024, but the U.S. has now announced that they will be in Germany as of the end of May. It also includes the previously announced 40 AMX-10 light tanks from France, the previously announced 14 Challengers from the UK and 14 new Challengers from the UK, 14 Leopards (2A6) from Germany announced on Jan. 25 plus they are going to provide 14 more later, 14 or so Leopards (2A4?) from Poland, maybe 20 Leopards (2A4) from Spain, but so far only 6 have been confirmed (they are planning to train 55 Ukrainian crew members), no Leopards from Netherlands (previous rumors said 18), Portugal is sending 4 (2A6) out of their 37, 8 (2A4) from Norway out of their 36, and 8 2A4 Leopards from Canada out of their 80. The 8 Canadian Leopards have already arrived in Poland. Non-NATO members Finland is providing 3 Leopards and Sweden is providing 10 2A6s along with 8 Archer 155mm SP Artillery. Also, Morocco is providing Ukraine with 173 T-74s EA, 70 are already in Ukraine. It does appear in a number of cases the announcements are lagging behind the actual shipments of tanks. Poland is providing Ukraine with another 60 upgraded T-72s. It has already sent Ukraine some 260 or more tanks. 

Twelve countries in NATO have Leopards. Germany is saying that a total of around 80 will be sent between them all. My count currently shows at least 77 Leopards from eight different countries (two not yet in NATO). It now looks like many of the older 40-45 ton German Leopard Is are being refurbished and will be sent. Germany has 88 of them it could send and Belgium has 50. Between Denmark, Netherlands and Germany, they are putting together a package of 100 1A5s, although the details of the deal keep changing.  It will be a while before most of them arrive. An initial package of 29 is being refurbished and are supposed to arrive in the summer (enough for one more brigade). There are a lot of them out there, with Greece supposedly having 520 (and 392 U.S. M-48s and 100 U.S. M-60s) and Turkey having 355 or 397 (and 750 M-48s and 785 M-60s). Opportunity to replace old stocks. Switzerland has 230 Leopard 2 tanks of which 96 are not in operation (in storage). Germany has asked for them but on 7 March the Swiss Parliament voted not to export tanksMeanwhile reports are saying some of the 100+ Leopard Is will still arriving in Ukraine starting May. Meanwhile, the U.S. is now planning on providing older M1A1s instead of M1A2s are it can be arranged to get there this fall. Not sure if the count of tanks provided will remain at only 31 (one battalion’s worth).

Meanwhile, Russia has been seen transporting T-54Bs from Siberia to somewhere (probably Ukraine). That particular model dates from 1955, so a little older than a Leopard I or M1A1. On 30 April, T-55s and T-62 were reported in the Berdiansk area.

From a practical point of view, it means that around four or so Ukrainian tank battalions will be armed up with Abrams/Leopard 2/Challengers. Ukraine has over 30 tank battalions. Some should probably be in place for the spring offensives. Some of the Canadian Leopard 2s have already arrived in PolandAt least 18 of the Leopard 2A6s have arrived in Ukraine. Challengers will be arriving in Ukraine during March.

Slovakia announced on 23 March that they have transferred 4 MiG-29s to Ukraine. It now appears that all 13 Slovak MiG-29s have been handed over to Ukraine. On 8 May, it was confirmed that 10 Polish MiG-29 have been delivered to Ukraine. On 5 May, it was confirmed that Croatia is providing 14 Mi-8 helicopters, of which 9 are already in Ukraine. Looks like Ukraine will be receiving F-16s also. Numbers to be determined. It may be six or more months before they are operational.

Some weapons have been supplied that have not been announced. For example, Finnish ex-Soviet 152K89 152mm field guns recently have showed up on the battlefield in Ukrainian hands, even though Finland has never announced that they were being provided. Danish artillery has also recently showed up in Ukraine.

Russian Army Build-up:  

In the fall of last year, Ukraine was reporting that around 280,000 Russians were deployed in Ukraine. This seems a reasonable estimate. On 4 November Putin stated at 318,000 reservists and “new volunteers” have been mobilized and 49,000 are in combat zones. I assume the Russian army in Ukraine was at about 200,000 at the start of this mobilization.

The U.S. and UK estimate that the Wagner Group had 50,000 people in December 2022. Have no idea if this estimate is accurate. John Kirby (U.S. DOD spokesman) said that Wagner has lost 30,000 people, at a wounded-to-killed ratio of maybe 2-to-1, implying 10,000 deaths. Around 20 May, the head of the Wagner Group said they they had lost 20,000 killed. 

Ukraine stated on 22 Feb. that Russia has deployed more than 350,000 troops to Ukraine. This sounds about right.

Russia is now starting its spring conscript draft of 147,000. It does this twice a year. Conscripts are for one year and are not allowed to serve outside of Russia.

The Russian defense budget for 2023 is $159 billion, up from $111 billion in 2022. This appears to now be around 9% of GDP.

According to one article, which I suspect is a little biased, Russian tank production at Uralvagonzavod is currently over 900 armored vehicles a year, including 35-40 T-90s a month. In contrast, the U.S. is producing two M-1A2 a month in Lima, Ohio. The German Leopard 2 is also still in production. 

Russia is getting some support from China, possibly spare parts and more important, microchips. They are reportedly not currently providing Russia with weapons. This is a source of discussion between the U.S./EU and China.

As of 26 February, Russia has announced that the DPR has raised a new battalion entirely composed of Ukrainian prisoners of war, called the Bohdan Khmelniksky Battalion. It was claimed that the unit consists of 70 Ukrainians. 

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia has added at least 41,000 troops to the front line from their new partial mobilization effort and will be adding more. Potentially up to 300,000. Most likely by the spring, both armies will be sporting 400,000 or more troops. It does appear that by spring, the level of intensity and casualties from this war will be a count twice as high as it currently has been.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 76.85 as of 12:16 PM EST. Ruble remains low at 80.13 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including ove 20,000 killed (implying a 4-ot-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 15 May at least 8,895 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 138 civilians killed from 1-28 February and 178 for 1-31 March and 169 killed from 1-30 April.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 22,644 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,895 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR) = 52,315. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000.

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: The second and third to last paragraphs in The Times (UK) article referenced in the Day 394 blog post says:

However, Barrons argues that Ukraine needs ammunition even more than it needs soldiers. It fires 90,000 155mm shells a month and sometimes 6,000 shells a day but combined US and European production is less than 30,000 a month. “There is a mathematical mismatch,” he says. The US is tripling its output but “Europe has been too slow”.

Russia, which has been firing 20,000 shells a day and is thought to have used up ten years’ worth of production in 12 months, has the same problem. In recent weeks they have reduced the numbers by 75 per cent.

So 6,000 shells a day vice 20,000 shells a day, have no idea if that is true or what percent of the rounds fire are “smart” versus old style. One would expect the side firing the most rounds would be causing more causalities. On the other hand, if U.S. production is less than 30,000 a month Ukraine will be forced to eventually reduce their expenditures to 1,000 or 2,000 shells a day. If Russia has to reduce their numbers by 75%, then they are firing 5,000 shells a day. Don’t know if any single number in this discussion is close to reality but suspect that both sides will have to reduce their artillery expenditure at least until May. This war could be very quiet for a couple of months.

Anyhow, Ukraine is requesting 250,000 shells a month from the EU.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is clear that the Russian attempt to cut off Ukrainian power and freeze them out over the winter has failed and they have not done any of those massive missile strikes since 9 March.

There has been some increase in airstrikes and drone attacks this month, partly in response to Ukrainian strikes, but nothing that looked like a major strike. The last major Russian airstrike was on 9 March. The previous one was on 10 February. Meanwhile, on 4 May a Russian hypersonic missile was reported to have been shot down by a Patriot missile. This was not supposed to be possible.

Attack on Kyiv on 15/16 May result in 18 out of 18 attacking claimed to have been shot down. One Patriot launcher was damaged. The Patriot missile battlery was the target of the attack.

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Completer write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Russia continues their display of Orc-like behavior with a video coming out of the execution of the POW tentatively identified as Oleksandr Ihorevich Matsievskiy of the Territorial Defense Forces. His last words were “Slava Ukraini.”  This execution probably occurred sometime in early February.

Another video was released on 11 April of a Russian-speaking Ukrainian soldier being beheaded, ISIL-like. This appears to have occurred last summer. I gather this was done by Wagner.

You would think at some point the Russian senior command would understand that this is working against them politically and is resulting in wide-spread international support for Ukraine, which is resulting in increased shipment of arms and ammunition. It also continues to show a real lack of discipline among the rank and file. In addition to being an inhumane war crime, it is just plain stupid. 

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Itis going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction. 

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there..

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and TurkeySee Day 443 for more info. Turkish presidential elections were held on 14 May and Erdogan won 49.5% of the vote. There is a run-off election on 28 May, and most likely Erdogan will exceed 50% of the vote. Erdogan has been endorsed by the 3rd party candidate. We shall see after that if he is willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023

This is the fifth provisional schedule for the second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have 27 presentations scheduled by 20 speakers and two group discussions planned. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Costs, Hotels and Call for Presentations: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The cost of the conference is $150 for entire conference or $60 a day. Please pay through PayPal (www.paypal.com) to SRichTDI@aol.com. The conference is priced to cover the costs of the conference facility. We are also set up to take credit card payments by phone. Call The Dupuy Institute during working hours at (703) 289-0007.

We are set up for virtual presentations and virtual attendees. We are exploring the costs of having the presentations professionally recorded.

 

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: 19 May 2023

 

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks                        Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030     Addressing the Decline in War Question with New Disaggregated Data

                                                Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1030 – 1130      A Cautionary Tale: Alternative Interpretations of the Same Data – virtual

                                                                                    Jim Storr

1130 – 1230 Land Operations – consistencies and discrepancies between theory, historical analysis and doctrine                             LtC. Trygve Smidt (Norway)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII                                                                         Sasho Todorov  

1500 – 1600    Force Ratios                                    Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1600 – 1700    open

1700 – 1800    open

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – Rangos

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old)

                                                                                   Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100     Evidence of Fabricated Survey Data Collected during the War in Iraq

                                           Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1000 – 1100 Unburdened by History: Understanding Russia’s Growing Influence in Haiti                                                                           Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1100 – 1200    open

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Right Way to Do Risk Analysis: A Primer and Update, With Examples from Pandemics                                                       Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1400 – 1500    Close  Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER)

                                                                                    Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1500 – 1600    Chemical Weapons in Syria – virtual           Jennifer Schlacht, M.A. – virtual

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – BJs

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    Russian Information Warfare Against Western Democracies Since 2013: A review and update                                                 Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1000 – 1100    open

1100 – 1200    open

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History – virtual

                                                            Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia)

1400 – 1500    The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new)

                                                                                  Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600    open

1600 – 1700    open

 

Evening:         Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Other Analysis of Warfare

1400 – 1500   History of Pneumatic Combat Weapons    Jacob Friend

1500 – 1600   Soviet WWII Aerial Photography      Eugene Matyukhin 

1600 – 1700    Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45

                                                                            Daniel Horvath – virtual

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    Wargaming 101                               William Sayers

1000 – 1100    Open

1100 – 1200    Urban Warfare (old)                         Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Study of Pneumatic Weapons in Sub/Urban Combat

                                                                                  Jacob Friend

1400 – 1500   Open

1500 – 1600   Penetrate, Dis-Integrate and Exploit: The Israeli Counter-Offensive at the Suez Canal, 1973 – virtual                                       LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD

1600 – 1700    Operation “Sea Lion”: Simulating the German 1940 invasion of England – virtual                                                                       Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York)

 

 

Day 3: Researching Operations

0900 – 1000 The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations Durning the Meuse-Argonne Offensive                                                  Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1000 – 1100    Kursk Photo Analysis                     Eugene Matyukhin

1100 – 1200    The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44                                                                Dr. Richard Harrison

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   Patterns of Explosive Violence Harm in Ukraine Before and After the 24 Feb. Invasion                                                           Chiara Torelli (AOAV) – virtual

1400 – 1500    Competing Proxy Strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War and a War of Attrition – LtC. Amos Fox

1500 – 1600    Open

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

The presentations from all three days of the first HAAC are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Bigger Fleets Win

This article just came across my desk courtesy of a friend: Bigger Fleets Win | Proceedings – January 2023 Vol. 149/1/1,439 (usni.org) 

I will avoid discussing the article, instead I will only discuss the two references to me (A little bit of vanity here).

First there is footnote 24, which references my book War by Numbers. There problem is that the discussion that he is footnoting does not something I recall writing. He may be paraphrasing me, but I do really recall making that point. Still, I appreciate the shout out.

The next paragraph also repeats footnote 24 following the sentence “Why bother discussing such ancient history when ‘everything is different now?’. I actually do not recall making such a statement, but maybe I did somewhere. Between a thousand+ blog posts, 60+ reports, 7+ books, etc. I could have said that. I don’t remember saying that. The article having two footnotes 24 and no footnote 25 leads me to suspect that the footnoting got garbled.

Later on in the article, they claim that “the DuPuy Institute finds it difficult to validate models of future combat based on past data because ‘there are no real-world examples in the past twenty-five years of combat between conventional armed forces with similar levels of advanced technology and military competence.'”

The first part of this…the “finds it difficult” part really does not sound like anything I have said. My attitude it that you go ahead and test a model to the past, because if it cannot predict the past, if it cannot predict the actions of lower tech weapons; then you can be pretty damn sure it is not also predicting modern combat. So this does not seem to be a claim I would make. 

Now the quote that is attached to that sounds exactly like something I would say or did say. I kind of remembering saying that in a phone interview. I don’t remember when or where. The reference is to footnote 30, an article on F-35s published in Breaking Defense two years ago. It is here: HASC Chair Slams F-35, 500-Ship Fleet; Highlights Cyber – Breaking Defense. Now, I don’t see any references to The Dupuy Institute there. Perhaps it is in one of the linked articles.

Anyhow, nice to be referenced and quoted. Would be nicer if it was in proper context. 

Update: Found the quote from my book. The article says:

“The Dupuy Institute, one of the most notable independent centers of operational research on land warfare, and one that models combat outcomes based on historical data, expressed this concern in 2017:

“Many have postulated… a revolution in warfare created by the synergetic effects of increased weapons accuracy… [etc., see above]. Recent U.S. conventional operations have increased this perception due to our opponents being technologically inferior, not particularly well trained, or simply incompetent, while the United States had enjoyed air supremacy and the luxury of outgunning our opponents.”

Now this is something I have said. It is footnote 29, the Freedberg article quoted above, which does not quote me. So, clearly the footnotes have gotten garbled.

I do have to thank Captain Tangredi, who I have never met, for calling us “one of the most notable independent centers of operational research on land warfare.” The quote from 2017 is clearly referring to War by Numbers (published 2017).

The Easy Button

Second to three recent articles from William (Chip) Sayers. The conclusions are his:

———-

The Easy Button

In the 1960s and 70s, the Soviet Union began exporting tactical and short-range ballistic missiles to its client states around the world. These missiles were developed as nuclear warhead carriers, so why give them to, for instance, Egypt, Iraq and North Korea? None of the countries were developing nuclear weapons, and Moscow wouldn’t have wanted these wild cards to do so at the time. All of these missiles had conventional warhead versions, and that’s what the Soviets were exporting, but they were so inaccurate as to make them virtually useless in the eyes of Western military analysts. A Soviet Combined Arms or Tank Army had three battalions of four R-17 Scud B launchers in their Table of Organization and Equipment, and they provided the army commander with a dedicated and powerful nuclear weapons capability. However, with a Circular Error Probable of 450m, twelve rockets with 1,000kg conventional warheads were highly unlikely to put even one within the effective blast radius of a point target.[1]

According to probability theory, half of the warheads would land within the CEP radius of the system, 93.7% within 2 CEPs, 99.8% within 3 CEPs and the balance within 4 CEPs. The Scud’s warhead can damage reinforced concrete buildings within an area of 7,854m2, compared to the 450m CEP which encompasses an area of 636,172m2. The Mean Area of Effectiveness (MAE) of the six warheads combined only cover about 7% of the total area of the CEP circle not particularly promising odds for hitting a point target.[2] 

While Western eyes would see this as a waste of time, the Soviets (and now the Russians) would look at it differently. The “War of the Cities” during the Iran/Iraq war — when the two sides used short-range ballistic missiles to indiscriminately bombard each other’s urban areas — offers considerable insight into the current war in Ukraine. The accuracy of the Scud B was obviously insufficient for most military targets. In this case, however, entire cities were the targets — as they are, today. Between 1984 and 1988, Iraq and Iran exchanged attacks on each other’s major population centers with fixed-wing aircraft, Tactical and SRBM attacks in a campaign of what can only be called Douhetian strategic bombing. The target for both sides was not military or industrial infrastructure, leadership or command/control capabilities. It was quite simply the enemy’s people. The aim was to inflict as much pain and destruction as possible on them to destroy their will to continue the war. While thousands of civilians were killed and wounded (Iran admitted to over 10,000 deaths, alone), both country’s efforts seemingly failed. 

However, it is never easy to say for sure what the impact is of operations aimed at influencing the enemy’s psychology. All of warfare is essentially intended to get inside the enemy’s head, be it via influence operations or sheer destruction of the enemy’s forces. Campaigns rarely, if ever, end in annihilation — at some point, the enemy’s will is broken and he gives ground or surrenders. For example, it is a myth that the strategic bombing of Britain, Germany and Japan during WWII was counterproductive, resulting in a strengthening of the public’s desire to resist the attackers. In fact, in all three cases, public morale declined substantially and industrial production was suppressed even in factories that were not bombed. Defeatism and absenteeism soared. Britain was not subjected to an effective and sustained campaign, but in Germany and Japan it is likely that their respective secret police forces were the major factor in keeping a lid on a possible revolt of the kind that resulted in the withdrawal from fighting by Russia and Germany in WWI.

Neither Iraq, nor Iran had the wherewithal to mount a sustained campaign — a small inventory of weapons on both sides ensured that the war of the cities could only be fought in fits and starts — nevertheless, Tehran was reportedly so damaged in the last months of the war that as many as 1 million of its 6 million residents left the capital city. There was also a great deal of fear that Iraq would start arming its Scuds with chemical warheads — a particular terror for civilians with no access to protective equipment. It is uncertain how much influence the war of the cities had on the mind of the Ayatollah or the Majles, but between that, a rejuvenated Iraqi Air Force and battlefield reverses, Ayatollah Khomeini was moved to “drink the chalice of poison,” and agree to end the war.

In 1995, the Russians went full scorched earth in Grozny, though their purpose in razing the city was tactical, rather than strategic: they used it as a tactic for clearing the city of insurgents, not breaking the will of the Chechen people and leadership. The results were much the same for the city, however.

Fast forward to the current war in Ukraine. When their coup de main on Kiev failed, the Russians fell back on their old tricks of attempting to flatten cities to demoralize their enemies into submission.  And that’s where things stand, today.

For the last thirty years, the Russians have talked up the accuracy of their tactical and short-range ballistic missiles, referring to them as precision weapons. Russian claims notwithstanding, photos of Ukrainian cities show plain evidence that civilian residences and infrastructure have suffered massively from the besieger’s bombardment. Entire neighborhoods of apartment buildings are rubbled and burned out. The Russians claim this to be collateral damage, but if the Russian missiles have “pin-point” accuracy, that shouldn’t occur on such a scale as this. The implication is that the apartment complexes, schools and hospitals are the targets. Deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure is a war crime. On the other hand, if the accuracy of Russian missiles is so poor that it takes this much destruction to hit legitimate targets, then the bombardment is indiscriminate, and that is a war crime, too. Either way, Western governments should drop the pretenses and treat Putin as what he is: a war criminal.

This begs the question as to why Putin is using such weapons to prosecute his war. To put it bluntly, he can’t trust his Air Force to do it. Russian fixed-wing bombers are not sufficiently accurate, their crews are not sufficiently well trained, and they are too vulnerable to Ukrainian air defenses to be survivable. So, they are stuck with delivering stand-off missiles from the safety of Russian territory. Again, these weapons are claimed to have great accuracy, but there is little evidence to back up these assertions. 

So, what’s going on here? Why all the seeming contradictions?  There are three possibilities. First, Russian missiles just aren’t that accurate and they’ve been making false claims in order to boost arms sales. This is probably the likeliest explanation and fits well with the possibility that they are using relatively low-cost munitions to bombard Ukrainian cities. Second, the Russians may be pressing into service high-precision and expensive missiles in a role they are ill-suited for. To wit: they are dumbing-down or removing their guidance systems to allow for a more traditional random bombardment — an expensive way to do the job. Third, the Russians are really hitting what they are aiming at with great precision. Apartment buildings are being targeted as though they were factories with specific aimpoints chosen to make for maximum destruction.

In the months prior to D-Day in June 1944, Gen. Eisenhower directed that all Allied heavy bombers in theater target railroad marshalling yards in France and Belgium to hinder the ability of German reinforcements to make it to the lodgment area. USAAF commanders believed their bombers could make a better contribution to success by bombing strategic targets in Germany and offered the fact that they couldn’t prevent French and Belgium casualties, given that marshaling yards tended to be located near the city centers. Eventually, the French and Belgian governments in exile authorized the strikes, believing the good they did would outweigh the civilian deaths they would cause, and while there is some question on how effective the strikes actually were, they caused much less collateral damage than had been feared. If Russian missiles are simply inaccurate and the proportion of collateral damage was reasonable compared to the damage caused to legitimate military targets, their actions might be seen as justifiable. However, the damage to civilian areas clearly isn’t reasonable. Further, tampering with guidance systems or the deliberate targeting of precision weapons against civilian targets would be evidence of a coldly calculated crime. The Hague should be warming up a cell for Mr. Putin.

The intriguing train of thought from this problem, however, is what happens next with precision-guided missiles? The US GMLRS, HIMARS and ATACMS systems have long proven that surface-to-surface missiles with GPS guidance can strike with great precision with relatively little technical investment. While their Russian counterpart systems have not, for whatever reason, shown this level of accuracy, it is clear that Moscow’s weaponry should be able to do so, if not now, certainly in the near future. It is simply not that difficult to do. Iran has claimed to have achieved a 50m CEP with some of their SRBMs. While this is, perhaps, a dubious assertion now, it is inevitable that nearly every nation that desires so may have access to weapons of such range and accuracy at some point in the near future. What are the implications? Several come to mind.

  1. From the illustration above, it is easy to see that a Scud-sized warhead with a 50m CEP would virtually guarantee target destruction when two are fired at a single target. The commander presses a button and the target goes away.  While high-precision SRBMs may be relatively expensive, they are a bargain for a country without a first-class air force. 
  2. This is in contrast to dependence upon an indifferently trained aircrew with elementary tactics, obsolescent weapons and aircraft having to penetrate lethal air defenses before making a low-probability of success attack. SRBMs don’t get scared or refuse a mission because of difficult circumstances, or because they disagree with their political leadership. The necessity of training and maintaining an expensive and unreliable air force is eliminated, as well — at least with regard to the air-to-ground mission. A similar savings could be made by substituting Surface-to-Air missiles for fighter-interceptors in the air-to-air role.
  3. The ensuing cost to success ratio is likely to tempt the use of high-precision ballistic missiles to solve problems that otherwise might be addressed through diplomacy, economic pressure, or other means short of violence. One could easily envision even policing actions being undertaken through the use of missiles: a wanted criminal or political adversary is located taking sanctuary in a nearby uncooperative country, the leadership doesn’t waste time arguing about extradition, he presses his “Easy Button” and obliterates the residence the wanted fugitive is occupying. Problem solved. An economic rival is pumping too much oil for your taste?  Press the Easy Button and make some unmanned pumping stations go away. Problem solved. A rival’s fishing fleet encroaching in your exclusive economic zone? The Easy Button makes some trawlers mysteriously disappear in the night and the problem is solved.

While it is easy to come up with dozens of scenarios where precision married to long-range weapons can be useful, the difficult part is developing a useful doctrine to employ them to maximum effect. Destroying a group of targets will have an impact, though limited to the additive effect of their individual values. Destroying the same number of targets according to an effective and well thought-out plan will have multiplicative effect far beyond the value of the individual elements. The whole will be much greater than the sum of its parts. What is required is an airpower doctrine — missile warfare is the purist, most fundamental form of airpower. However, there is only one military force in the world that has thoroughly explored airpower doctrine and that is the US Air Force. 

The only countries with the elements required to develop a viable airpower doctrine (a truly independent air force, an air force of sufficient size as to explore and test ideas while continuing to meet defense obligations, an academic plant of sufficient independence to develop suitable doctrine, an industrial base capable of designing and manufacturing the necessary tools, etc.) are all strong allies of the US, and none of them has an air force of sufficient size to realistically execute such a doctrine on their own. None of our adversaries has those elements necessary to do so, so it is likely that whatever precision ballistic missile attacks they execute will be done so with suboptimal, less than decisive effect.

The upshot is that without a vital, robust and well-founded doctrine, these weapons will not be capable of fulfilling their potential, but will rather merely become long-range artillery. They may be capable of great destruction, they are unlikely to ever become decisive unless wielded with an educated hand.

The Japanese Navy began World War II with an excellent submarine fleet armed with a revolutionary torpedo that actually worked, unlike those of virtually every other navy. In contrast, the US Navy fielded obsolescent boats (albeit, with superbly trained crews) armed with virtually worthless torpedoes. Over the course of the war, the US submarine service proved decisive in the defeat of Japan by cutting off Japanese transport of vital resources and troops to the home islands. The Japanese submarine force, by contrast, contributed very little to the overall war effort. The difference was doctrine. The Japanese wasted their assets on scouting for their battleline, while virtually ignoring the US lines of communications that ran across vast stretches of ocean. US submarines interdicted Japanese LOCs — vital for linking the home islands with the natural resources they went to war over in the first place.

If someone manages to marry the new, high-precision SRBMs with a solid, well thought out doctrine, we will move from an age of warfare where missiles are used, to a true age of missile warfare.  That would be a real “revolution in military affairs.”

 

[1] Missile Defense Project, “SS-1 “Scud”,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 11, 2016, last modified August 2, 2021, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/scud/.

[2] Weapon Data Fire Impact Explosion, Final Edition September 1945, Osrd No. 6053, Division 2, National Defense Research Committee Office Of Scientific Research And Development.

——–

P.S.: Some related past posts:

TDI Friday Read: Iranian Casualties In The 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

VVS View of Air Superiority | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 450

No spring offensive yet. Ukraine is making small advances around Bakhmut, but I suspect that is not their spring offensive. They appear to be holding back on the main offensive efforts until later.  

The classified Joint Staff briefing book did talk about 12 “combat credible” brigades being generated for the “spring counteroffensive.” They report on the status of 9 new brigades being raised (“trained and equipped by US, Allied and Partners”). Six will be ready by 31 March (page was dated 23 February) and 3 by 30 April. Eight of these newly raised brigades are mechanized-like brigades, which nominally have one tank battalion of 31 tanks per brigade. A NATO rep. said in late April that 98% of the vehicles scheduled are now in Ukrainian hands. This is a very qualified statement.

The status of these nine new brigades is discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Basically, eight of them have 28 – 32 tanks, seven have 90 to 101 other AFVs, IFVs, APCs and MRAPs, and six of them have between 8 to 16 artillery pieces and three have between 22 to 24 artillery pieces. Three other brigades will be added to offensive force, although there are no reports on their status. 

The DOD count of opposing forces is discussed here: Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and combat effectiveness is discussed here: Unstructured Comments on “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. has announced on 21 April that it will began training Ukrainian forces on their new Abrams tanks. The 31 tanks will arrive in Grafenwoehr at the end of the May and the training will last for around 10 weeks. On 28 April the Germans are saying that over 100 Ukrainians are now training on Leopard Is (the older version). That does indicate that some of these newly raised Ukrainian brigades are still going to receive more equipment. So while the weather may be clear in early May, that does not mean that Ukraine will initiate a major offensive operation in May. One notes that Zelenskyy is now saying they are waiting until fully prepared.

Ukraine is advancing around Bakhmut. Supposedly they have reclaimed 20 square kilometers of territory. This is not much, but is something. Russia clearly controls over half the town. On 11 April, Wagner sent out photos of them controlling Metalurh Stadium in central Bakhmut. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia mapIt is dated 19 May. The last dated update on the map is Soledar on 16 January.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. The grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 18 May, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 30,283,285 metric tonnes carried in 962 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 60 days left to the agreement. 

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. Ukraine did bombard Russian troops in the village of Tsapovka in early April, in Russian territory in the Belgorod Oblast. Ukraine published pictures of this. It is right on the border, due south of Borisovka. The village is reported to be unpopulated since 2013.

On 17 April, the Ukrainians did attack two Russian power stations in Belgorod oblast using drones. The following week the Russians also accidently dropped two bombs on Belgorod. On 1 May, a Russian ammo dump was hit near Tomorovka, in Belgorod province.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The early morning on 22 March (at 04:43:58 according to videos), there was another attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol harbor using seaborne naval drones. The last time they tried this (29 October 2022), they (lightly?) damaged the 4,035-ton frigate Admiral Makarov. It appears that one got close to one rather large ship and exploded near its rear. Not sure if a Russian ship was damaged. At least three drones were used in the attack. One was stopped by the booms at the entrance to the harbor, and two were destroyed in the harbor.

There was also a car blown up on 23 March in Melitipol that injured a Ukrainian accused of collaborating with the Russians. There was an IED exploded in Melitipol on 3 April.

Apparently, back in October, in conjunction with the Kherson offensive, there was a failed attempt by Ukraine to retake Zaporizhia nuclear power plant with an amphibious operation across the large reservoir there.

There was Ukrainian crossing on 20 or 21 April at the village of Dachi. This is just across the Dnipro near Kherson where the damaged Antonivka Road Bridge crosses. 

I do think this is a diversion, vice the preparation for a major offensive. The problems with conducting operations across the Dnipro work both ways. The Russians were forced in November to withdraw from north of the river because of supply issues. There are only three bridges across the river in the best of times. If the Russians could not support 20,000 troops to the north of the river, I suspect the Ukrainians will have a similar problem south of the river, especially as Russia has air superiority.

The Ukrainians two weeks ago hit three oil tanks in and around Crimea (one near Sevastopol early in the week, one in Krasnador province on 2 May that was only 7 km from the bridge to Crimea, and another attack on 3 May in Krasnador near the bridge). Also on 29 April it is claimed that the Russian village of Suzemka was shelled. It is 6 miles (10 kilometers) from the border in Bryansk province. The Russians report two, and later four civilians killed. On 2 May a train was derailed by a bomb near Bryansk. Finally, two drones attacked the Kremlin in Moscow on 4 May, with one hitting a flag on a dome. 

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 3 PM: It is a balmy 79 degrees (26 Celsius) and parlty cloudy. Rain is expected Monday through Sunday. Sunrise is at 4:43 and sunset is at 8:19, giving them more than fifteen hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 77 degrees (25 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Rain is expected for most of the next ten days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Do not know the current strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army but am guessing that it is over 300,000 deployed troops. They clearly are going to have to build it up to 400,000 or more in response to Russia’s partial mobilization. There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They were reporting their ground forces at 198,000 in July 2022. 

Do not have a good estimate of the total number of foreign volunteers now in Ukraine, although it is clearly thousands.

The U.S. and many countries in and around Europe are now providing tanks to Ukraine. This includes 31 Abrams (M1A2) from the U.S. that were not expected to arrive until 2024, but the U.S. has now announced that they will be in Germany as of the end of May. It also includes the previously announced 40 AMX-10 light tanks from France, the previously announced 14 Challengers from the UK and 14 new Challengers from the UK, 14 Leopards (2A6) from Germany announced on Jan. 25 plus they are going to provide 14 more later, 14 or so Leopards (2A4?) from Poland, maybe 20 Leopards (2A4) from Spain, but so far only 6 have been confirmed (they are planning to train 55 Ukrainian crew members), no Leopards from Netherlands (previous rumors said 18), Portugal is sending 4 (2A6) out of their 37, 8 (2A4) from Norway out of their 36, and 8 2A4 Leopards from Canada out of their 80. The 8 Canadian Leopards have already arrived in Poland. Non-NATO members Finland is providing 3 Leopards and Sweden is providing 10 2A6s along with 8 Archer 155mm SP Artillery. Also, Morocco is providing Ukraine with 173 T-74s EA, 70 are already in Ukraine. It does appear in a number of cases the announcements are lagging behind the actual shipments of tanks. Poland is providing Ukraine with another 60 upgraded T-72s. It has already sent Ukraine some 260 or more tanks. 

Twelve countries in NATO have Leopards. Germany is saying that a total of around 80 will be sent between them all. My count currently shows at least 77 Leopards from eight different countries (two not yet in NATO). It now looks like many of the older 40-45 ton German Leopard Is are being refurbished and will be sent. Germany has 88 of them it could send and Belgium has 50. Between Denmark, Netherlands and Germany, they are putting together a package of 100 1A5s, although the details of the deal keep changing.  It will be a while before most of them arrive. An initial package of 29 is being refurbished and are supposed to arrive in the summer (enough for one more brigade). There are a lot of them out there, with Greece supposedly having 520 (and 392 U.S. M-48s and 100 U.S. M-60s) and Turkey having 355 or 397 (and 750 M-48s and 785 M-60s). Opportunity to replace old stocks. Switzerland has 230 Leopard 2 tanks of which 96 are not in operation (in storage). Germany has asked for them but on 7 March the Swiss Parliament voted not to export tanksMeanwhile reports are saying some of the 100+ Leopard Is will still arriving in Ukraine starting May. Meanwhile, the U.S. is now planning on providing older M1A1s instead of M1A2s are it can be arranged to get there this fall. Not sure if the count of tanks provided will remain at only 31 (one battalion’s worth).

Meanwhile, Russia has been seen transporting T-54Bs from Siberia to somewhere (probably Ukraine). That particular model dates from 1955, so a little older than a Leopard I or M1A1. On 30 April, T-55s and T-62 were reported in the Berdiansk area.

From a practical point of view, it means that around four or so Ukrainian tank battalions will be armed up with Abrams/Leopard 2/Challengers. Ukraine has over 30 tank battalions. Some should probably be in place for the spring offensives. Some of the Canadian Leopard 2s have already arrived in PolandAt least 18 of the Leopard 2A6s have arrived in Ukraine. Challengers will be arriving in Ukraine during March.

Slovakia announced on 23 March that they have transferred 4 MiG-29s to Ukraine. It now appears that all 13 Slovak MiG-29s have been handed over to Ukraine. On 8 May, it was confirmed that 10 Polish MiG-29 have been delivered to Ukraine. On 5 May, it was confirmed that Croatia is providing 14 Mi-8 helicopters, of which 9 are already in Ukraine.

Some weapons have been supplied that have not been announced. For example, Finnish ex-Soviet 152K89 152mm field guns recently have showed up on the battlefield in Ukrainian hands, even though Finland has never announced that they were being provided. Danish artillery has also recently showed up in Ukraine.

Russian Army Build-up:  

In the fall of last year, Ukraine was reporting that around 280,000 Russians were deployed in Ukraine. This seems a reasonable estimate. On 4 November Putin stated at 318,000 reservists and “new volunteers” have been mobilized and 49,000 are in combat zones. I assume the Russian army in Ukraine was at about 200,000 at the start of this mobilization.

The U.S. and UK estimate that the Wagner Group had 50,000 people in December 2022. Have no idea if this estimate is accurate. John Kirby (U.S. DOD spokesman) said that Wagner has lost 30,000 people, at a wounded-to-killed ratio of maybe 2-to-1, implying 10,000 deaths. Have no way to confirm or contradict such claims, but I remain guardedly suspicious as always. How did the DOD come to the count of 30,000? 

Ukraine stated on 22 Feb. that Russia has deployed more than 350,000 troops to Ukraine. This sounds about right.

Russia is now starting its spring conscript draft of 147,000. It does this twice a year. Conscripts are for one year and are not allowed to serve outside of Russia.

The Russian defense budget for 2023 is $159 billion, up from $111 billion in 2022. This appears to now be around 9% of GDP.

According to one article, which I suspect is a little biased, Russian tank production at Uralvagonzavod is currently over 900 armored vehicles a year, including 35-40 T-90s a month. In contrast, the U.S. is producing two M-1A2 a month in Lima, Ohio. The German Leopard 2 is also still in production. 

Russia is getting some support from China, possibly spare parts and more important, microchips. They are reportedly not currently providing Russia with weapons. This is a source of discussion between the U.S./EU and China.

As of 26 February, Russia has announced that the DPR has raised a new battalion entirely composed of Ukrainian prisoners of war, called the Bohdan Khmelniksky Battalion. It was claimed that the unit consists of 70 Ukrainians. 

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia has added at least 41,000 troops to the front line from their new partial mobilization effort and will be adding more. Potentially up to 300,000. Most likely by the spring, both armies will be sporting 400,000 or more troops. It does appear that by spring, the level of intensity and casualties from this war will be a count twice as high as it currently has been.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 76.69 as of 9:39 AM EST. Ruble remains low at 79.81 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including ove 20,000 killed (implying a 4-ot-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 15 May at least 8,836 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 138 civilians killed from 1-28 February and 178 for 1-31 March and 169 killed from 1-30 April.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 22,644 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,836 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR) = 52,256. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000.

Ammo: The second and third to last paragraphs in The Times (UK) article referenced in the Day 394 blog post says:

However, Barrons argues that Ukraine needs ammunition even more than it needs soldiers. It fires 90,000 155mm shells a month and sometimes 6,000 shells a day but combined US and European production is less than 30,000 a month. “There is a mathematical mismatch,” he says. The US is tripling its output but “Europe has been too slow”.

Russia, which has been firing 20,000 shells a day and is thought to have used up ten years’ worth of production in 12 months, has the same problem. In recent weeks they have reduced the numbers by 75 per cent.

So 6,000 shells a day vice 20,000 shells a day, have no idea if that is true or what percent of the rounds fire are “smart” versus old style. One would expect the side firing the most rounds would be causing more causalities. On the other hand, if U.S. production is less than 30,000 a month Ukraine will be forced to eventually reduce their expenditures to 1,000 or 2,000 shells a day. If Russia has to reduce their numbers by 75%, then they are firing 5,000 shells a day. Don’t know if any single number in this discussion is close to reality but suspect that both sides will have to reduce their artillery expenditure at least until May. This war could be very quiet for a couple of months.

Anyhow, Ukraine is requesting 250,000 shells a month from the EU.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk provice.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is clear that the Russian attempt to cut off Ukrainian power and freeze them out over the winter has failed and they have not done any of those massive missile strikes since 9 March.

There has been some increase in airstrikes and drone attacks this month, partly in response to Ukrainian strikes, but nothing that looked like a major strike. The last major Russian airstrike was on 9 March. The previous one was on 10 February. Meanwhile, on 4 May a Russian hypersonic missile was reported to have been shot down by a Patriot missile. This was not supposed to be possible.

Attack on Kyiv on 15/16 May result in 18 out of 18 attacking claimed to have been shot down. One Patriot launcher was damaged. The Patriot missile battlery was the target of the attack.

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Completer write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Russia continues their display of Orc-like behavior with a video coming out of the execution of the POW tentatively identified as Oleksandr Ihorevich Matsievskiy of the Territorial Defense Forces. His last words were “Slava Ukraini.”  This execution probably occurred sometime in early February.

Another video was released on 11 April of a Russian-speaking Ukrainian soldier being beheaded, ISIL-like. This appears to have occurred last summer. I gather this was done by Wagner.

You would think at some point the Russian senior command would understand that this is working against them politically and is resulting in wide-spread international support for Ukraine, which is resulting in increased shipment of arms and ammunition. It also continues to show a real lack of discipline among the rank and file. In addition to being an inhumane war crime, it is just plain stupid. 

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Itis going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh.

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there..

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey. See Day 443 for more info. Turkish presidential elections were held on 14 May and Erdogan won 49.5% of the vote. There is a run-off election on 28 May, and most likely Erdogan will exceed 50% of the vote. We shall see after that if he is willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023

This is the fourth provisional schedule for the second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have 24 presentations scheduled by 17 speakers and two group discussions planned. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Costs, Hotels and Call for Presentations: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The cost of the conference is $150 for entire conference or $60 a day. Please pay through PayPal (www.paypal.com) to SRichTDI@aol.com. The conference is priced to cover the costs of the conference facility. We are also set up to take credit card payments by phone. Call The Dupuy Institute during working hours at (703) 289-0007.

We are set up for virtual presentations and virtual attendees. We are exploring the costs of having the presentations professionally recorded.

 

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: 31 March 2023

 

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks                        Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030     Addressing the Decline in War Question with New Disaggregated Data

                                                Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1030 – 1130      A Cautionary Tale: Alternative Interpretations of the Same Data – virtual

                                                                                    Jim Storr

1130 – 1230 Land Operations – consistencies and discrepancies between theory, historical analysis and doctrine                             LtC. Trygve Smidt (Norway)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500    Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII                                                                         Sasho Todorov  

1500 – 1600    Force Ratios                                    Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1600 – 1700    open

1700 – 1800    open

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – Rangos

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old)

                                                                                   Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100     Evidence of Fabricated Survey Data Collected during the War in Iraq

                                           Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1000 – 1100 Unburdened by History: Understanding Russia’s Growing Influence in Haiti                                                                           Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1100 – 1200    open

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Right Way to Do Risk Analysis: A Primer and Update, With Examples from Pandemics                                                       Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1400 – 1500    Close  Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER)

                                                                                    Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1500 – 1600    Chemical Weapons in Syria            Jennifer Schlacht, M.A.

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – BJs

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    Russian Information Warfare Against Western Democracies Since 2013: A review and update                                                 Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1000 – 1100    open

1100 – 1200    open

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History – virtual

                                                            Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia)

1400 – 1500    The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new)

                                                                                  Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600    open

1600 – 1700    open

 

Evening:         Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Other Analysis of Warfare

1400 – 1500   History of Pneumatic Combat Weapons    Jacob Friend

1500 – 1600   Soviet WWII Aerial Photography      Eugene Matyukhin 

1600 – 1700   Open

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    unnamed – William Sayers

1000 – 1100    Open

1100 – 1200    Urban Warfare (old)                         Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Study of Pneumatic Weapons in Sub/Urban Conbat

                                                                                  Jacob Friend

1400 – 1500    Open

1500 – 1600    Open

1600 – 1700   Penetrate, Dis-Integrate and Exploit: The Israeli Counter-Offensive at the Suez Canal, 1973                                                    LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD

 

 

Day 3: Researching Operations

0900 – 1000 The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations Durning the Meuse-Argonne Offensive                                                  Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1000 – 1100    Kursk Photo Analysis                     Eugene Matyukhin

1100 – 1200    The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44                                                                Dr. Richard Harrison

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   Patterns of Explosive Violence Harm in Ukraine Before and After the 24 Feb. Invasion                                                           Chiara Torelli (AOAV) – virtual

1400 – 1500    Open

1500 – 1600    Open

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

The presentations from all three days of the first HAAC are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).