Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

Syria After Aleppo

Reports of the collapse of resistance by forces fighting the regime of Bashar Al Assad in Aleppo, Syria have overshadowed news of the recent recapture of Palmyra by Daesh fighters. While the conquest of Aleppo is a significant victory for Assad, the loss of Plamyra – which had been recaptured by the Syrian Army earlier in the year – clearly indicates that success will not be decisive in bringing the five-year old civil war to an end.

Despite major assistance from Russia and Iran, the Syrian Army lacks the combat power to defeat the various domestic and foreign rebel forces arrayed against it. The army, estimated to number over 300,000 before the conflict began, is now believed to total less than half of that as a result of casualties, desertions, and fatigue. It has become particularly weak in infantry. In an attempt to remedy this, the Syrians have raised religiously and politically indoctrinated National Defense Forces (NDF) militias with the help of Iranian advisors, although they are of uncertain quality. The Iranians Qods Force and Lebanese Hizbollah have contributed advisor and fighters, respectively, and the Russians have also contributed advisors and heavy artillery and air support.

Reliable estimates of force strengths for the various factions are hard to come by, and figures for the Syrian Army are particularly variable. The Syrian Kurds are currently aligned against Daesh and Jubhat Fateh al-Sham (the current name for al Qaeda fighters in Syria). They seek independence from the Assad regime but are not fighting against it at this time.

Even the most optimistic estimates based on back-of-the-envelope counts of the raw numbers do not credit the Assad regime and its patrons with enough of a force ratio advantage to overwhelm their opponents in the sort-term. If the pessimistic estimates are more accurate, despite local successes, the Syrian government may struggle simply to maintain the status quo.

During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to intensify U.S. efforts effort to defeat Daesh and to work with Russia to that end. Analysts believe, however, that Russia supports Assad’s calculated strategy to defeat Syrian Sunni rebels first to eliminate the political threat they pose to his regime, before seeking to defeat Daesh and al Qaeda. Precisely what the incoming Trump administration will do differently than currently and the extent of actual military cooperation with Assad and Russia remains to be seen.

Pivot to Russia?

This is an interesting article on the U.S. deliberately pivoting from China to Russia: 45-years-ago-kissinger-envisioned-a-pivot-to-russia-will-trump-make-it-happen?

I am not sure I buy into any of it !!!…..but it got my attention.

The argument:
  1. 45 years ago Kissinger told Nixon that the next president would have to pivot towards Russia in 20 years.
  2. In effect, he envisioned the United States playing a balance of power role between China and Russia, moving back and forth between the two.
  3. Is this what Trump is doing with his recent negative comments on China and positive comments on Russia?
Factiods that got my attention:
  1. “As a means to block the spread of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, Carter administration officials approved of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which occurred shortly after Deng Xiaoping concluded the first trip of a Chinese leader to the United States in January 1979.” …..Really?
  2. “China’s economy was once a fraction of the Soviet economy; now it’s about five times larger.” …….it is always useful to look at GDP.

What is missing?

What is missing from the list of Trump’s foreign and national security policy team is an established foreign policy expert or established foreign policy professional. There is no one like a Kissinger or Brzezinski. Of the seven people nominated (the list is below) two are businessmen with no prior government or foreign policy experience, three are retired generals, one has no real experience, and there is only one who has spent a significant part her career in foreign policy (McFarland). McFarland is not a major name, although she was on the board of Jamestown Foundation, effectively headed by Brzezinski. She does not report directly to the president.

Their degrees are interesting:
Haley = BS in Accounting,
Tillerson = BS in Civil Engineering,
Ross = MBA.

 

The three generals are better educated:
Mattis = BA in History. Graduate of National War College…does he have an MA or MS or only a BA?
Flynn = An MBA Telecommunications, MA in National Security and Strategic Studies.
Kelly = MS from National Defense University.

 

McFarland has a MA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics and studied for a PhD but never completed her dissertation.

The real senior foreign policy experts appear to be the retired generals. Keep in mind, that many retired generals are not foreign policy experts. They often spend the first 15-20 years in service with their branch, then as a general in various commands. Depending on how this adds up, some may have considerable foreign policy experience, but many do not.

Flynn during his career deployed in Grenada and Haiti, and starting around 2001 has been involved in intelligence commands, often deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly no broad foreign policy experience but around two decades of very real experience in our last two wars.

Mattis’s international career also appears to have started around 2003 with the invasion of Iraq as the 1st Marine Division commander. He then went to the Combat Development Command and in 2006 to the Joint Forces Command and then U.S. Central Command. So, more than a decade of foreign policy experience.

Kelly is similar as he with the 1st Marine Division in Iraq. Again, maybe a decade.

On the other hand, McFarland is an old hand, having first worked on the National Security Council in the 1970s (when Kissinger was there).

Anyhow, degrees and experience does not produce a successful foreign policy and a lack of degrees and lack of experience does not mean they will not produce a successful foreign policy. But, with three defense experts, three business people (including Haley) and only one foreign policy expert (who does not directly report to the president), the foreign policy expertise is a little thin. The real concern is that among the six people that report directly to the president, there really is not an expert on foreign policy. Added to that, the president-elect is not considered a foreign policy expert either (BS in Economics).

It does raise the issue as to who is doing the bigger picture long-term strategic thinking for our foreign and national security policy or is this going to one of these administrations that jump from issue to issue with no real plan or overall strategy (like most administrations have…to be honest).

List of nominees:
Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson (head of Exxon)
Secretary of Defense: James Mattis (retired Marine Corps general)
National Security Advisor: Michael T. Flynn (retired Army Lt. General)
    Deputy National Security Advisor: K.T. McFarland (Fox News commentator)
Ambassador to the United Nations: Nikki Haley (Governor of South Carolina).
    This is apparently a cabinet-level position.
Secretary of Commerce: Wilbur Ross (businessman)
Homeland Security: John F. Kelly (retired Marine Corps General)

 

Questions II

Back on November 9 I made a long post about what our foreign and defense policies might be in the new administration. At the time, I really did not know, so I threw out a range of options on 14 different issues. That post is here: Questions

We now have a team nominated, although there are more positions to fill. It consists of:

Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson (head of Exxon)
Secretary of Defense: James Mattis (retired Marine Corps general)
National Security Advisor: Michael T. Flynn (retired Army Lt. General)
    Deputy National Security Advisor: K.T. McFarland (Fox News commentator)
Ambassador to the United Nations: Nikki Haley (Governor of South Carolina).
    This is apparently a cabinet-level position.
Secretary of Commerce: Wilbur Ross (businessman)
Homeland Security: John F. Kelly (retired Marine Corps General)

 

All these require confirmation by the senate except for the National Security Advisor (Flynn) and his Deputy (McFarland).

Anyhow, I am not sure I have answers to any of the 14 questions I posed. In fact, the only one that has been publicly discussed (#12) I whiffed on and provided no options. It simply read: “12. And then there is East Asia (China, the two Koreas, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, etc.).”

I gather China is going to be a central issue in the Trump administration from the start. Not sure how much impact this will have on national security. Will it primarily be an argument over trade?

Tillerson is the one

More rhyming headlines…sorry. Anyhow, looks like  Rex Tillerson, President of Exxon Mobil Corporation has been selected to be our next Secretary of State. Here is his Wikipedia bio: Rex Tillerson

Not much in the bio….he has been with Exxon for 41 years. It appears that this will be his first job since college that is not with Exxon. The most telling things are:

  1. Close ties to Russia and Putin.
  2. Doesn’t like sanctions (not surprising)
  3. Likes free trade (and the TPP)
  4. Suspicious of global warning (not surprising…considering his company)
  5. According to Wikipedia was recommended to Trump by Condoleezza Rice.

Anyhow, nothing really surprising or earthshaking here considering his business. The ties to Russia pose a problem and the hearings should be interesting. This is worth noting: John McCain: Rex Tillerson and Putin

To quote a couple of lines from McCain:

“But Vladimir Putin is a thug, a bully and a murderer, and anybody else who describes him an anything else is lying.”

and

“What about all the other things–right now, the targeting of hospitals by Russian aircraft with precision weapons in Syria, in Aleppo? Those are the kind of questions that we need to ask [Tillerson] about the relationship with Vladimir Putin.”

Senators McCain and Graham have been supportive of Ukraine and hostile to Russia. The Democrats have 48 seats in the Senate. If McCain and Graham were willing to break with the party and break with Trump, and could bring one more Republican senator with them, then they could actually reject Trump’s Secretary of State appointment. I don’t recall that ever happening for a Secretary of State appointment so suspect it is not very likely.

Over 50,000 killed

OK…latest estimate from DOD is that they have killed over 50,000 ISIL fighters over the last two years: Body count = 50K+

Here is my post on the subject in August when the count was a mere 45,000: some-back-of-the-envelope-calculations

I don’t think I have much more to add to this without getting very sarcastic. Note that they refer to it as a “conservative estimate.”  Something does not add up somewhere (either their loss estimates are way too high or their force size estimates have been way too low).

War Updates

We are not a news site or current affairs site (because it takes too much time)……but…a few things of note in the middle east:

  1. Mosul has still not fallen. Offensive started 17 October….we were on the outskirts of Mosul by the beginning of November, and now in a grind that some said would take 6 to 8 weeks. So far, it appears to be taking longer than that. We are claiming that 2,000 ISIL fighters have been killed or wounded. 2000-Islamic-State-militants-killed-or-injured-in-Mosul-offensive and us-says-2-000-is-fighters-killed-gravely-wounded-in-mosul
  2. The Syrians appear to be pushing hard to take all of Aleppo before the new U.S. president arrives in office. I suspect this is an attempt to get a negotiating advantage in light of what they perceive to be Trump’s attitudes towards Russia and Syria. According to this report, they have at least 85% of the city: thousands-flee-heavy-aleppo-fighting.
  3. ISIL has retaken Palmyra. latest-syria-says-98-percent-east-aleppo-retaken and recaptures-palmyra

The odd claim is the one made in the second article of this link, where Russia Foreign Minister Lavrov claims about the taking of Palmyra by ISIL that: “…it has been staged to give a respite to bandits in eastern Aleppo.” Of course, one person’s freedom fighters is another person’s bandits.

To take a quote from the first article from Lt. General Townsend: “‘At the start of the campaign, we estimated somewhere between at the low end 3,500, at the high end, about 6,000. By our calculations we think we have killed or badly wounded over 2,000. So if you do the math, that’s still 3,000-5,000’ militants remaining in Mosul, Townsend said.”

We assume he is talking 2,000 killed or seriously enough injured to no be able to return to action in the next couple of months….so, maybe 1,000 killed and 1,000 seriously wounded (kind of grabbing numbers out of thin air here). So, total losses are 4,000 – 6,000 if you count all wounded? That is kind of the entire opposing force.

Then there is the estimates that coalition has lost 14,000 killed and wounded since the start of the offensive (see our post at: Casualties in Iraq (November)). Does that mean that trained conventional counterinsurgency forces are losing something like 2.3-to-1 fighting the insurgents. That would be significant if that was the case.

Something if off somewhere in these various numbers. I not sure which number not to believe (although the estimate of insurgent strength has traditionally always been way too low).

Strachan On The Failures Of Western Strategists

Tom Ricks has posted a commentary on recent political events by Scottish historian Hew Strachan. Strachan is one of the current luminaries in field of strategic studies (his recent The Direction of War is excellent). He offers a fairly pungent critique of the failure of strategic thinkers in the West to understand and respond to the forces buffeting the U.S. and Europe that resulted in Brexit and the Trump presidency.

Strategists, for all their pontifications about the future, have failed on two counts. First, they have become too politically aware in their views. Politicians need to buttress current institutions, and in doing so feed the narrative that the institutions are robust and reliable, despite their need for reform and reinvigoration. Strategists need to be tougher, and to speak truth to power. Since the end of the Cold War, geopolitical pressures have taken the common ideologies of the “west” — democracy and liberal capitalism — in divergent geographical directions. Globalization, for all its rhetorical flourishes, has mattered less than regionalism. The United States has turned from the North Atlantic and the Middle East to the Pacific and East Asia. Meanwhile Europeans are driven by an opportunistic Russia and a flood of refugees to look to their eastern marches and the Mediterranean.

Secondly, strategists have failed because they have allowed their understanding of strategy to be dominated by their commitment to the status quo. Strategy has become obsessed with the mitigation of risk and the minimization of threats, rather than with the exploitation of the opportunities which risk presents. Strategy has to respond to and even initiate contingency, not to be fearful of it. Both the Brexit vote and the election of Trump amplify the risks which we face, but they also — like Hans Christian Andersen’s child — expose the emperor’s nakedness. We shall not master risk if we do not also embrace it.

This criticism applies not simply to the last eight years of the Obama administration, but really, to the international challenges that have manifested since 9/11. The notion that the only constant is change may be a worn cliche, but that does not mean it is not true. Many a great power has foundered due to the inability to adapt and master change.

The Roots of Russian ‘Hybrid Warfare’

Special Forces (spetsnaz) personnel of the Russian Federation federal agencies receiving awards from Russian President Vladimir Putin during an official reception.

On Russian foreign and military affairs, I have a lot of time for British academic Mark Galeotti. I recommend his work to anyone interested in these topics. An expert on Russian history and government, he is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of International Affairs Prague, and Principal Director of the consultancy Mayak Intelligence.

In a piece at War on the Rocks, Galeotti acknowledges the traditionally cited sources for Russia’s so-called “hybrid war” approach: its relative post-Soviet economic weakness and a military/political inheritance from the Soviet and Tsarist eras. However, he argues that the Putin government’s approach to foreign and military policy is a reflection of the hybrid nature of the current Russian state:

Today, Russia is a patrimonial, hyper-presidential regime, one characterized by the permeability of boundaries between public and private, domestic and external. As oligarch-turned-dissident Mikhail Khodorkovsky put it:

[W]hat distinguishes the current Russian government from the erstwhile Soviet leaders familiar to the West is its rejection of ideological constraints and the complete elimination of institutions.

Lacking meaningful rule of law or checks and balances, without drawing too heavy-handed a comparison with fascism, Putin’s Russia seems to embody, in its own chaotic and informal way, Mussolini’s dictum “tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato, nulla contro lo Stato” — “everything inside the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State.” Parenthetically, Mussolini sent what could be called “little blackshirt men” to Spain in the 1930s to fight on Franco’s side during the civil war. All notionally opted to do so of their own volition (as the Voluntary Troops Corps) and initially without insignia.

In Russia, state institutions are often regarded as personal fiefdoms and piggy banks, officials and even officers freely engage in commercial activity, and the Russian Orthodox Church is practically an arm of the Kremlin. Given all that, the infusion of non-military instruments into military affairs was almost inevitable. Beyond that, though, Putin’s Russia has been characterized — in the past, at least — by multiple, overlapping agencies, a “bureaucratic pluralism” intended as much to permit the Kremlin to divide and rule as for any practical advantages.

Galeotti asserts that the Putin regime believes itself in a “geopolitical, even civilizational struggle” with the West, and its approach to the conflict mirrors the way the regime operates, with “blurring of the borders between state, paramilitary, mercenary, and dupe.”

He lays out his argument fully in a newly published study, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia’s non-linear military challenge right.

GAO: “We’re 26 ships into the contract and we still don’t know if the [Littoral Combat Ship] can do its job.”

In a previous post, I questioned the wisdom of a defense procurement strategy of buying expensive, technologically advanced weapons systems while they are still being developed and before they have been proven combat effective. One of the examples I cited was the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.

(The LCS should not be confused with the Navy’s new guided-missile destroyer U.S.S. Zumwalt, which recently suffered an embarrassing propulsion system failure at sea, necessitating a tow back to port for repairs).

The incoming Trump administration is going to have a decision to make with regard to the LCS. Congress approved procurement of 40 total LCSs in the recent National Defense Authorization Act of 2017. The Navy has already built, purchased, or ordered 28. It intends eventually to build up to a fleet of 52 small surface combatant ships, either LCSs or a modified version it has classified as a frigate. As part of its 2018 budget request, the Navy wants $14 billion for the final 12 authorized vessels and their associated weapons systems to fund a “block” purchase.

However, at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 1 December, the General Accounting Office, a Defense Department representative, and various senators criticized the LCS program for “for cost overruns, engineering failures, and more.” They called for reduced, rather than increased, spending on it.

On the campaign trail, President-elect Donald Trump promised to expand the Navy to 350 ships as part of his proposals to “upgrade America’s military.” The Congressional Research Service has predicted the Navy would increase its total request to 56 small surface combatants.

The outcome remains to be seen, but a potential spanner in the works to Trump’s plans may be the recent revelation in the Washington Post of a Defense Department internal report that alleged that it was wasting up to $125 billion annually on poor business administration. Congress is expected to pass a continuing resolution this month to allow for negotiation of a new budget in early 2017.