Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 483

Spring Offensive: I am updating this posting twice a week, but there is really not a whole lot new to report. The Ukrainians are doing limited attacks in at least three locales in the south from west to east: 1) near Orikhiv, 2) near Huliaipole and 3) near Veyka Novosilka. They are also attacking around Bakhmut, both to the north and south of it. There is some action around Kreminna. Hesitant to repeat all the various reports out there.

It appears that Ukrainian offensive operations started on Monday, 5 June with a series of serious “shaping operations.” See: So has the Spring Offensive started? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Some are saying the offensive started 4 June.

On 6 June Russia (probably) blew the Kakhovka dam. On 20 June Ukraine’s Interior Ministry reported that 21 people have died. Other people are reporting higher figures. This has temporarily shut down any operations in Kherson province.

On Thursday, 8 June, Russia released images showing a Ukrainian column moving up and being interdicted by artillery. They were supposedly near a village called Novopokrovka, probably the one in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the NNE of Melitopol. As least one German Leopard 2A4 tank was destroyed along with 4 U.S. M-113s. See this video for a discussion: Update from Ukraine | The Counterattack Start is not good | Leopard-2 Convoy was Ambushed – YouTube. The unit was pretty compacted while it was travelling. I gather it was the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which was reported back in March to be armed with T-55S and Bradleys: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 10 June, Neskuchne (pop. 644 in 2016) was taken (or earlier). On 11 June, Blahodatne (pop. around 1,000) was taken by the Ukrainian 68th Jager Brigade. On 11 June Makarivka was taken. On 11 or 12 June Storozheve was taken by 35th Naval Infantry Bde. These are all small towns clustered to the northwest of Mariupol. A breakthrough here would effectively isolate Crimea and all points to the west. Lots of potential here, although it is still a fairly limited advance. Makarivka is 56 miles (90 kilometers) from Mariupol.

One twitter report on the action at Blahodatne said that 60 people from the 68th Jager Brigade attacked, and 4 were killed (see @armedMaidan for June 17). If this is true, this is a company-level attack by a brigade-sized force. I think this is fairly typical of what is happening across the front.

The 47th Mech Bde is one of the 9 new brigades raise for this offensive. The other two units listed above have been around since early in the war (April 2022 for the 68th) and from the beginning (in the case of the 35th Naval Infantry Bde). See: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Overall, there is this advance which is making some progress to NW of Mariupol, there are two or three attacks going on to the west of there, all the way to the Kakhovka Reservoir, and there are one or two attacks going on around Bakhmut, the one attacking force sitting just to the NW of Bakhmut and perhaps holding the high ground there.

Some Ukrainian loss figures are coming in. The attack on the advancing tank company on 8 June resulted in at least one Leopard tank and 4 M-113 destroyed. It appears that four Leopards have been confirmed as lost overall along with 2 AMX-10RCs. A total of 16 U.S. Bradleys have been killed (see: Ukraine loses 16 US-made armored vehicles, group says, but still gains territory | CNN). This would indicate that the brigades involved include 47th Mech Bde (with 99 M-2 Bradleys) and the 37th Bde with 14 AMX-10s. It does appear that 2 of 9 new brigades slotted for this spring offensive have been committed to action. Some people are saying they have committed three new brigades (they are not named), see: Ukraine deploys 3 of 12 brigades in counteroffensive, main battle still ahead − Reuters (msn.com). Article also notes that “Muzyka believes that the counteroffensive initially progressed quite well, but progress seems to have stopped 5 or 6 days after the start of this significant phase. The analysist has no idea why it happened.

In general, it appears that the 47th Mechanized Brigade has had a battalion or two gutted (a mechanized infantry battalion has around 30 IFVs and they lost 16 Bradleys). There are no other significant losses reported.

Probably the most significant loss was four Leopard mine plow tanks were killed at the same time and place, along with an MRAP and a Bradley. Finland provided Ukraine with up to six of these modified tanks. Not sure what killed them but picture leaves one to suspect they were taken out by mines, which is kind of what they were supposed to sweeping. One wonders if this was an equipment shortfall. 

On 12 June, Russian MG Sergei Goryachev, the COS 35th CAA, was reported killed by Russian bloggers. On 14 June Kadyrov (Chechen leader) reported that one of his commanders, Adam Delimkhanov, age 53, is missing and then later denied it. This guy: Adam Delimkhanov – Wikipedia. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. It is dated 21 June. The map now has three updates for 2023, Soledar on 16 January, near Orkhiv on 9 June 2023 and near Velyka Novosilka on 11 June 2023. They are also showing Bakhmut in Russian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

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We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now:

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. The grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 20 June, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 32,062,044 metric tonnes carried in 987 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 27 days left to the agreement.

Russia is claiming that they destroyed the Ukrainian 1,192-ton landing ship Yury Olefirenko, which is supposed to be Ukraine’s last warship. It was launched in 1970.

The Russian intelligence collection ship the Priazovye (3,470 tons full load) was attacked in the Black Sea by six sea-borne kamakaze drone. They were all intercepted and destroyed.

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Russia is putting 22 prisoners from Mariupol on trial. They are all members of the Azov Battalion, which Russia has designated a terrorist organization. Eight of the prisoners are woman, who are reported to have worked as cooks for the Azov Battalion. Two other prisoners who had been charged have been exchanged in prisoner exchanges.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

Zelenskyy said on 6 June that they have recovered around 2,500 prisoners, including 370 civilians., The last count I had of Ukrainian captured was around 6,000.

There was yet another prisoner exchange on 11 June for 95 POWs.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see for updates:  The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

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Weather: Kharkiv at 6 PM: It is 79 degrees (26 Celsius) and mostly sunny. No rain is expected today or tomorrow, and then there is a chance of rain for the next seven days. Sunrise is at 4:25 and sunset is at 8:47, giving them more than sixteen hours of daytime to operate it.

Kherson is 79 degrees (26 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. Change of rain today and not rain expected for the next nine days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Denmark and Netherlands are ordering up and buying another 14 Leopards for Ukraine. Belgium is offering up 40-50 more M-113s.

Russian Army Build-up:  Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Prigozhin reported that 32,000 prisoners who fought for Wagner have now returned home. So far, they have only committed 83 crimes since they left his employment.

Opposing forces: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 76.81 as of 11:10 AM EST. Ruble remains low at 83.89 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

There are still some political protests in Russia, with a female protester being arrested in Moscow and in Kazan. It is reported that over 100 protesters were arrested this last week: Russian police arrest more than 100 Navalny supporters, group says (msn.com).

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine.

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this.

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including over 20,000 killed (implying a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 18 June at least 9,083 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 178 civilians killed for 1-31 March, 169 killed from 1-30 April, and 174 killed from 1-31 May.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 25,528 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 16 June) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 9,083 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 55,387. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000. If the Russian Army losses are indeed above 50,000 and Ukrainian Army losses are similarly high, then we could be looking at over 100,000 killed in this war.

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It was updated in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Complete write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues:

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion.

A few dates to keep in mind for the American political campaigns: 1) trial date for Donald Trump on classified documents is set at 14 August 2023, 2) the first (of two?) Republican primary debates is set for 23 August, 3) the Iowa caucuses will be in mid-January 2024 (date has not been set yet), 4) the New Hampshire primary is scheduled for 13 February 2024, 5) 24 February is SC primary, then MI, 6) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then, 7) 25 March is the trial date for Donald Trump’s Stormy Daniel’s related case, 8) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently the two leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction.

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there.

On 16 June Putin did announce that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed to Belarus. One unconfirmed (and unconfirmable) estimate is that it is 10-12 68 KT weapons. On 20 June the head of Ukrainian intelligence said that no nuclear weapons have yet been moved to Belarus.

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey. See Day 443 for more info. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. We shall see if he is now willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

1420 – sixth posting

I have not posted about the YouTube channel 1420 in over a year. It is still going on and still producing interesting videos. It is primarily run by a young Russian named Daniil Orain who lives and mostly interviews in Moscow. Do not know if he has received any pushback from the Russian authorities. Some recent videos include:

Did we occupy the Baltic states in 1940? – YouTube

Russians: about destroyed dam in Ukraine – YouTube

Moscow residents react to being attacked – YouTube

Are we losing? – YouTube

There are a lot of other videos. He is prolific.

 

Old postings

CBC on 1420 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

“The Games the Marine Corps Plays”

An associate strongly recommended I look at this article. I would recommend the same to our readership: The Games the Marine Corps Plays | Military.com

It is written by Gary Anderson of GWU, who I do not know. But, to quote a few lines from the article:

  1. “You do not want prying eyes on your work that might question its rigor or validity.”
  2. “Since the Marines would be hundreds of miles away and irrelevant, they could be safely ignored.”
  3. “First, the Corps hired the most incompetent red team in the history of war-gaming, or their analysts cooked the books” (this sounds like a familiar problem, see:  Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)).

Anyhow, it is not a long article. Recommend reading it.

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 478

Spring Offensive: Nothing really new the last three days. Are the Ukrainians taking a breather? It appears that Ukrainian offensive operations started on Monday, 5 June with a series of serious “shaping operations.” See: So has the Spring Offensive started? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

On 6 June Russia (probably) blew the Kakhaovka dam. Right now Ukraine is recording 10 killed and 42 missing from this. This has temporarily shut down any operations in Kherson province.

On Thursday, 8 June, Russia released images showing a Ukrainian column moving up and being interdicted by artillery. They were supposedly near a village called Novopokrovka, probably the one in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the NNE of Melitopol. As least one German Leopard 2A4 tank was destroyed along with 4 U.S. M-113s. See this video for a discussion: Update from Ukraine | The Counterattack Start is not good | Leopard-2 Convoy was Ambushed – YouTube. The unit was pretty compacted while it was travelling. I still have not been able to identify the unit.

On 10 June, Neskuchne (pop. 644 in 2016) was taken (or earlier). On 11 June, Blahodatne (pop. around 1,000) was taken by the Ukrainian 68th Jager Brigade. On 11 June Makarivka was taken. On 11 or 12 June Storozheve was taken by 35th Naval Infantry Bde. These are all small towns clustered to the northwest of Mariupol. A breakthrough here would effectively isolate Crimea and all points to the west. Lots of potential here, although it is still a fairly limited advance. Makarivka is 56 miles (90 kilometers) from Mariupol.

It is also reported that the 47th Mech Bde is involved in these operations in the south, but not exactly sure where. There are also two or three other operations going on to the west of this point. The 47th Mech Bde is one of the 9 new brigades raise for this offensive. The other two units listed above have been around since early in the war (April 2022 for the 68th) and from the beginning (in the case of the 35th Naval Infantry Bde). See: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Overall, there is this advance which is making some progress to NW of Mariupol, there are two or three attacks going on to the west of there, all the way to the Kakhovka Reservoir, and there are one or two attacks going on around Bakhmut, the one attacking force sitting just to the NW of Bakhmut and perhaps holding the high ground there.

There is nothing further to report for the last three days.

Some Ukrainian loss figures are coming in. The attack on the advancing tank company on 8 June resulted in at least one Leopard tank and 4 M-113 destroyed. It appears that four Leopards have been confirmed as lost overall along with 2 AMX-10RCs. A total of 16 U.S. Bradleys have been killed (see: Ukraine loses 16 US-made armored vehicles, group says, but still gains territory | CNN). This would indicate that the brigades involved include 47th Mech Bde (with 99 M-2 Bradleys), 33rd Mech Bde (with 32 Leopard IIs), the 37th Bde with 14 AMX-10s and maybe the 118th Mech Bde with 90 M-113s (although 21st Bde and 117th Bde each has 10 M-113s). So it does appear that 4 of 9 new brigades slotted for this spring offensive have been committed to action. Some people are saying they have only committed three new brigades (they are not named), see: Ukraine deploys 3 of 12 brigades in counteroffensive, main battle still ahead − Reuters (msn.com). Article also notes that “Muzyka believes that the counteroffensive initially progressed quite well, but progress seems to have stopped 5 or 6 days after the start of this significant phase. The analysist has no idea why it happened.

Probably the most significant loss was four Leopard mine plow tanks were killed at the same time and place, along with an MRAP and a Bradley. Finland provided Ukraine with up to six of these modified tanks. Not sure what killed them but picture leaves one to suspect they were taken out by mines, which is kind of what they were supposed to sweeping. One wonders if this was an equipment shortfall. 

On 12 June, Russian MG Sergei Goryachev, the COS 35th CAA, was reported killed by Russian bloggers. On 14 June Kadyrov (Chechen leader) reported that one of his commanders, Adam Delimkhanov, age 53, is missing and then later denied it. This guy: Adam Delimkhanov – Wikipedia

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. It is dated 16 June. The map now has three updates for 2023, Soledar on 16 January, near Orkhiv on 9 June 2023 and near Velyka Novosilka on 11 June 2023. They are also showing Bakhmut in Russian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. The grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 15 June, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 31,814,836 metric tonnes carried in 982 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 32 days left to the agreement. 

Russia is claiming that they destroyed the Ukrainian 1,192-ton landing ship Yury Olefirenko, which is supposed to be Ukraine’s last warship. It was launched in 1970.

The Russian ship the Priazovye was attacked in the Black Sea by six sea-borne kamakaze drone. They were all intercepted and destroyed.

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. 

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Russia is putting 22 prisoners from Mariupol on trial. They are all members of the Azov Battalion, which Russia has designated a terrorist organization. Eight of the prisoners are woman, who are reported to have worked as cooks for the Azov Battalion. Two other prisoners who had been charged have been exchanged in prisoner exchanges. 

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

Zelenskyy said on 6 June that they have recovered around 2,500 prisoners, including 370 civilians., The last count I had of Ukrainian captured was around 6,000.

There was yet another prisoner exchange on 11 June for 95 POWs.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see for updates:  The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 3 PM: It is 78 degrees (26 Celsius) and partly cloudy. No rain is expected in the next nine days. Sunrise is at 4:25 and sunset is at 8:46, giving them more than sixteen hours of daytime to operate it.

Kherson is 82 degrees (28 Celsius) and cloudy. Rain expected three of the next ten days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Denmark and Netherlands are ordering up and buying another 14 Leopards for Ukraine.

Russian Army Build-up:  Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Opposing forces: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 75.74 as of 8:24 AM EST. Ruble remains low at 84.00 to the dollar and does appear to be slowly declining.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

There are still some political protests in Russia, with a female protester being arrested in Moscow and in Kazan. It is reported that over a 100 protesters were arrested this last week: Russian police arrest more than 100 Navalny supporters, group says (msn.com).

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including over 20,000 killed (implying a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 4 June at least 8,983 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 178 civilians killed for 1-31 March, 169 killed from 1-30 April, and 174 killed from 1-31 May.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 24,470 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 2 June) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,983 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 54,229. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000.

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It was updated in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Complete write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Itis going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction. 

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there.

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey. See Day 443 for more info. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. We shall see if he is now willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023

This is the sixth provisional schedule for the second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We currently have 28 presentations scheduled by 21 speakers and two group discussions planned. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Costs, Hotels and Call for Presentations: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The cost of the conference is $150 for entire conference or $60 a day. Please pay through PayPal (www.paypal.com) to SRichTDI@aol.com. The conference is priced to cover the costs of the conference facility. We are also set up to take credit card payments by phone. Call The Dupuy Institute during working hours at (703) 289-0007.

We are set up for virtual presentations and virtual attendees. We are exploring the costs of having the presentations professionally recorded.

 

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: 8 June 2023

 

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks                        Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030     Addressing the Decline in War Question with New Disaggregated Data

                                                Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1030 – 1130      A Cautionary Tale: Alternative Interpretations of the Same Data – virtual

                                                                                    Jim Storr

1130 – 1230 Land Operations – consistencies and discrepancies between theory, historical analysis and doctrine                             LtC. Trygve Smidt (Norway)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500 Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII                                                                         Sasho Todorov  

1500 – 1600    Force Ratios                                    Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1600 – 1700    open

1700 – 1800    open

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – Rangos

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old)

                                                                                   Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100     Evidence of Fabricated Survey Data Collected during the War in Iraq

                                           Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1000 – 1100 Unburdened by History: Understanding Russia’s Growing Influence in Haiti                                                                           Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1100 – 1200    open

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Right Way to Do Risk Analysis: A Primer and Update, With Examples from Pandemics                                                       Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1400 – 1500    Close  Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER)

                                                                                    Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1500 – 1600    Chemical Weapons in Syria – virtual           Jennifer Schlacht, M.A. – virtual

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):          Group Dinner – BJs

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    Russian Information Warfare Against Western Democracies Since 2013: A review and update                                                 Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1000 – 1100    open

1100 – 1200    open

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History – virtual

                                                            Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia)

1400 – 1500    The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new)

                                                                                  Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1500 – 1600    open

1600 – 1700    open

 

Evening:         Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Other Analysis of Warfare

1400 – 1500   History of Pneumatic Combat Weapons    Jacob Friend

1500 – 1600   Soviet WWII Aerial Photography      Eugene Matyukhin 

1600 – 1700    Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45

                                                                            Daniel Horvath – virtual

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 1000    Wargaming 101                               William Sayers

1000 – 1100    Urban Warfare (old)                        Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1100 – 1200    Beaches by the Numbers – virtual

                                Dr. Julian Spencer-Churchill (Concordia University, Quebec)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Study of Pneumatic Weapons in Sub/Urban Combat

                                                                                  Jacob Friend

1400 – 1500   Open

1500 – 1600   Penetrate, Dis-Integrate and Exploit: The Israeli Counter-Offensive at the Suez Canal, 1973 – virtual                                       LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD

1600 – 1700    Operation “Sea Lion”: Simulating the German 1940 invasion of England – virtual                                                                       Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York)

 

 

Day 3: Researching Operations

0900 – 1000 The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations Durning the Meuse-Argonne Offensive                                                  Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG)

1000 – 1100    Kursk Photo Analysis                     Eugene Matyukhin

1100 – 1200    The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44                                                                Dr. Richard Harrison

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   Patterns of Explosive Violence Harm in Ukraine Before and After the 24 Feb. Invasion                                                           Chiara Torelli (AOAV) – virtual

1400 – 1500    Competing Proxy Strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War and a War of Attrition – LtC. Amos Fox

1500 – 1600    Open

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

The presentations from all three days of the first HAAC are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 475



Well, things are starting to heat up in Ukraine. It appears that Ukrainian offensive operations started on Monday, 5 June with a series of serious “shaping operations.” See: So has the Spring Offensive started? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

On 6 June Russia (probably) blew the Kakhaovka dam. Right now Ukraine is recording 10 killed and 42 missing from this. This has temporarily shut down any operations in Kherson province.

On Thursday, 8 June, Russia released images showing a Ukrainian column moving up and being interdicted by artillery. They were supposedly near a village called Novopokrovka, probably the one in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the NNE of Melitopol. As least one German Leopard 2A4 tank was destroyed along with 4 U.S. M-113s. See this video for a discussion: Update from Ukraine | The Counterattack Start is not good | Leopard-2 Convoy was Ambushed – YouTube. The unit was pretty compacted while it was travelling. I still have not been able to identify the unit.

On 10 June, Neskuchne (pop. 644 in 2016) was taken (or earlier). On 11 June, Blahodatne (pop. around 1,000) was taken by the Ukrainian 68th Jager Brigade. On 11 June Makarivka was taken. On 11 or 12 June Storozheve was taken by 35th Naval Infantry Bde. These are all small towns clustered to the northwest of Mariupol. A breakthrough here would effectively isolate Crimea and all points to the west. Lots of potential here, although it is still a fairly limited advance. Makarivka is 56 miles (90 kilometers) from Mariupol.

It is also reported that the 47th Mech Bde is involved in these operations in the south, but not exactly sure where. There are also two or three other operations going on to the west of this point. The 47th Mech Bde is one of the 9 new brigades raise for this offensive. The other two units listed above have been around since early in the war (April 2022 for the 68th) and from the beginning (in the case of the 35th Naval Infantry Bde). See: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Overall, there is this advance which is making some progress to NW of Mariupol, there are two or three attacks going on to the west of there, all the way to the Kakhovka Reservoir, and there are one or two attacks going on around Bakhmut, the one attacking force sitting just to the NW of Bakhmut and perhaps holding the high ground there.

Some Ukrainian loss figures are coming in. The attack on the advancing tank company on 8 June resulted in at least one Leopard tank and 4 M-113 destroyed. It appears that four Leopards have been confirmed as lost overall along with 2 AMX-10RCs. A total of 16 U.S. Bradleys have been killed (see: Ukraine loses 16 US-made armored vehicles, group says, but still gains territory | CNN). This would indicate that the brigades involved include 47th Mech Bde (with 99 M-2 Bradleys), 33rd Mech Bde (with 32 Leopard IIs), the 37th Bde with 14 AMX-10s and maybe the 118th Mech Bde with 90 M-113s (although 21st Bde and 117th Bde each has 10 M-113s). So it does appear that 4 of 9 new brigades slotted for this spring offensive have been committed to action.

Probably the most significant loss was four Leopard mine plow tanks were killed at the same time and place, along with an MRAP and a Bradley. Finland provided Ukraine with up to six of these modified tanks. Not sure what killed them but picture leaves one to suspect they were taken out by mines, which is kind of what they were supposed to sweeping. One wonders if this was an equipment shortfall. 

On 12 June, Russian MG Sergei Goryachev, the COS 35th CAA, was reported killed by Russian bloggers.

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. It is dated 13 June. The map now has three updates for 2023, Soledar on 16 January, near Orkhiv on 9 June 2023 and near Velyka Novosilka on 11 June 2023. They are also showing Bakhmut in Russian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. The grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 12 June, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 31,560,062 metric tonnes carried in 977 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 35 days left to the agreement. 

Russia is claiming that they destroyed the Ukrainian 1,192-ton landing ship Yury Olefirenko, which is supposed to be Ukraine’s last warship. It was launched in 1970.

The Russian ship the Priazovye was attacked in the Black Sea by six sea-borne kamakaze drone. They were all intercepted and destroyed.

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. 

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

Zelenskyy said on 6 June that they have recovered around 2,500 prisoners, including 370 civilians., The last count I had of Ukrainian captured was around 6,000.

There was yet another prisoner exchange on 11 June for 95 POWs.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see for updates:  The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 4 PM: It is 72 degrees (22 Celsius) and mostly cloudy. No rain is expected in the next nine days. Sunrise is at 4:25 and sunset is at 8:44, giving them more than sixteen hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 75 degrees (24 Celsius) and cloudy. Rain expected four of the next ten days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Russian Army Build-up:  Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Opposing forces: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 74.22 as of 9:56 AM EST. Ruble remains low at 83.85 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

There are still some political protests in Russia, with a female protester being arrested in Moscow and in Kazan. It is reported that over a 100 protesters were arrested this last week: Russian police arrest more than 100 Navalny supporters, group says (msn.com).

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including over 20,000 killed (implying a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 4 June at least 8,983 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 178 civilians killed for 1-31 March, 169 killed from 1-30 April, and 174 killed from 1-31 May.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 24,470 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 2 June) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,983 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 54,229. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000.

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It was updated in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Complete write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Itis going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction. 

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there..

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey. See Day 443 for more info. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. We shall see if he is now willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

 

We have now got this blog post below 3,000 words. At one point it was above 13,000.

Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy

The third and last of three recent articles from William (Chip) Sayers. The conclusions are his:

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Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The US Navy

Early in the Reagan Administration, his Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, adopted “The Maritime Strategy,” a doctrine that would send the US Navy aggressively into the face of the Soviet Union in the case of general war. Since the late 1930s, navies had been circumspect in sending their capital ships into the range of land-based airpower.  The wisdom of this reticence was most spectacularly demonstrated two days after Pearl Harbor when the Royal Navy’s battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse were sunk while underway on the open ocean by Japanese bombers based outside of Saigon. 

But 40 years later, SECNAV Lehman was seemingly throwing the hard-learned lessons of history to the wind. His plan was to send US Navy carrier battlegroups (CVBGs) into waters menaced by Soviet land-based airpower in order to threaten enemy base areas with nuclear-capable bombers. Secretary Lehman believed by bringing the CVBGs in close, it would unnerve Moscow and throw them off their game, possibly forcing mistakes that would ease the pressure on the central front. Writing years after he left Government, Lehman went so far as to say that the Maritime Strategy was instrumental in bringing down the Soviet Union.[1]

My math saw it a bit differently. The average carrier air wing of the 1980s consisted of two fleet air defense squadrons with 12 F-14 Tomcats, each; two light attack squadrons with a total of 24 A-7 Corsair IIs (later replaced by F-18 Hornets), one attack squadron with 10 A-6 Intruders — the heavy punch of the fleet — a fixed-wing anti-submarine squadron with 10 S-3 Vikings, a rotary-wing anti-submarine squadron with 8 SH-3 Sea Kings and roughly 16-20 radar warning, electronic warfare, cargo, tanker and reconnaissance aircraft. The F-14 was specifically designed to protect the CVBG from Soviet Naval Aviation (AV-MF, or in English, SNA) bombers, though it was also the only aircraft capable of escorting for the carrier’s bombers until the F-18s gradually replaced the A-7s over the course of the 1980s. Depending on how one counts the F-14, about 45% of the air wing was dedicated to defense of the battle group. Put another way, disregarding operational readiness rates, a carrier could dispatch 34 bombers against enemy targets. Compare that to a USAF F-111 wing that could put up considerably more bombers with significantly greater range and load-carrying capacity. Secretary Lehman’s big stick didn’t look so big in that light.

The Soviet Union was a Continental power and has always looked at military force from that perspective. To the Soviet General Staff, the Soviet Navy was a supporting arm whose primary responsibility was to aid the Army in securing its flanks. As such, the Navy took a backseat to the Army and Strategic Rocket Forces when it came to resources and emphasis in planning. In reality, it wasn’t as simple as this: Khruschev’s emphasis of nuclear missile forces at the expense of conventional forces gave the Navy not only a strategic offensive mission with their Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), but also an important and frequently overlooked mission of securing the sub patrol areas near Soviet home waters when the range of their SLBMs made that possible in the mid-1970s.

To secure these “bastion” areas, the Soviet Navy devoted powerful combined-arms forces to keep the US Navy at bay. First, the Soviets deployed the world’s largest submarine fleet, comprised of a large number of modern, nuclear attack submarines along with a huge number of (albeit, mostly old) diesel-electric boats, and the only dedicated anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) submarines in any navy. The second leg of this triad was a fleet of “rocket” cruisers with large, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles capable of destroying any ship smaller than an aircraft carrier with a single hit, and a carrier with multiple hits. These missiles were very long-ranged (240-340nm) compared to Western counterparts and exploitation of that capability may have been problematic, but the Soviet fleet was betting that they could overcome the targeting difficulties inherent to over-the-horizon missile shots. These missiles were as large as small fighter aircraft and, in addition to carrying a very large armor-piercing warhead, would hit the target moving at several times the speed of sound. Given the basic physics formula of energy = mass x velocity2, they would not even require a warhead for most targets.

The big stick on this combined-arms team, however, was the bomber regiments of Soviet Naval Aviation. Each Soviet fleet had two or three medium bomber regiments of 24-30 aircraft, each. Tu-16/BADGERS could carry two anti-ship cruise missiles, while supersonic Tu-22M/BACKFIRES could carry one on long-range missions, or up to three closer to home. These Kh-22 (AS-4/KITCHEN) ASCMs were about 2/3rds the size of a MiG-21 fighter, but could fly at Mach 4.6 and 90,000 feet while carrying a 1,000kg warhead. The Backfire was the threat the F-14 was developed to counter and, as a single SNA regiment could launch as many as 90 KITCHENs at a CVBG, it is clear why the F-14 — capable of carrying up to six long-range AIM-54 Phoenix bomber killing missiles — and the later cruiser-based Aegis high-volume-of-firepower Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system had to be developed.

To illustrate the utility of wargames in analyzing how the enemy views his Courses of Action (COAs), I would cite an unusual example. During the research phase for his novel Red Storm Rising, Tom Clancy asked a couple of mutual friends to help him wargame a troop convoy crossing of the Atlantic, intended to be the centerpiece of the story. Larry Bond and Chris Carlson (now hugely successful novelists in their own right) used Larry’s naval miniatures wargame Harpoon to facilitate the study. They quickly found that the SNA bombers in repeated trials were running to a brick wall formed by a USAF squadron of F-15 Eagles based at Keflavik, Iceland. The SNA never got close to the convoy. It was shaping up to be a boring novel, when one of the team members (I’ve heard it was Chris, though he denies it) thought of mounting a Spetsnaz commando raid prior to H-Hour to take out the pesky Eagles. This story was so compelling, it ended up as a major plotline in the novel. And the rest, as they say, is history.

The idea that the Soviet Navy was planning to shoot through the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap and sweep the North Atlantic of NATO seapower was never a part of Soviet doctrine and Tom Clancy’s wargame experience shows why it was unrealistic. If a small number of USAF fighters could unhinge the entire operation, what would happen with many times that number of F-14s and Aegis cruisers? What of the powerful and practiced US and UK submarine force? Harpoon ASCM-firing B-52s? The enemy gets a vote when considering COAs, and NATO had a mind-boggling array of options to foil such a move by the Soviet Northern Fleet at the bleeding edge of its capabilities. This view was completely at odds with Soviet doctrine, which had the Soviet Navy playing — as it had in WWII — a primarily defensive role in support of the Army and the SLBM force.[2]

Far from counter-punching the Soviet Navy, the Maritime Strategy proposed walking face-first into a well-prepared, multi-faceted defense. However, Secretary Lehman was himself a naval aviator and he wasn’t suicidal. He did have ideas on how to mitigate the SNA threat. One was the use of Norway’s Vestfjord to provide his CVBGs with cover.[3]

USS America in Vestfjord clearly showing how the mountains would block the line of sight of missile-carrying bombers until they were very close to the target. (USNI Proceedings)

Vestfjord is created by the Lofoten Archipelago that forms the northern side of Ofotfjord at Narvik and extends about 100nm into the North Sea. The dramatic vertical relief provides an excellent radar shadow protecting ships operating in the deep waters close inshore from airborne radars searching from the north. If that were the only trick up the Soviet sleeve, hiding in Vestfjord’s radar shadow would provide extra time for the CVBG’s F-14s to whittle down the attacking bombers before they could achieve line of sight and launch their missiles. That wasn’t, however, the end of the story. In fact, it was just the beginning for me.

Over a period of about three years in the late 1980s, I participated in a number of wargames where this issue came up. As a Soviet Air Forces analyst, I brought a different perspective to the problem. Secretary Lehman was well aware of the threat SNA posed to his CVBGs, but he was undoubtedly unversed on Soviet Air Force (VVS) capabilities and formations, since it would not have been a factor for him until he sent the Navy into Vestfjord. 

While duking it out with the Navy, I ran into a phenomenon well-known within the wargaming community where the Navy under no circumstances would allow one of their aircraft carriers to be portrayed as being sunk or even seriously damaged. In one exercise, I was told that an attack by 90 bombers had managed to slightly damage one catapult. In another, my pilots had mysteriously mistaken a Royal Navy jump-jet carrier for a US CVN four times its size. After taking major losses on that raid, I nonchalantly told the Blue Navy player that I would whistle up another bomber division (like we “had plenty more where that came from”) and go at it again, tomorrow. He winced and admitted to me that there wasn’t any point because they would never allow me to sink a carrier. I replied that I just wanted him to admit that out loud before I let it go.

Yellow:  SNA ASCM-carrying bombers fly from bases on and near the Kola, around the North Cape and down the coast of Norway. Large purple circle: Kh-22 300nm launch line. Small purple circle: Kh-22 67nm launch line (reduced by the radar shadow in Vestfjord). Blue: USN F-14 fleet defense fighters push north to intercept the SNA before they can get radar line-of-sight to the CVBG. Red: VVS Bomber Aviation Division uses the mountains to screen its attack on the CVBG.

The final showdown came when I was called to the Pentagon and asked to give all the details of my tactics in a mano a mano combat with a Navy officer and a rather large crowd of onlookers. My final plan went like this: I sent a major SNA raid from the north to threaten the two-carrier CVBG hugging the southern slope of the mountains in Vestfjord. My opponent, knowing the broad strokes of my strategy, tried to hold back F-14s in reserve. However, he was quickly cut off by another Navy officer who said that the F-14s would have to “honor the threat” by committing the interceptors against the SNA bombers. 

While the F-14s were tied up 100-200nm north of Vestfjord, I sent in a bomber aviation division with about 90 Su-24/FENCER light bombers armed with a pair of 1,500kg Laser-guided bombs apiece. This force went into Vestfjord in a long trail formation covered by Su-27/FLANKERS. My opponent raised the difficulties of finding the target ships, but I countered that in a trail formation, all the later aircraft need do would be to follow the smoke columns from the fires of shot down aircraft and damaged ships. 

The FENCERS hugged the mountains so that their radars were looking out to sea for the CVBG, while the US radars were trying to pick out FENCERS from the radar clutter of the mountains behind them. What had been sauce for the goose had suddenly become sauce for the gander. The Navy knew from experience that picking out fighter aircraft from the mountains was a nasty challenge. This gave the VVS bombers a real chance to make it through to the target.

While nearly all modern warships lack any kind of significant armor, US Navy aircraft carriers are the exception. The Navy keeps the details close to their chest, but even if they don’t have conventional armor plate like a battleship, the use of fuel and water tankage can create a reasonable facsimile, while the sheer size of a carrier and the compartmentation available ensure that any damage is isolated and kept away from the vital areas of the ship. To do real harm takes a large bomb with real penetrative capability. Both of these are embodied in the 1,500kg bomb. Further, while dropping from low altitude — deck height or lower — the bomb would impact almost perpendicular to the side of the ship, ensuring maximum penetration. Laser guidance wouldn’t add too much to the equation, but it did give me an extra argument to deflect disputes about accuracy. With the bombs detonating inside the ship, there would be no danger from fragging one’s own aircraft and little danger to following planes, as well. A further advantage to dropping from such low altitude would be that it would be nearly impossible to mistake the target carrier with anything else — no other ship would tower over the bombers so they need only steer for the biggest object ahead of them.

Squirm as he might, my opponent was frustrated at every turn. Each idea he came up with was shot down by the onlookers. The Navy observers looked at our little desk-side exercise and could find no way out. They were finally forced to concede that their carriers were not invincible, after all. From that day to this, I haven’t heard the Navy talk about Vestfjord or taking on land-based air. My campaign may not have been what caused the Navy to rethink The Maritime Strategy, but it assuredly provided at least one nail in the coffin.

Naval wargaming is simple and straightforward when compared to wargaming ground combat. Naval warfare lends itself to mathematical fights between weapons systems.  There are little, if any, terrain considerations and all the combatants can be discretely modeled. Further, there is little of the human element to be considered as most of the interactions are, in reality, controlled by computer. In contrast, a land battle has a nearly infinite number of interactions and the human factor is the most important single determinate of defeat — you defeat the enemy by breaking his will to stand his ground — while weapons are merely tools to get inside his head. Elsewhere in this blog, I have stated that I had $40 commercial wargames in my closet that could do a more realistic job than the Pentagon’s million-dollar computer models. The cost factor only grows larger with naval wargames.

Perhaps this is why the US Navy has traditionally invested in wargames: the inherent simplicity, clarity and believable results of naval wargames make them accessible and instructive. After WWII, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz was asked if anything surprised him during the battles of the Pacific war. His answer, that only the Japanese use of Kamikaze tactics had not been foreseen and wargamed before the war ever began, is informative on the utility of naval wargaming. The US Naval War College continues to this day to run annual wargames with its students working on fleet problems with real-world relevance. The War College’s own website declared that, “Simulating complex war situations—from sea to space to cyber—builds analytical, strategic, and decision-making skills. Wargaming programming not only enriches our curriculum, but it also helps shape defense plans and policies for various commands and agencies.” Thus saith the Navy. The Air Force would agree. If we can get the Army in on it, we might have something of use to the nation.

[1] Zakheim, Dov S. and Lehman, John (2018) “Lehman’s Maritime Triumph,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 4 , Article 11. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/11.

[2] Watkins, James D. Admiral USN, The Maritime Strategy, US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1986/january-supplement/maritime-strategy-0.

[3] Ibid.

——

His other recent and related articles are:

The Easy Button | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101 – The 40-60-80 Games | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101 – In the Bowels of the Pentagon with J-8 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101: The Bad Use of a Good Tool | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101: A Tale of Two Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

He is doing a presentation at HAAC on Day 2 (Wednesday, Oct. 18) on Wargaming 101: Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471

Well, it does look like the preparatory or “shaping operations” for the Spring Offensive have begun, with people saying the offensive started on Monday, 5 June. See: So has the Spring Offensive started? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Still no blitzkrieg but it is no longer sitzkrieg. 

On Thursday, 8 June, Russia released images showed Ukrainian forces moving up and being interdicted by artillery. They were supposedly near a village called Novopokrovka, probably the one in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to the NNE of Melitopol. As least one German Leopard 2A4 tank was destroyed along with 4 U.S. M-113s. See this video for a discussion: Update from Ukraine | The Counterattack Start is not good | Leopard-2 Convoy was Ambushed – YouTube. The unit was pretty compacted while it was travelling.

Ukraine has raised 9 new brigades for this offensive. The three new brigades with M-113s are 21st Bde (10), 117th Bde (10) and 118th MBde (90). On the other hand, the only new brigade reporting Leopard IIs was the 33rd Bde. So either, people were shuffling equipment around since the leak of the classified Joint Staff briefing book two months ago, or it was an already established unit that had Leopards and M-113s. 

The classified Joint Staff briefing book did talk about 12 “combat credible” brigades being generated for the “spring counteroffensive.” They report on the status of 9 new brigades being raised (“trained and equipped by US, Allied and Partners”). Six will be ready by 31 March (page was dated 23 February) and 3 by 30 April. Eight of these newly raised brigades are mechanized-like brigades, which nominally have one tank battalion of 31 tanks per brigade. The unit attacked appears to have around a dozen tanks, or one tank company was exposed.

The status of these nine new brigades is discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Basically, eight of them have 28 – 32 tanks, seven have 90 to 101 other AFVs, IFVs, APCs and MRAPs, and six of them have between 8 to 16 artillery pieces and three have between 22 to 24 artillery pieces. Three other brigades will be added to offensive force, although there are no reports on their status. 

The DOD count of opposing forces is discussed here: Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and combat effectiveness is discussed here: Unstructured Comments on “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. has announced on 21 April that it will began training Ukrainian forces on their new Abrams tanks. The 31 tanks will arrive in Grafenwoehr at the end of the May and the training will last for around 10 weeks. On 28 April the Germans are saying that over 100 Ukrainians are now training on Leopard Is (the older version). That does indicate that some of these newly raised Ukrainian brigades are still going to receive more equipment.

Anyhow, the Ukrainians appear to be attacking primarily in the areas NE of Melitopol and addition to doing some operations around Bakhmut. We shall see what else shows up in the next few days. The area around Kherson will be quiet for the next few weeks: Some Dam Thoughts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). There was also some limited actions in Russia’s Belgorod province: Shebekino | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Some reports: Ukrainian forces suffer ‘stiff resistance’ and losses in assault on Russian lines (msn.com). Summation: Ukraine took some losses. “Ukrainian forces managed to overrun some Russian forces in the east around Bakhmut. However, Russian forces, armed with anti-tank missiles, grenades and mortars, have put up “stiff resistance,” with their forces dug into defensive lines that are several layers deep in some areas and marked by minefields that have taken a heavy toll on Ukrainian armored vehicles.”

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. It is dated 9 June. The last dated update on the map is Soledar on 16 January, although they are showing Bakhmut in Russian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. The grain deal has been renewed for another 60 days. Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over thirty million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 08 June, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 31,321,125 metric tonnes carried in 973 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 39 days left to the agreement. 

Russia is claiming that they destroyed the Ukrainian 1,192-ton landing ship Yury Olefirenko, which is supposed to be Ukraine’s last warship. It was launched in 1970.

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. Ukraine did bombard Russian troops in the village of Tsapovka in early April, in Russian territory in the Belgorod Oblast. Ukraine published pictures of this. It is right on the border, due south of Borisovka. The village is reported to be unpopulated since 2013.

On 17 April, the Ukrainians did attack two Russian power stations in Belgorod oblast using drones. The following week the Russians also accidently dropped two bombs on Belgorod. On 1 May, a Russian ammo dump was hit near Tomorovka, in Belgorod province.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange in early May of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians. On 7 May, Russia exchanged 45 defenders of Azovstal, including 10 officers for only just 3 pilots. I gather Russia is still holding thousands of more prisoners than Ukraine does.

Zelenskyy said on 6 June that they have recovered around 2,500 prisoners, including 370 civilians., The last count I had of Ukrainian captured was around 6,000.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

The early morning on 22 March (at 04:43:58 according to videos), there was another attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol harbor using seaborne naval drones. The last time they tried this (29 October 2022), they (lightly?) damaged the 4,035-ton frigate Admiral Makarov. It appears that one got close to one rather large ship and exploded near its rear. Not sure if a Russian ship was damaged. At least three drones were used in the attack. One was stopped by the booms at the entrance to the harbor, and two were destroyed in the harbor.

There was also a car blown up on 23 March in Melitipol that injured a Ukrainian accused of collaborating with the Russians. There was an IED exploded in Melitipol on 3 April.

Apparently, back in October, in conjunction with the Kherson offensive, there was a failed attempt by Ukraine to retake Zaporizhia nuclear power plant with an amphibious operation across the large reservoir there.

There was Ukrainian crossing on 20 or 21 April at the village of Dachi. This is just across the Dnipro near Kherson where the damaged Antonivka Road Bridge crosses. 

I do think this is a diversion, vice the preparation for a major offensive. The problems with conducting operations across the Dnipro work both ways. The Russians were forced in November to withdraw from north of the river because of supply issues. There are only three bridges across the river in the best of times. If the Russians could not support 20,000 troops to the north of the river, I suspect the Ukrainians will have a similar problem south of the river, especially as Russia has air superiority.

The Ukrainians two weeks ago hit three oil tanks in and around Crimea (one near Sevastopol early in the week, one in Krasnador province on 2 May that was only 7 km from the bridge to Crimea, and another attack on 3 May in Krasnador near the bridge). Also on 29 April it is claimed that the Russian village of Suzemka was shelled. It is 6 miles (10 kilometers) from the border in Bryansk province. The Russians report two, and later four civilians killed. On 2 May a train was derailed by a bomb near Bryansk. Finally, two drones attacked the Kremlin in Moscow on 4 May, with one hitting a flag on a dome. 

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 2 PM: It is 80 degrees (27 Celsius) and mostly sunny. No rain is expected in the next ten days. Sunrise is at 4:26 and sunset is at 8:42, giving them more than sixteen hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 83 degrees (27 Celsius) and partly cloudy. Rain expected on Sunday. Wednesday and the following Sunday.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Do not know the current strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army but am guessing that it is over 300,000 deployed troops. They clearly are going to have to build it up to 400,000 or more in response to Russia’s partial mobilization. There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They were reporting their ground forces at 198,000 in July 2022. 

Do not have a good estimate of the total number of foreign volunteers now in Ukraine, although it is clearly thousands.

The U.S. and many countries in and around Europe are now providing tanks to Ukraine. This includes 31 Abrams (M1A2) from the U.S. that were not expected to arrive until 2024, but the U.S. has now announced that they will be in Germany as of the end of May. It also includes the previously announced 40 AMX-10 light tanks from France, the previously announced 14 Challengers from the UK and 14 new Challengers from the UK, 14 Leopards (2A6) from Germany announced on Jan. 25 plus they are going to provide 14 more later, 14 or so Leopards (2A4?) from Poland, maybe 20 Leopards (2A4) from Spain, but so far only 6 have been confirmed (they are planning to train 55 Ukrainian crew members), no Leopards from Netherlands (previous rumors said 18), Portugal is sending 4 (2A6) out of their 37, 8 (2A4) from Norway out of their 36, and 8 2A4 Leopards from Canada out of their 80. The 8 Canadian Leopards have already arrived in Poland. Non-NATO members Finland is providing 3 Leopards and Sweden is providing 10 2A6s along with 8 Archer 155mm SP Artillery. Also, Morocco is providing Ukraine with 173 T-74s EA, 70 are already in Ukraine. It does appear in a number of cases the announcements are lagging behind the actual shipments of tanks. Poland is providing Ukraine with another 60 upgraded T-72s. It has already sent Ukraine some 260 or more tanks. 

Twelve countries in NATO have Leopards. Germany is saying that a total of around 80 will be sent between them all. My count currently shows at least 77 Leopards from eight different countries (two not yet in NATO). It now looks like many of the older 40-45 ton German Leopard Is are being refurbished and will be sent. Germany has 88 of them it could send and Belgium has 50. Between Denmark, Netherlands and Germany, they are putting together a package of 100 1A5s, although the details of the deal keep changing.  It will be a while before most of them arrive. An initial package of 29 is being refurbished and are supposed to arrive in the summer (enough for one more brigade). There are a lot of them out there, with Greece supposedly having 520 (and 392 U.S. M-48s and 100 U.S. M-60s) and Turkey having 355 or 397 (and 750 M-48s and 785 M-60s). Opportunity to replace old stocks. Switzerland has 230 Leopard 2 tanks of which 96 are not in operation (in storage). Germany has asked for them but on 7 March the Swiss Parliament voted not to export tanks. Meanwhile reports are saying some of the 100+ Leopard Is will still arriving in Ukraine starting May. Meanwhile, the U.S. is now planning on providing older M1A1s instead of M1A2s are it can be arranged to get there this fall. Not sure if the count of tanks provided will remain at only 31 (one battalion’s worth).

Meanwhile, Russia has been seen transporting T-54Bs from Siberia to somewhere (probably Ukraine). That particular model dates from 1955, so a little older than a Leopard I or M1A1. On 30 April, T-55s and T-62 were reported in the Berdiansk area.

From a practical point of view, it means that around four or so Ukrainian tank battalions will be armed up with Abrams/Leopard 2/Challengers. Ukraine has over 30 tank battalions. Some should probably be in place for the spring offensives. Some of the Canadian Leopard 2s have already arrived in Poland. At least 18 of the Leopard 2A6s have arrived in Ukraine. Challengers will be arriving in Ukraine during March.

Slovakia announced on 23 March that they have transferred 4 MiG-29s to Ukraine. It now appears that all 13 Slovak MiG-29s have been handed over to Ukraine. On 8 May, it was confirmed that 10 Polish MiG-29 have been delivered to Ukraine. On 5 May, it was confirmed that Croatia is providing 14 Mi-8 helicopters, of which 9 are already in Ukraine. Looks like Ukraine will be receiving F-16s also. Numbers to be determined. It may be six or more months before they are operational.

Some weapons have been supplied that have not been announced. For example, Finnish ex-Soviet 152K89 152mm field guns recently have showed up on the battlefield in Ukrainian hands, even though Finland has never announced that they were being provided. Danish artillery has also recently showed up in Ukraine.

Russian Army Build-up:  

In the fall of last year, Ukraine was reporting that around 280,000 Russians were deployed in Ukraine. This seems a reasonable estimate. On 4 November Putin stated at 318,000 reservists and “new volunteers” have been mobilized and 49,000 are in combat zones. I assume the Russian army in Ukraine was at about 200,000 at the start of this mobilization.

The U.S. and UK estimate that the Wagner Group had 50,000 people in December 2022. Have no idea if this estimate is accurate. John Kirby (U.S. DOD spokesman) said that Wagner has lost 30,000 people, at a wounded-to-killed ratio of maybe 2-to-1, implying 10,000 deaths. Around 20 May, the head of the Wagner Group said they had lost 20,000 killed. We have doubts about the accuracy of Prigozhin’s claims.

Ukraine stated on 22 Feb. that Russia has deployed more than 350,000 troops to Ukraine. This sounds about right.

Russia is now starting its spring conscript draft of 147,000. It does this twice a year. Conscripts are for one year and are not allowed to serve outside of Russia.

The Russian defense budget for 2023 is $159 billion, up from $111 billion in 2022. This appears to now be around 9% of GDP.

According to one article, which I suspect is a little biased, Russian tank production at Uralvagonzavod is currently over 900 armored vehicles a year, including 35-40 T-90s a month. In contrast, the U.S. is producing two M-1A2 a month in Lima, Ohio. The German Leopard 2 is also still in production. 

Russia is getting some support from China, possibly spare parts and more important, microchips. It is now reported that Chechnya will be receiving armored vehicles from China.

As of 26 February, Russia has announced that the DPR has raised a new battalion entirely composed of Ukrainian prisoners of war, called the Bohdan Khmelniksky Battalion. It was claimed that the unit consists of 70 Ukrainians. 

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia has added at least 41,000 troops to the front line from their new partial mobilization effort and will be adding more. Potentially up to 300,000. Most likely by the spring, both armies will be sporting 400,000 or more troops. It does appear that by spring, the level of intensity and casualties from this war will be a count twice as high as it currently has been.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Price of oil (Brent Crude) remains low at 76.15 as of 7:21 AM EST. Ruble remains low at 82.64 to the dollar.

On 6 May “right-wing” activist, Yevgeny Prilepin, was seriously injured near Nizhny Novgorod when his car was blown up. His bodyguard died. On 2 April, Vladlen Tartarsky, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger, was assassinated in St. Petersburg. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. Not sure who was responsible for any of these three efforts.

There are still some political protests in Russia, with a female protester being arrested in Moscow and in Kazan. It is reported that over a 100 protesters were arrested this last week: Russian police arrest more than 100 Navalny supporters, group says (msn.com).

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including over 20,000 killed (implying a 4-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 4 June at least 8,983 civilians confirmed dead in the war. They reported 178 civilians killed for 1-31 March, 169 killed from 1-30 April, and 174 killed from 1-31 May.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 24,470 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 2 June) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,983 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 54,229. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%. Mediazona is now reporting that Donetsk and Lugansk losses were in excess of 8,000.

An eighth American has been killed in Ukraine, Nick Maimer, 45, of Boise. He was a former Green Beret who was training Ukrainians. He was hit by artillery sometime in May.

Ammo: The second and third to last paragraphs in The Times (UK) article referenced in the Day 394 blog post says:

However, Barrons argues that Ukraine needs ammunition even more than it needs soldiers. It fires 90,000 155mm shells a month and sometimes 6,000 shells a day but combined US and European production is less than 30,000 a month. “There is a mathematical mismatch,” he says. The US is tripling its output but “Europe has been too slow”.

Russia, which has been firing 20,000 shells a day and is thought to have used up ten years’ worth of production in 12 months, has the same problem. In recent weeks they have reduced the numbers by 75 per cent.

So 6,000 shells a day vice 20,000 shells a day, have no idea if that is true or what percent of the rounds fire are “smart” versus old style. One would expect the side firing the most rounds would be causing more causalities. On the other hand, if U.S. production is less than 30,000 a month Ukraine will be forced to eventually reduce their expenditures to 1,000 or 2,000 shells a day. If Russia has to reduce their numbers by 75%, then they are firing 5,000 shells a day. Don’t know if any single number in this discussion is close to reality but suspect that both sides will have to reduce their artillery expenditure at least until May. This war could be very quiet for a couple of months.

Anyhow, Ukraine is requesting 250,000 shells a month from the EU.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

On 13 May, Russia lost 4 aircraft in one day, two Mi-8 helicopters, one Su-34 and one Su-35. This was their highly daily losses since the first month of the war. They were shot down just inside of the Russian territory, in Bryansk province.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is clear that the Russian attempt to cut off Ukrainian power and freeze them out over the winter has failed and they have not done any of those massive missile strikes since 9 March.

There has been some increase in airstrikes and drone attacks this month, partly in response to Ukrainian strikes, but nothing that looked like a major strike. The last major Russian airstrike was on 9 March. The previous one was on 10 February. Meanwhile, on 4 May a Russian hypersonic missile was reported to have been shot down by a Patriot missile. This was not supposed to be possible.

Attack on Kyiv on 15/16 May result in 18 out of 18 attacking claimed to have been shot down. One Patriot launcher was damaged. The Patriot missile battery was the target of the attack.

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Completer write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). 

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Russia continues their display of Orc-like behavior with a video coming out of the execution of the POW tentatively identified as Oleksandr Ihorevich Matsievskiy of the Territorial Defense Forces. His last words were “Slava Ukraini.”  This execution probably occurred sometime in early February.

Another video was released on 11 April of a Russian-speaking Ukrainian soldier being beheaded, ISIL-like. This appears to have occurred last summer. I gather this was done by Wagner.

You would think at some point the Russian senior command would understand that this is working against them politically and is resulting in wide-spread international support for Ukraine, which is resulting in increased shipment of arms and ammunition. It also continues to show a real lack of discipline among the rank and file. In addition to being an inhumane war crime, it is just plain stupid. 

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Itis going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction. 

Belarus: Belarus is back in the news as its dictator, Lukashenko, is ill. Also, Belarus has signed an agreement on 25 May with Russia about basing tactical nuclear weapons there, with some sources claiming they have been deployed there. I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there..

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey. See Day 443 for more info. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. We shall see if he is now willing to let Sweden into NATO.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

Shebekino

Shebekino is a town in Belgorod province 19 miles (30 km) southeast of Belgorod. It population in the 2021 census was 39,680, down from 44,552 in 1989.

It was founded in 1713 and on 1 June 2023 came under fire from Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainian-allied Freedom of Russia Legion is conducting operations in this area, and Russia does not seem to be able to easily suppress them. There may be a 100 or so anti-Putin Russians operating there.

Shebekino is on the Nezhegol River just south of Maslova Pristan. During the Battle of Kursk, which started 4 July 1943, the town was at the southern end of the Seventh Guards Army area of deployment, and they were faced by the German 42nd Army Corps. The 42nd Army Corps conducted feint attacks on the first couple of days of the offensive, and no other significant actions occurred there during July or August 1943.

On the other hand, just to the Northwest, Maslova Pristan was at the center of a bloody German attack of 5 July 1943, where the 320th Infantry Division tried to cross the Donets River in the face of considerable Russian opposition. Even though this produced the bloodiest day of action in July by any German division during the offensive in south, these operations are often left entirely out of some books on the Battle of Kursk.

Anyhow, in my big book on Kursk, I do reference Shebekino some 13 times. The references are on pages 414 (twice), 415 (3 times), 417 (2 times), 494 (3), 495, 548, and 657.

I have never been to Shebekino, but I was at Maslov Pristan in the 1990s. I left one picture in my book of the railroad embankment at Maslova Pristan (page 224 and above) and the road from Maslova Pristan (page 225). 

Some reports:

Attacks on Shebekino triggers criticism of Russian authorities – ISW report (yahoo.com)

Freedom of Russia Legion Destroys Russian Tanks Near Shebekino Checkpoint In Belgorod Region | Ukrainian news (ukranews.com)

 

So has the Spring Offensive started?

So, has the Spring Offensive started and no one has really noticed it? There are a few people who claim that it has:

Opinion | Counteroffensive against Russia is Ukraine’s D-Day – The Washington Post 

Now I have not read this article as I am too cheap to subscribe, as usually significant parts of it are requoted elsewhere: WP: First Stage Of AFU Counter-Offensive Is Higher Than Expected – Belarusian News – Charter’97 (charter97.org)

Probably the most interesting quote is from Col, Roman Svitan “At the moment, the Ukrainian military is conducting “forming’ operations…’This is not the main blow yet.‘” (my bolding).

Another supportive article (still quotes the Washington Post).

Ukraine Situation Report: Offensive Going Better Than Expected, U.S. Says (yahoo.com)

On the other hand, other commentators are not really saying this:

Update from Ukraine | Is it the start of the Ukrainian Counterattack? New Achievements – YouTube

Update from Ukraine | Who blown up the Dam? Ukraine Lost Leopard-2 John Deer Modification – YouTube (discussion on dam continues to 11:32, when he switches to discussion of the front line).