Category World War II

Armor Exchange Ratios at Kursk, SS Panzer Corps versus 48th Panzer Corps – part 1

This text is pulled from pages 744-745 of my Kursk book.

A look at the German and Soviet tank losses since the start of the battle against the SS Panzer corps shows:

             SS Panzer Corps   Opposing Soviet     Exchange

Date     Tank Losses           Tank Losses          Ratio

5th         54 tanks                     30 tanks               1:0.56

6th         79                            149                         1:1.89

7th         55                              86                         1:1.56

8th         47                           164                          1:3.49

9th         34                           135                          1:3.97

10th         3                             55                          1:18.33

11th       16                              9                           1:0.56

           ——                       ——-

           288 tanks              628 tanks                    1:2.18

This comparison is a case where one should not place too much reliance in the day-to-day statistics. While the German losses, calculated as a decline in ready-for-action, are reasonably accurate during this period for each day and for each division; the Soviet records are not. Overall, the Soviets lost as many or more tanks during this period, as indicated here, but there is some question how many were lost on exactly which day.

For the record, 118 tanks were lost by the Adolf Hitler SS Division while they may have been responsible for 255 Soviet tank losses (a 1-to-2.16 exchange ratio), the Das Reich SS Division lost 104 tanks, while they may have been responsible for 274 Soviet tanks (a 1-to-2.63 exchange ratio). The Totenkopf SS Division did not get as much credit, for although it lost only 66 tanks, it is only credited with 99 tanks (a 1-to-1.50 exchange ratio). One much keep in mind that these formations were supported by air, artillery, and elements of the 167th Infantry Division and they certainly played a role in causing Soviet tank losses. Furthermore, the assignment of which Soviet units faces which German units is sometime questionable as the unit boundaries overlapped and sometimes the German units were operating in close coordination with each other.

The reverse comparison can also be made, although it is less clear as there were often two different tank corps facing the same German divisions and sometimes elements of the same tank corps facing two different German divisions,. Still, one can  estimate that the XXXI Tank Corps lost 93 tanks while they may have been responsible for 15 German tanks (a 6.20-to-1 exchange ratio). The V Guards Tank Corps lost 166 while they may have been responsible for 62 German tanks (a 2.68-to-1 exchange ratio). The II Tank Corps lost 136 tanks while they may have been responsible for 34 German tanks (a 4.00-to-1 exchange ratio). Note that there is considerable overlap between these three formations and their opponents. Adding them together produces 395 Soviet tanks lost while they may have been responsible for 111 German tanks lost. this is a 3.56-to-1 exchange ratio. Finally, the carefully husbanded II Guards Tank Corps lost 48 tanks while they may have been responsible for taking out 32 German tanks (a 1.50-to-1 exchange ratio).

Panther Breakdowns In January 1944

Tank losses for 1st Battalion, 26th Panzer Regiment January 1944

The 1st Battalion of the German 26th Panzer Regiment (I./Pz.Rgt. 26) did not fight with its parent division (the 26th Panzer Division), which was engaged in Italy. Instead, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 was waiting for its Panthers to arrive. The first shipments were sent in August and Panthers continued to trickle in during the autumn, allowing the battalion to start training.

Instead of joining its parent division, the battalion was sent to the Ukraine, where its first action would take place in January 1944.

At first the battalion was attached to the Grossdeutschland Division, but when Soviet forces broke through northeast of Slatopol, as part of the Korsun-Shevchenkovsky operation, the battalion was sent to counterattack. The inexperienced battalion would be committed to action without infantry or artillery support, to fight a very confused battle on 28-29 January.

During its 75 kilometer march to the Slatopol area, the battalion lost a number of tanks due to mechanical problems. One Panther caught fire in the engine room and was completely destroyed. This is reminiscent of the Panthers at Kursk and as the first Panthers had been shipped to the battalion in August 1943, it may well have had several Panthers of the model D, which took part in Operation Zitadelle. Also, one of the two Bergepanthers caught fire, but it could be extinguished by the crew. The vehicle would however be out of action and sorely missed the following days.

Five other Panthers were damaged during the march, with the following problems: final drive leak, idler wheel bearing, radiator, fuel pump and also one drove off a bridge and was difficult to recover.

During the fighting 28-29 January, five Panthers were complete losses due to AT round hits that caused the tanks to catch fire. Another five had been hit by AT rounds that caused damage to the tracks or other components that rendered the tanks immobile. It was decided to blow them up, as they were in positions where they could not be recovered quickly. Finally, one Panther fallen down a steep slope during the night and could also not be recovered. It was attempted to blow it up, but that failed.

In addition, there were 24 Panthers that suffered serious mechanical breakdowns and which were put on trains to be repaired. In many cases, the engine main connecting rod bearings had been damaged. These 24 Panthers were put on train and sent away for repairs. Interestingly, even three Panthers written off as complete losses were put on trains. I can only speculate why, but perhaps the Germans wanted to make use of the raw materials.

The repair and recovery services had worked hard and carried out 118 repairs during the five last days of January.

On 31 January, the battalion had 30 combat ready Panthers, while 8 remained in the workshops. 24 had been sent away by train and 13 had been written off (in addition to the twelve mentioned above, one Panther had caught fire when loading on train in France).

The I./Pz.Rgt. 26 was sent into action with many vehicles that suffered from mechanical shortcomings. In addition, it was established that most of them had been replenished with fuel that was substandard and this may have been the cause of many of the defect engines that were sent away on train. To make matters worse, the battalion was sent into action without infantry and artillery support and without any proper reconnaissance of the battlefield.

All of this shows up in the outcome. It is also clear that the inability to recover tanks was a major factor causing complete write-offs. Five Panthers were direct losses due to enemy fire. Another five were damaged by enemy fire, but not recovered and thus became complete write-offs. Also, one Panther was completely lost due to an accident on the battlefield, but it seems that it would have been returned to service, had it been possible to recover it. Again, it is clear that command of the battlefield (or lack of it) played a significant role for irrevocable losses.

All data is taken from Anlage 25, Kriegstagebuch 2, I./Pz.Rgt. 26, BA-MA RH 39/599). The report is very detailed and shows all losses, with the individual turret numbers given.

Franz Staudegger’s birth date

In my book, page 814, I have Franz Staudegger’s birth date as 12 February 1923. Several other internet sources have that date, as does Agte on page 120. Some Wikipedia-type sites and several other internet sources have his birth date as 1921.

I have the date he passed away as 16 March 1991, as does several internet sources. Some Wikipedia-type sites and several other internet sources have his date of death as 16 May 1995.

Does anyone have documentation, a grave stone picture or an obituary so I can confirm these dates?

Anyhow, I think this is my last post on Wittmann and Staudegger until someone comes up with more information. My posts on the subject have been:

Revised Footnote on Staudegger

II Tank Corps on 8 July 1943

Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 4

Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 3

Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 2

Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 1

Revised Footnote on Staudegger

I do maintain a detailed and regularly updated errata sheets for all my books. In case it is not obvious, I am currently working on yet another (smaller) Kursk book. My proposed revised footnote on Staudegger (drawn from page 814 of my original book) now reads:

Probably the most detailed account of this action is in Patrick Agte’s book, Michael Wittman and the Waffen SS Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte in WWII (Stackpole Press, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2006), pages 103-105 and pages 119-121. The claim of facing 50-60 tanks comes from his Knight’s Cross award citation and Nazi-era press (propaganda) releases. The event could not have occurred near 252.2 as it occurred on the 8th of July (or 7 July in some sources). A number of internet sources (but not Agte) mention it occurring at the village of Psyolknee. We have not located a village called Psyolknee on any maps we have. While we do not doubt that some event like this occurred, the details are not support by anything in either side’s unit records.

We have examined the unit records of all Soviet tank corps in the area. The three closest Soviet armor units in the area were the V Guards Tank Corps, the X Tank Corps and the II Tank Corps.

Certainly the V Guards Tank Corps lost of lot of tanks this day with reported losses of 28 T-34s and 9 T-70s: 14 T-34s and 7 T-70s from the 20th Gds Tank Bde and 14 T-34s and 2 T-70s from the 21st Gds Tank Bde. The 22nd Gds Tank Bde reports it has no losses for this day. See Fond: 3403, Opis: 1, Delo: 18a, pages 143-156. Of course, if the claims for Staudegger are correct, then this would mean that he was responsible for 22 out of 28 T-34s lost by the V Guards Tank Corps on the 8th. As it were, it appears the tank corps was to the east of the Das Reich SS Division and at 1030 has reached the line of Sobachevskii-Kalinin-Belenikhino. In combat report #0112, 2200 July 8, 1943 they place the 20th Guards Tank Brigade two kilometers south of Sobachevskii and the 22nd Guards Tank Brigade in Belenikhino (Fond: 3403, Opis: 1, Delo: 18).

The X Tank Corps is another candidate except it reports that it only lost two tanks between 7 and 11 July (Fond 3410, Opis: 1, Delo: 17, page 10 and Fond: 3410, Opis: 1, Delo: 14, page 5). Unit strength reports for this unit do not contradict these reports. The nearest of its tanks brigades to the northeast of Teterevino on 8 July was the 178th Tank Brigade. The other two tank brigades were to the west of it and moving further west.

The II Tank Corps is the most likely candidate. It attacked in the afternoon and lost at least 31 tanks on the 9th of July. The 26th Tank Brigade did take Teterevino. They do report losses of 6 T-34s knocked out and 3 broken down, and 3 T-70s knocked out and 3 broken down. The I Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade did loose its way during the fight and ended up attacking towards Teterevino (see Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, page 146). There it encountered “two Panzer VI” tanks (Tigers) which brought the battalion under fire. After “suffering tank losses,” it retreated. The other battalion of the tank brigade was involved in the attacks to the south with the 169th Tank Brigade. The 99th Tank Brigade does report their losses as of 0700 on 10 July as 12 T-34s knocked out and 4 undergoing report, and 4 T-70s knocked out and 4 broken down. The 169th Tank Brigade report losses of 3 T-34s knocked out and 5 broken down and 1 T-70 knocked out. The 15th Guard Heavy Tank Regiment reports 2 Churchills knocked out and 2 broken down. These reports probably account for the actions of both 8 and 9 July (see Fond: 3407, Opis: 1, Delo: 108, pages 195-216).

The most likely candidate is the I Battalion of the 99th Tank Brigade. Its composition is not known, but may have been 10 T-34s and 10 T-70s. The 26th Tank Brigade also had 6 T-34s knocked out. One is left with the conclusion from an examination of the Soviet unit records that the claims of 22 T-34s killed by Staudegger on 8 July 1943, along with the 2 T-34s killed by Deutschland SS Infantry Regiment, are probably overstated. The claim that he stopped a panzer regiment is clearly incorrect, as Teterevino was taken and Das Reich reported that they later attacked out of Teterevino with 40 tanks.

Now granted, this is a very long footnote, but I have no way of otherwise addressing this issue. As it were, the claims of 22 T-34s by Staudegger are mentioned and quoted in my book from an interview done of retired Bundeswehr Brigadier General Guenther Baer (who was a tank commander with the II Battalion, Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Panzer Regiment in July 1943). He was interviewed in 1999.

 

P.S. This picture is of Staudegger taken on 23 July 1943. I am guessing it was done back in Germany. This copy of the picture was borrowed from: https://www.frihetskamp.net/franz-staudegger-slar-ut-en-sovjetisk-panserbataljon/

P.P.S. This post was revised 23 August 2018.

 

Repair of Jagdpanthers at Normandy – Part II

At the end of July, mounting enemy pressure would push the battalion back and from then Jagdpanthers would start to become complete losses. The first took place on July 31, when the final drives of Lt. Scheiber’s Jagdpanther was damaged. The vehicle could not be recovered due to strong enemy artillery fire and lack of towing vehicles. It was blown up by the crew on Aug 2. On July 31, another 11 Jagdpanthers were damaged, but all of them were short time damage.

On Aug 1, the number of Jagdpanthers in long term repair increased from 1 to 3 and that number remained constant August 13. From July 31 to Aug 2, the number of tanks in short repair shrunk by 4, suggesting at least that many were repaired. On Aug 5, the number in short repair was 17, but it shrunk to 13 on July 6, again suggesting that 4 were repaired. Indeed, one of the Kampfgruppen was notified that it could expect to receive three Jagdpanthers from the workshops in the night or on Aug 6.

From Aug 7 onwards, the number of Jagdpanther in short repair increased. On Aug 14, 17 Jagdpanther were in short repair, but it was noted that spare parts had to be brought up to repair them. At this point the German supply situation in general was desperate, which meant that the arrival of spare parts was not very likely. The battalion was ordered to pull out and bring its vehicles in workshops along. Thus far, seven tanks had been irretrievably lost (including one confiscated by an SS-units and whose fate was unknown).

During all of August, the following complete losses (including command tanks) were recorded, by cause (including Scheiber’s Jagdpanther mentioned above):

Mechanical damage, tank blown up by crew: 12

Destroyed AT fire: 2

Stuck in terrain, could not move, subsequently hit by enemy tank, burnt out: 1

Destroyed by HE or phosporus rounds: 2

Damaged by enemy fire and blown up by crew since it could not be recovered: 2

Confiscated by SS-unit, unknown fate: 1

Lack of fuel, blown up by crew: 1

Carpet bombing at Rouen: 1

Up to the point when the battalion we know of at least 32 cases when tanks in the battalion were repaired, which can be contrasted to 7 cases of complete losses. Obviously, this includes vehicles that suffered technical damage during the approach march, but is must also be noted that all cases of damage are not mentioned by the war diary. In august, there are a few cases noted:

4 Aug:         Unspecified number of Jagdpanther damaged by artillery fire.

5 Aug:         One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.

10 Aug:       One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.

12 Aug:       1 gun barrel damaged by enemy artillery fire.

13 Aug:       1 case of final drive failure

14 Aug:       2 damaged by artillery fire.

Given the data available, exact percentage calculations are perhaps not so meaningful, but it is clear that before the battalion began to pull out, the damage received was usually of such character that it is to be expected that it will be repaired.

What is also interesting is that losses due to presence of enemy ground combat units, or in some cases artillery fire, caused the Germans to blow up many Jagdpanthers. In fact, more than half the losses occurred in this way, which highlights the importance of controlling the ground.

Few Jagdpanthers were penetrated by AT rounds and in two of the cases, the vehicles could be repaired. Furthermore, the effects of artillery fire should not be neglected. Although a HE round is not likely to destroy a heavy tank, it may well (as is evident from several instances mentioned in the war diary) case damage to the tank and if ground units are close enough, the enemy tank will not be recovered.

The 654th Jagdpanther battalion is of course not an average unit. Nevertheless, its detailed war diary can contribute to a better understanding of tank losses and repairs.

 

P.S. The picture was drawn from this article: http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/nazi_germany/Jagdpanther.php

Repair of Jagdpanthers at Normandy – Part I

The 654th Jagdpanther battalion fought in Normandy, on the eastern part of the front. Unlike most German battalion level records, the war diary plus annexes has survived for this unit. At battalion level, the fate of many tanks can often be tracked and this unit is no exception. Included in the annexes is a list of the Jagpanthers lost by the battalion, by chassis number or turret number and which includes date (and often time as well), location, cause, list of items recovered, etc. All information is taken from the war diary and its annexes.

When it started marching from Rocquigny near the Belgian border towards Normandy, it had 25 Jagdpanthers, On 27th July, three command Panthers and one Jagdpanther arrived at the battalion. They first had to be checked by the workshops and on July 29 they were ready for action.

Marching to Normandy took its toll of the battalion. There were several air attacks, which caused losses in the battalion, but none of the Jagdpanthers were destroyed. However, many Jagdpanthers suffered mechanical breakdowns. During the march (approx. 300 km) the following cases of damage was recorded: 18 final drives (a well-known problem), two engines, 2 oil coolers, 3 cooling fans, 1 torsion bar, 4 road wheels, 1 drive shaft, 4 drive sprockets, 2 idler wheels and 109 track links.

The result was that on July 17, the battalion had 8 operational Jagdpanther, 16 in short repair and 1 in long repair. Efforts by the repair and recovery services raised the operational readiness to 23 Jagdpanther on 30 July, 2 in long repair and 1 long repair. This includes one additional Jagdpanther that arrived on this day. Until July 26, the following damage had been caused by enemy action: 1 gear box, 4 radiators, 1 oil cooler, 4 cooling fans, 6 drive sprockets, 2 final drives, 16 road wheels.

It is unclear how many vehicles that were damaged up to this point, as single vehicles could have suffered more than one kind of damage. For example, a hit on a tank could cause damage to more than one road wheel. Before July 31, no Jagdpanther was completely lost.

The 2nd Coy arrived ahead of the rest of the battalion at the front in Normandy and it reported 6 operational Jagdpanther on July 7, when attached to the Panzer-Lehr division. It was however attached to 276th ID when Pz-Lehr left its sector. When moving on July 8, four Jagdpanthers broke down. Two more broke down on July 9, but four were also repaired. On July 11, one Jagpanther was penetrated in the left side armour and three crew members were wounded, but no other damage was recorded. Also, another Jagpanther was penetrated (does not say from which direction). The loader was killed and the commander, driver and gunner were wounded. The crew still managed to drive the tank into safety.

At least one Jagpanther was repaired by the company between 12 and 17 July.

Given the increase in operational Jagpanthers from July 17 and 29 at least 14 must have been repaired. At least five were repaired by 2nd Coy before July 17. So far we have indications of 19 repairs. However, there were further Jagdpanthers damaged between July 18 and 29. On July 20, two were damaged by enemy artillery fire and classified as short repair. Two days later, a periscope on one Jagdpanther was destroyed by enemy artillery fire. On July 26 one Jagdpanther caught fire in the engine room, not by enemy action. Vehicle classified as short repair. Four days later, one Jagdpanther was damaged by artillery fire and classified as short repair.

There were at least five vehicles damaged in this period when the operational readiness rose due to the efforts of the mechanics. We can conclude that at least 24 had been repaired before July 31. But this cannot possibly account for all vehicles damaged Also, it is clear that the kind of damage sustained thus far was of a kind that ought to be repaired and it can safely be assumed that more than 100 % of its Jagdpanthers had been in repair and not a single one had been lost.

 

P.S. The picture was drawn from this article: http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/nazi_germany/Jagdpanther.php

 

The Tank Repair and Replacement Efforts of II Guards Tank Corps compared to Totenkopf SS Division

As I result of a discussion I am having about Kursk with Niklas Zetterling, I have decided to compare the actual repair and replacement efforts of the Soviet II Guards Tank Corps to the German Totenkopf (Death’s Head) SS Panzer Grenadier Division. The II Guard Tank Corps was selected as it has some of the more complete records and it maintained its position in the “Donets triangle” from the beginning of the battle on 5 July 1943 until the 15th of July 1943. Its headquarters at Kosukhin on 4 July (can’t locate), it was at Kalinin on 6 July (305455?), and it was at Sazhnoye (3734)  by 0700 7 July, moved to Kleimenovo (4037) by 0700 10 July, moved to Plota (4345) by 0700 11 July, moved to Zhilomostnoye (4048) by 0700 12 July, and moved to Bereznik (490555), 3 km east of Krasnoye by 0700 15 July. The unit was never overrun or forced back by an attack, so it was in a decent position to repair and replace tanks.

The Totenkopf was selected as it was the German armor unit nearest to it and engaged with it. The Totenkopf SS Division ended up holding down the SS Panzer Corps right flank until the 9th, when it then moved up to cross the Psel River and try to take Prokhorovka from the north-northwest.

So lets look at Totenkopf for a moment (this is data from the Kursk Data Base):

Date       Tank Strength*     Destroyed     Damaged   In Repair    Returned to Duty

7/04        165                         0                      0                11

7/05        150                         1                    14

7/06        139                         3                      8

7/07        133                         1                      7                               2

7/08        122                         2                      9                               0

7/09        105                         4                    15                               2

7/10        116                         0                      0                             11

7/11        134                         0                      3                             21

7/12        106                         3                    25                               0

7/13          77                         2                    27                               0

7/14          76                         2                     6                                7

7/15          80                         0                     1                                5

7/16          97                         0                     0                              17

7/17          98                         0                     2                                3

7/18          96                         0                     2                                0

Total                                    18                 119                              68

* On 4 July this tank strength consisted of 59 Pz III long, 8 Pz III Command, 7 Pz IV short, 40 Pz IV long, 11 Pz VI, 1 Pz VI Command, 28 SuG III and 11 Marder IIs. AFVs not included in this count are 5 Pz III Observation, 5 Hummel, 12 Wespe, 36 armored cars, 56 light halftracks (including 3 250/10 with 37mm AT) and 69 medium halftracks (including 2 251/9 with 75mm lt IG and 7 251/10 with 37mm AT).

Strength figures are nominally as of 1800 on that day.

It appears that around 13% of the tanks destroyed/damaged/broken-down were written-off as destroyed. The Totenkopf SS Division appears to have repaired 57% of the damaged tanks during this time (and they may have repaired more later).

Now, let us look at the II Guards Tank Corps (also data from the Kursk Data Base)

Date       Tank Strength     Destroyed     Damaged    In repair    Returned to Duty

7/04        187  *                   0                   0                30  **           0

7/05        187                      0                    0                30               0

7/06        159                    17                  11                41               0

7/07        171                      0                    7                29  **        19 T-34s **

7/08        155                      6                  10                39               0

7/09        133                      7                  23                54               5-8 Churchills ***

7/10        139                      0                    2                48               8

7/11        140                      3                    2                44               6 (4 Churchills)

7/12          82                    24                  35                78               0-1 Churchill

7/13          80                      1                    4                                   3

7/14          59                    13                    8                                   0

7/15          57                      2                  14                                 14 T-34s ****

7/16          63                      0                    0                                   6 ****

7/17          63                      0                    0                                   0

7/18          31                      9                  25                                   2

Total                                 82                141                                 63-67

    Less tanks that were probably not repaired:                         – 19

    Less the confusing Churchill reports:                                    –   9 – 13

Total returned to duty (RTD) was probably around:                    35

* On 4 July this tank strength consisted of 99 T-34s, 72 T-70s and 16 Churchills. The unit also had 28 BA-64 (armored cars) and 20 Bren Gun Carriers. Note that there is another report that records the corps on 4 July as having 121 T-34s, 75 T-70s, 21 Churchills (Fond: 2nds GTC, Opis: 1, Delo: 23, pages 4-9). We believe this is total tanks, not just tanks ready-for-action.

It appears that around 37% of the tanks destroyed/damaged/broken-down were written-off as destroyed. The II Guards Tank Corps appeared to repair 45% of the damaged tanks during this time (and they may have repaired more later), but as 28 of these repairs were probably not repaired tanks (see the ** and *** remarks below), then it appears that they repaired around 25% of the damaged tanks during this time.

So, compared to the Germans, the Soviet unit wrote off a higher percentage of tanks written off as destroyed (13% versus 37%) and a lower percentage of damaged tanks repaired (57% repaired versus 25% repaired). This is pretty typical for all the German panzer and panzer grenadier divisions compared to Soviet tank and mechanized corps at Kursk. Also, most of the Soviet repaired arrived on the 15th and 16th, after the battle was winding down.

 

——————————————————————————————————————–

P.S. The map is of the II Guards Tank Corps operation on 6 July 1943 from page 475 of my book. It is the II Guards Tank Corps map for 1800, 6 July 1943.

P.P.S.: The remaining notes are here:

** These tanks almost certainly are reserve T-34s, vice recently repaired ones. In operational report #181, dated 0700 8 July, they list a corps reserve of 20 T-34s and 10 T-70s. They state that “the 20 tanks in corps reserve are located in Bubnovo.” I have yet to locate Bubnovo on a map.The keeping of 20 or 30 spared tanks was a normal practice at Kursk at this time. The difference between the ready-for-action reports and other tank counts on 4 July do indicate that there was a spare 22 T-34s, 3 T-70s, and 5 Churchills with the unit (see the * remark). The 19 RTD tanks are certainly the 20 spare tanks activated. This is the only mention of the “corps reserve’ in the II Guards Tank Corps records we have.

*** These are all Churchills. From 7/09 through 7/12 we have 9-13 Churchills RTD. The actual report of Churchill strength and losses from 7/08 – 7/13 is confusing:

0700 7/08: 1. 5 Churchills at 2400 July 7

                  2. Combat ready tanks: 5 Churchills (from 2 reports)

0700 7/09: 1. 5 Churchills.

                  2. Losses on July 8: 2 Churchills burned, 3 Churchills knocked out.

0700 7/10: 1. “The regiment suffered losses, including 2 Churchills burned, out of 5 combat-ready.”

                   2. “47ths Gds Heavy Tank Rgt, with 3 Churchills is in the area of Khokhlovo….”

                   3. On July 9 the corps lost 1 Churchill burned and 1 Churchill knocked out.

                   4. Combat ready tanks: 3 Churchills (2 reports)

                   5. Corps lost 5 Mk-4s on 9 July (from a different report)

0700 7/11: Combat ready tanks: 3 Churchills (2 reports)

0700 7/12: 1. “47th Gds Heavy Tank Rgt, with 6 Churchills…”

                  2. At 2400 on July 11…..47th Gds Heavy tank Rgt, consisting of 2 Churchills, is in the corps commander reserve north of Leski.

                  3. Corps losses for July 11: 3 Churchills burned, 2 Churchills knocked out.

                  4. Combat Ready Tanks: 2 Churchills (2 reports)

0700 7/13: Report is missing

0700 7/14: Combat Ready Tanks: 2 Churchills

The unit, the 47th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment, was operating independent of the corps, having gotten separated on the 7th and moved over to face the III Panzer Corps.  It appear unlikely over these three days that 16-19 Churchills were damaged or broken down, and that 13-16 of them were repaired, but this is the only way to get totals to work. It is either that assumption, or one has to dismiss some parts of the records as in error, and it is hard to know what to dismiss. This is most likely anomalous data in the II GTC records.

**** These 14 tanks we believe are repaired. they reported at 0700 15 July to have combat-ready 30 T-34s, 12 T-70s, and 2 Churchills, they report losses for 15 July of 6 T-34s knocked out, 1 T-34 burned, 2 T-70s knocked out, 1 burned (10 tanks total) and they reported on 0700 16 July combat-ready 45 T-34s, 18 T-70s. Another report for the 16th states that “following repairs, the corps had the following tanks in line: 38 T-34s and 15 T-70s.”

P.P.P.S. The Totenkopf SS Division lost around 57 tanks on 12th and 13th of July (and we don’t know how many were actually lost on what given day). Some authors, in their accounts of Prokhorovka seem to ignore its efforts and its losses, even though it was engaged with elements of Rotmistrov’s Fifth Guards Tank Army and its objective was Prokhorovka (which it did not achieve).

Armor Exchange Ratios at Kursk, 5 and 6 July 1943

Just a little more on armor exchange ratios at Kursk. This is taken from pages 640-641 of my book.

It has been determined that the German tank losses due to mines was somewhere around 131 for the 5th of July. On the 6th of July, it gets harder to determine the mine losses, and an estimation has placed the losses tentatively at 69 tanks. This is 37.95 percent of the armor loss for those two days and 13.11 percent of total armor losses for 4 to 18 July. After that, it appears that the percentage of tanks lost to mines declined to perhaps five percent or less for the subsequent days. Overall, mines probably caused around 15 to 20 percent of German tank losses during the course of the entire battle.

If one does a loss-exchange ratio analysis, less the German mine losses in the first two days, the following figures are generated:

                                                              Decline in Strength

First Tank Army (less XXXI TC & 2 Bdes)       289

XLVIII Panzer Corps                                        332

  less Panther breakdowns                             -115

  less mine losses, 5th                                      -54

  less mine losses, 6th                                      -32

                                                                        ——

                                                                         131

This now shows an exchange ratio of 2.21 to one in favor of the German XLVIII Panzer Corps. A look as the SS Panzer Corps shows a very lopsided result:

                                                          Decline in Strength

Other Voronezh Front Armor                         385

SS Panzer Corps                                           187

  less mine losses, 5th                                    -33

  less mine losses, 6th                                    -14

                                                                      ——

                                                                      140

This shows an exchange ratio of 2.75 to one in favor of the Germans. Still, if one could factor out the other weapons effects, it would appear that the Germans, in their tank operations, were achieving kill ratios of two to one or greater. Furthermore, it does appear that the kill ratios achieved by the SS armor was superior to the neighboring Wehrmacht units, although it also appears that the primary reason for this was the way Soviet armored operations were conducted east of the Vorskla (under Vatutin and Chistyakov’s direction) as opposed to those west of the Vorskla (under Katukov’s command).

I left out the footnotes.

 

 

P.S. Picture is labeled: “Panzer-Abteilung 51 Panthers knocked out in a minefield ambush while advancing in Cherkasy, Ukraine – July 1943. Source: https://www.reddit.com/r/DestroyedTanks/comments/5iabwq/panzerabteilung_51_panthers_knocked_out_in_a/

P.P.S. Suspect they mean Cherkasskoye, Russia.

 

Armor Exchange Ratios at Kursk

A friend recently sent me part of an article from a foreign magazine that pulled data from my Kursk book, which in translation reads:

The German tank losses in the battle at Kursk has been debated. Until the 1990s, Soviet propaganda figures dominated, which claimed that the Germans lost 2,952 tanks and 195 assault guns. Subsequently, the pendulum swung back, as research in German archives showed that no more than 278 German tanks were lost during the battle at Kursk 5-23 July.

By far the most thorough study of the battle has been conducted by Chris Lawrence and is presented in his 1,600 page book about Kursk, which was released in 2015. Lawrence shows that previous figures, which suggest that ten Soviet tanks were lost for each German tank lost, is a comparison of apples and oranges….

….Lawrence finds that if German tanks included in the same way as Soviet losses, von Mansteins formations lost 1536…tanks and assault guns 5-18 July. The opposing Soviet forces lost 2471 tanks and assault guns, a much less lopsided ratio.

I took out the parts that of that quote that I didn’t want to debate or that gave the wrong impression.

I have also been bothered by other published comparisons of tank losses, where the author focused on total German tanks destroyed vice total Soviet tanks destroyed. This, of course, produces a very lop-sided exchange figure. This is not a valid measure of combat effectiveness. What would be a valid measure is total tanks destroyed and damaged compared to total tanks destroyed and damaged. I can talk for awhile about the differences in the German and Soviet repair systems and philosophies, but to try to shorten the discussion, lets just say that the Germans refused to write off any tanks if possible, whereas the Soviets often willingly wrote off tanks because they had spare tanks in their units, a steady flow of tanks from the factory, and I suspect a lack of repair parts (a fundamental flaw in the Soviet system, both military and civilian). And, of course, in many cases the Germans held the field of battle. In many respects you are comparing apples and oranges.

For my book I ended up comparing total destroyed, damaged and broken down over night compared to total destroyed, damaged and broken down over night. As my primary trusted source of tank losses was the ready-for-action reports for both sides from day-to-day, I ended up picking up those that broke down and were not returned to duty the same day along with those destroyed and damaged. It was pretty typical for the Germans to report 1 tank destroyed for around every 10 tanks not ready-for-action. When the Soviets reported total destroyed for a day (which they often did), it was not unusual that the number ready-for-action the next day indicated more were damaged or broke down. Now, broken down tanks may make up 10 to 20% of the total losses for a day, but total losses for the day (regardless of cause) is clearly a more valid measure of combat effectiveness than total destroyed.

So, I do end up with a very different comparison of the exchange ratio of armor compared to some authors. Also, I count tank-like vehicles (like Sturmgeshuetz and Marders) as tanks. I also count any German light tanks and command tanks as tanks. Most comparisons I gather count Soviet assault guns and light tanks in their figures, so they need to make sure that both sides forces are counted by the same rules. This results in my having higher figures for German tanks than some other sources do, among many other differences. Now I do take the time to break down the counts by exact vehicle type in my appendices, so anyone who wants to calculate otherwise can do so. Note my figures include tanks lost to mine damage, which very rarely destroys tanks. Using total destroyed (or more to the point, destroyed totally) simply ignors the effects of mines on the battle.

The exchange ratios for armor are discussed in my book on pages 640-641, 744-745, 809-811, 1021-1022, and 1209-1211. The figures of 2,471 Soviet tanks destroyed, damaged or broken down and 1,536 German tanks destroyed, damaged and broken down comes from page 1210, among other places (pages 1338, 1339, 1340, 1367 and 1368). This is a 1.61 armor exchange, although the majority of tanks were probably not taken out in combat between tanks.

 

P.S. Picture is labeled: “Crew of a Wehrmacht repair unit working on a Panzer III.” Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/panzer3/crew-of-a-wehrmacht-repair-unit-working-on-a-panzer-iii/

II Tank Corps on 8 July 1943

This post is a follow-on to the post about the claims that Franz Staudegger’s  (1923-1991) killed 22 T-34s on 8 July 1943.:

Panzer Aces Wittmann and Staudegger at Kursk – part 3

There is an unsourced posting on the internet dated 1 November 2017 that claims that the Soviet 26th Tank Brigade (II Tank Corps) attacked and took Teterevino on 8 July. I only stumbled across it this last Friday. The post is here: https://www.quora.com/Is-it-true-that-fifty-T-34s-lost-a-battle-against-one-Tiger-I-tank

The poster stated in the second half of his post:

The 8th of July 1943. The village of Teterevino with the railway station was defended by panzergrenadiers of the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd SS “Deutschland” Regiment assigned to the 2nd SS Tank Division “Das Reich”. There was also a Tiger #1325 of SS-Unterscharführer Franz Staudegger undergoing minor repairs. This tank was assigned to the 13th Heavy Company of the 1st SS Tank Division “Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler”.

The village was attacked by the 26th Soviet Tank Brigade of the 2nd Tank Corps coming from north east. 34 T-34 medium tanks and 19 T-70 light tanks with an infantry support. You see, no 50 to 60 T-34s as the German propaganda claimed. The brigade was supposed also to be supported by 11 Mk IV Churchills of the 15th Guards Heavy Tank Regiment. However it came under an air attack and couldn’t participate. If it could, the battle outcome would be worse for the Germans.

So, the Soviet tanks attacked the German positions near the village. The panzergrenadiers knocked out two Soviet tanks before Staudegger engaged. According to his Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross submission, he knocked out 17 Soviet tanks in one attack (it took him 2 hours) and followed them to knock out 5 additional ones before running low on ammunition and fuel. The rest fled, so he also left the area. No doubt a nice story for the Wehrmachtbericht.

What really happened that the Soviet attack started at 14:00. The Soviet tanks of the 26th Tank Brigade pushed the Germans out of the village by 15:20. Werner Ostendorff, the Chief of Staff of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, ordered a counter-attack at 15:25. The “Das Reich” HQ reported 40 Soviet tanks with an infantry support going westwards from Teterevino at 15:30. How come 40 tanks? The brigade had 53 tanks originally and Staudegger claimed to knock out nearly half of them. The next report from the “Das Reich” HQ said the Soviet advance was halted, but they prepare for another attack. The Soviets breached German defences on the left flank of the 3rd Battalion at 16:00. SS-Hauptsturmführer Helmuth Schreiber, the commander of the 10th Company, led a counter-attack which routed the Soviets and took back the village in a bloody hand-to-hand combat. The situation was unstable, so SS-Obersturmbannführer Hans Albin Freiherr von Reitzenstein, the commander of the 2nd Tank Regiment, was ordered to move from Kochetovka with his force of about 60 tanks to flank the Soviets near Teterevino at 17:00 (there were other Soviet troops advancing between Teterevino and Prokhorovka: the 169th and 99th Tank Brigades). The Soviets breached defences of the 2nd Battalion of the SS “Deutschland” Regiment at 17:50. 30 tanks of the 26th Soviet Tank Brigade attacked Teterevino again. The German counter-attack was followed by an air strike of four wings of Junkers Ju.87 bombers and two wings of Henschel Hs.129 ground-attack aircraft of the 8th Air Corps which scattered the Soviet tanks retreating to Prokhorovka (a major battle to be held there in 4 days – Battle of Prokhorovka). By the end of day, the 26th Tank Brigade lost completely (burnt) 12 T-34s and 9 T-70s. 5 T-34s were damaged. 5 T-34s were battle ready. Location of 12 T-34s and 10 T-70s was unknown after the air strike. 26 killed, 35 wounded, 150 missing.

So, staff reports don’t confirm the story of Staudegger destroying and routing the whole Soviet tank brigade as it kept fighting for the rest of day. Their reported losses also don’t match numbers the German propaganda claimed.

This post is unsourced and the poster is not known to me, but is listed at Paul V. Bolotoff.  Not sure of his sources for the 26th Tank Brigade, but the detail posted indicates that he probably had Soviet or Russian sources.

According to my records, the 26th Tank Brigade at 0700 on 10 July reported 11 T-34s (3 broken down, 6 knocked out) and 4 T-70s (3 broken down, 3 knocked out) (TSAMO, Fond: 3407, Opis: 1, Delo: 108, pages 195-216). It then makes that unusual statement that “In all, there are 20 T-34s and 20 T-70s.” Assuming the brigade started with a strength of around 32 (or 34) T-34s and around 20 T-70s, then this means that it could have lost 6 T-34s knocked out, 3 T-34s broken down, and at least 12 T-34s damaged or not reported on. For the T-70s, this is 3 T-70s knocked out, 3 T-70s broken down, and at least 10 T-70s damaged or not report on. This adds up to 18 T-34s and 13 T-70s that could have been lost on the 8th (or the 9th). This does not match well with the claim that Staudegger alone killed 22 T-34s. Also, there were other units in the area. There was the III Battalion of the 3rd SS (Deutschland) Panzer Grenadier Regiment that Staudegger was supporting. This unit killed two T-34s (Agte, page 103). Then there were other units of the Das Reich SS Division, which may have been holding positions in and around Teterevino, probably including the I Battalion (see Agte, page 103). So the 31 or more tanks that the 26th Tank Brigade that may have been lost this day had to be shared among these units. This makes the claims for Staudegger a little more tenuous.