In my book, page 814, I have Franz Staudegger’s birth date as 12 February 1923. Several other internet sources have that date, as does Agte on page 120. Some Wikipedia-type sites and several other internet sources have his birth date as 1921.
I have the date he passed away as 16 March 1991, as does several internet sources. Some Wikipedia-type sites and several other internet sources have his date of death as 16 May 1995.
Does anyone have documentation, a grave stone picture or an obituary so I can confirm these dates?
Anyhow, I think this is my last post on Wittmann and Staudegger until someone comes up with more information. My posts on the subject have been:
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
By January 1982 Iran held some 28,423 Iraqi PoWs to Iraq’s 5,285 Iranian captives.[29] In early 1984 Iran held 50,000 Iraqis to Iraq’s 7,300 Iranian PoWs.[30] In August 1986 Iran claimed to hold some 52,000 Iraqi PoWs.[31] Just before the cease-fire in 1988 the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated 49,285 Iraqi PoWs in fifteen Iranian camps and 12,747 Iranians in ten Iraqi camps.[32]
On 9 August 1988 the ICRC count was 50,182 Iraqi PoWs held in Iran to 13,526 Iranians in Iraqi captivity.[33] Iran had at least 8,500 captured in the final Iraqi offensives oi July 1988 and another 700 on 23 August 1988 immediately after the cease-fire went into effect.[34] PoW release had begun long before the war ended. In August 1986 Iran had released 200 Iraqi PoWs and had unilaterally released some 620-650 previously.[35] By 18 October 1988 Iran and Iraq had agreed to begin PoW exchanges. Beginning 30 October 1988 each side exchanged 25 PoWs. Eight of the 25 Iranians were civilian internees captured early in the war.[36]
On 10 November Iran and Iraq agreed again to the exchange of 1,118 Iraqi and 411 Iranian PoWs who were badly wounded or ill.[37] However, after 156 Iraqis and only 57 Iranians had been released the exchange broke down by 27 November over 63 Iraqis who refused repatriation.[38] In January 1989 Iran released 131 sick and wounded Iraqis and Iraq reciprocated by releasing 124 Iranians.[39] In February Iran offered to release another 260 ill Iraqi PoWs. One hundred fifty-eight were released, but 27 refused to return.[40] In March 1989 the more or less official count of PoWs was 50,000 Iraqi to 18,902 Iranians.[41] Iran, on 10 April, released 70 disabled and sick Iraqi PoWs and on 23 May a further 49 plus 15 other PoWs of varied nationalities who fought for Iraq.[42] No further activity occurred until December when Iran proposed more sick and disabled PoWs be exchanged and suggested that a substantial number of Egyptian nationals were among the PoWs it held.[43] Eventually on 14 March 1990 Iran released twenty Egyptians captured fighting for Iraq.[44]
Post-Desert Storm PoW Exchanges
It was not until after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait that the PoW issue came alive again. On 15 August 1990 Saddam Hussein offered to release all Iranian PoWs. He further allowed 17,000 Iranian nationals in Kuwait to return home. By 23 August PoW exchanges were running at 6,000 a day and some 21,000 Iraqi and Iranian PoWs had been repatriated.[45] By 4 September 23,798 Iranian and 24,250 Iraqis had been released.[46] On 16 November the two countries agreed to another exchange of 100 PoWs a day and a group of200 Iraqis was released on 4 December, another group of 200 on 10 December 1990.[47] There is no record of Iranian PoW releases by Iraq in this time period. However, a total of 39,043 Iranian PoWs were eventually released.[48]
On 1 June 1991 Iran claimed Iraq was still holding at least 5,000 Iranian PoWs, an assertion Iraq denied. When Iran repeated the claim in October, Iraq admitted it had 400 who refused repatriation.[49] During the 1991-92 time frame another 64 Iranian soldiers became PoWs during fighting with the NLA [National Liberation Army of Iran] and Kurdish groups supported by Iraq.[50]
Then in early 1991 some 5,000 Iraqi soldiers crossed into Iran to evade coalition forces in the Desert Storm War. Beginning in November 1992 Iran released 400, followed by releases of 1,000 (April 1993), 400 (May 1993), 450 (June 1993) and 459 (July 1993). Eventually 4,115 were released in fourteen intervals with the last known release bringing the total to 4,574.[51] At the same time Iran released 100 Iraqi PoWs from the War of Sacred Defense in May 1993.[52]
At that time the ICRC claimed to have had overseen the repatriation of over 80,000 PoWs held by both Iran and Iraq.[53] This figure is not borne out by the published numbers. At this time the maximum number of Iranian and Iraqi PoWs released from both the Iran-Iraq and Desert Storm wars stood at about 92,267, a discrepancy of 12,000. Some of the 17,000 repatriated civilian internees of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait may have been counted. The ICRC still had some 19,000 Iraqis and 4,000 Iranians on its books as active PoWs.[54]
By July 1992 the only exchanges were those of 101 MIA bodies.[55] In December 1993 Iran complained Iraq was still holding 8,000 Iranian PoWs. The proof was that 26 Iranian civilian internees from the war had escaped and made it back to Iran that same month.[56]
In January 1994 Iran conceded that many of the personnel it listed as PoWs may have been KIA/MIA.[57] Then in July 1994 Iran accused Iraq of holding 16,000 Iranian PoWs.[58] According to the Red Cross Iran continued to hold as many as 19,000 Iraqi PoWs as of 1994.[59] In 1994 the ICRC calculated 4,168 confirmed Iranian PoWs still in Iraq and some 475 other unaccounted for Iranian PoWs.[60]
In August 1995 the Iraqis complained Iran still held 7,000 of their PoWs.[61] That same month Iran released 100 PoWs. The ICRC claimed at that time it had overseen the repatriation of 82,000 of 100,000 known PoWs of the war.[62] MIA exchanges continued with Iraq returning 144 dead and Iran 200 in June 1996.[63] Since then Iran released 150 of Iraqi PoWs as late as 28 October and 724 on 27 December 1996 making a total of 974 that year.[64] Iraq insisted there were still 20,000 Iraqis captive in Iran.[65]
“Not even a single Iranian PoW has been released by the Iraqi regime in the past five years.”
In January 1997 the two nations exchanged 60 Iranian and 70 Iraqi MIA remains, but Iraq again insisted Iran held 17,000 of its PoWs.[66] In August 1997 Saddam Hussein claimed Iran still held 20,000 (1997 ICRC figures about 13,000) Iraqi PoWs. He also claimed that all 39,000 Iranian PoWs held by Iraq had been freed except for a pilot downed during the early part of the war who was still being held as proof Iran started the whole thing.[67] The Iranians countered that 5,000 Iraqi PoWs had requested and been granted asylum in Iran which more or less agrees with 1994 ICRC figures for total remaining Iraqi PoWs (19,000-5,000 = 14,000).[68] In September 1997 47 more Iraqi PoWs were released.[69] In total Iran has released some 48,650 Iraqi PoWs.[70] In November 1997 Iran approved release of another 500 Iraqi PoWs.[71]
Speaking in September 1997 Brigadier General Abdullah Najafi, chairman of the Iranian PoW commission, stated that “not even a single Iranian PoW has been released by the Iraqi regime in the past five years.”[72] This suggests that some may have been released as late as 1992, but this author can find no record of this. The cold fact remains that since 1990 (or 1992 at the latest), no known living Iranian PoW has been recovered. 27,000 remains of MIAs have with another 39,000 estimated. A chronology of this confusing and somewhat contradictory chain of events is given below.
This author’s figures (admittedly incomplete) indicate the release of 92,267 PoWs (plus 547 more Iraqis as of November 1997) by both sides resulting from the Iran-Iraq and Desert Storm conflicts. If ICRC figures for “PoWs” (which seems to include PoWs and CIs from both conflicts) are correct 18,000 are still unreleased. Their own figures list 13,000 Iraqis and 5,000 Iranians still unreleased which makes up the difference.
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
NOTES
[29] Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War, London: Brassey’s, 1988, p. 104,
[42] “Persian Gulf War Aftermath,” FYEO, NO. 211, 17 April 1989, p. 211-3; “Persian Gulf War, FYEO, NO. 214, 29 May 1989, p. 214-5; “Persian Gulf War Aftermath,” FYEO, NO. 215, 12 June 1989, p. 215-9.
[43] “Persian Gulf“, FYEO, NO. 229, 25 December 1989, p. 229-4. The reports indicated 13,000-20,000 Egyptians held, but this figure seems incredible.
[44] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, N0. 236, 2 April 1990, p. 236-4,
[45] “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 246, 20 August 1990, p. 246-3; “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, N0. 247, 3 September 1990, p. 247-1.
[46] “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 248, 17 September 1990, p. 248-1.
[47] “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 253, 26 November 1990, p. 253-2; “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, N0. 254, 10 December 1990, p. 254-1, 254-2; “Persian Gulf Crisis,” FYEO, No. 255, 24 December 1990, p. 255-1.
[48] “Iran Calls on Iraq to Release Prisoners of War,” Iran News, 18 August 1997.
[49] “War in the Gulf: Chronology of Events,” FYEO, No, 267, 10 June 1991, p. 267-2; “War in the Gulf: Chronology of Events,” FYEO, No. 277, 28 October 1991, p. 277-4.
[50] “Iran and Iraq,” International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC) Annual Report 1996, 1 June 1997.
[51] “1,000 Iraqi Military Men to Return to Iraq,” 1, 17 February 1993; “Iran Releases More Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 22 April 1993; “Iran Frees Another Group of Iraqi Army Personnel,” IRNA, 19 May 1993; “450 Iraqi Military Men to Return Home Tomorrow,” IRNA, 22 June 1993; “Iran to Set Free 459 Iraqis Tomorrow,” IRNA, 13 July 1993.
[52] “Iran to Release More Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 26 May 1993.
[53] “Iran-Iraq Conflict: Repatriation Process May Resume,” ICRC Press Release, 96/40, 28 December 1996,
[54] “Aftermath of the Iran/Iraq War,” ICRCAnnual Report 1994, 30 May 1995
[55] “Gulf War Aftermath: Chronology of Events,” FYEO, No. 297, 3 August 1992, p. 297-3.
[56] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No, 333, 20 December 1993, p. 333-3: “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 324, 10 January 1994, p. 324-3.
[57] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 335, 24 January 1994, p. 335-3.
[58] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 348, 25 July 1994, p. 348-21
[59] “Aftermath of the Iran/Iraq War,” ICRCAnnual Report 1994, 30 May 1995
[60] “Aftermath of the Iran/Iraq War,” ICRCAnnual Report 1994, 30 May 1995
[61] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 376, 21 August 1995, p. 376-41
[62] “Iran: 100 Iraqi Prisoners of War Set Free,” ICRC News 34, 23 August 1995.
[63] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 399, 8 July 1996, p. 399-4.
[64] “Iran Releases 150 Iraqi PoWs,” Compass Middle East News Wire, 28 October 1996; “General Najafi: Iran Continues to Release Remaining PoWs,” Tehran Times, 13 March 1997; “724 Iraqi Prisoners of War Freed Unilaterally,” Iran Review, No 2 (January 1997).
[65] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 412, 6 January 1997, p. 412-4.
[66] “Persian Gulf,” FYEO, No. 413, 20 January 1997, p. 413-3.
[67] “Iraq – Saddam Hits at Iran Over Jets, PoWs,” USNI Daily Defense News Capsules, 8 August 1997.
[68] “Issue of Iranian PoWs Should Be Publicized More,” IRNA, 18 August 1997.
[69] “Iran Releases More Iraqi PoWs Unilaterally,” IRNA, 25 September 1997.
[70] “Iran Calls on Iraq to Release Prisoners of War,” Iran News, 18 August 1997.
[71] “Iran to Unilaterally Release 500 Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 26 November 1997; “Leader Approves Release of Iraqi PoWs,” IRNA, 26 November 1997.
[72] “Iran Releases More Iraqi PoWs Unilaterally,” IRNA, 25 September 1997.
I do maintain a detailed and regularly updated errata sheets for all my books. In case it is not obvious, I am currently working on yet another (smaller) Kursk book. My proposed revised footnote on Staudegger (drawn from page 814 of my original book) now reads:
Probably the most detailed account of this action is in Patrick Agte’s book, Michael Wittman and the Waffen SS Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte in WWII (Stackpole Press, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006), pages 103-105 and pages 119-121. The claim of facing 50-60 tanks comes from his Knight’s Cross award citation and Nazi-era press (propaganda) releases. The event could not have occurred near 252.2 as it occurred on the 8th of July (or 7 July in some sources). A number of internet sources (but not Agte) mention it occurring at the village of Psyolknee. We have not located a village called Psyolknee on any maps we have. While we do not doubt that some event like this occurred, the details are not support by anything in either side’s unit records.
We have examined the unit records of all Soviet tank corps in the area. The three closest Soviet armor units in the area were the V Guards Tank Corps, the X Tank Corps and the II Tank Corps.
Certainly the V Guards Tank Corps lost of lot of tanks this day with reported losses of 28 T-34s and 9 T-70s: 14 T-34s and 7 T-70s from the 20th Gds Tank Bde and 14 T-34s and 2 T-70s from the 21st Gds Tank Bde. The 22nd Gds Tank Bde reports it has no losses for this day. See Fond: 3403, Opis: 1, Delo: 18a, pages 143-156. Of course, if the claims for Staudegger are correct, then this would mean that he was responsible for 22 out of 28 T-34s lost by the V Guards Tank Corps on the 8th. As it were, it appears the tank corps was to the east of the Das Reich SS Division and at 1030 has reached the line of Sobachevskii-Kalinin-Belenikhino. In combat report #0112, 2200 July 8, 1943 they place the 20th Guards Tank Brigade two kilometers south of Sobachevskii and the 22nd Guards Tank Brigade in Belenikhino (Fond: 3403, Opis: 1, Delo: 18).
The X Tank Corps is another candidate except it reports that it only lost two tanks between 7 and 11 July (Fond 3410, Opis: 1, Delo: 17, page 10 and Fond: 3410, Opis: 1, Delo: 14, page 5). Unit strength reports for this unit do not contradict these reports. The nearest of its tanks brigades to the northeast of Teterevino on 8 July was the 178th Tank Brigade. The other two tank brigades were to the west of it and moving further west.
The II Tank Corps is the most likely candidate. It attacked in the afternoon and lost at least 31 tanks on the 9th of July. The 26th Tank Brigade did take Teterevino. They do report losses of 6 T-34s knocked out and 3 broken down, and 3 T-70s knocked out and 3 broken down. The I Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade did loose its way during the fight and ended up attacking towards Teterevino (see Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, page 146). There it encountered “two Panzer VI” tanks (Tigers) which brought the battalion under fire. After “suffering tank losses,” it retreated. The other battalion of the tank brigade was involved in the attacks to the south with the 169th Tank Brigade. The 99th Tank Brigade does report their losses as of 0700 on 10 July as 12 T-34s knocked out and 4 undergoing report, and 4 T-70s knocked out and 4 broken down. The 169th Tank Brigade report losses of 3 T-34s knocked out and 5 broken down and 1 T-70 knocked out. The 15th Guard Heavy Tank Regiment reports 2 Churchills knocked out and 2 broken down. These reports probably account for the actions of both 8 and 9 July (see Fond: 3407, Opis: 1, Delo: 108, pages 195-216).
The most likely candidate is the I Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade. Its composition is not known, but may have been 10 T-34s and 10 T-70s. The 26th Tank Brigade also had 6 T-34s knocked out. One is left with the conclusion from an examination of the Soviet unit records that the claims of 22 T-34s killed by Staudegger on 8 July 1943, along with the 2 T-34s killed by Deutschland SS Infantry Regiment, are probably overstated. The claim that he stopped a panzer regiment is clearly incorrect, as Teterevino was taken and Das Reich reported that they later attacked out of Teterevino with 40 tanks.
Now granted, this is a very long footnote, but I have no way of otherwise addressing this issue. As it were, the claims of 22 T-34s by Staudegger are mentioned and quoted in my book from an interview done of retired Bundeswehr Brigadier General Guenther Baer (who was a tank commander with the II Battalion, Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Panzer Regiment in July 1943). He was interviewed in 1999.
Shalmjah border, February 2010. An operation to repatriate the mortal remains of Iranian soldiers killed during the Iran-Iraq War is carried out under the aegis of the ICRC. [CC BY-NC-ND / ICRC / M. Greub]
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
By 1995 Iran had conducted seventeen dedicated MIA [missing in action] retrieval operations from wartime battlefields. Approximately 80% of the MIAs are believed to lie in Iraqi territory. In that year Iran proposed a joint Iranian-Iraqi accord to retrieve the missing of both sides.[18] Brigadier General Mir Feisel Baqerzadeh and IRGC Brigadier General Behahim Safaie head the Special Commission for MIA Retrieval. Iran claimed to have recovered or settled some 21,000 cases by early 1995. In that time 2,505 MIAs had been retrieved by joint search operations in Iraq and another 12,638 in Iranian territory, the latter representing 85% of those estimated missing in Iranian held ground. Back calculating these figures indicates total Iranian missing was now regarded as 72,753, up 20% from the original figure of 60,711. By October 1996 the count was 24,000 retrieved.[19] By June of 1997 the number of MIA cases resolved had risen to 33,000 including 6,000 death certificates issued at family request for individuals of whom no trace had ever been found.[20] As of September 1997 the total number of MIA bodies recovered stood at over 37,000 according to Brigadier General Baqerzadeh.[21] “Martyr” (i.e. killed in action) status entitles the family to a $24,000 lump sum death benefit as well as a $280 monthly pension with provision for $56 a month for each dependent child from the Foundation for the Martyrs,[22]
The rate of actual forensic identification of the remains is unknown. One source mentions a positive identification of some 900. The standard practice seems to be determination of the operation in which they were martyred and the provincial origins of units in that engagement. Wartime operations which have yielded large numbers of MIA remains are Beit al-Moqqadas-4, Kheiber, Karbala-4, Karbala-5, Karbala-6, Karbala-8, Karbala-10, Ramazan, Badr, Kheiber, Muslim Ibn-e Aqil, Wal Fajir Preliminary Operation, Wal Fajir-1, Wal Fajir-2, Wal Fajir-6, Wal Fajir-8, Fath-5, and the Iraqi attacks on Majnoon and Shalamech, The retrieval operations are often dangerous and occur in former minefields. As of 1995 eleven IRGC personnel had been killed and fourteen seriously wounded in MIA retrieval operations. Individual military units often recover their own MIAs. In a speech at Gurgan, Ali Mirtaheri, head of the committee in charge of search teams for MIAs of the 27th Huzrat-e Rasul Pasdaran Infantry Division, stated in November 1997 that divisional teams had recovered 1,610 MIA bodies. Forty-two team members from the division have been killed and another eighty maimed in the operations (probably from leftover mines).[23]
Due to the number of cases and the vigorous retrieval operations MIA funerals tend to be mass affairs. Burials in Tehran alone tell the story. In October 1993 208 were buried in Tehran and 360 in other locations. In October 1994 1,000 martyrs were buried in Tehran; in April 1995 another 600 of 3,000 just recovered MIAs and the following month 405 more in Mashad; in October 1995 600 were interred; 750 in October 1996; 1,000 more in January 1997; in July 1997 another 2,000 including 400 from Tehran Province were interred nationwide; in September 1997 200 of 1,233 interred nationwide, including 47 in Qazvin, 34 in Khuzistan, 5 in Shustar and 5 in Sistan-Baluchistan. Of these only 118 were unknowns.[24] Unrecovered Iranian MIAs are carried as active soldiers on their unit personnel rolls with their current status listed simply as “still at the front.” Iran has also recovered Iraqi MIAs, returning up to 400 bodies at a time in a mutual exchange program usually accomplished at the Khosrawi border station in Kermanshah Province.[25] A total of 31,000 Iraqi bodies have been so returned compared to 2,500 Iranian dead returned by Iraq as of January 1997.[26] In January 1997, in conjunction with the Iraqi return of the remains of sixty Iranian MIAs of the Wal Fajir Preliminary Operation, Brigadier General Mir Feisel Baqerzadeh stated that Iran was willing to assume all search responsibilities and associated costs for both Iraqi and Iranian MIAs on Iraqi territory should Iraq not wish to continue recovery operations.[27] In May 1997 Brigadier General Mohammed Balar, spokesman for the Commission for Iranian PoWs, called on international organizations to pressure Iraq to clarify the status of 20,000 Iranian MIAs.[28]
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
NOTES
[18] “Iran Proposes Joint Committee to Decide Fate of PoWs,” Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), 18 October 1993.
[19] “The Remains of 750 Iranian Soldiers…” Al Akhbar Muslim World News, 15 October 1996.
[20] “Remains of Twenty Martyrs of Imposed War Handed Over to Iran,” IRNA, 1 June 1997.
[21] “Funeral Service to be Held Nationwide for 1,233 War Martyrs,” IRNA, 1 October 1997.
[23] “37,000 Bodies of Martyrs Discovered in Seven Years,” IRNA, 10 November 1997.
[24] “Funeral Procession War Martyrs,” IRNA, 7 July 1997; “The Remains of 750 Iranian Soldiers…”, Al Akhbar Muslim World News, 15 October 1996; “Funeral Service to be Held Nationwide for 1,233 War Martyrs,” IRNA, 1 October 1997; “Funeral Service for War Martyrs,” Iran Daily, 7 October 1997.
[25] “3,000 Bodies of Martyrs Found on Former Iran-Iraq Battlefields,” IRNA, 15 February 1995; “Funeral Service Held for 405 Martyrs in Mashad,” IRNA, 6 March 1995; “Cases of Over 21,000 MIA’s Settled So Far, IRNA, 19 February 1995; “568 More Bodies of Iran’s MIAs Uncovered,” IRNA, 17 October 1993; “Paper on PoW Issues,” IRNA, 31 May 1993; “IRGC Official: Investigations Continue to Find Our Martyrs’ Bodies,” IRNA, 20 February 1995; “Bodies of 65 Martyrs of Iraq-Imposed War Delivered to Iran,” IRNA, 13 August 1993; “Leader Attends Funeral for 600 Martys,” Iran News, 28 October 1995; “Leader Attends Funeral Service for 1,000 Martyrs,” Iran News, 20 October 1997; “War: MIAs Search Operation for MIAs Extended Another Year,” IRNA, 23 October 1995.
[26] “Funeral Ceremony for 1,000 Soldiers Killed in War Against Iraq,” Iran Weekly Press Digest, 21-31 January 1997.
[27] “Bodies of Sixty Martyrs Handed Over to Iran,” IRNA, 7 January 1997.
[28] “Iran Calls in International Clout to Find 20,000 PoWs,” Iran News, 20 May 1997.
At the end of July, mounting enemy pressure would push the battalion back and from then Jagdpanthers would start to become complete losses. The first took place on July 31, when the final drives of Lt. Scheiber’s Jagdpanther was damaged. The vehicle could not be recovered due to strong enemy artillery fire and lack of towing vehicles. It was blown up by the crew on Aug 2. On July 31, another 11 Jagdpanthers were damaged, but all of them were short time damage.
On Aug 1, the number of Jagdpanthers in long term repair increased from 1 to 3 and that number remained constant August 13. From July 31 to Aug 2, the number of tanks in short repair shrunk by 4, suggesting at least that many were repaired. On Aug 5, the number in short repair was 17, but it shrunk to 13 on July 6, again suggesting that 4 were repaired. Indeed, one of the Kampfgruppen was notified that it could expect to receive three Jagdpanthers from the workshops in the night or on Aug 6.
From Aug 7 onwards, the number of Jagdpanther in short repair increased. On Aug 14, 17 Jagdpanther were in short repair, but it was noted that spare parts had to be brought up to repair them. At this point the German supply situation in general was desperate, which meant that the arrival of spare parts was not very likely. The battalion was ordered to pull out and bring its vehicles in workshops along. Thus far, seven tanks had been irretrievably lost (including one confiscated by an SS-units and whose fate was unknown).
During all of August, the following complete losses (including command tanks) were recorded, by cause (including Scheiber’s Jagdpanther mentioned above):
Mechanical damage, tank blown up by crew: 12
Destroyed AT fire: 2
Stuck in terrain, could not move, subsequently hit by enemy tank, burnt out: 1
Destroyed by HE or phosporus rounds: 2
Damaged by enemy fire and blown up by crew since it could not be recovered: 2
Confiscated by SS-unit, unknown fate: 1
Lack of fuel, blown up by crew: 1
Carpet bombing at Rouen: 1
Up to the point when the battalion we know of at least 32 cases when tanks in the battalion were repaired, which can be contrasted to 7 cases of complete losses. Obviously, this includes vehicles that suffered technical damage during the approach march, but is must also be noted that all cases of damage are not mentioned by the war diary. In august, there are a few cases noted:
4 Aug: Unspecified number of Jagdpanther damaged by artillery fire.
5 Aug: One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.
10 Aug: One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.
12 Aug: 1 gun barrel damaged by enemy artillery fire.
13 Aug: 1 case of final drive failure
14 Aug: 2 damaged by artillery fire.
Given the data available, exact percentage calculations are perhaps not so meaningful, but it is clear that before the battalion began to pull out, the damage received was usually of such character that it is to be expected that it will be repaired.
What is also interesting is that losses due to presence of enemy ground combat units, or in some cases artillery fire, caused the Germans to blow up many Jagdpanthers. In fact, more than half the losses occurred in this way, which highlights the importance of controlling the ground.
Few Jagdpanthers were penetrated by AT rounds and in two of the cases, the vehicles could be repaired. Furthermore, the effects of artillery fire should not be neglected. Although a HE round is not likely to destroy a heavy tank, it may well (as is evident from several instances mentioned in the war diary) case damage to the tank and if ground units are close enough, the enemy tank will not be recovered.
The 654th Jagdpanther battalion is of course not an average unit. Nevertheless, its detailed war diary can contribute to a better understanding of tank losses and repairs.
The 654th Jagdpanther battalion fought in Normandy, on the eastern part of the front. Unlike most German battalion level records, the war diary plus annexes has survived for this unit. At battalion level, the fate of many tanks can often be tracked and this unit is no exception. Included in the annexes is a list of the Jagpanthers lost by the battalion, by chassis number or turret number and which includes date (and often time as well), location, cause, list of items recovered, etc. All information is taken from the war diary and its annexes.
When it started marching from Rocquigny near the Belgian border towards Normandy, it had 25 Jagdpanthers, On 27th July, three command Panthers and one Jagdpanther arrived at the battalion. They first had to be checked by the workshops and on July 29 they were ready for action.
Marching to Normandy took its toll of the battalion. There were several air attacks, which caused losses in the battalion, but none of the Jagdpanthers were destroyed. However, many Jagdpanthers suffered mechanical breakdowns. During the march (approx. 300 km) the following cases of damage was recorded: 18 final drives (a well-known problem), two engines, 2 oil coolers, 3 cooling fans, 1 torsion bar, 4 road wheels, 1 drive shaft, 4 drive sprockets, 2 idler wheels and 109 track links.
The result was that on July 17, the battalion had 8 operational Jagdpanther, 16 in short repair and 1 in long repair. Efforts by the repair and recovery services raised the operational readiness to 23 Jagdpanther on 30 July, 2 in long repair and 1 long repair. This includes one additional Jagdpanther that arrived on this day. Until July 26, the following damage had been caused by enemy action: 1 gear box, 4 radiators, 1 oil cooler, 4 cooling fans, 6 drive sprockets, 2 final drives, 16 road wheels.
It is unclear how many vehicles that were damaged up to this point, as single vehicles could have suffered more than one kind of damage. For example, a hit on a tank could cause damage to more than one road wheel. Before July 31, no Jagdpanther was completely lost.
The 2nd Coy arrived ahead of the rest of the battalion at the front in Normandy and it reported 6 operational Jagdpanther on July 7, when attached to the Panzer-Lehr division. It was however attached to 276th ID when Pz-Lehr left its sector. When moving on July 8, four Jagdpanthers broke down. Two more broke down on July 9, but four were also repaired. On July 11, one Jagpanther was penetrated in the left side armour and three crew members were wounded, but no other damage was recorded. Also, another Jagpanther was penetrated (does not say from which direction). The loader was killed and the commander, driver and gunner were wounded. The crew still managed to drive the tank into safety.
At least one Jagpanther was repaired by the company between 12 and 17 July.
Given the increase in operational Jagpanthers from July 17 and 29 at least 14 must have been repaired. At least five were repaired by 2nd Coy before July 17. So far we have indications of 19 repairs. However, there were further Jagdpanthers damaged between July 18 and 29. On July 20, two were damaged by enemy artillery fire and classified as short repair. Two days later, a periscope on one Jagdpanther was destroyed by enemy artillery fire. On July 26 one Jagdpanther caught fire in the engine room, not by enemy action. Vehicle classified as short repair. Four days later, one Jagdpanther was damaged by artillery fire and classified as short repair.
There were at least five vehicles damaged in this period when the operational readiness rose due to the efforts of the mechanics. We can conclude that at least 24 had been repaired before July 31. But this cannot possibly account for all vehicles damaged Also, it is clear that the kind of damage sustained thus far was of a kind that ought to be repaired and it can safely be assumed that more than 100 % of its Jagdpanthers had been in repair and not a single one had been lost.
The Martyrs Memorial to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) in Imam Khomeini Square, Hamadan, Iran. [KiwiOutThere]
[This post is based on “Iranian Casualties in the Iran-Iraq War: A Reappraisal,” by H. W. Beuttel, originally published in the December 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]
The Iran-Iraq War was the longest sustained conventional war of the 20th Century. Lasting from 22 September 1980 to 20 August 1988, the seven years, ten months, and twenty-nine days of this conflict are some of the least understood in modem military history. The War of Sacred Defense to the Iranians and War of Second Qadissiya to Iraqis is the true “forgotten war” of our times. Seemingly never ending combat on a scale not witnessed since World War I and World War II was the norm. Casualties were popularly held to be enormous and, coupled with the lack of battlefield resolution year after year, led to frequent comparisons with the Western Front of World War I. Despite the fact that Iran had been the victim of naked Iraqi aggression, it was the Iraqis who were viewed as the “good guys” and actively supported by most nations in the world as well as the world press.
Studying the Iran-Iraq War is beset with difficulties. Much of the reporting done on the war was conducted in a slipshod manner. Both Iraq and Iran tended to exaggerate each other’s losses. As oftentimes Iraqi claims were the only source, accounts of Iranian losses became exaggerated. The data is highly fragmentary, often contradictory, usually vague in particulars, and often suspect as a whole. It defies complete reconciliation or adjudication in a quantitative sense as will be evident below.
There are few stand-alone good sources for the Iran-Iraq War in English. One of the first, and best, is Edgar O’Ballance, The Gulf War (1988). O’Ballance was a dedicated and knowledgeable military reporter who had covered many conflicts throughout the world. Unfortunately his book ends with the Karbala-9 offensive of April 1987. Another good reference is Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1990). Hiro too is a careful journalist who specializes in South Asian affairs. Finally, there is Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War Volume III: The Iran-Iraq War (1990). This is the most comprehensive treatment of the conflict from a military standpoint and tends to be the “standard” reference. Finally there are Iranian sources, most notably articles appearing since the war in the Tehran Times, Iran News, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) and others.
This paper will approach the subject of losses in the conflict from the Iranian perspective. This is for two reasons. First, too often during the war Iraqi claims and figures were uncritically accepted out of prejudice against Iran. Secondly, since the War the Iranians have been more forthcoming about details of the conflict and though not providing direct figures, have released related quantified data that allows us to extrapolate better estimates. The first installment of this paper examines the evidence for total Iranian war casualties being far lower than popularly believed. It will also analyze this data to establish overall killed-to-wounded ratios, MIA and PoW issues, and the effectiveness of chemical warfare in the conflict. Later installments will analyze selected Iranian operations during the war to establish data such as average loss rate per day, mean length of engagements, advance rates, dispersion factors, casualty thresholds affecting breakpoint and other issues.
Casualties as Reported and Estimated
Too often incorrect formulae were applied to calculate casualties or the killed-to-wounded ratio. The standard belief was that Iran suffered two wounded for every killed—a ratio not seen since the ancient world. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy established that the average distribution of killed-to-wounded in 20th Century warfare is on the order of 1:4 and in fact this relationship may be as old as the year 1700.[1] In Operation Peace for Galilee of 1982 the Israeli ratio of killed-to-wounded was on the order of 1:6.5 while the Syrian was 1:3.56.[2] At the same time in the Falklands, U.K. casualty ratio was 1:3. For Argentine ground forces it was 1:4.85.[3] Also it was assumed that Iran must have suffered 3-4 times the casualties of Iraqi forces in many given engagements on the basis of no good evidence this author can find.
Typical Western estimates of Iranian losses in the war are given below.[4]
The lowest estimate of Iranian KIA was from the Pentagon which estimated the killed (military and civilian) at 262,000.[5]
At the end of 1980 the Iraqis claimed 4,500 Iranian KIA and 11,500 WIA.[6] Iraqi claims as of 22 September 1981 were 41,779 Iranian KIA[7] By the end of August 1981 other estimates placed it as 14,000-18,000 KIA and some 26,000-30,000 WIA.[8] Alternate estimates placed this at 14,000 KIA and 28,000 WIA,[9] Still others claimed 38,000 KIA.[10] During the first half of 1982 estimate was 90,000 Iranians killed.[11] Iran’s casualties in its 1984 offensives resulted in 30,000-50,000 more KIA.[12] In mid-1984 Iran’s KIA were 180,000-500,000 and WIA 500,000-825,000.[13] By 23 March 1985, Iranian KIA may have been 650,000 with 490,000 “seriously” wounded.[14] In September 1986 the count of Iranian dead was 240,000.[15] By April 1987 Iran had 600,000-700,000 KIA and twice that number wounded.[16] Iraq claimed 800,000 total Iranian KIA at the time of the cease-fire.[17] Figure 1 graphically depicts this reporting.
Official Iranian statistics released on 19 September 1988 immediately after the cease fire listed the following casualty figures:
Mr Beuttel, a former U.S. Army intelligence officer, was employed as a military analyst by Boeing Research & Development at the time of original publication. The views and opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of The Boeing Company.
[3] Martin Middlebrook, Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982, Revised Edition; London: Penguin Books, 1987, pp. 382-385; Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the Malvinas, London: Penguin Books, 1990, pp. 283-284. The low British ratio in the Falklands is a result of many ground forces being killed in mass while still aboard the Sir Galahad. This deflates the ratio vis a vis that actually experienced in ground combat. The shipborne dead should more properly be considered naval casualties.
As I result of a discussion I am having about Kursk with Niklas Zetterling, I have decided to compare the actual repair and replacement efforts of the Soviet II Guards Tank Corps to the German Totenkopf (Death’s Head) SS Panzer Grenadier Division. The II Guard Tank Corps was selected as it has some of the more complete records and it maintained its position in the “Donets triangle” from the beginning of the battle on 5 July 1943 until the 15th of July 1943. Its headquarters at Kosukhin on 4 July (can’t locate), it was at Kalinin on 6 July (305455?), and it was at Sazhnoye (3734) by 0700 7 July, moved to Kleimenovo (4037) by 0700 10 July, moved to Plota (4345) by 0700 11 July, moved to Zhilomostnoye (4048) by 0700 12 July, and moved to Bereznik (490555), 3 km east of Krasnoye by 0700 15 July. The unit was never overrun or forced back by an attack, so it was in a decent position to repair and replace tanks.
The Totenkopf was selected as it was the German armor unit nearest to it and engaged with it. The Totenkopf SS Division ended up holding down the SS Panzer Corps right flank until the 9th, when it then moved up to cross the Psel River and try to take Prokhorovka from the north-northwest.
So lets look at Totenkopf for a moment (this is data from the Kursk Data Base):
Date Tank Strength* Destroyed Damaged In Repair Returned to Duty
7/04 165 0 0 11
7/05 150 1 14
7/06 139 3 8
7/07 133 1 7 2
7/08 122 2 9 0
7/09 105 4 15 2
7/10 116 0 0 11
7/11 134 0 3 21
7/12 106 3 25 0
7/13 77 2 27 0
7/14 76 2 6 7
7/15 80 0 1 5
7/16 97 0 0 17
7/17 98 0 2 3
7/18 96 0 2 0
Total 18 119 68
* On 4 July this tank strength consisted of 59 Pz III long, 8 Pz III Command, 7 Pz IV short, 40 Pz IV long, 11 Pz VI, 1 Pz VI Command, 28 SuG III and 11 Marder IIs. AFVs not included in this count are 5 Pz III Observation, 5 Hummel, 12 Wespe, 36 armored cars, 56 light halftracks (including 3 250/10 with 37mm AT) and 69 medium halftracks (including 2 251/9 with 75mm lt IG and 7 251/10 with 37mm AT).
Strength figures are nominally as of 1800 on that day.
It appears that around 13% of the tanks destroyed/damaged/broken-down were written-off as destroyed. The Totenkopf SS Division appears to have repaired 57% of the damaged tanks during this time (and they may have repaired more later).
Now, let us look at the II Guards Tank Corps (also data from the Kursk Data Base)
Date Tank Strength Destroyed Damaged In repair Returned to Duty
7/04 187 * 0 0 30 ** 0
7/05 187 0 0 30 0
7/06 159 17 11 41 0
7/07 171 0 7 29 ** 19 T-34s **
7/08 155 6 10 39 0
7/09 133 7 23 54 5-8 Churchills ***
7/10 139 0 2 48 8
7/11 140 3 2 44 6 (4 Churchills)
7/12 82 24 35 78 0-1 Churchill
7/13 80 1 4 3
7/14 59 13 8 0
7/15 57 2 14 14 T-34s ****
7/16 63 0 0 6 ****
7/17 63 0 0 0
7/18 31 9 25 2
Total 82 141 63-67
Less tanks that were probably not repaired: – 19
Less the confusing Churchill reports: – 9 – 13
Total returned to duty (RTD) was probably around: 35
* On 4 July this tank strength consisted of 99 T-34s, 72 T-70s and 16 Churchills. The unit also had 28 BA-64 (armored cars) and 20 Bren Gun Carriers. Note that there is another report that records the corps on 4 July as having 121 T-34s, 75 T-70s, 21 Churchills (Fond: 2nds GTC, Opis: 1, Delo: 23, pages 4-9). We believe this is total tanks, not just tanks ready-for-action.
It appears that around 37% of the tanks destroyed/damaged/broken-down were written-off as destroyed. The II Guards Tank Corps appeared to repair 45% of the damaged tanks during this time (and they may have repaired more later), but as 28 of these repairs were probably not repaired tanks (see the ** and *** remarks below), then it appears that they repaired around 25% of the damaged tanks during this time.
So, compared to the Germans, the Soviet unit wrote off a higher percentage of tanks written off as destroyed (13% versus 37%) and a lower percentage of damaged tanks repaired (57% repaired versus 25% repaired). This is pretty typical for all the German panzer and panzer grenadier divisions compared to Soviet tank and mechanized corps at Kursk. Also, most of the Soviet repaired arrived on the 15th and 16th, after the battle was winding down.
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P.S. The map is of the II Guards Tank Corps operation on 6 July 1943 from page 475 of my book. It is the II Guards Tank Corps map for 1800, 6 July 1943.
P.P.S.: The remaining notes are here:
** These tanks almost certainly are reserve T-34s, vice recently repaired ones. In operational report #181, dated 0700 8 July, they list a corps reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s. They state that “the 20 tanks in corps reserve are located in Bubnovo.” I have yet to locate Bubnovo on a map.The keeping of 20 or 30 spared tanks was a normal practice at Kursk at this time. The difference between the ready-for-action reports and other tank counts on 4 July do indicate that there was a spare 22 T-34s, 3 T-70s, and 5 Churchills with the unit (see the * remark). The 19 RTD tanks are certainly the 20 spare tanks activated. This is the only mention of the “corps reserve’ in the II Guards Tank Corps records we have.
*** These are all Churchills. From 7/09 through 7/12 we have 9-13 Churchills RTD. The actual report of Churchill strength and losses from 7/08 – 7/13 is confusing:
0700 7/12: 1. “47th Gds Heavy Tank Rgt, with 6 Churchills…”
2. At 2400 on July 11…..47th Gds Heavy tank Rgt, consisting of 2 Churchills, is in the corps commander reserve north of Leski.
3. Corps losses for July 11: 3 Churchills burned, 2 Churchills knocked out.
4. Combat Ready Tanks: 2 Churchills (2 reports)
0700 7/13: Report is missing
0700 7/14: Combat Ready Tanks: 2 Churchills
The unit, the 47th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, was operating independent of the corps, having gotten separated on the 7th and moved over to face the III Panzer Corps. It appear unlikely over these three days that 16-19 Churchills were damaged or broken down, and that 13-16 of them were repaired, but this is the only way to get totals to work. It is either that assumption, or one has to dismiss some parts of the records as in error, and it is hard to know what to dismiss. This is most likely anomalous data in the II GTC records.
**** These 14 tanks we believe are repaired. they reported at 0700 15 July to have combat-ready 30 T-34s, 12 T-70s, and 2 Churchills, they report losses for 15 July of 6 T-34s knocked out, 1 T-34 burned, 2 T-70s knocked out, 1 burned (10 tanks total) and they reported on 0700 16 July combat-ready 45 T-34s, 18 T-70s. Another report for the 16th states that “following repairs, the corps had the following tanks in line: 38 T-34s and 15 T-70s.”
P.P.P.S. The Totenkopf SS Division lost around 57 tanks on 12th and 13th of July (and we don’t know how many were actually lost on what given day). Some authors, in their accounts of Prokhorovka seem to ignore its efforts and its losses, even though it was engaged with elements of Rotmistrov’s Fifth Guards Tank Army and its objective was Prokhorovka (which it did not achieve).
A couple of years ago, a media report that the Chinese had claimed a technological breakthrough in stealth-busting quantum radar capabilities led me to muse about the possible repercussions on U.S. military capabilities. This was during the height of the technology-rooted Third Offset Strategy mania. It seemed to me at the time that concentrating on technological solutions to the U.S.’s strategic challenges might not be the wisest course of action.
The notion that stealth might be a wasting asset seemed somewhat far-fetched when I wrote that, but it appears to have become a much more serious concern. As the DARPA solicitation states, “Our acquisition system is finding it difficult to respond on relevant timescales to adversary progress, which has made the search for next generation capabilities at once more urgent and more futile.” (p. 5)
Just a little more on armor exchange ratios at Kursk. This is taken from pages 640-641 of my book.
It has been determined that the German tank losses due to mines was somewhere around 131 for the 5th of July. On the 6th of July, it gets harder to determine the mine losses, and an estimation has placed the losses tentatively at 69 tanks. This is 37.95 percent of the armor loss for those two days and 13.11 percent of total armor losses for 4 to 18 July. After that, it appears that the percentage of tanks lost to mines declined to perhaps five percent or less for the subsequent days. Overall, mines probably caused around 15 to 20 percent of German tank losses during the course of the entire battle.
If one does a loss-exchange ratio analysis, less the German mine losses in the first two days, the following figures are generated:
Decline in Strength
First Tank Army (less XXXI TC & 2 Bdes) 289
XLVIII Panzer Corps 332
less Panther breakdowns -115
less mine losses, 5th -54
less mine losses, 6th -32
——
131
This now shows an exchange ratio of 2.21 to one in favor of the German XLVIII Panzer Corps. A look as the SS Panzer Corps shows a very lopsided result:
Decline in Strength
Other Voronezh Front Armor 385
SS Panzer Corps 187
less mine losses, 5th -33
less mine losses, 6th -14
——
140
This shows an exchange ratio of 2.75 to one in favor of the Germans. Still, if one could factor out the other weapons effects, it would appear that the Germans, in their tank operations, were achieving kill ratios of two to one or greater. Furthermore, it does appear that the kill ratios achieved by the SS armor was superior to the neighboring Wehrmacht units, although it also appears that the primary reason for this was the way Soviet armored operations were conducted east of the Vorskla (under Vatutin and Chistyakov’s direction) as opposed to those west of the Vorskla (under Katukov’s command).
As I result of a discussion I am having about Kursk with Niklas Zetterling, I have decided to compare the actual repair and replacement efforts of the Soviet II Guards Tank Corps to the German Totenkopf (Death’s Head) SS Panzer Grenadier Division. The II Guard Tank Corps was selected as it has some of the more complete records and it maintained its position in the “Donets triangle” from the beginning of the battle on 5 July 1943 until the 15th of July 1943. Its headquarters at Kosukhin on 4 July (can’t locate), it was at Kalinin on 6 July (305455?), and it was at Sazhnoye (3734) by 0700 7 July, moved to Kleimenovo (4037) by 0700 10 July, moved to Plota (4345) by 0700 11 July, moved to Zhilomostnoye (4048) by 0700 12 July, and moved to Bereznik (490555), 3 km east of Krasnoye by 0700 15 July. The unit was never overrun or forced back by an attack, so it was in a decent position to repair and replace tanks.
