Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

Excess Deaths in China

Still can’t get to the Johns Hopkins site to do my weekly update. Not sure why.

In the meantime, let me briefly address the issue of excess deaths in China, as that was not discussed in the Economist article.

An article of interest: https://medicalxpress.com/news/2021-02-deaths-china-covid-outbreak.html

Also see: https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/372/bmj.n415.full.pdf

Main points:

  1. This only looked at 1 January to 31 March 2020
  2. Overall deaths did not increase for most of China.
  3. Excess deaths were in Wuhan were 412 per 100,000.
    1. Or, to convert this to a meaningful number, population of the urban area of  Wuhan in 2018 was 8,896,900. 
      1. Population of the Prefecture is 11,081,000 in 2018.
      2. Population of the Metro area is 19 million.
    2. Therefore, excess deaths are at least 36,655 depending on which population is used.
  4. Outside of Wuhan city, the overall death rate was slightly lower. This is probably related to the lockdown.

I have not seen excess deaths calculations for all of China or excess death calculations after 31 March 2020. China reported as of last week 4,848 deaths. This is probably undercounted. The actual number of deaths in China from Coronavirus is probably in the tens of thousands and may exceed a hundred thousand. I have not seen evidence indicating that it is worse than that.

Excess Deaths in various countries

I am trying to get away from posting about the Coronavirus and spend my time talking about things like Afghanistan and insurgencies, but right now the Johns Hopkins Covid tracker is not opening, so I can’t do my weekly update. May have to wait until tomorrow to do that. So instead, let me point our a recent article in the Economist on excess deaths: https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/coronavirus-excess-deaths-tracker

A few highlights:
1. Mexico: Covid-19 deaths: 201,600; Excess deaths: 494,690

2. Russia: Covid-19 deaths: 97,200; Excess deaths: 494,610

3. Italy: Covid-19 deaths: 86,490; Excess deaths: 116,410

4. United States: Covid-19 deaths: 558,060; Excess deaths: 597,490

5. Britain: Covid-19 deaths:  150,920: Excess deaths 119.320

6. Belgium: Covid-19 deaths: 24,020; Excess deaths: 18,890

7. France: Covid-19 deaths: 102,290: Excess deaths: 81,690 

8. Germany: Covid-19 deaths; Excess deaths: 52,670

 

So, there appears to be:

  1. A number of countries that grossly underreport Covid-19 deaths. Mexico and Russia are two of the more extreme cases.
  2. There are a large number of countries where reported Covid-19 deaths and excess deaths are similar. This includes the United States and Spain.
  3. There are a number of countries where they are reporting more Covid-19 deaths then they have excess deaths. This is Britain, Belgium, France, Italy and Germany.
  4. And then there are countries like Japan and New Zealand where excess deaths is in the negative (for example New Zealand reports 30 Covid-19 deaths, while their excess deaths are -2,060. In the case of Japan is it -11,280 Excess deaths compared to 7,880 reported Covid-19 cases). There are 14 countries that report negative excess deaths during this time. This is not entirely surprising as shut downs reduce traffic, and vehicle accidents are a leading cause of death in most countries. 

China is not listed in this article.

Comparative Mortality Rates from Coronavirus by Nation

Split off the material on mortality rates into a separate blog post. As is already known, countries do not report or catch every case of Coronavirus. It appears in the case of the United States, the actual number of cases is 3 to 4 times higher than what is reported. For other countries (like Russia), the disparity is even higher. Mortality rates might be a more useful metric for measuring differences between counties, but even these are not consistently reported. On the other hand, they can be checked by doing a comparison of “excess deaths” in 2020 and 2021 compared to previous years. So far I have checked excess deaths and blogged about it for two countries, the United States, which was close to the figure for reported mortality figures; and for Russia, which has an excess death figure way higher than their reported mortality figures. The suspicion is that Russia has been covering up or discouraging reporting of deaths from coronavirus.  Anyhow, knowing this is not perfect or consistently reported data, here is a comparative mortality rates between various countries.

First I list the “top ten.” I may have missed a smaller country that I have not been watching. I then list a couple of other European countries. Then I list Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Next is the listing of the four Scandinavian countries. This comparison is interesting as Sweden took a different approach (no lockdown) compared to the other three. Finally, I list some selected East Asian countries. Mortality is calculate as the number reported killed per million population. The higher the figure, they worst they are doing.

Morality rate (people killed per million population) by country:

Country    Population   Deaths     Rate

San Marino   0.034                 90    2,647

Brazil         213.4            525,892    2,464

Belgium       11.6              25,194    2,172

Italy              59.2            127,952    2,161

Colombia     51.0           110,019     2,157

Argentina     45.8              96,983    2,118

UK                67.1            128,532    1,915

Mexico       126.0            233,958    1,857

U.S.             332.0           605,944     1,825

Spain            47.4              80,952    1,708

Russia:       146.2

  reported:                       137,718       942

  excess:                          460,000    3,146

 

 

France          67.4           111,426     1,653

Germany      83.2              91,122    1,095

 

Canada         38.3              26,344       688

Australia       25.8                   910         35

New Zealand   5.1                    26            5

 

Sweden         10.4              14,639     1,408

Denmark         5.8                 2,539        438

Norway           5.4                    796         147

Finland           5.5                     976        177

 

China        1,411.8                 4,848            3

S. Korea         51.7                 2,033          39

Japan         126.2                 14,847        118

Taiwan          23.5                     715          30

Vietnam        97.6                       97            1

Singapore       5.7                       36            6

 

This does seem to be the most useful measure of response to the Coronavirus. As can be seen, some countries have done a much better job than others. This does not seem to be tied to wealth. It does seem to be related to leadership, or lack thereof. 

Excess deaths blog posts:

Excess Deaths and Coronavirus | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Excess Mortality in Russia | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Coronavirus in the DC area – weekly update 66

Colorized picture from California, 1918. Source: reddit

This is weekly update number 66 on the coronavirus in the DC area. This week the D.C area (pop. 5.4 million) slightly increased to 446 new cases over the week. Last week it was 439 new cases. Twenty-four weeks ago it was 18,934 new cases.

Parts of Europe seem to be bringing the virus under control, but parts of Europe appear to be losing control. This varies widely by country. Italy (pop. 60.3 million), the original epicenter of the European outbreak, reported 907 new cases for yesterday. The UK (pop. 67.1 million) has had an upswing that seems to only be getting worse. They are reporting 29K new cases yesterday. Its high was 68K new cases on 8 January. It was down below 2K cases a day a month ago. France (pop. 67.4 million) has the fourth highest number of reported cases in the world (after U.S., India and Brazil). They reported for France 4K new cases yesterday. The new case count yesterday for Spain has increased to 14K for yesterday and is back on the rise. One wonders why Italy has gotten it under control but the U.K. and Spain are again losing control of the situation. As for Germany it is only 713 new cases yesterday and for Russia it is up to 23K new cases a day. Keep in mind, these are daily rates. They do add up over the course of a week. The U.S. (population 331.9 million) had 24K new cases yesterday, which is twice as high as it was last week. Our high was 300K new cases on 2 January. In Asia and the Pacific the number of reported cases remains low: China (58), Japan (1,689), South Korea is rising (1,212), Taiwan (27, after peaking at 723 on 5/22), Vietnam is rising (1,029 !) which is their highest reported daily rate ever, Singapore (10), Australia (30) and New Zealand (5). Again, these are daily rates. Japan’s rate is pretty high for a country about to host the Olympics. Australia, which has a low rate, are still cancelling potentially spreader events like the Australian Grand Prix.

All the data is from the Johns Hopkin’s website as of today, 10:22 AM:  Johns Hopkins CSSE. 

……………………..….Population…last week…this week…Deaths
Washington D.C…….…..702,445…….49,347….49,417….1,142
Arlington, VA……………..237,521..…..15,301….15,321…….258
Alexandria VA……………160,530…….11,882…..11,900…….139
Fairfax County, VA…….1,150,795.……77,136.…77,210….1,117
Falls Church, VA…………..14,772.……….430.…..…430………..8
Fairfax City, VA……..…..…24,574.……….572.………574………20
Loudoun County, VA….…406,850…….28,097.….28,100…….283
Prince Williams C., VA…..468,011…….45,792.….45,847…….508
Manassas…………………..41,641..……..4,315.…..4,317………48
Manassas Park………….…17,307….…..1,221.…..1,222………11
Stafford Country, VA……..149,960……..11,537.…11,555………82
Fredericksburg, VA…………29,144……..2,154…….2,158………25
Montgomery C., MD…….1,052,567……71,171.…71,251…..1,626
Prince Georges C., MD.…..909,308……85,509….85,608…..1,597
Total……….…….….……..5,365,425…404,464…404,910…..6,864

The Mortality Rate is 1.70%. There were 9 fatalities in the last week compared to 446 new cases. This is a mortality rate of 2.02%.  The population known to have been infected is 7.55% or one confirmed case for every 13 people.

Virginia (pop. 8.5 million) had only 132 new cases yesterday. Last week it was 148 cases. Twenty-three weeks ago it was 4,707.

Dare County, North Carolina (pop. 37K), a beach area in the outer banks, has had 2,201 cases (2,185 last week) and 10 deaths.

Will China invade Taiwan in the next 20 years? Summation:

This post is a summation of my previous ten posts on the subject. We first looked in two posts whether there was a reasonable threat of Taiwan being invaded in the next six years. Our conclusion was that the idea was “somewhat loopy.” I was surprised that I received no push-back from any readers on this. The two posts are:

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – wherefore and why? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

My nagging suspicion was that the claims made by retiring Admiral Phillip Davidson of the Indo-Pacific Command was a whole lot more related to preserving or generating budget than it was a realistic assessment.

I then looked at what is the costs and risks for China if they choose to invade Taiwan. They are significant and it is not just economic. I also looked at the leadership of China, which is more than one man. This is in this post: Will China take the risk and actually invade Taiwan? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

I then took a more long-term look (20 years) at the subject with an introductory post and six follow-up post discussing each of the six variables in depth. They are:

Will China invade Taiwan in the next 20 years? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 1: Who is the leader of China? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 2: What is the changing composition of the politburo? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 3: How is the economy of China doing? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 4: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 5: What is the degree of U.S. commitment to Taiwan? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 6: What is the size and capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

To try to summarize, the leadership of China is in their sixties. They tend to be careful, deliberate and somewhat risk adverse. They are not very likely do a high-risk operation that could undermine the Chinese economy and potentially Communist Chinese rule. Therefore, the Taiwan is really not at risk of invasion unless there is a leadership change and this is probably not going to happen in the next 10-15 years. That new leadership may also be risk adverse. So, kind of looking at less than a 25% chance of getting risk taking leadership who would be tempted to do this, and that window for that happening is probably 15-20 years out.

But, in addition to getting the leaders who would take the risk, the Chinese also needs to build up a navy and air force to do so. They really don’t have the air force. For example, they only have 400 modern aircraft. Taiwan alone has 159. Add a few hundred aircraft from the U.S. inventory of 2,700 and any invasion is in trouble. Good luck conducting and sustaining a large amphibious operation when the defenders have air superiority. I don’t recall this ever being attempted before. Basically, for China to do anything militarily, it has to build another 1,000 or more modern aircraft. This is expensive. Certainly can’t be done with present defense budget. So, what we will see, and it we will have years of warning, is a significant increase in Chinese defense budget (above 2% of GDP), building of hundred of aircraft, building more naval assets and so forth. So we will know if they are really serious by the budget expenditures. Right now, their defense budget does not really give them the ability to invade Taiwan.

Now, of course, such a scenario does require U.S. assistance to defend Taiwan. This is discussed in “variable 4.” The real key is that to defend Taiwan can be done primarily with air assets. This is a much less lower threshold for engagement then sending troops, and we have not been that adverse to sending troops around the world (Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria for example). Do we have enough commitment to send just air forces? 

The real key is whether U.S. commitment declines over time and whether China does indeed build up. This does create a window say 15-20 years out where China may have the capability in place and U.S. commitment is wavering and the Chinese leadership is willing to take a risk. The problem is that China has a demographic problem. According to some reports, their population is already declining. This is going to create a drag on their economy. 

We have been talking about this for a while: Demographics of China | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Witness Japan: Where Did Japan Go? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

So, the drag on the Chinese economy from their demographics, along with possibly other economic or political problems may well become a major factor in the next ten years. How does this play out if their window of opportunity for doing this military and politically is 15-20 years out? Does this mean that they really will never be in position to invade Taiwan? This does look to be the case. 

Now, this does not rule out a mis-calculation or a major mistake by the Chinese leadership. History is full of such idiocy, like Japan attacking a country in 1941 that had over ten times the GDP that they did. So we cannot rule out, no matter how the situation looks on paper, that someone will ignore the statistics and do it anyway. There are plenty of examples of this in history.

Now, I do believe that it is essential that the U.S. maintains its commitment to Taiwan to maintain the deterrence. This certainly includes maintaining fleet presence in the area, arm sales to Taiwan, and conducting exercises with South Korea and Japan the emphasizes reinforcing the area. This are all good and what we have been doing. Of course, plopping a brigade in Taiwan would be the ultimate commitment, but I don’t think that is on anyone’s agenda.

Still, my conclusion is that this is:

  1. Not going to happen in the next 6 years.
  2. Probably not going to happen in the next 15 years.
  3. May be a threat in the next 15-20 years, but only if
    1. The new Chinese leadership is willing to take a risk.
    2. The Chinese economy is growing.
    3. The Chinese governance is stable.
    4. The Chinese military has been built up significantly.
    5. The U.S. commitment has weakened.
  4. Could always happen if the Chinese make a major mis-calculation.

My overall conclusion is that this is not very likely to happen. Still, one must be prepared for it, and by being prepared for it, it decreases the likelihood of it ever happening.

 

 

—–some additional ruminations from the first draft of this blog post that was done about a month ago——-

It is clear that the danger to Taiwan will become obvious over time. The army may be capable of conducting an amphibious invasion now, but the navy and air force is not large enough. With a concerted effort, certainly the Air Force could be built up and modernized over a decade or so, but it going to take longer to build a fleet that at least temporarily contest the seas with the U.S. These are build-ups that will develop over time and will be noticed. So we will know when were are truly moving into a period of real exposure. Whether the political leadership will react in the proper and timely manner is another subject.

But, there is also the possibility of a changing regime in the People’s Republic (more democratic or in political turmoil) could obviate the threat to Taiwan or much less likely, a changing regime in the Democratic Republic (Taiwan) could take away the need to defend it (they might want to join China?). So the problem could magically go away, but we have no indication of that now.

The end result is I do not think there is a real threat of it happening any time in the next decade. I think in the second half of the second decade (more than 15 years from now) China could have all the pieces in place to make it happen, but we will see them develop it over time. Right now, with defense spending at 1.7% or less of their GDP, they may not get there in two decades. But regardless, it will be clear if it is happening.

So, I sort of discount the possibility that China will invade Taiwan in the next 20 years. It could happen. To do so would require 1) new leadership that is willing to take the risk, 2) significant build up of the air force, 3) build up of naval and sea-lane control assets, 4) the correct internal regime conditions (desire and sufficient economic/political stability), and 5) a favorable international situation (U.S. lack of commitment). Will all these conditions track in a manor favorable to invading Taiwan in the next 20 years? I would not stake money on it.

Variable 6: What is the size and capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces?

I think I covered most of this in my previous posts, for example: Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). But, let me walk and talk through the subject one last time.

An amphibious invasion of Taiwan is going to require China to not only put an army across that can defeat the 130,000-man Taiwanese Army, but to also supply that invading army for the duration of the operation (which could takes weeks or months). This means maintaining control of the sea and the air. So while China probably has the army right now that is capable of doing this, if the United States supports Taiwan, it does not have the navy or the air force to do this (especially over time).

So, for the Chinese armed forces to invade Taiwan, they will need not only an army (which the have), but a navy (which they currently do not have) and an air force (which they really don’t have) that can control the sea and the air around Taiwan.

So, for the Chinese to invade Taiwan, they need to either 1) build up their navy, 2) built up and modernize their air force, and/or 3) make sure the United States does not intervene. As this last point is covered in the last post, let us just look like at what they need to do to address the first two points.

The Chinese navy currently consists of 2 small carriers and 36 destroyers. The U.S. navy consists of around 11 large carriers, 9 amphibious carriers, 22 cruisers and 59 destroyers. This is a gross mismatch. See: .

See: The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And: Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The U.S. Navy is here: U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Therefore, over the next 20 years, any significant build-up of naval capabilities will be a strong indicator of intention. The build-up has to be more than another small carrier or two and more than a few more destroyers. They have to build up a capability to at least seal the Straits of Formosa from U.S. naval intervention for at least a month. Now that can be done with air, missiles, smaller surface ships, submarines, etc., but without a deep water navy, they will have lots of other problems (economic interdiction, interdiction of oil supplies, loss of the Spratly Islands, etc.). It is not a pretty picture for them no matter how they look at it, and building up a navy that can take on our deep water fleet is a very tough task to do in next 20 years. Kind of reminds me of Kaiser Willy’s attempt before the Great War to build a battlefleet to challenge the British. That did not work out well either.

And then there is the air. Now according to an article Clinton Reilly just posted in the comments (and I saw not reason to cross-check their data) the U.S. Air Force has nearly 2,300 warplanes in service and 1,422 aircraft for the U.S. Navy and Marines. So, 3,700 + Taiwan’s air force (300+) + anyone else that wants to help (S. Korea, Japan and Australia come to mind). China has 1,264 airplanes. Furthermore, among the most advanced planes are 19 J-20s, 50 J-16s, and 235 J-11s (a variant of the Su-27), 24 Su-34s, 76 Su-30s or 404 airplanes that hold my attention. In contrast the United States Air Force has 432 F-15s, 939 F-16s, 186 F-22s, and 283 F-35s or 1,840. The U.S. Navy has 532 F-18s and 18 F-35s while the USMC has 273 F-18s and 57 F-35s. Taiwan has 113 F-16s and 46 Mirage 2000. So a total of 2,720 vice 404. 

So while one can talk about differing world-wide missions and obligations for the U.S. air forces; for a short period of time, it ain’t that hard to quickly shift a lot of the planes to the defense of Taiwan. The People’s Republic of China (Red China) kind of needs to be able to take on over 2,000 hostile modern fighter aircraft. Hard to do with only 400 of their own.

So, for China to be able to establish permanent control of the airspace around Taiwan, do they need at least another 1,000 planes? May be…probably. Not sure how they do so otherwise. So, then means a pretty serious building program over the next 20 years. We will see this coming. 

So, to have a serious threat to invade and maintain that invasion force they are really going to have go through a serious build-up of both naval and air assets. Far more than what they are doing right now. Furthermore, we will see it coming for years. Added to that, we can also respond in kind. So…..

Coronavirus in the DC area – weekly update 65

Colorized picture from California, 1918. Source: reddit

This is weekly update number 65 on the coronavirus in the DC area. This week the D.C area (pop. 5.4 million) slightly declined to 439 new cases over the week. Last week it was 455 new cases. Twenty-three weeks ago it was 18,934 new cases.

Europe also seems to be slowly bringing the virus under control. Italy (pop. 60.3 million), the original epicenter of the European outbreak, reported 677 new cases for yesterday. The UK has had an upswing that seems to only be getting worse. They are reporting 20K new cases yesterday. Its high was 68K new cases on 8 January. It was down below 2K cases a day a month ago. France has the fourth highest number of reported cases in the world (after U.S., India and Brazil). Yesterday they reported for France 3K new cases yesterday. Their death count of 111,232 (population 67.4 million) is the eighth highest reported deaths in the world (behind U.S., Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, UK, and Italy). Still, it is less than the UK with 128,390 dead in a population of 67.1 million, Italy with 127,542 deaths in a population of 59.2 million, Belgium with 25,170 deaths out of a population of 11.6 million, Brazil with 515,985 deaths out of a population of 213.3 million, Mexico with 232,803 deaths out of a population of 126.0 million, Argentina with 93,668 deaths out of a population of 45.8 million) and Colombia with 105,934 deaths out of a population of 51.0 million. These seven countries have a higher reported mortality rate than the United States (604,479 deaths in a population of 331.9 million). Don’t know for certain if they are the only seven countries with a higher reported mortality rate, I suspect Russia, with a calculated excess deaths of 460,000 is also higher (see previous blog post). The new case count yesterday for Spain has increased to 7K for yesterday, for Germany it is only 569 and for Russia it is up to 20K new cases a day. Keep in mind, these are daily rates. They do add up over the course of a week. The U.S. (population 331.7 million) had 12K new cases yesterday, which is about the same as the last two weeks. Our high was 300K new cases on 2 January. In Asia and the Pacific the number of reported cases remains low: China (low…can’t read the chart), Japan (1,401), South Korea (794), Taiwan (54 !), Vietnam (371 !), Singapore (354 !), Australia (42 !) and New Zealand (1). Again, these are daily rates. Japan’s rate is pretty high for a country about to host the Olympics.

All the data is from the Johns Hopkin’s website as of today, 10:21 AM:  Johns Hopkins CSSE. 

……………………..….Population…last week…this week…Deaths
Washington D.C…….…..702,445…….49,284…..49,347….1,141
Arlington, VA……………..237,521..…..15,299…..15,301…….258
Alexandria VA……………160,530…….11,864…..11,882…….139
Fairfax County, VA…….1,150,795.……77,057…..77,136…1,115
Falls Church, VA…………..14,772.……….429……….430………8
Fairfax City, VA……..…..…24,574.……….571……….572……..20
Loudoun County, VA….…406,850……..28,065…..28,097……283
Prince Williams C., VA…..468,011……..45,728…..45,792……506
Manassas…………………..41,641..……..4,312……4,315……..48
Manassas Park………….…17,307….……1,219……1,221…..…11
Stafford Country, VA……..149,960……..11,491…..11,537…..…82
Fredericksburg, VA…………29,144………2,150……2,154…..…25
Montgomery C., MD…….1,052,567……71,119…..71,171….1,623
Prince Georges C., MD.…..909,308……85,437…..85,509….1,596
Total……….…….….……..5,365,425….404,025…404,464….6,855

The Mortality Rate is 1.69%. There were 11 fatalities in the last week compared to 439 new cases. This is a mortality rate of 2.51% (which is high, but probably caused by the declining number of reported new cases). The population known to have been infected is 7.54% or one confirmed case for every 13 people.

Virginia (pop. 8.5 million) had only 148 new cases yesterday. Last week it was 144 cases. Twenty-two weeks ago it was 4,707.

Dare County, North Carolina (pop. 37K), a beach area in the outer banks, has 2,185 cases (2,181 last week) and 10 deaths.

Coronavirus in Russia

I know some people who are in Moscow right now. Their observations are that:

1. No one is wearing masks.

2. They are still congregating like normal.

3. Even though the signs at the subway are saying they should wear masks, no one is wearing masks.

4. But don’t take my word for this: here is a video of downtown Moscow on 4 June 2021:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wjP4Vkf_V1w

5. Probably the reported number of cases for Russia (5,408,744 cases total) is low because most people don’t get tested.

Now this last point is always an issue. Part of the reason I focus on mortality rates is because I am guessing that the expected mortality rate should be around 0.5% or 1 death per 200 cases. In the case of the United States the mortality rate is 1.80%. This probably means that number of actual cases is up to four times higher than the number of reported cases. In the case of Russia, the mortality rate is 2.43%. This probably means that the number of actual cases is maybe five times higher than the number of reported cases.

But, the number of deaths in Russia is also grossly under-reported. This has been “known” for many months. The reported number of deaths is 131,671. On 1 May 2021, The Moscow Times reported that “excess deaths” estimates place the number of cases at 460,000. More to the point, 460,000 more people died in a twelve month period from April 2020 to March 2021 compared to the number that died during the same period the previous year. Certainly the vast majority of those excess deaths were due to Coronavirus. So 460,000 deaths versus 5,408,744 reported cases or a mortality rate of  8.5%. That would make the argument that the number infected is actually more like over 60% of the country (assuming the mortality rate is actually around 0.5%, less if it is higher). If there is 460,000 excess deaths from Coronavirus, then with a population of 146.2 million, we are looking at 3,146 deaths per million people. In contrast, the United States has 604,006 deaths in a population of 331.9 million or 1,820 deaths per million people. Just to compare to a more competent response, Canada has 26,188 deaths in a population of 38.3 million or 684 deaths per million people.

Copy of The Moscow Times article:

https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/05/01/russias-pandemic-excess-death-toll-passes-460k-a73804

It is worth while looking at the chart of excess deaths in that article. I was not able to to add it to this blog post.

A lot of Russian have been vaccinated: 39.2 million doses administered out of a population of 146.2 million (including Crimea and Sevastopol) according to John’s Hopkins. Right now the number of cases in Russia is on the rise, about 20K cases a day as of last Friday compared to the United States at 7K cases last Friday and Canada at 606 cases last Friday.

Coronavirus in the DC area – weekly update 64

Colorized picture from California, 1918. Source: reddit

This is weekly update number 64 on the coronavirus in the DC area. This week the D.C area (pop. 5.4 million) slightly declined to 445 new cases over the week. Last week it was 461 new cases. Twenty-two weeks ago it was 18,934 new cases.

Europe also seems to be slowly bringing the virus under control. Italy (pop. 60.3 million), the original epicenter of the European outbreak, reported 834 new cases for yesterday. The UK has had an upswing, reporting 12K new cases yesterday. Its high was 68K new cases on 8 January. It was down below 2K cases a day a month ago. France has the fourth highest number of cases in the world (after U.S., India and Brazil). Yesterday they reported for France 2K new cases. Their death count of 110,991 (population 67.4 million) is the eighth highest reported deaths in the world (behind U.S., Brazil, India, Mexico, Russia, UK, and Italy). Still, it is less than the UK with 128,272 dead in a population of 67.1 million, Italy with 127,322 deaths in a population of 59.2 million, Belgium with 25,144 deaths out of a population of 11.6 million, Brazil with 504,717 deaths out of a population of 213.3 million, Mexico with 231,505 deaths out of a population of 126.0 million, Argentina with 90,281 deaths out of a population of 45.8 million) and Colombia with 101,302 deaths out of a population of 51.0 million. These seven countries have a higher reported mortality rate than the United States (602,504 deaths in a population of 331.9 million). Don’t know for certain if they are the only seven countries with a higher reported mortality rate. The new case count yesterday for Spain remains around 4K, for Germany it is 685 and for Russia 16K new cases a day. Keep in mind, these are daily rates. They do add up over the course of a week. The U.S. (population 331.7 million) had 11K new cases yesterday, which is about the same at last week. Our high was 300K new cases on 2 January. In Asia and the Pacific the number of reported cases remains low: China (31), Japan (1,443), South Korea (644), Taiwan (77), Vietnam (252), Singapore (18), Australia (14) and New Zealand (3). Again, these are daily rates. Japan’s rate is pretty high for a country about to host the Olympics.

All the data is from the Johns Hopkin’s website as of today, 11:21 AM:  Johns Hopkins CSSE. 

……………………..….Population…last week…this week…Deaths
Washington D.C…….…..702,445…….49,213…..49,284…..1,141
Arlington, VA……………..237,521..…..15,296…..15,299….…257
Alexandria VA……………160,530…….11,851…..11,864……..138
Fairfax County, VA…….1,150,795.……77,011…..77,057…..1,111
Falls Church, VA…………..14,772.……….429………429……..…7
Fairfax City, VA……..…..…24,574.………..567……..571……….20
Loudoun County, VA….…406,850……..28,019….28,065…….283
Prince Williams C., VA…..468,011……..45,607….45,728…….505
Manassas…………………..41,641..……..4,310…….4,312……..48
Manassas Park………….…17,307….…..1,219……1,219………11
Stafford Country, VA……..149,960…….11,462…..11,491………82
Fredericksburg, VA…………29,144……..2,150……2,150………25
Montgomery C., MD…….1,052,567……71,071…71,119…..1,622
Prince Georges C., MD.…..909,308……85,375…85,437….1,594
Total……….…….….……..5,365,425….403,580..404,025….6,844

The Mortality Rate is 1.69%. There were 19 fatalities in the last week compared to 445 new cases. This is a mortality rate of 4.27% (which is high, but probably caused by the declining number of reported new cases). The population known to have been infected is 7.53% or one confirmed case for every 13 people. 

Virginia (pop. 8.5 million) had only 144 new cases yesterday. Last week it was 137 cases. Twenty-one weeks ago it was 4,707. 

Dare County, North Carolina (pop. 37K), a beach area in the outer banks, has 2,181 cases (2,171 last week) and 10 deaths.

 

Variable 5: What is the degree of U.S. commitment to Taiwan?

The people who are saying with certainty that China is going to invade Taiwan in the next two decades seem to be discounting a lot of factors that would indicate that China would not do so, regardless. For example, I would guess that there is at least a 50% chance that the Chinese economy would stagnate or slow down in the next two decades. This most likely precludes them taking a step as drastic as invading Taiwan. Then there is the current leadership of China, which tends to be careful and cautious. I do not think the current leadership of China is likely to invade Taiwan. They may well be in power for the better part of the next two decades. So, one could make the argument that there appears to be a least a 75% chance that China will not invade Taiwan in the next two decades, regardless of the degree of U.S. commitment.

Now, I have heard some people talk about this invasion as almost a certainty. To bring me on board with their thinking they would have convince me that: 1) Xi Jinping and the current politburo are ready to take such a gamble, 2) that the Chinese economy will be continually stable and  growing for the next two decades, and 3) that they have built up their air and naval capability to ensure such an effort. I don’t think one can make a rational argument that it is almost a certainty. Still, it is a possibility and a very real possibility, which leads us into examining U.S. commitment.

The degree of U.S. commitment is a significant variable, and perhaps the most difficult element to predict. There does some to be some sort of “conventional” wisdom that the United States is hesitant to commit troops to fight in far off places. Yet, the actual track record is the reverse. So, for example, it appears that some people (including Joseph Stalin) assumed that the United States would not intervene if there was an invasion of South Korea. So North Korea rolled across the border in 1950 with their T-34s, the U.S. responded, and my father ended up fighting there.

Then there is Vietnam, where we had a large military assistance program of tens of thousands of people and the South Vietnamese government was still losing the war. So we then decided to send hundreds of thousands of troops there to engage hundreds of thousand of Vietnamese guerillas and even some North Vietnamese troops, putting us into the fourth bloodiest war in U.S. history. My father ending up fighting there twice.

Then there is Kuwait, where the United States had no political, legal, alliance, or defense obligations; yet when they were invaded in 1990 by Iraq, we sent over hundreds to thousands of troops and drove the Iraqi’s out in the 1991 Gulf War. None of my family were involved in that one, although Trevor Dupuy did some estimates for congress that are worth noting (see: Forecasting the 1990-1991 Gulf War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Assessing the TNDA 1990-91 Gulf War Forecast | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Assessing the 1990-1991 Gulf War Forecasts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Then we were attacked on 9/11. In response in 2001 we invaded not only the country that was housing Osama bin Laden (Afghanistan), but in 2003 we also invaded Iraq. Threw both governments out of power and occupied both countries. My brother was in Afghanistan a half-dozen times. None of my family were involved in Iraq, although I did do an estimate of casualties and duration for a guerilla war in Iraq: See America’s Modern Wars, Chapter 1.

And then there is also the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), the Invasion of Grenada (1983) and the Invasion of Panama (1989), among many other interventions. My father was deployed in the first one as part of a projected amphibious invasion force. We have no direct connection to the other two events.

So, if you have smugly adopted the “conventional” wisdom that the U.S. won’t commit troops to fight in far off places, well you probably should re-evaluate the basis for your smugness. It does not match with my personal experiences.

The real discussion:

So, will the United States intervene to support Taiwan? Well, that does not have to be answered with a definitive “yes.” A simple “maybe” is probably enough. It is a case of deterring the Chinese from determining that this could be a successful course of action. If it is uncertain, will they then undertake it? 

The main thing is that it needs to be clear that the answer is not “no – we won’t intervene.’ We also have to ensure that the Chinese do not make the mistake of assuming that it is “no” or calculating that if they move quick enough, it can be presented as a fait acompli (much like Stalin tried with North Korea in 1950). So, the most likely U.S. strategy is that they will continue to make it clear that they are willing to support, able to support Taiwan. The problem is that not only do they need to make it clear, but they need to make sure that China believes it.

Now, the actual level of support for Taiwan in the U.S. may decline over the next twenty years. There are three major factors driving this 1) the U.S. does not have strong ties to supporting Taiwan, 2) the current Republican Party appears to be leaning towards being anti-interventionist, 3) the Democrats have traditionally not been interventionist (although WWI, WWII, Korea, Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam occurred on their watch). Lets address each of these:

  1. Are the U.S. as willing to defend Taiwan because it was a democracy as they were when they were “anti-communist?” The PRC is still one of four communist countries in the world, but the policy of containment and anti-communism is not what it once was. Do we care as much about supporting democracies as we did about containing communism? Probably not. There is not a track record to strongly indicate otherwise.
  2. Elements of the current Republican Party appears to be anti-interventionist. This is not the first time. They were very much that way in the 1920s and 1930s and there have been significant isolationist and anti-interventionist movements in the party in recent times, including Pat Buchanan’s runs for president in 1992, 1996 and 2000 and Ron Paul’s campaigns for president in 2008 and 2012. The last Republican president appeared to be instinctually an isolationist and anti-interventionist. Is this the future of the Republican Party going forward? Hard to say. I saw Liz Cheney tweeting this week about defending Taiwan, but she is kind of on the outs with a lot in people in the party (they voted her out of her leadership position in the House). So, it may well be. As it is, I suspect they will be out of power more often than they are in power for the next 40+ years (See: Is the United States on the Verge of Becoming a Single Party Democracy? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org))
  3. Then there is the Democratic Party, which has been anti-interventionist since the Vietnam War (they were not before the Vietnam War). Still, since the Vietnam War we have seen intervention by Democratic presidents in places like Kosovo, Syria, Libya, etc. So, they are not completely anti-interventionist, but this is a strong tendency in the party.

So, we are staring at a situation where the vast majority of the electorate, many congressmen and many senators don’t really have a strong opinion on this. This creates an environment where there is not a lot of clear underlying support for Taiwan.  

The key then becomes who is president. That seems to be driven by whoever is randomly in office (and sometimes it does seem random). Would we have sent over a couple of hundred thousand troops to liberate Kuwait in 1991 if Michael Dukakis was president instead of George Bush Sr.? Would the United States have invaded Iraq in 2003 if Al Gore was president instead of George Bush, Jr.? It is clear that who is in charge makes a big difference in these types of decisions. So, the question is: who will be in charge of the United States from 2029-2036 (assuming the current president serves for two terms, which is the most likely scenario) or 2037-2044? That is a pretty tough guess at the moment, although I do believe it will most likely be a Democrat. Will that individual be willing to intervene to protect Taiwan? Keep in mind, they actually don’t have to intervene, just have to appear to be willing to.

While I don’t think the U.S. policy on Taiwan will officially change over the next twenty years, the issue will be whether the United States has a credible deterrence. The key adjective is credible. As long as the Chinese believe there is a good chance that the United States will intervene, then there is deterrent value to the policy. If they do not believe we will, then that deterrence is gone. 

Now, the one thing we could do to maintain a credible deterrence is to base troops there (like we do in South Korea). I don’t think that anyone senior in the last or the current administration is recommending that. I also don’t think that this is likely to be U.S. policy going forward. Still, it is an option worth considering, for even if the vast majority of Americans are not interesting in supporting Taiwan, having troops there serves as a trip wire. It almost guarantees U.S. involvement and therefore serves as a very credible deterrent. Still, I suspect this would be a very hard sell for the American people. Also, if the U.S. did deploy troops to Taiwan, there would certainly be an outcry and some kind of response from China. That may not be worth the pain.

Now, in the past, deterrence has worked. Obviously, it has not always worked (Korea 1950), but in the case of the cold war, western Europe was not invaded by the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union and the United States did not fire nukes at each other. So, in those cases deterrence did work for 40+ years. The question is: can the U.S. maintain a credible deterrence against China in the decade after next. I do have my doubts. Of course, this does not automatically mean that Taiwan gets invaded, but it does open the door to that possibility.