Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

Urban Combat in Mosul

battle-of-mosul-11-nov-2016The Iraqi Interior Ministry announced on Tuesday that Daesh fighters have been cleared from a third of the city of Mosul east of the Tigris River. Pre-battle estimates by the Iraqis credited Daesh with 5,000-6,000 fighters in the city. The Iraqi government has deployed a polyglot force of 100,000 Defense and Interior Ministry troops, Kurdish peshmerga militia, and Shi’ite paramilitary fighters, supported by Western ground and air support, which have mostly surrounded the city. While official casualty estimates have not been announced, the Iraqis claimed to have killed 955 Daesh fighters and captured 108 on the southern front alone.

Despite the months of preparation and a clear objective, The Washington Post‘s Loveday Morris recently reported that Iraqi Army commanders were still “shaken” by the character of the fighting in Mosul’s urban environs. Although confident they will ultimately prevail, they doubt they will meet the objective set by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to bring the city under control by the end of the year.

Although the Iraqi military leaders profess surprise at the complexity of urban combat, their descriptions of do not reveal anything unprecedented in historical experience. Many comments reflect recurring problems the Iraqi Army has faced in its recent operations to clear Daesh from central and western Iraq.

  • It is a bitter fight: street to street, house to house, with the presence of civilians slowing the advancing forces. Car bombs — the militants’ main weapon — speed out of garages and straight into advancing military convoys.
  • “If there were no civilians, we’d just burn it all,” said Maj. Gen. Sami al-Aridhi, a counterterrorism commander. He was forced to temporarily pause operations in his sector Monday because too many families were clogging the street. “I couldn’t bomb with artillery or tanks, or heavy weapons. I said, ‘We can’t do anything.’ ”
  • Militants wait to move between fighting positions until people fill the streets, using their presence as protection from airstrikes.
  • Col. Arkan Fadhil calls in airstrikes from the U.S.-led coalition, but they are less forthcoming than in previous battles because of the presence of families, and are used only to defend Iraqi forces rather than backing them when they attack.
  • Just a few Islamic State militants hidden in populated areas can cause tremendous chaos. [E]lite units stormed [six neighborhoods on] Nov. 4, on a day that was initially trumpeted as a success before it became clear that their early gains were not sustainable. After pushing forward with relatively little resistance, the forces were ambushed and cut off.
  • Low-ranking officers in the field made some mistakes…such as pushing forward without waiting for other units or without properly clearing and securing areas, later getting ambushed and becoming surrounded and trapped. Since the pitched battles of Nov. 4, the [Iraqi] counterterrorism troops have adjusted their pace.
  • [Iraqi counterterrorism forces] said they have had to slow down as they wait for other fronts to advance on the city. Whether they can fight inside when they reach it also remains to be seen. In the battle for the city of Ramadi, the elite counterterrorism troops ended up leading the entire fight after police and army forces struggled to move forward in their sectors.
  • Restrictions in the use of airstrikes also slow their advance. But on Tuesday morning, more than half a dozen rockets roared overhead into the Mosul neighborhood of Tahrir. Officers identified them as TOS-1 short-range missiles, which unleash a blast of pressure over an area of several hundred square meters, devastating anything in their wake. The officers said they had been informed that there were no civilians in the target area. “We only use these missiles in empty areas,” Aridhi said. “We don’t use them in places with families in it.” They sometimes are used when Iraqi forces are under heavy direct fire, he said, because it is faster than sending coordinates to the coalition.

The Iraqi government has not yet released casualty figures for the fighting, but losses are perceived to be heavy by the combatants themselves.

Given the extreme ratio of forces involved, it would seem that Iraqi military leaders are on firm ground in their confidence of ultimate success. It also seems likely they are correct about the amount of time that will be needed to secure Mosul. The defending Daesh fighters are unlikely to be reinforced and cannot replace their combat losses. Simple arithmetic will do them in sooner or later. It also appears clear that the Iraqis are holding open an avenue of retreat to the west, in the hopes that surviving Daesh forces will simply withdraw rather than fight to the last.

It is somewhat unexpected that the Iraqi Army would be surprised by the character of urban fighting in Mosul, given that they have a good deal of recent experience with it. Although they did not lead the fights, Iraqi Army elements participated in the battles for Fallujah in 2004 and Sadr City in 2008. Iraqi government forces cleared Basra with Coalition assistance in 2008, and recaptured Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah (again) over the last year.

There exists a significant body of conventional wisdom that holds that urban combat is bloodier than non-urban combat, requires a higher ratio of attackers to defenders to be successful, and will be prevalent in the future. None of these conclusions is borne out by historical evidence. TDI has done a significant amount of analysis challenging the basis and conclusions of this conventional wisdom. War by Numbers, the forthcoming book by TDI President Chris Lawrence, goes into this research in great detail.

Kursk Book Status

Kursk

The Kursk book remains sold out at Amazon.com, although there are four sellers on the site selling new copies. One of those is the publisher Aberdeen Books. I gather most of the other book sellers have also sold out of their copies, leaving Aberdeen Books as the primary source for the book. He has enough inventory to get through this Christmas and winter. There are currently no plans to print any additional copies, although I have not ruled out doing an abridged or condensed version at some point in the future.

Aberdeen website: http://www.aberdeenbookstore.com/

New Colombian Deal

Round Two: Colombia has signed a new deal with FARC: colombias-government-rebels-sign-modified-peace-agreement

  1. I gather it still needs to be approved (this was the problem the last time).
  2. Apparently he does not need to call a second plebiscite, but needs approval from congress (this is in the second article below).
  3. The agreement does not include the smaller more radical guerilla group ELN.
  4. There is a ceasefire in effect until 31 December.
  5. FARC is reported in the article to be 7,000 strong.
  6. ELN is reported in the article to be less than 2,000
  7. I assume no new Nobel prizes will be awarded.

Another article on the same subject: Colombia-agrees-to-modified-peace-deal-with-FARC

What Is The Relationship Between Rate of Fire and Military Effectiveness?

marine-firing-m240Over at his Best Defense blog, Tom Ricks recently posed an interesting question: Is rate of fire no longer a key metric in assessing military effectiveness?

Rate of fire doesn’t seem to be important in today’s militaries. I mean, everyone can go “full auto.” Rather, the problem seems to me firing too much and running out of ammunition.

I wonder if this affects how contemporary military historians look at the tactical level of war. Throughout most of history, the problem, it seems to me, was how many rocks, spears, arrows or bullets you could get off. Hence the importance of drill, which was designed to increase the volume of infantry fire (and to reduce people walking off the battlefield when they moved back to reload).

There are several ways to address this question from a historical perspective, but one place to start is to look at how rate of fire relates historically to combat.

Rate of fire is one of several measures of a weapon’s ability to inflict damage, i.e. its lethality. In the early 1960s, Trevor Dupuy and his associates at the Historical Evaluation Research Organization (HERO) assessed whether historical trends in increasing weapon lethality were changing the nature of combat. To measure this, they developed a methodology for scoring the inherent lethality of a given weapon, the Theoretical Lethality Index (TLI). TLI is the product of five factors:

  • rate of fire
  • targets per strike
  • range factor
  • accuracy
  • reliability

In the TLI methodology, rate of fire is defined as the number of effective strikes a weapon can deliver under ideal conditions in increments of one hour, and assumes no logistical limitation.

As measured by TLI, increased rates of fire do indeed increase weapon lethality. The TLI of an early 20th century semi-automatic rifle is nearly five times higher than a mid-19th century muzzle-loaded rifle due to its higher rate of fire. Despite having lower accuracy and reliability, a World War II-era machine gun has 10 times the TLI of a semi-automatic rifle due to its rate of fire. The rate of fire of small arms has not increased since the early-to-mid 20th century, and the assault rifle, adopted by modern armies following World War II, remains that standard infantry weapon in the early 21st century.

attrition-fig-11

Rate of fire is just but one of many factors that can influence a weapon’s lethality, however. Artillery has much higher TLI values than small arms despite lower rates of fire. This is for the obvious reasons that artillery has far greater range than small arms and because each round of ammunition can hit multiple targets per strike.

There are other methods for scoring weapon lethality but the TLI provides a logical and consistent methodology for comparing weapons to each other. Through the TLI, Dupuy substantiated the observation that indeed, weapons have become more lethal over time, particularly in the last century.

But if weapons have become more lethal, has combat become bloodier? No. Dupuy and his colleagues also discovered that, counterintuitively, the average casualty rates in land combat have been declining since the 17th century. Combat casualty rates did climb in the early and mid-19th century, but fell again precipitously from the later 19th century through the end of the 20th.

attrition-fig-13

The reason, Dupuy determined, was because armies have historically adapted to increases in weapon lethality by dispersing in greater depth on the battlefield, decentralizing tactical decision-making and enhancing mobility, and placing a greater emphasis on combined arms tactics. The area occupied by 100,000 soldiers increased 4,000 times between antiquity and the late 20th century. Average ground force dispersion increased by a third between World War II and the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and he estimated it had increased by another quarter by 1990.

attrition-fig-14

Simply put, even as weapons become more deadly, there are fewer targets on the battlefield for them to hit. Through the mid-19th century, the combination of low rates of fire and relatively shorter range required the massing of infantry fires in order to achieve lethal effect. Before 1850, artillery caused more battlefield casualties than infantry small arms. This ratio changed due to the increased rates of fire and range of rifled and breach loading weapons introduced in the 1850s and 1860s. The majority of combat casualties in  conflicts of the mid-to-late 19th century were inflicted by infantry small arms.

attrition-fig-19The lethality of modern small arms combined with machine guns led to further dispersion and the decentralization of tactical decision-making in early 20th century warfare. The increased destructiveness of artillery, due to improved range and more powerful ammunition, coupled with the invention of the field telephone and indirect fire techniques during World War I, restored the long arm to its role as king of the battlefield.

attrition-fig-35

Dupuy represented this historical relationship between lethality and dispersion on the battlefield by applying a dispersion factor to TLI values to obtain what he termed the Operational Lethality Index (OLI). By accounting for these effects, OLI values are a good theoretical approximation of relative weapon effectiveness.

npw-fig-2-5Although little empirical research has been done on this question, it seems logical that the trend toward greater use of precision-guided weapons is at least a partial response to the so-called “empty battlefield.” The developers of the Third Offset Strategy postulated that the emphasis on developing precision weaponry by the U.S. in the 1970s was a calculated response to offset the Soviet emphasis on mass firepower (i.e. the “second offset”). The goal of modern precision weapons is “one shot, one kill,” where a reduced rate of fire is compensated for by greater range and accuracy. Such weapons have become sufficiently lethal that the best way to survive on a modern battlefield is to not be seen.

At least, that was the conventional wisdom until recently. The U.S. Army in particular is watching how the Ukrainian separatist forces and their Russian enablers are making use of new artillery weapons, drone and information technology, and tactics to engage targets with mass fires. Some critics have alleged that the U.S. artillery arm has atrophied during the Global War on Terror and may no longer be capable of overmatching potential adversaries. It is not yet clear whether there will be a real competition between mass and precision fires on the battlefields of the near future, but it is possible that it signals yet another shift in the historical relationship between lethality, mobility, and dispersion in combat.

SOURCES

Trevor N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War (Falls Church, VA: NOVA Publications, 1995)

_____., Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987)

_____. The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1980)

_____. Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Indianapolis; New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1979)

Taking Mosul

It states in the article tagged below that “His Ninth Armoured Division and elite counter terrorism units fighting nearby seized six of some 60 neighborhoods last week, the first gains inside Mosul since the Oct. 17 start of a campaign to crush Islamic State in its Iraqi fortress”

Does this mean that they have taken a tenth of Mosul?

crashing-waves-of-jihadists

Note that the article is talking about 5,000 jihadists inside of Mosul. Also of considerable interest is the statement: “Hashemi said an inner core of mainly Francophone foreign fighters, given the name ‘al-Murabitoun’ (Guards) had taken an oath to fight to the death defending strategic positions in the heart of the city.”

Lt. General Michael T. Flynn

Lt. General Michael Flynn was the head of DIA for two years before he was fired (2012-2014). I gather he is close to Trump on foreign and defense policy and is in line to be the next National Security Advisor (the next Kissinger…or next Scowcroft, or next Brzezinski, or next Powell or next Rice).

His Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_T._Flynn

He does have a book that was just released. A significant amount of it is actually readable on the Amazon.com site: https://www.amazon.com/Field-Fight-Global-Against-Radical/dp/1250106222/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8

Click on the “look inside” section and flip through pages 157 to 180  (“Conclusion”). Most of that chapter is there.

His co-author’s bio is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Ledeen

Multiple other articles on him are here:

  1. http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/donald-trump-general-michael-flynn-vp-225253
  2. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/us/politics/michael-flynn-donald-trump.html?_r=0
  3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/09/15/michael-flynn-trumps-military-adviser-says-colin-powells-emails-include-really-mean-things/
  4. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/15/trump-adviser-michael-t-flynn-on-his-dinner-with-putin-and-why-russia-today-is-just-like-cnn/

I am sure there is a lot more.

 

Questions

Well, the election is done. Oddly enough there was a certain degree of continuity in U.S foreign and defense policy from Bush Junior to Obama and it probably would have continued to Clinton. Are we now looking at any fundamental changes? What will be our defense policies?

  1. In Afghanistan
    1. Significantly increase effort?
    2. Slightly increase U.S. effort?
    3. Keep the same?
    4. Decrease U.S. effort?
    5. Disengage?
  2. In Iraq
    1. Maintain current effort after Mosul falls?
    2. Decrease U.S. effort?
    3. Disengage?
  3. With Syria
    1. No fly zones?
    2. Significantly increase effort?
    3. Slightly increase U.S. effort?
    4. Keep the same?
    5. Decrease U.S. effort?
    6. Disengage?
    7. Negotiate settlement with Russia and Assad?
  4. With Ukraine
    1. Significantly increase effort (probably not)?
    2. Slightly increase U.S. effort?
    3. Keep the same?
    4. Decrease U.S. effort?
    5. Disengage?
    6. Negotiate settlement with Russia?
    7. What about Crimea?
    8. What about Lugansk and Donetsk Peoples Republics?
    9. What about sanctions?
    10. What about EU sanctions?
  5. With Russia
    1. Confront more aggressively?
    2. Keep the same?
    3. Try to tone it down?
    4. Reset?
  6. With NATO
    1. Increase commitment (probably not)?
    2. Keep the same?
    3. Decrease U.S. effort?
    4. Force our NATO allies to contribute more?
    5. Disengage because NATO is obsolete?
    6. Negotiate some arrangement with Russia?
  7. What about Georgia?
    1. Encourage NATO to take them as a member (I am guessing not)?
    2. Continue working with them (Partnership for Peace)?
    3. Decrease commitment to them?
    4. Disengage?
    5. What about Abkhazia and Ossetia?
  8. With Iran
    1. Cancel current deal and try to renegotiate?
    2. Keep the same?
    3. Try to work out some overarching deal concerning nukes, Iraq support, and Assad support?
  9. With Yemen
    1. Keep the same (remain disengaged)?
    2. Re-engage to some level?
  10. War on Terror
    1. What additional actions are they going to take against ISIL?
    2. What about Al-Qaeda?
    3. Any other long-term initiatives to forestall the development of groups in the future or stop their attacks?
  11. With the Defense Budget
    1. Increase defense budget? (He has stated that he will increase the army from 480,000 to 540,000).
    2. Keep the same?
    3. I gather we will end sequestration (which is already on hold)?
    4. Who is going to be the Secretary of Defense?
  12. And then there is East Asia (China, the two Koreas, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, etc.).
  13. With trade
    1. Will TPP be cancelled?
    2. Will TPP be re-negotiated?
  14. Oil and Climate Change
    1. This is an international issue.
    2. Are we going to pump more oil?
    3. Are we going to use more coal (I gather this is the case)?
    4. Will interest and funding for clean energy decline (I gather this is the case)?

I am not sure what President-elect Trump intends to do on any of subjects, although he is probably going to do something on trade.

There are a few articles detailing his plans, like this one: http://www.defensenews.com/articles/trump-defense-plan-detailed

And this one: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/11/09/four-questions-about-how-trump-would-affect-the-military-industrial-complex/

But at this juncture, we really do not know what our future defense policy will be.

A2/D2 and Jam Gee-Cee in the Western Pacific

western-pacific-oceanOne of the primary scenarios the Third Offset Strategy is intended to address is a potential military conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China over the sovereignty of the Republic of China (Taiwan) and territorial control of the South and East China Seas. As surveyed by James Holmes in a wonderful Mahanian geopolitical analysis, the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea at the intersection between East Asia and the Indian Ocean region, bounded by strategic gaps and choke points between island chains, atolls, and reefs, and riven by competing territorial claims among rising and established regional powers.

China’s current policy appears to be to develop the ability to assert military control over the Western Pacific and deny U.S. armed forces access to the area in case of overt conflict. The strategic dimension is framed by China’s pursuit of anti-access/area denial (A2/D2) capabilities enabled by development of sophisticated long-range strike, sensor, guidance, and other military technologies, and the use of asymmetrical warfare operational concepts such as psychological and information operations, and “lawfare” (the so-called “three warfares.”) China is also advancing its interests in decidedly low-tech ways as well, such as creating artificial islands on disputed reefs through dredging.

The current U.S. approach to thwarting China’s A2/D2 strategy is the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC, aka “Jam Gee Cee”), or the concept formerly known as AirSea Battle. As described by Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, the current iteration of JAM-GC

…is designed to preserve U.S. access to the Western Pacific by combining passive defenses against Chinese missile attack with an emphasis on offensive action to destroy or disable the forces that China would use to establish A2/AD. This offensive action would use “cross-domain synergy” among U.S. space, cyber, air, and maritime forces (hence the moniker “AirSea”) to blind or suppress Chinese sensors. The heart of the concept, however, lies in physically destroying the Chinese weapons and infrastructure that underpin A2/AD.

The brute, counterforce character of JAM-GC provides the logic behind proposals for new long-range precision strike weapons such as the Air Force’s stealthy Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) program, recently designated the B-21 Raider.

The JAM-GC concept has not yet been officially set and continues to evolve. Both the A2/D2 construct and the premises behind JAM-GC are being challenged. As Biddle and Oelrich conclude in their detailed analysis of the strategic and military trends in the region, it is not at all clear that China’s A2/D2 approach will actually achieve its goal.

[W]e find that by 2040 China will not achieve military hegemony over the Western Pacific or anything close to it—even without ASB. A2/AD is giving air and maritime defenders increasing advantages, but those advantages are strongest over controlled landmasses and weaken over distance. As both sides deploy A2/AD, these capabilities will increasingly replace today’s U.S. command of the global commons not with Chinese hegemony but with a more differentiated pattern of control, with a U.S. sphere of influence around allied landmasses, a Chinese sphere of influence over the Chinese mainland, and contested battlespace covering much of the South and East China Seas, wherein neither power enjoys wartime freedom of surface or air movement.

They also raise deeper concerns about JAM-GC’s emphasis on an aggressive counterforce posture. In an era of constrained defense spending, developing and acquiring the military capability to execute it could be costly. Also, long-range air and missile strikes against the Chinese mainland runs the distinct risk of escalating a regional conflict into a general war between nuclear armed opponents.

A recent RAND analysis echoed these conclusions. The adoption of counterforce strategies by both the U.S. and China would result in heavy military losses by both sides that would make it difficult to constrain a longer, broader conflict. Although the RAND analysts foresee the U.S. prevailing in such a conflict, it would not be quick and the ramifications to both sides would be severe.

Dissatisfaction with these options and potential outcomes is partly what motivated the development of the Third Offset Strategy in the first place. It is not clear whether leveraging technological innovation can provide new operational capabilities that will enable successful solutions to these strategic dilemmas. What does seem apparent is that fresh thinking is needed.

 

We probably need to keep talking about Afghanistan

image description

Shawn posted a very nice summary a couple of days ago. It is worth reading if you have not already: Meanwhile in Afghanistan

Recent article reports the same trends: Afghan-government-lost-2-percent-territory

A couple of things get my attention in all this:

  1. They are talking about control of territory. I believe control of population is a lot better metric.
    1. One notes in Shawn’s write up that control of population is 68.5% (vice 61.3% of area).
  2. The insurgent level of activity is very high:
    1. 5,523 Afghan Army and police killed (15,000 casualties)
    2. 22,733 incidents from 8/1/2015 to 8/15/2016

Based on Chapter 11 (Estimating Insurgent Force Size) of my book America’s Modern Wars, working backward from this incident data would mean that there are something like 60,000 – 80,000 full-time and part-time insurgents operating. There is a lot comparing apples to oranges to get there: for example, how are they counting incidents in Afghanistan vice how were they counting incidents in the past cases we use for this estimate, what is the mix of full-time and part-time insurgents, how active and motivated are the insurgents, and so forth; but that level of activity is similar to the level of activity in Iraq at its worse (26,033 incidents in 2005, 45,330 in 2006 and 19,125 in 2007 according to one count). We had over 180,000 U.S. and coalition troops there to deal with that. The Afghani’s have 170,000 Army and Air Force or around 320,000 if you count police (and we did not count police in our database unless there were actively involved in counterinsurgent work). The 5,500+ Afghan Army and police killed a year indicates a pretty active insurgency. We lost less than 5,500 for the entire time we were in Iraq. The low wounded-to-killed ratio in the current Afghan data may well be influenced by who they choose to report as wounded and how they address lightly wounded (as discussed in Chapter 15, Casualties, in my upcoming book War by Numbers). Don’t know what current U.S. Army estimates are of Afghan insurgent strength.

Now, in Chapter Six of my book America’s Modern Wars, we developed a force ratio model based upon 83 historical cases (see chart at top of this post). It was very dependent on the cause of the insurgency, whether it was based on a central idea (like nationalism) or was regional or factional, or whether it was based on a overarching idea (like communism). I don’t still don’t really know the nature of the Afghan insurgency, and we were never funded to study this insurgency (we were only funded for Iraq work). So, I have not done the in-depth analysis of the Afghan insurgency that I did for Iraq. But…….nothing here looks particularly positive.

We never did an analysis of stalemated insurgencies. It could be done, although there are not that many cases of these. One could certainly examine any insurgency that lasts more than 15 years for this purpose. Does a long stalemated insurgency mean that the government (or counterinsurgents) eventually win? Or does a long stalemated insurgency mean that the insurgents eventually win? I don’t know. I would have to go back through our database of 100+ cases, update the data, sort out the cases and then I could make some predictions. That takes time and effort, and right now my effort is focused elsewhere. Is anyone inside DOD doing this type of analysis? I doubt it. Apparently a stalemate means that you can now pass the problem onto the next administration. While it solves the immediate political problem, is really does not answer the question of whether we are winning or losing. Is what we are doing good enough that this will revolve in our favor in the next ten years, or do we need to do more? I think this is the question that needs to be addressed.

Isolation of Mosul

mosul_battle_zone_map_medium01

Well, it looks like Mosul is isolated, sort of: mosul-iraq-advance

The Shiite militia have cut the main road to the west of Mosul. As no one wants the Shiite militia to go into the city, this is a good use for them. Also the Turks don’t want them to advance on the Turkmen town of Tal Afar. Not sure who is supposed to take it, but it appears that Mosul is not yet completely isolated. But, I suspect that anyone ISIL wanted to stay are still in Mosul and anyone they wanted to leave has left.

Are there 5,000 ISIL fighters in Mosul? I doubt that. I suspect there is a holding force of hundreds and probably no more than a thousand. If they left more than that behind, then it is just a gift for the Iraqi Army, for the insurgents are nicely gathered together ready to be killed. They are a bigger problem is they go back to being guerillas, which is what I assume most of them are doing.

The Iraqi army has not yet entered the city. The front line in the east is just 200 meters from Mosul (two Canadian football fields away).