Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

The Battle for Kyiv will be released on 30 November

The Battle for Kyiv will be released on 30 November in the UK. It will be released in the U.S. on 18 January 2024. The book is due to be delivered to the Pen & Sword warehouse on 24 November.

The book covers the first six or so weeks of the war. It is the first of a series of books on the war in Ukraine. The next book is the series is The Siege of Mariupol, which is currently being completed. It is co-authored with Stefan Korshak. His blog on Medium is here: Stefan Korshak – Medium. The third book in the series will be The Battle for the Donbas, covering the fighting in Spring and Summer of 2022.

We our down to our last 16 copies of Attrition

Just to give you all a heads-up, we are down to our last 16 copies of Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War. Hard to predict how long those remaining copies will last. It is still affordable at $19.95. Right now, Amazon is selling it used for $50 – $400. See: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org).

I do not control the rights to reprint it.

Ordering info is here: TDI Purchasing Publications (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

F-16s for Ukraine: Game Changer or Resource Waster?

Another posting from William (Chip) Sayers, who started his career in the air force:

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F-16s for Ukraine: Game Changer or Resource Waster? 

Now that the Biden Administration has finally decided to allow the Ukrainian Air Force to receive F-16 Falcons (or as they are known by their pilots, “Vipers”), a lot of pushback has shown up in the media claiming this is not a good decision. This pushback mainly comes in the form of two objections: The Ukrainians won’t be able to operate them until it is too late, and that once they do, the F-16 won’t prove to be a game changer.

Let’s discuss how long it will take the UAF to learn how to employ the F-16. Some of the pushback is coming from people with expertise in this field, including Viper instructor pilots, so we can’t just dismiss their opinions out of hand. However, we can evaluate what they have to say against the situation as it stands.

The experts usually claim that it will be years before the UAF can “fully exploit” the F-16, or something along those lines. And they are undoubtedly correct. You show me a really good Viper jock, and I’ll show you an experienced Major, someone with hundreds, or even thousands of hours in the F-16’s cockpit. However, this is undoubtedly irrelevant. If the UAF can exploit even half the capability of the F-16’s potential, they will be way ahead of where they were at the beginning of the war with their Russian-produced fighters. The real question is, how long will it take for the UAF to be able to operate the F-16s in a way that positively contributes to their war effort. And that will take substantially less time. According to a US Air Force report based on the training of two UAF fighter pilots, it should take three to four months.[i] How can this be?

First off, the UAF has a sizable cadre of trained MiG-29 and Su-27 pilots — aircraft comparable to the F-16, if a bit less capable. As it happens, it is significantly easier to fly and fight the F-16 compared to the Russian aircraft. Anyone who can fly the MiG-29 can learn to fly the Viper very rapidly. Two vignettes: In my somewhat abbreviated flying career, I flew the T-37, a sweet little trainer that was well suited to its job. However, having been designed in the 1950’s, its instrument layout was, shall we say, suboptimal. It was often said that if you could fly instruments in the T-37, you could do it in anything. This analogy fits well with the comparison between the MiG-29 and the F-16.

Vignette #2: In the early 1990s I took a class of new analysts to Langley Air Force Base for an orientation with the US Air Force. The highlight of the visit was a chance for everyone to fly the full-motion F-15 weapons simulator. At this point, I had been out of the cockpit for around 10 years and my only updated experience was flying the PC game, Falcon 3.0 — which actually simulated radar and weapons employment quite well. I went last, and did so well, the instructors started playing cat & mouse with me to keep me humble. The point is, I was able to do well on the experience of a $40 commercial flight simulator because US 4th generation jets were purposely designed to be easy to use. So again, UAF MiG-29 pilots should be able to fly the Viper well with a minimum of training, compared to their clunky former mounts. They should be able to fly the jet successfully in air-to-air missions using their MiG tactics in a matter of weeks. 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions will take longer, and effective air-to-ground missions will come sometime after that. Will this make UAF Viper pilots masters of the air? No, that really does take time, but they will be effective and will rapidly improve with experience. One thing the experts seem to miss is that they were working during peacetime. The UAF is in an existential war, and that is a powerful motivator.

So, if the UAF can get the F-16 into the war relatively rapidly, will it make any difference? At first blush, it seems highly doubtful. Both sides’ air forces have contributed little of consequence to the war thus far. The deadly air defenses fielded by both sides have largely kept airpower away from the front lines and, in the case of the Russians, relegated to launching long-range missiles from the safety of their home airspace. However, things may be quietly changing.

Recently, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to successfully plan, coordinate and execute SEAD missions against the most advanced Russian SAM systems in existence. Undoubtedly, some credit is due to the incompetence of Russian air defenders and some to the somewhat less than advertised performance of their “best in the world” equipment. However, the great majority of the credit belongs to the Ukrainian planners, particularly given the somewhat low-tech (slow, prop-driven drones, among other things) they used to accomplish the missions. 

The Viper comes in a variety of flavors as do the weapons they carry. The capabilities the UAF will have depends upon the particular combination they field. For example, the F-16CJ Block 50D is specifically designed to hunt and kill air defenses. When teamed with the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), the combination is extremely effective. During Operation DESERT STORM, Iraqi troops were so intimidated by the HARM that they refused to use their field radios (which were never targeted, and probably couldn’t be, regardless) and for the next 12 years through Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH and IRAQI FREEDOM, no Iraqi air defense unit turned on its targeting radars — ALL of their shots were fired unguided. Likewise, in Operation ALLIED FORCE over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, it was rare to see the air defenses turn on their targeting radars. If the UAF can successfully integrate such aircraft and weapons into their SEAD schemes, it could prove as effective with the Russians as it was with the Iraqis and Serbs.

While no amount of SEAD can ever get rid of the threat from air defense guns and IR-guided SAMs, suppression/destruction of the Russian S-300/400, Tor, Pantsir and Buk radar-guided SAMs opens up the UAF’s ability to use altitude to take them out of the range of the short-range threat that will always be present. 

At this point, the F-16’s AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) will move to the fore. The combat histories of the various aircraft and weapons involved would suggest that even a relatively small number of F-16s should be able to secure air superiority over Ukraine. This will be complicated by the fact that the UAF pilots will likely fight using Russian tactics, at least initially. The F-16 was designed to support the use of more dynamic Western tactics, and while it would be difficult for pilots flying MiG-29s to discard their traditional Ground-Controlled Intercept (GCI) doctrine, this will come if the UAF embraces the change. In the mid-1990s, the Kuwaiti Air Force acquired US F-18 Hornets and were trained by the very best the US Navy had to offer. Within three years, they went from being essentially dead in the water to putting the whoop to the Royal Navy’s Harrier pilots and being voted the “Best in the Gulf” by their peer air forces. Changing tactics mid-conflict is far from ideal, but combat can do much to focus the mind. It all depends on the commitment of the UAF leadership and if they buy into the change.

Russian air-to-air missiles are formidable on paper, but have come up short under operational circumstances and their GCI-driven tactics fail to take advantage of what capability they have. However, the superior situational awareness afforded the pilot by the Viper’s easy to use radar and the AMRAAM’s status as a virtual one-shot, one-kill weapon when fired within its parameters make the F-16 capable of high kill:loss ratios. If Ukraine’s F-16s come equipped with the latest models of the AIM-9 Sidewinder Infrared-homing missile, it will be all the more deadly when fighting obsolescent Russian fighters using reliability-challenged weapons and outdated tactics. The sooner UAF Viper pilots can adjust to Western tactics, the more dominant they will be in the skies of their homeland.

Without going into various offshoots, there are two types of air superiority: local air superiority and general air superiority. Local air superiority refers to the seizure of air superiority at a specific time and place in order to conduct a particular operation for a limited time without undue interference by the opponent’s air force. Within the Soviet/Russian doctrinal system, it is gained by strong groupings of long-range SAMs, augmented by Combat Air Patrols (CAP) of fighters to plug gaps and back up the SAM defenses. Obviously, local air superiority cannot be established very far from the front lines on the ground, but this is not a concern since within this scheme, air and air defense forces are used in support of ground forces. While the Russians have always talked a big game, this is essentially the only scheme of air superiority the Russians recognize.  

General, or Persistent air superiority is established over an entire combat zone, region or even country. Of necessity, it must be done utilizing strong fighter forces — often with bomber units as a supplement — and lasts until the enemy can wrest it away by attriting the other side’s fighters to the point that they can no longer present a serious threat. This can best be illustrated by the USAAF’s victory over the Luftwaffe in the European strategic bombing campaign in WWII. 

General air superiority buys the side that has it several advantages. First, it keeps the enemy from meaningfully intervening in the operations of one’s air, ground and naval forces. Secondly, it blinds the enemy to what is going on in one’s own territory, while simultaneously opening up the enemy’s territory to comprehensive reconnaissance. The phenomenon of blinding the enemy while gaining omniscience over him is a war winning, though often overlooked, circumstance. This had as much to do with the victories in Patton’s 1944 operations in France, Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as anything else.

Perhaps the biggest benefit of air superiority is the freedom of operations it allows the winner’s forces, including the ability for his air forces to strike when and where they choose. During the summer and fall of 1943, USAAF bombers damaged many targets in Germany while air superiority was being contested, but to nothing like the extent desired. After the USAAF won air superiority over Germany late that winter, their strikes became vastly more effective to the point that, once released from Eisenhower’s direct command in support of the D-Day landings and subsequent ground operations, it took just six months to collapse the German war economy. Clearly, the UAF’s F-16s won’t be collapsing the Russian war economy, but the ability to strike railheads, bridges, fuel and ammunition dumps, Command, Control and Communications (C3) nodes, headquarters and artillery units with such precision can be a decisive factor and force multiplier for Ukrainian ground forces.

The F-16 in every form is an extremely accurate bomber at low altitude, even while using non-guided “dumb” bombs. In a 1980s edition of the USAF’s official publication Fighter Weapons Review, an F-16 pilot detailed a new way to attack runways without specialized munitions. His technique called for aiming 3 feet short of the lip of the runway so that the bombs, burrowing in a predictable manner, go under the concrete to detonate under the center of the runway.  3 feet. That’s some precision bombing.

Typically, putting bombs on target accurately is one of the most challenging tasks a fighter pilot can undertake, particularly in the face of challenging air defenses. However, the Viper makes air-to-ground attacks much easier than with the Russian legacy aircraft. The F-16’s fire control system projects a “Continuously Computed Impact Point (CCIP)” indicator on the heads-up display, which indicates exactly where the bombs will land if punched off at that moment. In earlier jets, the pilot had to fly a precise pre-planned approach to the release point, hitting exact parameters of altitude, airspeed, and dive angle — even the slightest deviation would throw the bombs off target. The first aircraft in a flight might get away with flying a predictable flight path, but the enemy will know with certainty where number four will be at release and can adjust their aim accordingly. The CCIP allows the pilot to take any path to the target, randomly changing airspeed and altitude as necessary for survivability. At the last second, the Viper pilot can pop-up, place the CCIP on the target and deliver his bombs with great precision. It is not for no reason that CCIP’s nickname is the “death dot.” The death dot is featured on most Western fighters today, but Ukraine’s fighter fleet lacks this tool, and therefore the F-16 should give the UAF a major leap forward in effectiveness on ground attack missions.

One thing we shouldn’t expect is a major overnight upgrade in Close Air Support (CAS). The Soviet/Russian Air Force — and by extension, the Ukrainian Air Force — have never really done fixed-wing CAS, at least as we define it. Any air support requiring detailed integration with troops in contact is generally left to attack helicopters, while fixed-wing aircraft do what we used to call Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), which doesn’t require close integration and is less likely to inflict friendly fire casualties. (It’s a dirty little secret that about 95% of air forces world-wide do the same.) Doing CAS according to US doctrine is probably the most difficult mission pilots can undertake, requiring a great deal of training and practice. Even if the UAF decides that they like our CAS concept better, it will take some time for them to be able to do it effectively.

Having determined that the UAF could bring the F-16 on line fairly quickly (albeit, without mastery of all its capabilities), that it represents a significant upgrade in SEAD, air superiority and ground attack capabilities, what will its impact be overall? Game changer or not? Most likely, not. It’s really just a matter of numbers. With a sufficiently sized fleet, the F-16 could dominate the skies to the point that Russian troops that moved would be inviting death by interdiction, while those that hunkered down in defensive positions would starve, be blasted to atoms or surrounded and captured by Ukrainian ground forces. However, that would take closer to 200 aircraft than the few dozen they’re likely to get. And, of course, they’ll need attrition replacements for their inevitable combat losses.

One thing we can do right now to significantly improve the survivability of the F-16 fleet is to put their entire logistics support package on wheels. If the UAF’s Viper fleet proves to be effective, the Russians will undoubtedly put their Main Operating Bases (MOBs) at the top of their priority strike list. While putting MOBs out of action is not nearly as easy as some assume, the loss of a hangar-queen here and an unlucky jet there will add up, and with a fleet as small as they are likely to have, they can ill-afford such losses on the ground. The best way to avoid that is to simply not be home when the cruise missiles arrive. The MiG-29 was specifically designed for such operations with the sturdy landing gear and air intake Foreign Object Damage (FOD) screens necessary to operate from unpaved fields. While the Viper will never be capable of operating from a sod field, it can easily operate from highway strips and better so than larger, heavier and less powerful jets. By making the F-16 fleet’s logistics mobile, they could quickly move from highway strip to highway strip to thwart Russian efforts to find them. Coupled with Ukrainian air superiority over their own territory — thereby making Russian reconnaissance vastly more difficult — UAF F-16 attrition could be kept to manageable levels multiplying their impact on the war.

The F-16 probably won’t be a game changer, but it may very well be a decisive factor.

 

 

[i] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-months  Accessed 26Oct23.

 

The American Political Scene and Aid to Ukraine

My bias on this blog is to stay away from politics, but sometimes it can’t be helped. The U..S. is providing about half the international aid to Ukraine. I have not done the exact math on this comparing U.S. military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine as compared to our NATO allies, plus the EU aid (which is sometimes left out of people’s calculations), plus aid outside of NATO/EU (like Japan, South Korea and Australia). So, haven’t done the exact math in a while, but I gather the U.S, portion is around half. Therefore, what is going on in the House of Representatives and the 2024 U.S. presidential election is worth noting. If Ukraine losses half of its military and humanitarian aid, this does affect its ability to conduct on this war.

First, while the current president supports aid to Ukraine, as do the leaders of both parties in the Senate, the current Republican Speaker of the House does not (although he does support aid for Israel). His latest statement on the subject was that it was not an “urgent need” compared to aid for Israel. Furthermore, three of the top four Republican candidates for President do not support additional aid to Ukraine.

It is uncertain to what extent the Republican controlled House opposes aid to Ukraine. There are currently 212 seats held by Democrats (who mostly support aid to Ukraine) and 221 seats held by the Republicans (and 2 vacant). The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is at least $133 Billion. 

In January the Gallup poll (3-22 January) says that 65% of Americans support the war in Ukraine. 31% clearly do not. This is pretty much the same figures as in August 2022 (66% vs 31%). Among self-identified Democrats the split was 81% to 16%, among independents it was 59% to 38% and among Republicans it was 53% to 41%. So, according to the Gallup poll, the majority of Republicans support Ukraine. On the other hand, 47% of the Republicans polled said that the U.S. is doing too much to help UkrainePrevious polling from Washington Post shows that 52% of Republicans want to reduce aid to Ukraine or “…want their member of congress to opposed additional funding.” 

The leading two contenders for the Republican presidential nomination are both opposed to extensive aid for Ukraine. Ron Desantis said that it was a not a “vital” U.S. interest. He got immediate pushback from six U.S. Republican senators, but it is clear that there is a very definite split in the Republican Party on this issue. It is a long way until November 2024. We will have to see how this develops.

Eleven Republican members of the House did propose in February a resolution (“Ukraine Fatigue Resolution”) to cut aid to Ukraine. There is a clearly a vocal minority that is opposed to supporting Ukraine, along with both leading Republican presidential candidates. The “Ukraine Fatigue Resolution” is worth a read. It is here: Text – H.Res.113 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Ukraine Fatigue Resolution | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

A letter was issued on 20 April (Hitler’s birthday) calling for an end to unrestrained U.S. aid to Ukraine. It was signed by three senators (out of 100) and 16 members of the house (out of 435). There is a vocal minority opposed to this war, but it is clearly a minority. 

Meanwhile, a Republican House member submitted a resolution in April recognizing the borders of Ukraine as being the 1991 borders. This was supported by 13 Democrats and 5 other Republicans. 

On 13 July, the House took a vote on cutting off aid to Ukraine. The vote was 358-70 rejecting the amendment. All 70 opposed votes were Republican. See: Here are the 70 House Republicans who voted to cut off all US military aid to Ukraine (msn.com).

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” in June with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion. 

In September, a shutdown of U.S. government was delayed for 45 days (until mid-November), then the Republican Speaker of the House was thrown out of office for the first time in the U.S. history and a new speaker has finally been appointed, although house business was shut down for three weeks (did anyone actually miss them?). New additional aid for Ukraine has not been passed.

The second Republican primary debate occurred on 27 September. Four candidates clearly and strongly indicated that they support Ukraine (Christie, Haley, Pence and Scott). The Republican Party seems to split on this issue. Recent polling shows the majority of Americans still support Ukraine.

A few dates to keep in mind for the American political campaigns: 1) the third Republican primary debate is scheduled for 8 November, 2) Donald Trump currently leads the polling for the Republican Party presidential nomination by significant margins. He is currently in a civil trial in New York concerning his businesses. A summary judgment was issued on 26 September that his companies had committed fraud, 3) no start date has been set for the Fulton County Georgia case, but four of the defendants have pleaded guilty under a plea agreement. The other 15 defendants, including Donald Trump, will be going to trial soon, 4) the Iowa caucuses will be on 15 January 2024, 5) the Nevada primary will be on 6 February 2024, 6) the New Hampshire primary is scheduled for 13 February 2024, 7) 24 February is SC primary, then MI, 8) The date for the DOJ Special Council criminal trial for charges related to the 6 January incidents in now scheduled for 4 March. We gather Trump’s former chief of staff has taken a partial immunity deal with the government and will be providing testimony, 9) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then, 10) 25 March is the trial date for Donald Trump’s New York Stormy Daniel’s related case, 11) 20 May is the trial date for Donald Trump’s classified documents case, 12) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently the three of the four leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.

Former VP and Republican presidential candidate Mike Pence was in Ukraine in July. He fully supports the war effort. A couple of days ago, he suspended his campaign. There are for practical purposes, only 6 real contenders are left, and two of them may not yet make the stage in Florida come 8 November.

The False Lessons of Modern War

Hard to ignore an article that name checks Trevor Dupuy and I. Attached is an article by William F. Owen in the British Army Review, Autumn 2023 Issue. I hope I am not breaking some copyright by posting it up: Owen, The False Lessons of Modern War-Why Ignorance is Not Insight (2023). It is available on-line here: The false lessons of modern war: Why ignorance is not insight – Issuu. The full title of the article is “The False Lessons of Modern War: Why Ignorance is not Insight.”

Trevor Dupuy is namechecked in the article: “Much was less than certain, yet paradoxically, a book written in 1978, Trevor N Dupuy’s Elusive Victory, had got far more right than later writers were to get wrong.” That is a pretty strong endorsement. 

He then footnotes the book in his third footnote, referencing losses in 1967.

In the following paragraph he states: “Simply put, no conflict today comes even close to these types of losses, yet the myth persists that war and warfare are becoming ‘more lethal.’ They are not, and a large body of literature proves it.” His footnote to this paragraph then states “See the collected work of Trevor N Dupuy and Christopher Lawrence, Understanding War, War by Numbers and Attrition.”

I like this guy, but I have never met him. He is certainly welcome to present at the third HAAC: The Third HAAC – October 2024? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

A few other quotes from the article worth mentioning:

  1. “Lessons should be a product of analysis, not observation.” (I put this sentence in bold for a reason).
  2. “Observations have often been wrong” (this is his following sentence)
  3. “Warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War is two or three generations behind the standard competent, well-trained armies should aspire to operate.”
  4. “…fires lead manoeuvre in contrast to the opinions of the ‘manouverist approach.” (spell check is complaining about the British spellings).
  5. “Fast forward to today and the war in Ukraine; there is far less to be learned than in 1973.”
  6. “Why should the lessons from Ukraine be removed from the specific context of the participant’s differing training and equipment level and be relevant to the British Army?”
  7. “Is something that is a lesson for the Ukrainians a lesson for everyone else?”
  8. “In sharp contrast, the current war in Ukraine sees much-outdated equipment in ad-hoc combat formations, not seemingly underpinned by NATO equivalent training, doctrine and organisation levels.”

I will let you read the rest, but this is a definitely an article worth reading, even if you find yourself not in agreement with all parts of it. 

I do want to thank Dr. Shawn Woodford for bringing this to my attention.

 

P.S.

Elusive Victory is available here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

Understanding War is here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

War by Numbers is here: War by Numbers : Nebraska Press (unl.edu) or here: War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9781612348865: Amazon.com: Books

Attrition is here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org). Inventory is getting low for this one.

Of Rockets and Hospitals

Below is a new blog post from our friend William (Chip) Sayers. As it about the current fighting between Hamas and Israel, I am almost afraid to post it, as anything you say is going to offend someone somewhere. But… we push forward, in the spirit of open discussion, putting the usual disclaimer that this is Chip Sayers’ personal evaluation and does not represent the position of The Dupuy Institute, and so on and so forth.

His posting:

Of Rockets and Hospitals

Recently, a Gaza City hospital was reportedly destroyed with great loss of life. At first, the Israeli Air Force was blamed — with all the footage of buildings collapsing after IAF strikes, it seemed the logical explanation. However, a second narrative sprang up when an audio file of what was purported to a Hamas guerilla reporting to his leadership that the strike was actually by a malfunctioning Hamas rocket inadvertently falling on the hospital. If one blindly believes one side or the other, this is a simple problem: the bad guys did it and are trying to shift the blame to the good guys. For the rest of us with more critical minds, we want to know if this is something that can be teased apart to reveal the truth.

First off, we need to explore motive: why would either side deliberately do this? The Hamas audio file clearly portrays the incident as an accident, so motive is not a factor on their side — they didn’t mean to do it. 

Israel’s position in more complex. Two weeks into this war, Tel Aviv has more worldwide support than they have enjoyed in decades, primarily it seems, due to the savage nature of Hamas’ surprise attack and a clear attempt to intimidate Israel through deliberately repulsive inhumane actions. This support may not last long and any misstep by Tel Aviv could cause it to vanish altogether. Certainly, the deliberate bombing of a Palestinian hospital would qualify as a massive misstep. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that Israel would risk so much for so little advantage. Indeed, what advantage could be derived from such a strike? Even if Netanyahu was hell-bent on genocide, this would be a bad move at this stage of the war.

If Israel did this, it is far more likely that it was a mistake — similar to the U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade twenty-four years ago. In that particular case, we had paid little attention to Yugoslavia for the previous decade and our files were in pitiful shape [Chip would probably know this due to his background]. Meanwhile, the Chinese Embassy had moved without our notice. I’m sure the Dept. of State knew exactly where it was, but Dept. of Defense, not so much. Could this have been the result of a similar mistake? Possibly, but Gaza isn’t a backwater that Israeli intelligence has ignored for the previous decade. Further, hospitals — particularly in wartime — have distinct signatures: lots of traffic, including multiple ambulances at any given time, 24-hour service, plus they are usually distinctively marked. So, it seems unlikely that it could have been a case of misidentification.

If this was not an intentional act, could it have been some kind of mistake? The strategic bombing campaign against Germany in WWII is replete with examples of bombers — even lead bombers — being hit at the moment of bomb release which cause the deadly payloads to go astray. In December, 1972, a USAF B-52 infamously damaged the Bac Mai hospital in Hanoi in a similar occurrence. Further, the bombs themselves can be damaged such that fins are bent or fail to deploy, causing the missile to go astray. Even GPS-guided bombs can malfunction or fall to human error with unintended consequences. On 5 December 2001, Hamid Karzai, future President of Afghanistan was almost killed when an attack controller changed the batteries on his GPS kit just before a strike and inadvertently ordered the bomb onto his own coordinates. Could this have been a malfunction or mistake on the part of the IAF? Yes, absolutely.

Could this have been caused by a Hamas rocket? Yes. In fact, it’s inevitable. While some of Hamas’ rockets are factory-made in Iran, it appears that the vast majority are “homemade” in small sheet-metal shops on-site. While the designs have been largely standardized, the potential for malfunctions is fairly high. When tens of thousands of rockets are launched, a certain percentage of them are inevitably going to go astray. In point of fact, Hamas and Hezbollah actually depend on the fact that these things land indiscriminately among the general population of Israel. While a portion of Hezbollah’s rockets are guided to one degree or another, the vast majority of both group’s are not, so many of the attacking rockets may be malfunctioning without anyone being the wiser. It’s actually surprising that more “short rounds” of Hamas rockets haven’t been reported falling on Gaza.

So, what can the actual damage to the hospital tell us? Well, for one thing, it tells us someone is lying. It is almost inconceivable that 500 people died in that strike given the damage reported. Had the hospital collapsed entirely, that would be a high figure. But there is no significant structural damage to the building to be seen and a very small crater in the pavement (2-3 feet deep by about as wide), consistent with the detonation of a relatively small rocket warhead detonation. A dozen, two dozen, maybe a handful more deaths could have resulted, but 500 is patently ludicrous. In a perfect storm of circumstances, a 2,000lb bomb might have done that kind of damage, but it would have had to be an airburst detonation roughly 30-50 feet above the ground. That would almost certainly have been a preplanned act with deliberate fuzeing to kill the maximum number of people. We have seen no evidence whatsoever that the IAF has made other attacks in a similar fashion. A malfunction or mistake with a 2,000lb bomb would have involved a bomb fuzed to detonate after penetrating deep into the ground — which matches what we have seen thus far as they have brought down building after building with such attacks. Had one of these attacks gone astray for whatever reason, there would be a crater in evidence — on the order of 30 or 40 feet wide by 20 feet or more deep, nothing like what we’ve seen.

The evidence is leaning towards a Hamas rocket, but an IAF bomb cannot be ruled out. The question remains, who benefits? Clearly, it’s Hamas. U.S. support has weakened already, with Congressmen and college students protesting Israeli “war crimes.” The narrative that Israel did this serves to give the sides a moral equivalence in some minds. On the other hand, Israel has everything to lose and nothing to gain by such butchery.

And this, my friends, is a good example of intelligence analysis. You take disparate fragments of information, paste them into a framework that tells a plausible story, and you make a judgement call. Hopefully, the analyst has his or her judgment backed by plenty of relevant experience. There are no crystal balls and only on the rarest occasions does the enemy reveal his evil plans within earshot of some collector. And even then, you always have to be suspicious that he’s feeding you the information for his own nefarious reasons.

My own call? Hamas did it. They may have even done it deliberately — we saw that happen often enough 25 years ago in the Balkans. However, we won’t get that paranoid. The likeliest explanation is a malfunction, and I’m sticking with my story.

The Third HAAC – October 2024?

We are definitely hosting a third HAAC. The tentative date is Tuesday-Thursday, 8-10 October 2024. The tentative location is the same conference area in Tysons Corner, VA (near DC). 

Anyhow, already putting together a list of presentations and presenters. The first HAAC had 32 presentations by 23 speakers and 2 group discussions. The second HAAC had 37 presentations by 29 speakers and 2 group discussions. More is better. Looking for new presenters and for all of our old presenters to return.

Email me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com.

 

The Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 – 19 October 2023

This is the thirteenth provisional schedule for the second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC). We have 37 presentations scheduled by 28 speakers and two group discussions planned. Each slot is an hour long, so planning for a 45-minute presentation and 15 minutes of discussion.

The conference is at 1934 Old Gallows Road, Suite 350, Vienna, VA 22182. This is basically across the street by Tysons Corner Shopping mall and the Marriot Hotel on Route 7. It is right off the Route 7 exit from 495 (the Beltway). It is at the corner of Route 7 (Leesburg Pike) and Old Gallows Road. It is in the building above the restaurant called Rangos. Parking is in the parking garage next door to it.

Conference description is here: The Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 in Tysons Corner, VA | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Costs, Hotels and Call for Presentations: Cost of the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17 -19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Hotels for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Call for Presentations for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The cost of the conference is $150 for entire conference or $60 a day. Please pay through PayPal (www.paypal.com) to SRichTDI@aol.com. The conference is priced to cover the costs of the conference facility. We are also set up to take credit card payments by phone. Call The Dupuy Institute during working hours at (703) 289-0007.

We are set up for virtual presentations and virtual attendees. We are exploring the costs of having the presentations professionally recorded.

 

Schedule: Pike and Gallows Conference Center

Updated: revised 16 October 2023

 

 

Day 1: Analysis of Conventional Combat

0900 – 0930    Introductory remarks – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

0930 – 1030    Studying Combat: The “Base of Sand” Problem – Dr. Shawn R. Woodford

1030 – 1130    A Cautionary Tale: Alternative Interpretations of the Same Data – Jim Storr – virtual

1130 – 1230    Land Operations – consistencies and discrepancies between theory, historical analysis and doctrine – LtC. Trygve Smidt (Norway)

1230 – 1400    Lunch

1400 – 1500    Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII – Sasho Todorov, esquire  

1500 – 1600    The French Air Force in the 1940 Campaign – Dr. James F. Slaughter

1600 – 1700    Force Ratios – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1700 – 1800    Grinch in Ukraine – Carl Larson

 

Evening (1900):    Group Dinner – Rangos

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Unconventional Warfare

0900 – 1000    Iraq, Data, Hypotheses and Afghanistan (old) –  Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1000 – 1100    Evidence of Fabricated Survey Data Collected during the War in Iraq – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1100 – 1200   Urban Warfare (old) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    The Right Way to Do Risk Analysis: A Primer and Update, With Examples from Pandemics – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1400 – 1500    Close  Combat Overmatch Weapons (SLAMMER) – Joe Follansbee (Col., USA, ret.)

1500 – 1600    Chemical Weapons in Syria – Jennifer Schlacht, M.A. – virtual

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: The Next Middle East Wars

 

Evening (1900):    Group Dinner – BJs

 

 

Day 3: Other Analysis of Warfare

0900 – 1000    Addressing the Decline in War Question with New Disaggregated Data – Dr. Michael Spagat (Royal Holloway University of London)

1000 – 1100    The Application of the Scientific Method to Military History – Clinton Reilly (Computer Strategies, Australia) – virtual

1100 – 1200   The Future of TDI and work of the conference (new) – Christopher A. Lawrence (TDI)

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400   The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Ukraine, 1943-44 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1400 – 1500    Russian Information Warfare Against Western Democracies Since 2013: A review and update – Dr. Doug Samuelson (InfoLogix)

1500 – 1600    Wagner Group structure and new infantry tactics – Carl Larson

1600 – 1700    Group Discussion: Russo-Ukrainian War

 

Evening:    Happy hour – Rangos 

 

 

Schedule: Einstein Conference Room

 

Day 1: Poster and Book Room

Opened at 0800

 

Afternoon Day 1: Air Warfare Analysis

1400 – 1500    French Aerial Bombing Problem 1914-1940 – Dr. James F. Slaughter

1500 – 1600    Temporal and Geographic Patterns of Fatal Casualty Rates in WWI and WWII (part 2 or overflow presentation) – Sasho Todorov, esquire 

1600 – 1700    Air Combat Analysis on the Eastern Front in 1944-45 – Daniel Horvath – virtual

 

 

Day 2: Analysis of Conventional Combat – all virtual

0900 – 1000    Unburdened by History: Understanding Russia’s Growing Influence in Haiti – Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG) – virtual

1000 – 1100   World War 2 Operational Research Revisited – John Magill (UK) – virtual 

1100 – 1200   The Stochastic Salvo Model for Naval Combat: Applications to Aircraft Carrier Combat in 1942 – Geoffrey Clark – virtual

1200 – 1300    Lunch

1300 – 1400    Machine Learning the Lessons of History      Dr. Robert Helmbold – virtual (repeat)

1400 – 1500    The Promised Land: Four Thousand Years of Mid-East Conflict? – Dr. Robert Helmbold – virtual

1500 – 1600    Operation “Sea Lion”: Simulating the German 1940 invasion of England – Dr. Niall MacKay (University of York) & Dr. Ian Horwood (York St. John University) – part 1 – virtual

1600 – 1700    Operation “Sea Lion”: Simulating the German 1940 invasion of England – Dr. Jamie Wood (University of York) & Dr. Chris Price (York St. John University) – part 2 – virtual

 

 

Day 3: Researching Operations

0900 – 1000    The AEF and Consolidation of Gains Operations During the Meuse-Argonne Offensive – Dr. Christopher Davis (UNCG) – virtual

1000 – 1100    Wargaming 101 – William Sayers – virtual

1100 – 1200    The Red Army’s Plans for a Preemptive Attack in 1941 – Dr. Richard Harrison

1200 – 1300    Lunch    

1300 – 1400    Penetrate, Dis-Integrate and Exploit: The Israeli Counter-Offensive at the Suez Canal, 1973 – LtC. Nathan A Jennings, PhD – virtual

1400 – 1500    Competing Proxy Strategies in the Russo-Ukrainian War and a War of Attrition – LtC. Amos Fox – virtual

1500 – 1600    1) Patterns of Explosive Weapons Use in Ukraine – and – 2) IED Attacks Targeting State and International Armed Actors: Trend and Patterns 2013-2022 – Chiara Torelli (AOAV) – virtual

1600 – 1700    A Naval Power Index: The U.S. Navy vs three challengers – Imperial Japan, USSR and PRC China – Geoffrey Clark – virtual

 

 

The presentations from all three days of the first HAAC are here: Presentations from the first HAAC – all three days | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Hamas-Israeli War – Day 3

Israel formally declared war against the Palestinian militant group Hamas on 8 October (although not against Gaza). It was done by the Israeli security cabinet. I have not seen a declaration. The last time they declared war was in 1973. The last time anyone in the world formally declared war was when?

Israel as ordered a complete siege of the Gaza Strip. The defense minister said: “There will be no electricity, no food, no fuel, everything is closed. We are fighting human animals and we are acting accordingly.” The Gaza Strip does have a 6.8 mile (11 kilometer) border with Egypt. Speaking of Egypt, there is a report that an Egyptian intelligence official told AP that the Israeli government was warned by Egypt 10 days before the Hamas attack that “something big” was being planned by Hamas. The office of Israeli Prime Minister has called the claim “absolutely false’. 

Israel has regained most of the areas that Hamas penetrated. Gun battles continued through the night of 7/8 October. Israel claimed on 8 October that it took back 29 areas from Hamas (up from 22 that they said Hamas took on 7 October). Israel retook the Sderot police station on 8 October, implying that Hamas had taken it the previous day. They are now trying to secure the border areas. As of 9 October (today) there are still some Hamas fighters in Israel and fighting is going on near the Gaza strip but on the Israeli side (maps below are from Wikipedia).

Israel is saying that up to 1,000 Hamas fighters “infiltrated” into Israel. How in the world did that happen? The Israeli army has 126,000 active personnel, while the Gaza Strip has a border with Israel of 32 miles (51 kilometers). They could not protect that border? In contrast, the U.S. border with Mexico is 1,954 miles long (3,145 kilometers).

The Hamas attack on 7 October looks well planned, greatly assisted by a lack of Israeli defensive forces in the area. Hamas took the border crossings in the east of Gaza (Erez Crossing) and were able to advance into Sderot from there; and they took the border crossing in the south-west corner of Gaza (Kerem Shalon), advancing out of there to attack an Israeli music festival. They breached the walls in other areas of the strip. The fact that these two border crossings were not well defended is mystifying.

From there I gather they overran one or two Israeli army bases and the main police station in Sderot (pop. 30,553 in 2021). They then ranged far and wide across the civilian areas, roaming uncontested for up to ten hours. This is a major league failure by the IDF. The lack of a quick and immediate response is also mystifying.

Israel has reported that 85 soldiers, 37 police officers and 5 ISA (Shin Bet – Israel Security Agency) members have been killed. IDF published the names of the soldiers. Photographic evidence is showing one Israeli Merkava tank destroyed and at least five captured. Clearly the bases were not well defended.

A significant number of Israelis were captured. The Israeli Government Press Office stated on the evening of 8 October that the number of hostages in Gaza is over 100. The Israeli ambassador to the U.S. said on 7 October that dozens of Americans are among the hostages. 

On Monday, 9 October, the Israeli government confirmed that more than 900 Israeli civilians had been killed and another 2,150 wounded. Reports are that several Americans (4?) have been killed. The rescue service Zaka said it removed around 260 bodies from the Supernova music festival in the desert near Gaza. Israeli officials say more than 250 people have been killed there.

The U.S. said today (9 October) that nine Americans have been killed in Israel and others are missing. UK is reporting that more than 10 British citizens are killed or missing. Nepal has reported that ten of their citizens have been killed. The French are reporting one woman killed and several others are missing. Cambodia (1) and Ukraine (2) have confirmed that some of their citizens have been killed. Thailand is now reporting that 12 of its citizens have been killed and 11 captured. Others that may have been killed include 4 Argentines, 1 Chilean, 1 German (captured a music festival), 2 Paraguayans and one Canadian killed and two others missing. Thailand says 11 of its citizens have been abducted while Mexico says 2 have been abducted. One Chinese citizen appears to have been abducted from the Supernova festival. Brazil is reporting three missing from that music festival. One Irish woman is missing as are two Tanzania students. 

Israel did strike back, with some 400 targets struck in Gaza during the night of 7/8 October and it is said that more than 800 targets have been hit in Gaza by the evening of 8 October. Gaza Strip has an area of 141 sq. miles (365 sq. kilometers) and a population of 2,375,259. Population density is 16,853 per sq. mile (6,507 per sq. kilometer). This is more than the population density of Washington DC (11,281 per sq. mile) and the size of Gaza Strip is twice the size of Washington DC (68.35 sq miles). Going to be pretty hard to strike 800 targets and not injure at least 800 civilians. The Palestinian Health Ministry was reporting for 7 October) that 232 people in Gaza Strip had been killed and at least 1,700 had been wounded. Have no idea how accurate their reporting is. The Hamas-run health ministry is saying as of 8 October that 413 Palestinians have been killed and 2,300 have been wounded. I assume that is cumulative. It is reported that 7 Palestinians were also killed in the West Bank. On 9 October, the enclave’s Health Ministry has said that 687 people have been killed and 3,700 other wounded from Israel’s retaliatory airstrikes. There has also been 17 people reported killed in the West Bank and 6 in Lebanon. Again, I have no idea how accurate these figures are.

Don’t know how many missiles hit Israel, but some done. Israel said more than 3,500 were fired by Hamas on 7 October. Their latest reports appear to be saying over 2,200 missiles were fired. Don’t know what percent of those were intercepted by the Iron Dome system. Rockets were still being fired on 8 October.

Israeli artillery did fire into southern Lebanon with artillery on 8 October, probably in response to something. Hezbollah responded with some rocket attacks. So far the fighting has been limited to firing in the area of the Shebaa farms. Several people were reported as wounded. The danger is that Hezbollah could join the war. 

The U.S. carrier Gerald R. Ford is moving to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Second HAAC is next week, 17-19 October

Just a reminder that the second HAAC is next week. So far we have received payments from 10 people, including one (discounted) student. Please make your payments to PayPal to SRichTDI@aol.com. You can also make a credit card payment by calling (703-289-0007) or emailing me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com I will be on travel from Wed through Sunday (11-15).