Category European Theater of Operations (ETO)

Amphitheater, 9 – 11 September 1943

There used to be an engagement called “The Amphitheater, 9-11 July 1943′ in our databases. It was in the Land Warfare Data Base (LWDB) and we moved it over to our Division-Level Engagement Data Base (DLEDB). We did revise it. It now consists of two engagements:

Amphitheater Beachhead, 9 September: Created for EPW Study by Richard Anderson on 30 September 1998.

Amphitheater (rev), 10-11 September: Extensively revised 30 October for EPW study by Richard Anderson. Original engagement no. 3940 deleted.

Amphitheater Beachhead:

Engagement No: 23002

Duration: 1 Day

Front Width: 3.5 km

Force Name: Br 56th Infantry Division Ger KG Stempel, 16th PzD

Total Strength: 12,480 5,241

Total Armor: 52 27

Artillery Pieces: 110 36

Total Casualties: 444 142

Armor Losses: 10 3

Artillery Losses: 4 14

Enemy Captured: 54 120

Amphitheater (rev):

Engagement No: 23005

Duration: 2 Days

Front Width: 13 km

Force Name: Br 56th Infantry Division Ger KG Stempel (+), 16th PzD

Total Strength: 12,036 10,271

Total Armor: 42 90

Artillery Pieces: 106 38

Total Casualties: 1,213 478

Armor Losses: 7 44

Artillery Losses: 1 —

Enemy Captured: 23 725

This is response to the discussion under this post:

More on the QJM/TNDM Italian Battles

The DLEDB consists of 752 division-level engagements from 1904 to 1991. There are 121 fields per engagement, including 5 text fields. It is programmed in Access. It is company proprietary.

Cost of Creating a Data Base

Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 5-Summary)

Shawn Woodford
October 19, 2018

U.S. Army 155mm field howitzer in Normandy. [padresteve.com]

[This series of posts is adapted from the article “Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor,” by Richard C. Anderson, Jr., originally published in the June 1997 edition of the International TNDM Newsletter.]

Posts in the series
Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 1)
Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 2-Kursk)
Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 3-Normandy)
Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 4-Ardennes)
Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 5-Summary)

Table IX shows the distribution of cause of loss by type or armor vehicle. From the distribution it might be inferred that better protected armored vehicles may be less vulnerable to artillery attack. Nevertheless, the heavily armored vehicles still suffered a minimum loss of 5.6 percent due to artillery. Unfortunately the sample size for heavy tanks was very small, 18 of 980 cases or only 1.8 percent of the total.

The data are limited at this time to the seven cases.[6] Further research is necessary to expand the data sample so as to permit proper statistical analysis of the effectiveness of artillery versus tanks.

NOTES

[18] Heavy armor includes the KV-1, KV-2, Tiger, and Tiger II.

[19] Medium armor includes the T-34, Grant, Panther, and Panzer IV.

[20] Light armor includes the T-60, T-70. Stuart, armored cars, and armored personnel carriers.

Eastern Front European Theater of Operations (ETO)Land Warfare Lessons of History World War II

Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 4-Ardennes)

Shawn Woodford
October 18, 2018
1 Comment

Knocked-out Panthers in Krinkelt, Belgium, Battle of the Bulge, 17 December 1944. [worldwarphotos.info]

NOTES

[14] From ORS Joint Report No. 1. A total of an estimated 300 German armor vehicles were found following the battle.

[15] Data from 38th Infantry After Action Report (including “Sketch showing enemy vehicles destroyed by 38th Inf Regt. and attached units 17-20 Dec. 1944″), from 12th SS PzD strength report dated 8 December 1944, and from strengths indicated on the OKW brieﬁng maps for 17 December (1st [circa 0600 hours], 2d [circa 1200 hours], and 3d [circa 1800 hours] situation), 18 December (1st and 2d situation), 19 December (2d situation), 20 December (3d situation), and 21 December (2d and 3d situation).

[16] Losses include conﬁrmed and probable losses.

[17] Data from Combat Interview “26^th Infantry Regiment at Dom Bütgenbach” and from 12^th SS PzD, ibid.

Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 3-Normandy)

Shawn Woodford
October 17, 2018

The U.S. Army 333rd Field Artillery Battalion (Colored) in Normandy, July 1944 (US Army Photo/Tom Gregg)

NOTES

[10] From ORS Report No. 17.

[11] Five of the 13 counted as unknown were penetrated by both armor piercing shot and by infantry hollow charge weapons. There was no evidence to indicate which was the original cause of the loss.

[12] From ORS Report No. 17

[13] From ORS Report No. 15. The “Pocket” was the area west of the line Falaise-Argentan and east of the line Vassy-Gets-Domfront in Normandy that was the site in August 1944 of the beginning of the German retreat from France. The German forces were being enveloped from the north and south by Allied ground forces and were under constant, heavy air attack.

European Theater of Operations (ETO)Land Warfare Lessons of History World War II

Artillery Effectiveness vs. Armor (Part 1)

Shawn Woodford
October 15, 2018
15 Comments

A U.S. M1 155mm towed artillery piece being set up for firing during the Battle of the Bulge, December 1944.

The effectiveness of artillery against exposed personnel and other “soft” targets has long been accepted. Fragments and blast are deadly to those unfortunate enough to not be under cover. What has also long been accepted is the relative—if not total—immunity of armored vehicles when exposed to shell ﬁre. In a recent memorandum, the United States Army Armor School disputed the results of tests of artillery versus tanks by stating, “…the Armor School nonconcurred with the Artillery School regarding the suppressive effects of artillery…the M-1 main battle tank cannot be destroyed by artillery…”

This statement may in fact be true,[1] if the advancement of armored vehicle design has greatly exceeded the advancement of artillery weapon design in the last fifty years. [Original emphasis] However, if the statement is not true, then recent research by TDI[2] into the effectiveness of artillery shell ﬁre versus tanks in World War II may be illuminating.

The TDI search found that an average of 12.8 percent of tank and other armored vehicle losses[3] were due to artillery ﬁre in seven eases in World War II where the cause of loss could be reliably identified. The highest percent loss due to artillery was found to be 14.8 percent in the case of the Soviet 1st Tank Army at Kursk (Table II). The lowest percent loss due to artillery was found to be 5.9 percent in the case of Dom Bütgenbach (Table VIII).

The seven cases are split almost evenly between those that show armor losses to a defender and those that show losses to an attacker. The ﬁrst four cases (Kursk, Normandy l. Normandy ll, and the “Pocket“) are engagements in which the side for which armor losses were recorded was on the defensive. The last three cases (Ardennes, Krinkelt. and Dom Bütgenbach) are engagements in which the side for which armor losses were recorded was on the offensive.

Four of the seven eases (Normandy I, Normandy ll, the “Pocket,” and Ardennes) represent data collected by operations research personnel utilizing rigid criteria for the identification of the cause of loss. Specific causes of loss were only given when the primary destructive agent could be clearly identified. The other three cases (Kursk, Krinkelt, and Dom Bütgenbach) are based upon combat reports that—of necessity—represent less precise data collection efforts.

However, the similarity in results remains striking. The largest identiﬁable cause of tank loss found in the data was, predictably, high-velocity armor piercing (AP) antitank rounds. AP rounds were found to be the cause of 68.7 percent of all losses. Artillery was second, responsible for 12.8 percent of all losses. Air attack as a cause was third, accounting for 7.4 percent of the total lost. Unknown causes, which included losses due to hits from multiple weapon types as well as unidentiﬁed weapons, inﬂicted 6.3% of the losses and ranked fourth. Other causes, which included infantry antitank weapons and mines, were responsible for 4.8% of the losses and ranked ﬁfth.

NOTES

[1] The statement may be true, although it has an “unsinkable Titanic,” ring to it. It is much more likely that this statement is a hypothesis, rather than a truism.

[2] As pan of this article a survey of the Research Analysis Corporation’s publications list was made in an attempt to locate data from previous operations research on the subject. A single reference to the study of tank losses was found. Group 1 Alvin D. Coox and L. Van Loan Naisawald, Survey of Allied Tank Casualties in World War II, CONFIDENTIAL ORO Report T-117, 1 March 1951.

[3] The percentage loss by cause excludes vehicles lost due to mechanical breakdown or abandonment. lf these were included, they would account for 29.2 percent of the total lost. However, 271 of the 404 (67.1%) abandoned were lost in just two of the cases. These two cases (Normandy ll and the Falaise Pocket) cover the period in the Normandy Campaign when the Allies broke through the German defenses and began the pursuit across France.

Repair of Jagdpanthers at Normandy – Part II

At the end of July, mounting enemy pressure would push the battalion back and from then Jagdpanthers would start to become complete losses. The first took place on July 31, when the final drives of Lt. Scheiber’s Jagdpanther was damaged. The vehicle could not be recovered due to strong enemy artillery fire and lack of towing vehicles. It was blown up by the crew on Aug 2. On July 31, another 11 Jagdpanthers were damaged, but all of them were short time damage.

On Aug 1, the number of Jagdpanthers in long term repair increased from 1 to 3 and that number remained constant August 13. From July 31 to Aug 2, the number of tanks in short repair shrunk by 4, suggesting at least that many were repaired. On Aug 5, the number in short repair was 17, but it shrunk to 13 on July 6, again suggesting that 4 were repaired. Indeed, one of the Kampfgruppen was notified that it could expect to receive three Jagdpanthers from the workshops in the night or on Aug 6.

From Aug 7 onwards, the number of Jagdpanther in short repair increased. On Aug 14, 17 Jagdpanther were in short repair, but it was noted that spare parts had to be brought up to repair them. At this point the German supply situation in general was desperate, which meant that the arrival of spare parts was not very likely. The battalion was ordered to pull out and bring its vehicles in workshops along. Thus far, seven tanks had been irretrievably lost (including one confiscated by an SS-units and whose fate was unknown).

During all of August, the following complete losses (including command tanks) were recorded, by cause (including Scheiber’s Jagdpanther mentioned above):

Mechanical damage, tank blown up by crew: 12

Destroyed AT fire: 2

Stuck in terrain, could not move, subsequently hit by enemy tank, burnt out: 1

Destroyed by HE or phosporus rounds: 2

Damaged by enemy fire and blown up by crew since it could not be recovered: 2

Confiscated by SS-unit, unknown fate: 1

Lack of fuel, blown up by crew: 1

Carpet bombing at Rouen: 1

Up to the point when the battalion we know of at least 32 cases when tanks in the battalion were repaired, which can be contrasted to 7 cases of complete losses. Obviously, this includes vehicles that suffered technical damage during the approach march, but is must also be noted that all cases of damage are not mentioned by the war diary. In august, there are a few cases noted:

4 Aug: Unspecified number of Jagdpanther damaged by artillery fire.

5 Aug: One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.

10 Aug: One Jagdpanther damaged during march, short term repair.

12 Aug: 1 gun barrel damaged by enemy artillery fire.

13 Aug: 1 case of final drive failure

14 Aug: 2 damaged by artillery fire.

Given the data available, exact percentage calculations are perhaps not so meaningful, but it is clear that before the battalion began to pull out, the damage received was usually of such character that it is to be expected that it will be repaired.

What is also interesting is that losses due to presence of enemy ground combat units, or in some cases artillery fire, caused the Germans to blow up many Jagdpanthers. In fact, more than half the losses occurred in this way, which highlights the importance of controlling the ground.

Few Jagdpanthers were penetrated by AT rounds and in two of the cases, the vehicles could be repaired. Furthermore, the effects of artillery fire should not be neglected. Although a HE round is not likely to destroy a heavy tank, it may well (as is evident from several instances mentioned in the war diary) case damage to the tank and if ground units are close enough, the enemy tank will not be recovered.

The 654th Jagdpanther battalion is of course not an average unit. Nevertheless, its detailed war diary can contribute to a better understanding of tank losses and repairs.

P.S. The picture was drawn from this article: http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/nazi_germany/Jagdpanther.php

Repair of Jagdpanthers at Normandy – Part I

The 654th Jagdpanther battalion fought in Normandy, on the eastern part of the front. Unlike most German battalion level records, the war diary plus annexes has survived for this unit. At battalion level, the fate of many tanks can often be tracked and this unit is no exception. Included in the annexes is a list of the Jagpanthers lost by the battalion, by chassis number or turret number and which includes date (and often time as well), location, cause, list of items recovered, etc. All information is taken from the war diary and its annexes.

When it started marching from Rocquigny near the Belgian border towards Normandy, it had 25 Jagdpanthers, On 27th July, three command Panthers and one Jagdpanther arrived at the battalion. They first had to be checked by the workshops and on July 29 they were ready for action.

Marching to Normandy took its toll of the battalion. There were several air attacks, which caused losses in the battalion, but none of the Jagdpanthers were destroyed. However, many Jagdpanthers suffered mechanical breakdowns. During the march (approx. 300 km) the following cases of damage was recorded: 18 final drives (a well-known problem), two engines, 2 oil coolers, 3 cooling fans, 1 torsion bar, 4 road wheels, 1 drive shaft, 4 drive sprockets, 2 idler wheels and 109 track links.

The result was that on July 17, the battalion had 8 operational Jagdpanther, 16 in short repair and 1 in long repair. Efforts by the repair and recovery services raised the operational readiness to 23 Jagdpanther on 30 July, 2 in long repair and 1 long repair. This includes one additional Jagdpanther that arrived on this day. Until July 26, the following damage had been caused by enemy action: 1 gear box, 4 radiators, 1 oil cooler, 4 cooling fans, 6 drive sprockets, 2 final drives, 16 road wheels.

It is unclear how many vehicles that were damaged up to this point, as single vehicles could have suffered more than one kind of damage. For example, a hit on a tank could cause damage to more than one road wheel. Before July 31, no Jagdpanther was completely lost.

The 2nd Coy arrived ahead of the rest of the battalion at the front in Normandy and it reported 6 operational Jagdpanther on July 7, when attached to the Panzer-Lehr division. It was however attached to 276th ID when Pz-Lehr left its sector. When moving on July 8, four Jagdpanthers broke down. Two more broke down on July 9, but four were also repaired. On July 11, one Jagpanther was penetrated in the left side armour and three crew members were wounded, but no other damage was recorded. Also, another Jagpanther was penetrated (does not say from which direction). The loader was killed and the commander, driver and gunner were wounded. The crew still managed to drive the tank into safety.

At least one Jagpanther was repaired by the company between 12 and 17 July.

Given the increase in operational Jagpanthers from July 17 and 29 at least 14 must have been repaired. At least five were repaired by 2nd Coy before July 17. So far we have indications of 19 repairs. However, there were further Jagdpanthers damaged between July 18 and 29. On July 20, two were damaged by enemy artillery fire and classified as short repair. Two days later, a periscope on one Jagdpanther was destroyed by enemy artillery fire. On July 26 one Jagdpanther caught fire in the engine room, not by enemy action. Vehicle classified as short repair. Four days later, one Jagdpanther was damaged by artillery fire and classified as short repair.

There were at least five vehicles damaged in this period when the operational readiness rose due to the efforts of the mechanics. We can conclude that at least 24 had been repaired before July 31. But this cannot possibly account for all vehicles damaged Also, it is clear that the kind of damage sustained thus far was of a kind that ought to be repaired and it can safely be assumed that more than 100 % of its Jagdpanthers had been in repair and not a single one had been lost.

P.S. The picture was drawn from this article: http://www.tanks-encyclopedia.com/ww2/nazi_germany/Jagdpanther.php