Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

What Russia’s Failing Economy Means

An article in the Huffington Post caught my attention: What Russia’s Failing Economy Means

A few lines from it:

“But the economic decline in Russia started in the very beginning of 2012. The growth rate was only 1.3 percent in 2013, for example, when oil was well above $100 per barrel”

“The key problem of the economy, and the key reason for the decline, was the decline in investment. The economy cannot grow without investment…In 2012, investment stopped growing. In 2014, investment started to decline. That’s the main reason why the Russian economy is contracting.”

“That means that the only one real chance the Russian economy has is if the government improves the investment climate and boosts investment. But in order to do this, Russia needs to implement the rule of law. Once again, that’s not in the interest of Putin, because implementing the rule of law is the best way for him to lose power” (I put this line in bold)

The increase in military budget by 0.8 percent when inflation in the country is 13 percent actually means shrinking of the military budget. I would not pay big attention to the nominal numbers because inflation in Russia is very high.

“It’s important to note that the Russian economy is not in free fall. It’s not like a landslide, like in Venezuela” (which nicely serves as a lead-in to my next post)

And finally:

“They [poverty and unemployment] may change the political climate, but it won’t happen in a year, or in two years. It may take a decade, maybe, but it’s not a very fast and rapid process.”

 

Five Percent Cut in Russian Defense Spending

Russia could cut defense procurement spending

To quote a couple of paragraphs towards the end of the article:

“When Putin announced his defense revamp in 2011, the government expected GDP growth of 6 percent throughout the decade. This year the economy is facing its second year in row of falling GDP, its longest recession in two decades.

Oil, which together with a small basket of other commodities makes up half of state revenues, is now selling at slightly above $30 per barrel, just over half the level the Russian government had expected for this year in late 2015.”

 

War by Numbers III

The table of contents for the book:

—             Preface                                                                                    6
One          Understanding War                                                                 8
Two          Force Ratios                                                                          15
Three       Attacker versus Defender                                                      22
Four         Human Factors                                                                      24
Five          Measuring Human Factors in Combat: Italy                          27
Six            Measuring Human Factors in Combat: Ardennes & Kursk   40
Seven       Measuring Human Factors in Combat: Modern Wars          55
Eight         Outcome of Battles                                                               67
Nine          Exchange Ratios                                                                  75
Ten           The Combat Value of Superior Situational Awareness        83
Eleven      The Combat Value of Surprise                                           113
Twelve      The Nature of Lower Level Combat                                   135
Thirteen    The Effects of Dispersion on Combat                                150
Fourteen   Advance Rates                                                                  164
Fifteen       Casualties                                                                         171
Sixteen      Urban Legends                                                                 197
Seventeen The Use of Case Studies                                                 248
Eighteen    Modeling Warfare                                                             270
Nineteen    Validation of the TNDM                                                    286
Twenty       Conclusions                                                                     313

Appendix I:   Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat                           317
Appendix II:  Dupuy’s Combat Advance Rate Verities                       322
Appendix III: Dupuy’s Combat Attrition Verities                                 326

Bibliography                                                                                       331

Page numbers are based upon the manuscript and will certainly change. The book is 342 pages and 121,095 words. Definitely a lot shorter than the Kursk book.

 

War by Numbers II

What is it about (these two paragraphs are from my proposal):

War by Numbers looks at the basic nature of conventional warfare based upon extensive analysis of historical combat. Never passé, conventional combat capability has been a feature of the current growth of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and has returned as a threat in Eastern Europe. This book attempts to establish what we actually know about conventional combat and why we know it. It also provides an indication of how much impact various factors have on combat. It is the next step in analysis of combat that goes one step beyond what was addressed by theorists like Clausewitz.

It is the nature of the scientific process that hypothesis and theories do need to be tested and challenge. In a sense, we are attempting to add that rigor to a field that often does not operate with such rigor. In a profession where errors in judgment can result in the loss of lives, a rigorous understanding of warfare should be desired. War by Numbers attempts to provide such an understanding.

War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat

I have signed a contract with Potomac Books (and imprint of University of Nebraska Press) to publish War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat. The book is already complete (as I now write books first and find publishers later). Publication date will be spring 2017.

We May Not Be Interested in COIN, but COIN is Interested in Us

Photo By United States Mint, Smithsonian Institution [Public domain or Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons
Photo By United States Mint, Smithsonian Institution [Public domain or Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons

Is the United States Army turning its back on the experience it gained in Iraq and Afghanistan? Retired Brigadier General Robert Scales fears so. After recounting his personal experience with the U.S. Army’s neglect of counterinsurgency lessons following the Vietnam War, Scales sees the pattern repeating itself.

The Army as an institution loves the image of the big war: swift maneuver, tanks, heavy artillery, armed helicopters overhead, mounds of logistics support. The nitty-gritty of working with indigenous personnel to common ends, small unit patrols in civilian-infested cities, quick clashes against faceless enemies that fade back into the populace — not so much. Lessons will fade, and those who earned their PhDs in small wars will be passed over and left by the wayside.

U.S. Army War College professor Andrew Hill found the same neglect in the recent report of the National Commission on the Future of the Army, in which any reference to stability operations “is barely discernable.” As Scales put it, “here is the problem with that approach: The ability to win the big one is vital, but so is the ability to win the small wars. We paid a price for forgetting what we learned in Vietnam. I hope succeeding generations do not have to pay again.”

The U.S. government appears to be repeating the pattern insofar as its support for basic research on insurgency and counterinsurgency. During the early years of the Vietnam conflict, the U.S. government invested significant resources to support research and analysis efforts. This led to some very interesting and promising lines of inquiry by organizations such as the Special Operations Research Office, and scholars like Ted Gurr and Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, among others. However, as Chris Lawrence recently pointed out, this funding was cut by the end of the 1960s, years before the war ended. After, the fruits of this initial research was published in the early 1970s, further research on the subject slowed considerably.

The emergence of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan led to another round of research and analysis funding by the U.S. government in the mid-2000s. This resulted in renewed interest in the foundations built during the 1960s, as well as new analytical work of considerable promise. Despite the fact that these conflicts remain unresolved, this resourcing dried up once more by 2009 and government sponsored basic research has once more ground to a crawl. As Chris has explained, this boom-or-bust approach also carries a cost:

The problem lies in that the government (or at least the parts that I dealt with) sometimes has the attention span of a two-year-old. Not only that, it also has the need for instant gratification, very much like a two-year-old. Practically, what that means is that projects that can answer an immediate question get funding (like the Bosnia and Iraq casualty estimates). Larger research efforts that will produce an answer or a product in two to three years can also get funding. On the other hand, projects that produce a preliminary answer in two to three years and then need several more years of funding to refine, check, correct and develop that work, tend to die. This has happened repeatedly. The analytical community is littered with many clever, well thought out reports that look to be good starts. What is missing is a complete body of analysis on a subject. [America’s Modern Wars, 295]

The ambivalent conduct and outcomes of the recent counterinsurgencies generated hotly contested debates that remain unresolved. This is at least partly due to a lack of a detailed and comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and counterinsurgency. This state of affairs appears to be a matter of choice.

March 2018

This is the date that sticks in my mind. The Russian economy was pretty much in freefall in 2015 with at least a 3.7% drop. In 2016 it is estimated to drop another 1.5%. After that, it really depends on the price of oil, which the government of Russia has a hard time controlling.

If in 2017 the price of oil has not risen above $50 a barrel, then expect the Russian economy to continue to contract. Even if there is a bump in oil prices, the economy would most likely remain in the doldrums, especially with the trade sanctions that are in place. In the U.S. any incumbent coming into an election with three years of a declining economy would be out of office faster than you can say “Herbert Hoover.”

On the other hand, elections may work a little differently in Russia. Both Putin and Medvedev have been elected to office with majority vote. This has been the case for the last four elections. In 2000 Putin had 53.4% of the vote, in 2004 Putin had 71.9%, in 2008 Medvedev had 71.2% of the vote, and in 2012 Putin had 63.6% of the vote. But, in the last election, which Putin won comfortably, there were allegations in some areas of election fraud. Allies of Putin do control all four television stations and most of the press has remained timid. The Russian opposition is often organizing by internet, vice more formal structures.

In March 2018, Putin may face the first truly contested election in his career. In the last election a half-dozen significant candidates were simply ruled ineligible to run by the courts. Part of the application process was that they needed to get two million valid signatures, which was a difficult undertaking (in contrast, it only takes a $1,000 to get on the ballot in the New Hampshire presidential primary, something that was achieved by 58 people in 2016).

Will Putin still be able to win a 2018 election using current methods (control of the television stations and breaking up the opposition) or will they have to consider wide-spread voter fraud (like was done in Georgia in 2003 and was done by Yanokovych in Ukraine during the 2004 election)? It is doubtful that Putin would choose to loose the election and step down. To date, no one in power in Russia has lost an election, and this is the case in several other countries that made up the former Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are the pesky corruption problems among many in high levels in the government. The last thing they need is a hostile regime in power who may choose to vigorously investigate. There does seem to be a tradition that the losers of elections are investigated for corruption. This includes Timoshenko in Ukraine in 2010 (who was jailed but is now released), Yanokovych in 2014 (who decamped to Russia), and Saakashvili of Georgia in 2014 (who decamped to Ukraine). These prosecutions were often with cause.

So, it appears that most people are expecting Putin to win the election regardless. It really depends on how sketchy winning the election “regardless” becomes. Will it be outrageous enough that there is another color revolution (as in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 that thwarted Yanokovych the first time). This is the question. We have seen people power in Georgia throw out the regime of Sheverdnadze (Gorbachev’s old foreign minister) in November 2003 with the Rose Revolution. We have seen people power in Ukraine twice take on the Russian backed Yanokovych (thwarted in the 2004 Orange Revolution and thrown out of power in 2014). Is this possible in Moscow in 2018?

It was people power that helped halt the coup in August 1991 as Yeltsin stood in Red Square. This directly led to the end of the Soviet Union. These things are hard to predict and they often quickly take on a life of their own. Yanokovych was legitimately elected to be president of Ukraine in February 2010. Protests started against his rule in November 2013 and he was out of office and left the country in February 2014. Similarly, Gorbachev became the head of the Soviet Union in 1985. The hardline coup against rule occurred in August 1991 and the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991. Not sure many “Sovietologists” in July 1991 expected the Soviet Union to cease to exist by the end of the year.

The Russian Landscape

DOCTOR ZHIVAGO...Title: DOCTOR ZHIVAGO Year: 1965 Dir: LEAN, DAVID Ref: DOC037IF Credit: [ MGM / THE KOBAL COLLECTION ]
DOCTOR ZHIVAGO…Title: DOCTOR ZHIVAGO Year: 1965 Dir: LEAN, DAVID Ref: DOC037IF Credit: [ MGM / THE KOBAL COLLECTION ]

Russian evokes images of snow, tundra, vast expanses of country, brown bears, head scarf wearing peasant women and balalaikas. Of course, most Russians live in cities. The county is 73% urban (the U.S. is 82% urban). Commies loved concrete and it shows.

Moscow is a very big city, with a population of 12.2 million people in the city limit and 16.8 million in the urban area. This is 12 percent of the population of a country of 144 million people (and 2 million in Crimea). It is the political center of the country, it is the business center of country, and it is the cultural and entertainment center of the country. Even many of their famous hockey players come from Moscow. It is sort of like Washington DC, New York and Los Angeles all rolled up in one. In contrast the expanded Washington DC metropolitan area makes up 2 percent of the U.S. population (6 million out of 322 million) and America’s largest metropolitan area, centered around New York with 20 million people makes up 6 percent of the U.S. population. Moscow is the largest city in Europe.

The second largest city in Russia is the beautiful St. Petersburg at 5.2 million and after that, it is Novosibirsk with 1.6 million. Moscow simply towers over the rest of the country demographically, politically and financially. Russia has a second city (St. Petersburg), but not a clear third or fourth city. Moscow accounts for 22% of the Russian GDP.

This centralization means that most likely any political change, be it a reform movement, a palace coup, or any actual demonstrations are going to be centered in Moscow. Movements are probably not going to start in the provinces and then move to Moscow.

Moscow will be the center of change in the governance of Russia if there is such a change. There is nothing like an Iowa caucus or a New Hampshire primary. In the last election in 2012, Putin won with 63.6 percent of the vote in a campaign that included only one outdoor public speech! The vote for the Moscow Oblast (region) for Putin was 56.6%. Moscow might tire of his regime quicker than the rest of the country, and being the center of burgeoning Russian middle class (which now under assault due to the economic downturn), their allegiance and well-being is critical in the long-run to regime survival. If the Russian electoral system does not allow for them to properly express their displeasure and make governmental changes (and there are many reasons to believe that it will not), then this is where the change will come from.

On the other hand, many people have a strong interest in maintaining the current system in some form (especially considering the degree of corruption). So as they begin feel the pressure to change, they may try to internally reform themselves. There have been several examples of top-down reformers in Russian history. Their track record is not particularly good. Gorbachev lost control of the government five years after he instituted reforms. Khrushchev was sent off to retirement in late 1964, two years after he actually backed away from his reforms.

So the question becomes, does the Russian government attempt reforms before the next elections (which are coming in March 2018), what is their nature, and what is going to be the long-term result of that?

Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics

RAND Wargame
Source: David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.

RAND has published a new report by analysts David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson detailing their assessment of the threat to the Baltic republics of conventional invasion by Russian military forces. The conclusions of the study are sobering — that NATO could do little to prevent Russian military forces from effectively overrunning Latvia and Estonia in as few as 60 hours. Their analysis should provide plenty of food for thought.

Just as interesting, however, is that Shlapak and Johnson used old-style paper wargaming techniques to facilitate their analysis. The image above of their home-designed wargame above should warm the cockles of any Avalon Hill or SPI board wargame enthusiast of a certain age. As to why they chose this approach, they stated:

RAND developed this map-based tabletop exercise because existing models were ill-suited to represent the many unknowns and uncertainties surrounding a conventional military campaign in the Baltics, where low force-to-space ratios and relatively open terrain meant that maneuver between dispersed forces—rather than pushing and shoving between opposing units arrayed along a linear front—would likely be the dominant mode of combat.

While they did state that they used rules and tables governing movement and combat based on “offline modeling,” it is very curious that they did not find any of the many sophisticated Defense Department computer models and simulations available to be suitable for their task. They outline their methodology in an appendix, but promise to provide a fuller report at a later date.