Category Eastern Front

Soviet Damaged versus Destroyed Tanks at Kursk

This is the other half of the comparison discussed here:

German Damaged versus Destroyed Tanks at Kursk

Here is the data I have for Kursk in July 1943 (from pages 1365, 1366, and 1367 of my Kursk book):

Unit…………….Tanks Destroyed……..Tanks Damaged……..Percent Destroyed

II TC                   91                               103                          47%

II GTC                82                               141                           37

X TC                   69                                39                           64

XVIII TC             37                               130                           22

XXIX TC           109                                 97                          53

III MC                132                                99                           54

V GMC              109                                50                           69

V GTC               131                                85                           61

VI TC                 118                                33                           78

XXXI TC            110                                70                           61

Truf Det.              23                                  6                           79

Tank Bdes         157                              164                           46

Tank Rgt            153                                64                           65

SP Art Rgts          58                                11                           84

Total                1,379                           1,092                           55%

 

There figures include assault guns and self-propelled artillery (SU-76s, SU-122s and SU-152s).

German Damaged versus Destroyed Tanks at Kursk

In his last post Niklas Zetterling notes that around 20% of German tanks lost in battle were destroyed. Here is the data I have for Kursk in July 1943 (pages 1336, 1337, and 1339 of my Kursk book):

Unit……………….Tanks Destroyed……..Tanks Damaged……..Percent Destroyed

3rd PzD                  12                                  70                            15%

GD PzGrD              26                                144                            15

Panthers                 42                                188                            18

11th PzD                 13                                124                              9

LSSAH PzGrD        20                                138                            13

DR SS PzGrD         18                                129                            12

T SS PzGrD            18                                121                            13

6th PzD                   18                                  87                            17

7th PzD                   26                                103                            20

19th PzD                 23                                  89                            21

503rd “T” Bn             5                                  70                              7

StuG units                 5                                  47                           10

Total                      226                              1310                           15%

 

Note that my count of tanks damaged/destroyed include those that broke down in combat. This is not an insignificant portion. It does not include tanks that were damaged or broken down during the day but were back in the action before they reported towards the end of the day a count of tanks ready-for-action. Rarely do we have reports of tanks damaged, mostly just reports of the number ready-for-action each day.

These figures include assault guns. Also, these figures include Marders (self-propelled anti-tank guns), which is why they differ slightly from the figures in my previous posts.

The units are listed from left to right (west to east) as they were deployed on 5 July 1943. They were organized into three panzer corps.

Also see:

III Panzer Corps Tank Loss Reports 9-21 July 1943

 

The 10th Panzer Division Tank Losses in October 1941

The 10. Pz.Div. was one of the spearheads in Operation Taifun, the German attempt to capture Moscow in October 1941. Its tank component was the Pz.Rgt. 7, whose war diary has survived, in file (BA-MA RH 39/99). All data presented below is taken from that source.

On 1 October, the panzer regiment had 41 Pz II, 82 Pz III, 19 Pz IV and 10 Bef.Wg. operational. Ten days later this had shrunk to 29 Pz II, 66 Pz III, 21 Pz IV and 8 Bef.Wg All in all, a reduction from 152 to 124, despite the slight increase in the number of Pz IV operational.

On 21 October it had been reduced to 22 Pz II, 35 Pz III, 12 Pz IV and 6 command tanks. It seems that the workshops did manage to put tanks back in running order, as the number of operational tanks rose to 22 Pz II, 43 Pz III, 14 Pz IV and 10 command tanks on 1 November.

It would have been good to compare this to the daily tank losses (irrevocable losses), as they are given in a table in the annexes. Unfortunately, the copy I have received does not extend to the left margin. Thus, I can only see the month, not the date, which is given in the leftmost column of the table. However, it can be concluded that the losses in October amounted to 8 Pz II, 15 Pz III, 1 Pz IV and 1 Command tank. It should be noted that the table gives all tank losses from the beginning of Operation Barbarossa to April 1942, even showing in which company each individual tank loss occurred.

We could see that between 1 October and 21 October, the number of operational tanks shrunk from 152 to 75, a reduction of 77. During the entire month of October 25 tanks were lost irrevocably. Most likely, some of those were lost after 21 October and also some vehicles were most likely repaired between 1 and 21 October. We saw that the number of operational tanks rose by 14 between 21 October and 1 November. Given a similar effort from the repair services, around 25 tanks could have been repaired between 1 and 21 October.

With this in mind, it would seem that for each German tank destroyed, around 4 were rendered temporarily inoperable. This is a ratio consistent with other operations, as long as the Germans were able to tow away their damaged tanks (which includes tanks suffering from mechanical problems).

III Panzer Corps Tank Loss Reports 9-21 July 1943

German World War II records are often not stereotypical “German-like” in their depth and detail. Often it is hard to tell on any given day how many tanks are damaged versus destroyed versus broken down. For much of my work on Kursk, I have had to rely on changes in daily tank strength reports, and work from there. Many authors seem to have hung their hat on German reports of total tank losses, or tanks destroyed, which is systematically reported. One the more detailed tank status reports we have came from the III Panzer Corps from 9 to 21 July 1943.

Let me show you want they have (this was the most complete report):

Tank Report as of 9 July 1943 early (morning):

And then there is a key at the bottom that said “+ (green) into repair” and “+ (red) total.” Of course my copy is in black and white, taken from microfilm at the U.S. archives (T312, R68, pg 4374). Perhaps someone has a color copy of this file from Germany.

Anyhow, 26 tanks lost this day. Note that they count Sturmgeshuetz (Assault Guns) as tanks (many authors don’t).

The total tank losses reported are:

8 July 1943: 26
9 July 1943: 60 + 48 for the 6th Panzer Division = 108 !!!

1. (they do not give losses for the 6th PzD but it only had 22 tanks ready-for action early on 10 July).

2. See: https://dupuyinstitute.dreamhosters.com/2018/10/10/6th-panzer-division-tank-losses-on-9-july-1943/

3. This is a significant action that is not clear from the records and certainly not from the 10-day “totally destroyed” list.

10 July 1943: No figures given
11 July 1943: 29 (but they only report for the 7th and 19th PzD.
12 July 1943: 21 (no reports from three battalions)
13 July 1943: 24 (no reports from 7th PzD and two of the Bns)
14 July 1943: 1

They don’t report any losses from the 15th through the 21st.

The 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion (Tigers) reports 19 tanks lost on the 9th. Only two Tigers were reported destroyed from the 5th – 10th.

This is one of the few German reports I have seen that report damaged tanks, and it is clearly incomplete. Usually they just report ready for action and total destroyed. The problem is that the unit can be in significant action one day (like 9 July when III Panzer Corps lost over 100 tanks), and they end up only recording a couple of tanks destroyed.

Just to show the differences (data from pages 1336, 1337 and 1339 of my Kursk book):

These counts to not include Marders (self-propelled antitank guns).

I think, if you are really looking at analyzing and understanding German armor operations in World War II, then you need to look at the daily changes in ready-for-action, not just their “total destroyed claims.”

6th Panzer Division Tank Losses on 9 July 1943

Soviet Tank Repairs at Kursk (part 2 of 2)

This first blog post on this subject strongly made the point that the Russian armor repair effort was not at the same level as the German efforts, which is what I observed when assembling the Kursk Data Base (KDB). But, Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, continued on pages 448-449, touting what a great job the repair people did. I figured for completeness, I needed to post this.

To continue P. A. Rotmistrov’s (Fifth Guards Tank Army commander) quote from the previous posting:

The mechanics’ profile was diverse. The 83rd Army-level Repair-Recovery Battalion and the corps’ mobile repair depots were staffed with qualified workers from the tank industry (the Stalingrad and Khar’kov factories), but who lacked work experience in field conditions. The tank brigade equipment companies, on the other hand, were staffed primarily with specialists on the repair of armored vehicles under combat conditions. Such a combination of cadres on the whole produced satisfactory results.

Major overhauls, like engine, gun, and turret replacements, were performed at the mobile repair depots of the tank corps. Each tank corps had two of these repair depots, each staffed with 70 to 80 men. For urgent repairs just 8-10 kilometers from the front lines, two army-level, three corps-level and nine brigade collection points for disabled vehicles were set up, which shared all the repair-recovery resources.

On the night of 12 July, as the 5th Guard Tank Army commander later remembered:

The repair workers faced the task of restoring and repairing parts and components, stripped from irreparably damaged tanks from those tanks that needed major overhauls. We had to get hold of 45 engines, 20 gear boxes and several engine and steering clutches. All of the recover and repair units and teams of the separate regiments, brigades, and corps and the army were mobilized to accomplish this task.

To what Rotmistrov said I will add that in order to hasten the repair of the 5th Guard Tank Army’s damaged armored vehicles, the Front’s Armored and Mechanized Forces commander transferred 167 field repair depots from the 38th Army to the 5th Guards Tank Army on 14 July. The truly heroic effort produced results. Of the 420 damaged tanks in its brigades and regiments after the fighting of 12 July, 112 requiring minor or moderate repairs were restored to operation in the very first days after the battle. In addition, the Front command took other steps to assist the army. Already by 15 July, just three days after the engagement, the 5th Guards Tank Army began to receive new tanks. The 29th Tank Corps was the first to begin to received the new vehicles. The 31st Tank Brigade’s war diary notes, “15 July….An order arrived to pick up 16 T-34 tanks at Solntesevo Station. A procurement team had been sent.”

Soviet Tank Repairs at Kursk (part 1 of 2)

Below is text taken directly from Valeriy Zamulin’s book Demolishing the Myth, pages 447-448.

To quote:

The units of the [German] II SS Panzer Corps also left behind only a scorched field and demolished equipment when they eventually withdrew. The headquarters of the 2nd Tank Corps report on 16 July 1943 “…The enemy, organizing a retreat during the night, withdrew all his forces, evacuated all the damaged equipment, and torched the remaining knocked-out tanks and vehicles on the battlefield.”

In the Red Army, the main burden for recovering tanks and self-propelled guns and for transporting them to collection points for disabled vehicles lay on the brigades’ equipment companies and the personnel of the tank battalions. Usually, the crew themselves actively participated in the recovery of their damaged tanks or self-propelled guns and then performed any routine or moderately difficult repair jobs. Kommunar tractors, and Komintern and Stalinets-2 artillery prime movers were used for this work. Mainly, however, a single T-34 or a pair of them made the recover, because the tracotrs had bulky profiles, insufficient power, and no armor protection.

In contrast, the recovery and repair work in the units of [German] Army Group South was well-organized. Each panzer regiment had a well-equipped separate tank maintenance company, while a separate Tiger battalion had its own tank maintenance platoon. These elements managed to do 95% of all the repair work on the armored vehicles, which was performed in frontline conditions.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to say the same thing about the repair work in the corps formations of the [Soviet] 5th Guards Tank Army. At 2400 12.07.43, the headquarters of the 29th Tank Corps reported the following information in a combat dispatch:

The brigade and battalion of the corps are engaged in recovering the wounded and equipment. In the course of the night 3 T-34 tanks and 1 Su-122 self-propelled gun will be repaired.

The recovery of damaged vehciles is being implemented by three turret-less T-34 tanks and one M-3 tank. Five teams are performing the repair work; two teams from the 32nd Tank Brigade and one from the 31st Tank Brigade, in addition to the corps repair teams. One of the corps teams is doing the repair work on self-propelled guns.

Thus, of the 55 knocked-out tanks and self-propelled guns, the 29th Tank Corps was only able to repair four over the night. Naturally, at such a pace it was not easy to restore the combat capability of the corps quickly.

P.A. Rotmistrov [Fifth Guards Tank Army commander] later wrote:

The presence in the army of only mechanical tools could not guarentee the quick restoration and repair of parts, necessary for tank repairs. The lack of welding equipment and repair workshops delayed the fabrication and rehabilitation of spare parts, and thus also the repair of tanks and self-propelled guns within set periods. Army and Front depots of inventory of armored vehicles were located far way (150-300 kilometers), and the insufficient amount of transportation in the army’s corps and brigades complicated the timely supply of components and spare parts.

There were no special break-down teams in the repair units, so it was necessary to pull qualified mechanics from repair work in order to break down the tanks, which reduced labor productivity.

36th Panzer Regiment Tank Losses, January 1944

The 36th Panzer Regiment was the tank component of the 14th Panzer Division, which had been destroyed at Stalingrad. When recreated, the division was supposed to have a three-battalion panzer regiment. However, it only received the I. and III. battalions before transferring to the eastern front in the autumn 1943. As losses accumulated, its remaining tanks and assault guns were concentrated in the III. battalion and the I. battalion was sent out of the theatre to replenish.

On 1 January 1944, the regiment had the following vehicles operational: 10 StuG, 11 Pz III, 11 Pz IV. In short term repair were: 7 StuG, 1 Pz III and 8 Pz IV. However, there is some uncertainty regarding the Pz III tanks, as they are not to be found in the organization chart, except for 6 command tanks in the battalion and the regiment. This is according to the monthly report to the Inspector-General of Panzer Troops (BA-MA RH 10/152).

The battalion war diary can be found in file BA-MA RH39/380. It is not as detailed as the war diary I have used for previous posts on I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther battalion. It just contains a narrative and I don’t have the kind of detailed annexes included in the file on I./Pz.Rgt. 26.

From the war diary, I conclude the following losses during January 1944:

StuG: 10 complete losses. One of them was only damaged by enemy fire, but could not be recovered due to nearby enemy units and was fired upon by other German StuG until it caught fire. Another 10 StuG were damaged, either by enemy fire or suffered from technical breakdowns.

Pz IV: 3 complete losses, 6 damaged. As there has been some posts on the effectiveness of artillery versus armour on the blog, it can be worth mentioning that one of the damaged Pz IV was hit by artillery fire.

Pz III tanks are not mentioned at all in the battalion war diary.

There are two comments on repairs in the war diary. On 14 January, it is said that one repaired tank returns and on 27 January, it is reported that 3 Pz IV and 1 StuG returns from workshops. However, this can not be all repairs. On 1 February, the battalion had 5 operational Stug and 2 in short term repair. As it started out with 10+7 StuG, had 5+2 on 1 February, while reporting 10 destroyed and 10 damaged during January, there must have been more repairs. The figures would suggest that 15 StuG were repaired, as there were no shipments of new StuG from the factories, according to the records in BA-MA RH 10/349 (list of deliveries of new AFV). Neither is any transfer of AFV from other units mentioned in the war diary.

It seems that the number of repaired Pz IV is 5, given the number on hand on 1 February.

All in all, this would mean that the battalion started out with 10 StuG and 11 Pz IV on 1 January, lost irretrievably 10 StuG and 3 Pz IV, 10 StuG damaged and 6 Pz IV damaged, while 15 StuG and 5 Pz IV were repaired. It should be noted that these figures are less certain than those given for the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 in previous posts, as the war diary of the III./Pz.Rgt 36 is not as detailed.

Admittedly, it is problematic to compare loss rates between units fighting different enemy formations, but it is still tempting to compare the III./Pz.Rgt. 36 with the I./Pz.Rgt. 26. After all, they fought in the same general area (Ukraine south of Kiev) in similar conditions against similar Soviet units. Clearly, the StuG and Pz IV were far more often directly destroyed by hits from enemy units. On the other hand, there seems to have been significantly fewer cases of mechanical breakdown among StuG and Pz IV. Ten such cases are explicitly mentioned, but in many cases the war diary just says that a tank was out of action, without giving a cause. Most likely, in those cases the cause was enemy action.

Clearly the proportions between destroyed by enemy fire, damaged by enemy fire and lost due to other causes differ considerably between the III./Pz.Rgt 36 and I./Pz.Rgt. 26.

This Picture is TAKEN FROM The SS Panzer corps in July 1943.

 

Mine Effectiveness (Mines at Kursk III)

There is an interesting statement in Zamulin’s book on Kursk (Demolishing the Myth, page 43) that says:

If in front of the line of defenses it required 350-400 anti-tank mines on average to damage or destroy one tank, then in the depths of the defense that number fell to 150-200 anti-tank mines. Such a difference is explained by the fact that mine emplacement in the depths of the defense occurred along lines of advance already revealed by the enemy.

I think I am reading that correctly, in that it takes 400 mines to damage or destroy one tank. There is no footnote to this passage, so I do not know if such a figure is from studies done in World War II, after World War II, or is just some rule of thumb. But, I have that data to test it here:

Mines at Kursk I

and here:

Tank Losses to Mines (Mines at Kursk II)

So, for the first day of the offensive in the south I have 131 to 154 German tanks lost to mines. So in first echelon of Sixth Guards Army there were 68,987 anti-tank mines (see my Kursk book, page 200). In the first echelon of the Seventh Guards Army there were 32,194 anti-tank mines in front of the III Panzer Corps (the 81st GRD and the 78th GRD, see page 201). This is a total of 101,181 anti-tank mines in the first echelon, opposite the three attacking German panzer corps.

So….101,181/154 = 657 or 101,181/131 = 772. Therefore, based upon this data, it appears that it was more like 657-772 mines per tank damaged or destroyed.

Now maybe I should only count 1/2 of the 71st Guards Rifle Division (GRD) mines, because the 332nd Infantry Division was opposite to half of the division (Kursk, page 378) and maybe 1/2 of the 67th GRD because both the 11th PzD and the 167th ID were opposite to it (Kursk, page 388). This reduces the mines counted against the German armor by 17,756. Now this is probably not really correct, as the mines are going to be biased towards the most obvious areas of attack (which is where the German armor went), but still (101,181-17,756)/154 = 541 or 101,181-17,756)/131 = 637.

So, it appears were are looking at a figure ranging from 541 to 772 anti-tank mines per tank damaged or destroyed.

Now……I can break it down by division attacking sector:

                            Estimated Tanks

                            Lost to Mines

Division               Low       High        Mines                               Range

3rd PzD                —                7            19,530 or less                383 or more per tank

GD PzGrD            —              25            as above                        as above

Panther Rgt         15             19            as above                        as above

11th PzD               —               8           15,981 or less                 1,998 or more per tank

LSSAH PzGrD     15             20           16,476                            515 to 687 per tank

DR SS PzGrD        9             12           as above                        as above

T SS PzGrD           9             12           17,000/2                        708 to 944 per tank

6th PzD      .69 x  20     .79 x 20          17,000/2 + 20,266/2      1165 to 1331 per tank

19h PzD     .69 x  19     .79 x 19          20,266/2 + 11,928/2      1073 to 1238 per tank

7th PzD      .69 x  21     .79 x 21          11,928/2                         351 to 426 per tank

Now, we never attempted to estimate the number of tanks damaged or destroyed by mines after the first day (5 July 1943) because we did not have the data. But this does give us some idea of how many anti-tank mines need to be laid to damage or destroy a tank. I have not done a “literature search” to determine if anyone else has done any other in-depth analysis of this.

Panther Breakdowns in February-March 1944

In a previous post, I presented information on the actions of the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 Panther battalion in January 1944.

Panther Breakdowns In January 1944

During late January and February, the battalion had usually been attacking. In March, it found itself embroiled in defensive fighting. This would show up in its losses. On 1 February, it reported 30 operational Panthers and 8 in workshops. No less than 24 had been sent off by train for more extensive engine repairs. Eleven Panthers had been irrevocably lost in combat (five due to hits that caused permanent damage, five had been damaged but could not be recovered and one had suffered an accident and could not be recovered). Two Panthers had been lost to engine room fires during march.

The battles fought 1-20 February only cost the battalion one Panther destroyed by enemy action (burned out due to AT round hit). Also, one more Panther spontaneously caught fire in the engine room and burned out. In the same period, no less than 97 Panthers were repaired by the workshop units, a very high damaged to destroyed ratio. Note that these repairs are due to combat damage as well as non-combat damage.

On 12 February, 20 Panthers were operational, 25 in workshop and 14 were to be recovered from various locations.

From 21 February, the battalion shifted to defensive operations and would retreat. This would lead to an increasing number of tanks being irrevocably lost. On 6 and 7 March, eight Panthers were blown up by the battalion. Of these only two had been damaged by enemy fire. The remaining six suffered from mechanical breakdowns.

The report (I./Pz.Rgt. 26 “Zusammengefasster Bericht über Panzerlage”) gives causes for each Panther being put out of action these days. It is clear that of 15 Panthers put out of action 5-7 March, only three had been hit by enemy fire and it seems that none received irreparable damage.

The battalion continued to retreat and on 8 March two Panthers were cannibalized for parts and subsequently blown up. These two (numbers 132 and 332) had not been knocked out by the enemy. They had simply got stuck in the terrain, one of them had also damaged a final drive. Lack of towing vehicles meant that they could not be recovered.

Late on 8 March it was decided to blow up another three Panthers, all of which had technical problems but could not be recovered in time, due to lack of towing vehicles and mounting enemy pressure.

On 9 March, another six Panther were blown up. Three had been hit by enemy fire, but as they were blown up, it seems unlikely that they had received terminal damage before being blown up. Finally, on 14 March two more Panthers were blown up. They both had technical damage.

After the actions in the Uman–Zvenigorodka area, the battalion retreated southwest, to the Kishinev–Balta area. During the retreat, another 19 Panthers were blown up, none of which had been damaged by enemy fire. Instead, demolition was carried out because vehicles had crashed off bridges, suffered technical damage, got stuck in the terrain, but could not be recovered in time before enemy pressure got to strong.

Despite these problems, the repair services repaired 41 Panthers in the period, which indicates that they worked hard.

During the first three months of 1944, the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 lost 60 Panthers irrevocably. Of these 37 were blown up without being damaged by the enemy. Four destroyed themselves by engine room fires. This left 19 being hit by enemy fire. Of these, its seems only 7 were actually destroyed by the hits received.

It seems clear that enemy fire was not the main cause of losses. As long as the Germans could recover damaged tanks, and had spare parts, few total losses occurred. Also, it is obvious that tanks were put out of action mainly by other causes than enemy fire. However, advancing Soviet ground units had much to do with the German tank losses, as such action could prevent recovery and force the Germans to blow up otherwise repairable tanks.

I have previously encountered claims that the Germans kept destroyed tanks on the rosters and thereby their true losses would appear smaller than they actually were. That notion finds no support in the very detailed war diary of the I./Pz.Rgt 26. I cannot find one single such case in the three months I have studied. Instead, it is clear that they far more often had to blow up perfectly repairable tanks.

During the three months discussed here, the workshops of the battalion repaired well over 200 Panthers, perhaps as many as 300, which can be contrasted to only about 7 being directly destroyed by enemy fire. This shows that it can be very problematic to infer tank losses from changes in the number of operational tanks from one time to another. Also, it shows the importance of controlling the terrain after the action has been fought.

All information is from the war diary, with annexes, of the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 (Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, RH 39/599).

Tank Losses to Mines (Mines at Kursk II)

This is a follow up post to this post:

Mines at Kursk I

This is excerpted directly from my Kursk book, page 423.

The German tank losses due to mines can be estimated for this day [5 July 1943]. There is a report that appears to record all the German tanks lost to mines on 5 July. The 3rd Panzer Division reported losing six tanks damaged to mines. One other was destroyed, and while the records do not explicitly so state, the assumption is that this one was also lost to mines. The Gross Deutschland reports that it lost 5 assault guns and about 20 tanks to mines. This was the worst loss to mines suffered by any division. The 11th Panzer Division reported losing eight tanks on 5 July. It is unclear, but it appear that all of these were also lost to mines. The Adolf Hitler SS Division reported losing 20 tanks on 5 July, including six Tiger tanks. The Totenkopf SS Division lost 12 tanks, including five Tigers. The record notes that these were “mostly from mines.” The Das Reich SS Division reported 12 tanks lost, including two Tigers. They do not report the cause of loss, but it is also assumed that most were from mines. A comparison of the calculated losses from these divisions (generate by subtracting the number of tanks ready-for-action on the evening of the 4th from the number ready-for-action on the evening of the 5th) compared to the reported losses due to mines shows the following:

                           Calculated losses     Reported losses     Mine loss 

                           (from all causes)      (mine losses)          as a percent

                            5 July                       5 July                     of total loss

3rd PzD                  10                                7                             70%

GD PzGrD              30                              25                             83%

11th PzD                12                                8                             67%

LSSAH PzGrD       20                               20                          100%

DR SS PzGrD        19                               12                            63%

T SS PzGD            15                               12                             80%

                            ——                           ——                            ——

                            106                               84                             79%

 

It is estimated that the Panther regiment lost 19 tanks to mines on this day. In the case of the III Panzer corps, it showed a decline in strength on the first day of 64 tanks. Assuming that the same percent were lost to mines as for the other two panzer corps, then another 51 tanks were lost to mines. We do know that at least 9 Tigers were lost to mines on this day and a total of 16 were lost to mines in the first three days of battle.

Therefore, it is estimated that on the 5th of July, the attacking Germans lost as many as 154 tanks to mines out of 249 damaged or destroyed that day. This amounts to 62 percent of the tanks lost on that day and accounted for 10 percent of the total German tanks lost between 4 and 18 Julty. This is the upper estimate, as the records often report that “most” of the tank losses were to mines. If one assumes that “most” means 75 percent lost to mines, then the figure are less. The XLVIII Panzer corps loss to mines would remained at 40, the SS Panzer Corps loss to mines would lower to 33, the Panzer Regiment von Lauchert to 15, and the III Panzer and Corps Raus to 44, for a total of 131 tanks lost to mines on 5 July.

Of those tanks lost to mines, only one or two, including one Panther, were clearly destroyed by mines. Most of the tanks lost to mines were damaged without loss to the crew. In many case the tanks were repaired and put back into action within a few days. There were also at least four Soviet tanks lost to mines on this day, probably their own mines, and we know of two German Tiger tanks that were lost to their own mines.

One more mine related post to follow.