Williamson Murray, professor emeritus of history at Ohio State University, on the notion that military failures can be traced to an overemphasis on the lessons of the last war:
It is a myth that military organizations tend to do badly in each new war because they have studied too closely the last one; nothing could be farther from the truth. The fact is that military organizations, for the most part, study what makes them feel comfortable about themselves, not the uncongenial lessons of past conflicts. The result is that more often than not, militaries have to relearn in combat—and usually at a heavy cost—lessons that were readily apparent at the end of the last conflict.
It appears that the Army’s XM-25 Counter-Defilade Target Engagement System, a shoulder-fired 25mm grenade launcher, may not get the opportunity to fulfill its destiny as the Weapon That Will Change Infantry Warfare Forever after all.
Military.com reports that the Department of Defense’s Inspector General’s Office has recommended that the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, Katrina McFarland, “determine whether to proceed with or cancel the XM25 program after reviewing the results of the 2016 Governmental testing,” which will be completed this fall. The Army has indicated that it concurs with the recommendation.
The Army delayed acquisition funding and extended the XM-25’s development phase in 2014 in response to problems encountered during field testing and critiques of the weapon by the 75th Ranger Regiment and the Army’s Maneuver Center of Excellence. During a live-fire exercise in 2013, an XM-25 “experienced a double feed and an unintentional primer ignition of one of the 25mm high explosive rounds,” which fortunately, caused only minor injuries to the soldier testing it, but potentially could have been much worse.
More consequentially for the XM-25 program, the Rangers found that infantry squad soldiers assigned to wield it could not also carry a rifle due to the extra weight. This limited the ability of the XM-25 bearer to perform battle drills and deprived the squad of a rifle in close range combat. The XM-25 also quickly depleted all of its 36 rounds in action. As a result, the Rangers declined to use an XM-25 in an assault on a fortified compound in Afghanistan in 2013, on the grounds that the weapon’s limited utility did not justify leaving out an M4A1 carbine.
The DOD IG criticized the Army for not specifying the exact costs of the extended development and for declining to state how many XM-25s it is considering initially procuring. Stay tuned…
The Russian General Staff is not only repositioning these units back where they were before 2009, it’s also rebuilding a capable combat grouping on Crimea — albeit one that’s largely defensive in nature… It also secures the Russian vision for how this conflict ends: In a hypothetical future where the Minsk agreement is actually implemented, Russian forces may withdraw from the separatist enclaves in the Donbass. If the deal fails to hold or Kiev reneges on the terms, Russian divisions ringing the country from its north to very southeast (not including Crimea) would be poised to counter any Ukrainian moves by striking from several directions.
Kofman also sees this strategy as seeking to maintain Russia’s political dominance over Ukraine in the longer term.
The string of divisions, airbases, and brigades will be able to effect conventional deterrence or compellence for years to come… Russia will retain escalation dominance over Ukraine for the foreseeable future. By the end of 2017, its forces will be better positioned to conduct an incursion or threaten regime change in Kiev than they ever were in 2014.
Kofman recommends that the U.S. and its allies carefully think through the implications of this strategy. He believes it will take Ukraine five to 10 years to rebuild an effective military, but even if successful, the future correlation of forces and the aggressive positioning of Russian forces could make the situation more unstable rather than less so.
U.S. policymakers should think about the medium to long term — a timeline that is admittedly not our strong suit. If this conflict is not placed on stable footing by the time both countries feel themselves capable of engaging in a larger fight, it may well result in a conventional war that would dwarf the small set-piece battles we’ve seen so far. Beyond imposing a ceasefire on the current fighting, the West should think about what a rematch might look like several years from now.
Chris and I both have discussed previously the apparent waning interest on the part of the Department of Defense to sponsor empirical research studying the basic phenomena of modern warfare. The U.S. government’s boom-or-bust approach to this is long standing, extending back at least to the Vietnam War. Recent criticism of the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment (OSD/NA) is unlikely to help. Established in 1973 and led by the legendary Andrew “Yoda” Marshall until 2015, OSD/NA plays an important role in funding basic research on topics of crucial importance to the art of net assessment. Critics of the office appear to be unaware of just how thin the actual base of empirical knowledge is on the conduct of war. Marshall understood that the net result of a net assessment based mostly on guesswork was likely to be useless, or worse, misleadingly wrong.
This lack of attention to the actual conduct of war extends beyond government sponsored research. In 2004, Stephen Biddle, a professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-regarded defense and foreign policy analyst, published Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. The book focused on a very basic question: what causes victory and defeat in battle? Using a comparative approach that incorporated quantitative and qualitative methods, he effectively argued that success in contemporary combat was due to the mastery of what he called the “modern system.” (I won’t go into detail here, but I heartily recommend the book to anyone interested in the topic.)
Military Power was critically acclaimed and received multiple awards from academic, foreign policy, military, operations research, and strategic studies organizations. For all the accolades, however, Biddle was quite aware just how neglected the study of war has become in U.S. academic and professional communities. He concluded the book with a very straightforward assessment:
[F]or at least a generation, the study of war’s conduct has fallen between the stools of the institutional structure of modern academia and government. Political scientists often treat war itself as outside their subject matter; while its causes are seen as political and hence legitimate subjects of study, its conduct and outcomes are more often excluded. Since the 1970s, historians have turned away from the conduct of operations to focus on war’s effects on social, economic, and political structures. Military officers have deep subject matter knowledge but are rarely trained as theoreticians and have pressing operational demands on their professional attention. Policy analysts and operations researchers focus so tightly on short-deadline decision analysis (should the government buy the F22 or cancel it? Should the Army have 10 divisions or 8?) that underlying issues of cause and effect are often overlooked—even when the decisions under analysis turn on embedded assumptions about the causes of military outcomes. Operations research has also gradually lost much of its original empirical focus; modeling is now a chiefly deductive undertaking, with little systematic effort to test deductive claims against real world evidence. Over forty years ago, Thomas Schelling and Bernard Brodie argued that without an academic discipline of military science, the study of the conduct of war had languished; the passage of time has done little to overturn their assessment. Yet the subject is simply too important to treat by proxy and assumption on the margins of other questions In the absence of an institutional home for the study of warfare, it is all the more essential that analysts in existing disciplines recognize its importance and take up the business of investigating capability and its causes directly and rigorously. Few subjects are more important—or less studied by theoretical social scientists. With so much at stake, we surely must do better. [pp. 207-208]
Biddle published Military Power 12 years ago, in 2004. Has anything changed substantially? Have we done better?
During the Cold War Sweden and Finland were two nations that were democratic and independent but were neutral and not part of NATO. Norway and Denmark were a part of NATO since 1949 and the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) were part of the Soviet Union since 1940. Now the three Baltic states are part of NATO as of 2004 and Sweden and Finland are establishing ties to NATO.
Just a little demographics: the population of Scandinavia is around 27 million people, that is 5 million in Norway (which has a per capita income higher than the U.S.), 10 million in Sweden, 5.5 million in Finland, over 5.5 million in Denmark, plus Iceland and the Faroe Islands. The population of the three Baltic states is around 6 million people (and includes four major languages, including Russian). The population of Russia is 144 million (with 5 million in St. Petersburg and less than a million in the Kaliningrad Oblast).
We have sold the rights to use our combat model, the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model) to Sweden and Finland. We have never the rights to use the combat model to a NATO member.
Ukraine is taking Russia to court in multiple venues. This includes the multiple cases in the International Court of Justice in the Hague and the European Court of Human Rights. Not sure how this all plays out, but in the end, there has to be some additional cost to Russia if the judgments go against it. It is not like the bad old days when one could march into the Rhineland, annex Austria and take the Sudetenland facing only international condemnation. Now one has to deal with law suits!!! I gather these things are going to drag on for years.
In his 1990 book Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War, Trevor Dupuy took a look at the relationship between tank losses and crew casualties in the U.S. 1st Army between June 1944 and May 1945 (pp. 80-81). The data sampled included 797 medium (averaging 5 crewmen) and 101 light (averaging 4 crewmen) tanks. For each tank loss, an average of one crewman was killed or wounded. Interestingly, although gunfire accounted for the most tank and crew casualties, infantry anti-tank rockets (such as the Panzerfaust) inflicted 13% of the tank losses, but caused 21% of the crew losses.
Casualties were evenly distributed among the crew positions.
Whether or not a destroyed tank caught fire made a big difference for the crew. Only 40% of the tanks in the sample burned, but casualties were distributed evenly between the tanks that burned and those that did not. This was due to the higher casualty rate in the tanks that caught fire (1.28 crew casualties per tank) and those that did not (0.78 casualties per tank).
Dupuy found the relationship between tank losses and casualties to be straightforward and obvious. This relationship would not be so simple when viewed at the battalion level. More on that in a future post [Tank Loss Rates in Combat: Then and Now].
China and Russian both have one carrier of over 55,000 tons. These Kuznetsov class carriers can carry around 36 – 41 aircraft. Each of our ten Nimitz class carriers carry around 80-90 aircraft. Our amphibious assault ships can carry 36 or more aircraft. In all reality, these carriers are their equivalent.
Now, the first article states that the Chinese plan to have six carriers deployed by 2025. There are only two shown in these listings, the active Liaoning (CV-16) and the newly build CV-001A to be commissioned in 2020. So maybe four more 65,000-ton carriers by 2025?
Needless to say, we are probably not looking at a “carrier gap” anytime in the near or mid-term future.
!["The Ultimate Sand Castle" [Flickr, Jon]](https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ultimate_Sand_Castle.jpg)
