Apparently the ability of a horse to “amble” (as opposed to walk, trot, canter or gallop) is limited to certain breeds of horses and is tied to a single gene mutation.
These “mutated horses” existed in the Danelaw area of England in the 9th century.
Therefore (and this is the weak link in their argument), they may have been spread by Vikings across the world (or maybe they were transported by Vikings to England from another place in the world).
Anyhow, I have not figured out how this is relevant to modern combat, but I still find it interesting.
No quantitative analysis here, but a decent and balanced look at Kennedy’s thinking on Vietnam in 1963, when we had more than 16,000 advisors committed but had not yet put in combat troops: Kennedy and Vietnam
A couple of salient points:
His ruminations on a Congo intervention are particularly interesting: “I assume this probably won’t be successful. Nothing ever seems to be….”
Concerning the Congo: “He also reiterated the need for an expert military assessment ‘of the chances of its [US military intervention] success'”
Conclusion: “My view, rooted in the documents and tape recordings at the JFK Library, does not support the conclusions of either Kennedy advocates or critics.”
The U.S. at the end of 1960, under Eisenhower, the U.S had 685 troops in South Vietnam. Under Kennedy, at the end of 1961 it was 3,164, in 1962 it was 11,326 and in 1963 it was 16,263. Under Johnson, it continued to grow to 23,210 in 1964 and 184,314 at the end of 1965. At the end of 1968 it was at 536,040 (source: DISS — Dupuy Insurgency Spread Sheets).
It is part of their spring/summer releases. The book may be in the warehouse and available for sale by mid-June.
According to U. of N. Press, the book is 498 pages, 231 tables, 2 charts and 49 graphs. Not sure that this is the final page count as my manuscript is only 342 pages and 121,094 words. I have not seen the final edited manuscript.
I have developed a course from this book called “Data for Wargames.” Will be giving presentations on the book and the course in early October at The Military Conflict Institute (TMCI) meeting in Alexandria, VA (more on this later).
Revolutionary new technologies such as nanotechnology, robotics and artificial intelligence will drive that fundamental change. But while Milley said that a revolution is coming, how exactly the character of ground warfare will shape up remains an open question. “Exactly what that’s going to look like, I don’t know,” Milley said. “I just know that we’re there. We’re on the leading edge of it. I think we’ve got a few years to figure it out—probably less than ten. But I think by 2025, you’re going to see armies—not only the American Army but armies around the world—will be fundamentally and substantively different than they are today.”
In related news, the Army’s Paladin Integrated Management program to upgrade 133 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers to M109A7’s to improve the weapon’s reliability, maintainability, performance, responsiveness, and lethality has run into problems. The Department of Defense Inspector General found the M109A7 failed to meet maximum rate-of-fire requirements in tests and requires additional fire extinguisher capabilities in crew compartments. Army observers have warned of recent advances in Russian artillery technology and the need for effective countering capabilities. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cancelled the Army’s proposed next-generation XM2001 Crusader self-propelled howitzer in 2002.
Key quote: “We still anticipate that somewhere between 5,000 or so fighters are inside Mosul,” Garver said. “We’re still anticipating a tough fight.”
There are also ISIL fighters outside of Mosul. Note that the article states that Mosul is the home of 2 million. This is probably not the case after two years of Islamic State rule. I have seen estimates as low as 500,000.
We have no way of confirming the accuracy of these estimates (unlike our work during the Iraq and Afghan insurgencies), but a somewhat negative article on the Iraqi Army published in the New York Times in June does provide strength estimates for the Islamic State. The article is: New York Times Article
A few details:
“The Islamic State has roughly 19,000 to 25,000 fighters, about half in Iraq and half in Syria…”
“Most of the 10,000 to 12,000 in Iraq are concentrated around Mosul, in the Tal Afar area, and elsewhere in Nineveh Province.”
The article here is a nice summary of the situation. Mark Perry is an old friend of The Dupuy Institute. It does have a political slant in its introduction, but the rest of it is good analysis. We usually try to avoid politics in this blog.
Offensive is now tentatively schedule to begin sometime in early October.
…with a final battle for Mosul coming at the end of October (and therefore the political slant to the article).
The attack might be coordinated with an attack on Raqqa in Syria, the capital of the shrinking Islamic State.
U.S. advisors are with Iraqi units at the battalion-level.
Over 200 U.S. advisors are at al-Qayyarah air base, 40 miles south of Mosul.
There is an effort to include local Sunni’s in the effort, along with a CENTCOM estimate that Anbar’s Sunnis can contribute at most 10,000 soldiers to the Mosul effort.
The American RAND staff and Vietnamese interviewers on the front porch of the villa on Rue Pasteur. Courtesy of Hanh Easterbrook. [Revisionist History]
Although this blog focuses on quantitative historical analysis, it is probably a good idea to consider from time to time that the analysis is being done by human beings. As objective as analysts try to be about the subjects they study, they cannot avoid interpreting what they see through the lenses of their own personal biases, experiences, and perspectives. This is not a bad thing, as each analyst can bring something new to the process and find things that other perhaps cannot.
The U.S. experience in Vietnam offers a number of examples of this. Recently, journalist and writer Malcolm Gladwell presented a podcast exploring an effort by the RAND Corporation initiated in the early 1960s to interview and assess the morale of captured Viet Cong fighters and defectors. His story centers on two RAND analysts, Leon Gouré and Konrad Kellen, and one of their Vietnamese interpreters, Mai Elliott. The podcast traces the origins and history of the project, how Gouré, Kellen, and Elliott brought very different perspectives to their work, and how they developed differing interpretations of the evidence they collected. Despite the relevance of the subject and the influence the research had on decision-making at high levels, the study ended inconclusively and ambivalently for all involved. (Elliott would go on to write an account of RAND’s activities in Southeast Asia and several other books.)
Gladwell presents an interesting human story as well as some insight into the human element of social science analysis. It is a unique take on one aspect of the Vietnam War and definitely worth the time to listen to. The podcast is part of his Revisionist History series.
