Mystics & Statistics

A blog on quantitative historical analysis hosted by The Dupuy Institute

Fifth Generation Deterrence

“Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of the enemy… the FEAR to attack. And so, … the Doomsday machine is terrifying and simple to understand… and completely credible and convincing.” – Dr. Strangelove.

In a previous post, we looked at some aspects of the nuclear balance of power. In this Stpost, we will consider some aspects of conventional deterrence. Ironically, Chris Lawrence was cleaning out a box in his office (posted in this blog), which contained an important article for this debate, “The Case for More Effective, Less Expensive Weapons Systems: What ‘Quality Versus Quantity’ Issue?” by none other than Pierre M. Sprey, available here, published in 1982.

In comparing the F-15 and F-16, Sprey identifies four principal effectiveness characteristics that contribute to victory in air-to-air combat:

  1. Achieving surprise bounces and avoiding being surprised;
  2. Out-numbering the enemy in the air;
  3. Out-maneuvering the enemy to reach firing position (when surprise fails);
  4. Achieving reliable kills within the brief firing opportunities presented by combat.

“Surprise is the first because, in every air war since WWI, somewhere between 65% and 85% of all fighters shot down were unaware of their attacker.” Sprey mentions that the F-16 is superior to the F-15 due to the smaller size, and that fact that it smokes much less, both aspects that are clearly Within-Visual Range (WVR) combat considerations. Further, his discussion of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat is dismissive.

The F-15 has an apparently advantage inasmuch as it carries the Sparrow radar missile. On closer examination, this proves to be little or no advantage: in Vietnam, the Sparrow had a kill rate of .08 to .10, less that one third that of the AIM-9D/G — and the new models of the Sparrow do not appear to have corrected the major reasons for this disappointing performance; even worse, locking-on with the Sparrow destroys surprise because of the distinctive and powerful radar signature involved.

Sprey was right to criticize the performance of the early radar-guided missiles.  From “Trends in Air-to-Air Combat: Implications for Future Air Superiority,” page 10

From 1965 through 1968, during Operation Rolling Thunder, AIM-7 Sparrow missiles succeeded in downing their targets only 8 percent of the time and AIM-9 Sidewinders only 15 percent of the time. Pre-conflict testing indicated expected success rates of 71 and 65 percent respectively. Despite these problems, AAMs offered advantages over guns and accounted for the vast majority of U.S. air-to-air victories throughout the war.

Sprey seemed to miss out of the fact that the radar guided missile that supported BVR air combat was not something in the far distant future, but an evolution of radar and missile technology. Even in the 1980’s, the share of air-to-air combat victories by BVR missiles was on the rise, and since the 1990’s, it has become the most common way to shoot down an enemy aircraft.

In an Aviation Week podcast in July of this year, retired Marine Lt. Col. David Berke (also previously quoted in this blog), and Pierre Sprey debated the F-35. Therein, Sprey offers a formulaic definition of air power, as created by force and effectiveness, with force being a function of cost, reliability, and how often it can fly per day (sortie generation rate?). “To create air power, you have to put a bunch of airplanes in the sky over the enemy. You can’t do it with a tiny hand full, even if they are like unbelievably good. If you send six aircraft to China, they could care less what they are … F-22 deployments are now six aircraft.”

Berke counters with the ideas that he expressed before in his initial conversation with Aviation week (as analyzed in this blog), that information and situational awareness are by far the most important factor in aerial warfare. This stems from the advantage of surprise, which was Sprey’s first criteria in 1982, and remains a critical factor is warfare to this day. This reminds me a bit of Disraeli’s truism of “lies, damn lies and statistics”pick the metrics that tell your story, rather than objectively look at the data.

Critics beyond Mr. Sprey have said that high technology weapons like the F-22 and the F-35 are irrelevant for America’s wars; “the [F-22] was not relevant to the military’s operations in places like Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya — at least according to then-secretary of defense Robert Gates.” Indeed, according to the Washington Post, “Gates called the $65 billion fleet a ‘niche silver-bullet solution’ to a major aerial war threat that remains distant. … and has promised to urge President Obama to veto the military spending bill if the full Senate retains F-22 funding.”

The current conflict in Syria against ISIS, after the Russian deployment resulted in crowded and contested airspace, as evidenced by a NATO Turkish F-16 shoot down of a Russian Air Force Su-24 (wikipedia), and as reported on this blog. Indeed, ironically for Mr. Sprey’s analysis of the relative values of the AIM-9 vs the AIM-7 missiles, as again reported by this blog,

[T]he U.S. Navy F/A-18E Super Hornet locked onto a Su-22 Fitter at a range of 1.5 miles. It fired an AIM-9X heat-seeking Sidewinder missile at it. The Syrian pilot was able to send off flares to draw the missile away from the Su-22. The AIM-9X is not supposed to be so easily distracted. They had to shoot down the Su-22 with a radar guided AMRAAM missile.

For the record the AIM-7 was a direct technical predecessor of the AIM-120 AMRAAM. We can perhaps conclude that having more that one type of weapon is useful, especially as other air power nations are always trying to improve their counter measures, and this incident shows that they can do so effectively. Of course, more observations are necessary for statistical proof, but since air combat is so rare since the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to learn the lesson and improve the AIM-9X should not be squandered.

USAF Air Combat Dominance as Deterrent

Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting. – Sun Tzu

The admonition to win without fighting is indeed a timeless principle of warfare, and it is clearly illustrated through this report on the performance of the F-22 in the war against ISIS, over the crowded airspace in Syria, from Aviation Week on June 4th, 2017.  I’ve quoted at length, and applied emphasis.

Shell, a U.S. Air Force lieutenant colonel and Raptor squadron commander who spoke on the condition that Aviation Week identify him only by his call sign, and his squadron of stealth F-22 Lockheed Martin Raptors had a critical job to do: de-conflict coalition operations over Syria with an irate Russia.

… one of the most critical missions the F-22 conducts in the skies over Syria, particularly in the weeks following the April 6 Tomahawk strike, is de-confliction between coalition and non-coalition aircraft, says Shell. … the stealth F-22’s ability to evade detection gives it a unique advantage in getting non-coalition players to cooperate, says Shell. 

‘It is easier to bring air dominance to bear if you know where the other aircraft are that you are trying to influence, and they don’t know where you are,’ says Shell. ‘When other airplanes don’t know where you are, their sense of comfort goes down, so they have a tendency to comply more.

… U.S. and non-coalition aircraft were still communicating directly, over an internationally recognized, unsecure frequency often used for emergencies known as ‘Guard,’  says Shell. His F-22s acted as a kind of quarterback, using high-fidelity sensors to determine the positions of all the actors on the battlefield, directing non-coalition aircraft where to fly and asking them over the Guard frequency to move out of the way. 

The Raptors were able to fly in contested areas, in range of surface-to-air missile systems and fighters, without the non-coalition players knowing their exact positions, Shell says. This allowed them to establish air superiority—giving coalition forces freedom of movement in the air and on the ground—and a credible deterrent.

Far from being a silver bullet solution for a distant aerial war, America’s stealth fighters are providing credible deterrence on the front lines today. They have achieved in some cases, the ultimate goal of winning without fighting, by exploiting the advantage of surprise. The right question might be, how many are required for this mission, given the enormous costs of fifth generation fighters? (more on this later).  As a quarterback, the F-22 can support many allied units, as part of a larger team.

Giving credit where it is due, Mr. Sprey has rightly stated in his Aviation Week interview, “cost is part of the force you can bring to bear upon the enemy.”  His mechanism to compute air power in 2017, however, seems to ignore the most important aspect of air power since it first emerged in World War I, surprise.  His dogmatic focus on the lightweight, single purpose air-to-air fighter, which seems to shun even available, proven technology seems clear.

Economics of Warfare 19 – 4

Continuing with a fourth and final posting on the nineteenth lecture from Professor Michael Spagat’s Economics of Warfare course that he gives at Royal Holloway University. It is posted on his blog Wars, Numbers and Human Losses at: https://mikespagat.wordpress.com/

This lecture continues the discussion of terrorism, looking at whether poverty or poor education causes terrorism. The conventional wisdom, supported by a book by Alan Krueger, is that they do not. Dr. Spagat explores this in more depth and the data tends to support this theme, although there are exceptions.

On slide 39, Dr. Spagat leaves us with a gem of a quote. The data he had been looking at was responses to surveys about terrorism. As he notes: “It is one thing to voice support on a survey for terrorism or attacks–it is another matter entirely to strap on explosives and blow oneself up. In other words, suicide bombers have to be really committed individuals.”

He then goes to show Palestinian suicide bombers are generally less impoverished and better educated on average than the population they are drawn from. He sees a similar observation when looking at deceased Hezbollah militants (pages 39-41). This is not surprising if you are familiar with the history of revolutions and insurgencies.

The link to his lecture is here: http://personal.rhul.ac.uk/uhte/014/Economics%20of%20Warfare/Lecture%2019.pdf

Military History In The Digital Era

Volumes of the U.S. Army in World War II official history series published by the U.S. Army Center for Military History [Hewes Library photo]

The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) has released a draft strategic plan announcing that it will “no longer accept transfers of permanent or temporary records in analog formats and will accept records only in electronic format and with appropriate metadata” by the end of 2022. Given the widespread shift to so-called “paperless” offices across society, this change may not be as drastic as it may seem. Whether this will produce an improvement in record keeping is another question.

Military historians are starting to encounter the impact of electronic records on the preservation and availability of historical documentation of America’s recent conflicts. Adin Dobkin wrote an excellent overview earlier this year on the challenges the U.S Army Center for Military History faces in writing the official histories of the U.S Army in Afghanistan and Iraq. Army field historians on tight deployment timelines “hoovered up” huge amounts of electronic historical documentation during the conflicts. Now official historians have to sort through enormous amounts of material that is often poorly organized and removed from the context from which it was originally created. Despite the volume of material collected, much of it has little historical value and there are gaps in crucial documentation. Separating the useful wheat from the digital chaff can tedious and time-consuming.

Record keeping the paper age was often much better. As Chris wrote earlier this year, TDI conducted three separate studies on Army records management in the late-1990s and early 2000s. Each of these studies warned that U.S. Army documentation retention standards and practices had degraded significantly. Significant gaps existed in operational records vital to future historians. TDI found that the Army had better records for Red Cloud’s War of 1866-1868 than it did a hundred years later for Vietnam.

TDI is often asked why it tends to focus on the World War II era and earlier for its analytical studies. The answer is pretty simple: those are the most recent conflicts for which relatively complete, primary source historical data is available for the opposing combatants. Unfortunately, the Digital Age is unlikely to change that basic fact.

Anyone Can Be A Historian

In the world of government contracting, it is hard for a contractor to remain working with the government for longer than 3-5 years. Problems happen, people annoy each other, mistakes are made, frictions develop, and pretty soon people start wondering if they could do better with another contactor. So it not unusual to see contractors fall in and out of favor. I have seen it happen repeatedly.

Many years ago a company that was a competitor to Dupuy’s HERO conducted a study. It was well done as they hired one of our employees as their employee and another of our employees as a consultant. They got a follow-on contract. But, this being the government, as is often the case, the follow-on contract came a year or so after the original effort was completed. The original team had move to other projects in the company. As it was, defense budgets were in a period of decline, so the company decided they could conduct the next study using available staff so they could keep them employed. The former HERO employee was not available as he had been assigned to another project, and that project manager did not want to let him go. The consultant was not called back. Instead they took some available engineers who were between contracts and put them on the project. After all, anyone can do history.

Needless to say, the next study was a failure. I was later told by a manager in the government that they would never hire that contractor back. Apparently this work requires enough expertise that we cannot be easily replaced by any bright guy.

Against the Panzers

The book that came out of the A2/D2 Study (Anti-Armor Defense Data Study) was Against the Panzers, by Allyn R. Vannoy and Jay Karamales: Against the Panzers: United States Infantry Versus German Tanks, 1944-1945

The graphics person for of my three books and the images for this website is Jay Karamales. Jay is a multi-talented person whose primary occupation is a programmer. Apparently the challenge of writing a book while working a full-time job was stressful enough that he never tried it again. Unfortunately, there was never an Against the Panzers II, although I gathered he did some work on it.

For a taste of Mr. Karamales’ book, I recommend you take a look at his article in the TNDM Newsletter: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/v1n6.pdf

A2/D2 Study

A2/D2 Study = Anti-armor defense data study.

In the last days of the Soviet Union—before anyone realized they *were* the last days—the NATO nations were still doing all they could to prepare for a possible Soviet onslaught into Western Europe. They had spent decades developing combat models to help them predict where the blow would fall, where defense would be critical, where logistics would make the difference, what mix of forces could survive. Their main problem was that they didn’t know how far they could trust those models. How could they validate them? Maybe if they could reverse-engineer the past, they could be relied upon to predict the future.

To that end, the American Department of Defense (DoD) and (particularly) the British Defence Operational Analysis Establishment (DOAE) undertook to collect data about historical battles that resembled the battles they expected to be fighting, with the aim of feeding that data into their models and seeing how much the models’ results resembled the historical outcomes of those battles. The thinking went that if the models could produce a result similar to history, they could be confident that feeding in modern data would produce a realistic result and teach them how to adjust their dispositions for optimal results.

One of the battles that NATO expected to fight was a Soviet armored drive through the Fulda Gap, a relatively flat corridor through otherwise rough terrain in south-central West Germany. The battle that most resembled such an operation, in the minds of the planners, was the December 1944 surprise attack by the German Army into the Ardennes Forest region along the German/Luxembourg/Belgian border, which became known as the Battle of the Bulge for the wedge-shaped salient it drove into American lines. As the British involvement in this epic battle—what Churchill called the greatest battle in the history of the U.S. Army—was minor, consisting of a minor holding action by XXX Corps, the DOAE delegated collecting the relevant data for this battle to the DoD. The responsible element of the DoD was the Army’s Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), which in turn hired defense contractor Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to perform the data collection and study. In late 1990 SAIC began in-depth research, consisting of archival reviews and interviews of surviving veterans, for the project which hoped to identify engagements down to vehicle-on-vehicle action, with rounds expended, ammunition types, ranges, and other quantitative data which could be fed into models. Ultimately the study team, led by former HERO researcher and Trevor Dupuy protégé Jay Karamales, identified and recorded details for 56 combat actions from the ETO in 1944-1945, most from the Battle of the Bulge; and the detailed data from these engagements was used in the validation efforts for various combat models. This quantitative data, along with a copious amount of anecdotal information, was used as the basis for Karamales’ 1996 book with his co-author Allyn Vannoy titled Against the Panzers: United States Infantry versus German Tanks, 1944-1945: A History of Eight Battles Told through Diaries, Unit Histories and Interviews.

Copies of this study are available at DTIC. If you put “saic a2d2” into a search engine you should find all the volumes in PDF format on the DTIC website. As an example, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a232910.pdf or http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA284378

 

Pigs Blood

We do have a section on rules of engagement in my book America’s Modern Wars (Chapter 9). In that effort, I ended up coding by judgment the rules of engagement in five categories (polite, strict, restricted, unrestricted, brutal). The telling chart is here:

As one can see, success tends to be at either end of the spectrum, with the counterinsurgents winning around 75% of the insurgencies fought with strict rules of engagements and the counterinsurgents winning around 75% of the insurgencies fought brutally. Anything in between those two points does not work as well.

We ended up doing this for all “83 insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations” (the only category that had the “polite” cases, and they were 100% successful), for the “62 insurgencies” (show above), for the “36 insurgencies versus foreigners” (same pattern as above), and for the “26 insurgent civil wars” (same pattern as above). See pages 85-86 of America’s Modern Wars.

While the results were not statistically significant (see pages 86-87), the fact that the four different tests were all pretty consistent in results no matter which way you cut the data tends to indicate that there is something there. Clearly more work needs to be done, but we were never able to get back to this issue. On the other hand, lots of people have strong opinions on the subject based upon a lot less data. 

This is explained in more detail in this post from 2015:

Is Your Washroom Breeding Bolsheviks?

Tanks With Frickin’ Laser Beams On Their Heads

Portent Of The Future: This Mobile High-Energy Laser-equipped Stryker was evaluated during the 2017 Maneuver Fires Integrated Experiment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The MEHEL can shoot a drone out of the sky using a 5kW laser. (Photo Credit: C. Todd Lopez)

As the U.S. Army ponders its Multi-Domain Battle concept for future warfare, it is also considering what types of weapons it will need to conduct it. Among these is a replacement for the venerable M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT), which is now 40 years old. Recent trends in combat are leading some to postulate a next-generation MBT that is lighter and more maneuverable, but equipped with a variety of new defensive capabilities to make them more survivable against modern anti-tank weapons. These include electronic jamming and anti-missile missiles, collectively referred to as Active Protection Systems, as well as unmanned turrets. Manned vehicles will be augmented with unmanned ground vehicles.The Army is also exploring new advanced composite armor and nanotechnology.

Also under consideration are replacements for the traditional MBT long gun, including high-power lasers and railguns. Some of these could be powered by hydrogen power cells and biofuels.

As the U.S. looks toward lighter armored vehicles, some countries appear to going in the other direction. Both Russia and Israel are developing beefed-up versions of existing vehicles designed specifically for fighting in urban environments.

The strategic demands on U.S. ground combat forces don’t allow for the luxury of fielding larger combat vehicles that complicate the challenge of rapid deployment to face global threats. Even as the historical trend toward increasing lethality and greater dispersion on the battlefield continues, the U.S. may have little choice other than to rely on technological innovation to balance the evolving capabilities of potential adversaries.