Category Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming

The ORO/RAC/GRC Library

I noticed my posts in 2017 on the HERO and SAIC Libraries got a couple of hits a week or so ago. I was actually planning on continuing posting on this subject at the time, but got sidetracked. So, let me take a moment now to post on another disappeared library.

The Operations Research Office (ORO) was the Army’s RAND. Formed in 1948 under the leadership of Ellis Johnson, it grew to considerable size (220 in June 1952) providing studies and analysis for the U.S. Army. ORO  was tied to Johns Hopkins University. But, the leadership of ORO had a contentious relationship with the army, so the Army decided in 1961 to dissolve it and reconstitute it under new leadership. The army set up a new corporation called Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) and hired back everyone at ORO but the senior management. It was also claimed that RAC stood for “Relax and Cooperate.”

RAC continued the work of ORO and in fact they were functionally the same organization. Under these two organizations, it included developing the first Army combat models (Carmonette and Atlas) in addition to field analysis of the Korean and Vietnam wars. They also had a historical analysis capability, having employed Dr. Hugh Cole,. the person who managed and wrote part of the Army “Green Book” series, the official history of the U.S. Army in World War II.

The Army decided to then build its own RAND. This was the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA) founded in January 1973. My father was one of army officers assigned to this new outfit, which is the connection that eventually led me into this business. As I had a strong interest in military history and wargaming as a teenager, my father working at the Army’s premier wargaming shop got my interest. I often discussed with him the work they were doing, and in particular, his rather negative evaluation of the combat models they were using (in particular CEM – Concepts Evaluation Model). The Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) that I managed in 1987-1989 was for the purpose of validating CEM. 

With the Army having created its own RAND, RAC as an independent FFRDC (Federally Funded Research and Development Center) was no longer needed. They therefore mutated in a private contractor called General Research Corporation (GRC). They inherited most of the staff and the ORO/RAC library. Dr. Hugh Cole retired but ended up working for us on the ACSDB as a consultant, along with Charles McDonald.

GRC continued doing business, although I do not know what that was, as I never intersected with them. I started working in this business in 1987 at Trevor Dupuy’s DMSI (Data Memory Systems, Inc.) doing contract work for CAA among others. CAA eventually changed its name to Center for Army Analysis (CAA).

GRC about 15 or so years ago (operating from memory here) was bought out by AT&T defense systems (AT&T = old Bell Telephone). I also had never intersected with them. They inherited the ORO/RAC/GRC library and took over the GRC building in Tysons Corner. When I heard that they had shut the library down, I payed a visit to their office.

It turns out that this library, built up over 50+ years of research, was indeed shut down. It was taking up space and they decided they needed another conference room! So, they told the employees they could take whatever they wanted from the library and threw the rest away. So, the library and all of its material was dissolved and thrown away.

So… where does one find ORO/RAC/GRC material? Well, I have a rather thick bibliography listing all the ORO/RAC reports. Forget how I scored that. It is a unique item and I don’t know of anyone else who has one. On the other hand, if you ask me to find it, I don’t know in which of the 80+ boxes of books it is in that I have stashed away. I am not going to even try at this point to find, as they are stacked up (although it is good exercise). Of course, ORO/RAC/GRC submitted their reports to DTIC and NTIS. But, as I pointed out in the my post on TDI Reports at DTIC that only about 40 percent of HERO reports are listed in DTC and 0 of the 80 TDI reports are listed there. Now, I also have all the HERO reports in those stacks of boxes I have stashed away. A friend of mine at CMH (Center for Military History) did inform me that some/all of the ORO reports are sitting in archived files of one DOD agency in the national archives, but these section of files are still classified and not available to most researchers. Also, they are difficult to locate and access. CAA also has its own library, but I do not know the state or extent of it. If CAA needs a HERO/DMSI/TNDA/TDI report, they invariably end up asking me, which does not give me a lot of confidence. I did ask a senior analysis at CAA once where he would go to get an ORO/RAC report, and he told me he would just call the library at GRC. Obviously that is no longer an option. 

I do not know the state of the CAA library or its holdings. When the GRC library was shut down I did flag the issue to the director of CAA. The corrective action I believe would have been to assemble a small team to create a definitive Army Studies and Analysis Research Library to collect all the ORO/RAC/GRC and HERO/DMSI/TNDA/TDI and CORG/CDEC/CAA and RAND Arroyo and other relative studies in one place (probably the CAA library). This effort was not acted on. 

It is probably still possible to do at this point, but as the “graybeards” are disappearing from the business, and it is amazing what they keep stored in their files cabinets and basements, then it will get harder to do over time.

 

Related Posts:

TDI Reports at DTIC | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The HERO Library | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The SAIC Library | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Less related posts:

Company Commander | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Validation Data Bases Available (Ardennes) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Historians and the Early Era of U.S. Army Operations Research | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Use of the Two Campaign Data Bases | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Some sources:

A History of the Department of Defense Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (I am actually the author of this, although I am listed as a researcher): https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1995/9501/9501.PDF and here: https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc39765/m1/1/

History of Operations Research in the United States Army, Volume I: 1942-1962: CMH Publications Catalog – HISTORY OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY, VOLUME 1: 1942-1962

 

 

 

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game. This is the fourth game map they have provided me.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. This game map covers the area around Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. I do use different transliteration conventions than them (and many other people). For example, they spell Andreevka with an ee in the middle. An American, seeing the ee will invariably pronounce it like geek as opposed to ge-yek with two syllables. The two e’s are separately pronounced in Russian. Some transliteration conventions use an apostrophe instead of a y. I don’t think most Americans know what to do with a word spelled ge’ek or Andre’evka. The apostrophe is part of the Library of Congress transliteration system (which I think sucks). Some people use that system but take out the apostrophes, which gets us back to geek or Andreevka. I think it should be Andreyevka, which is closer to the Russian pronunciation.

Andreyevka and Vasilyevka is where the XVIII Tank Corps attacks into and through, getting as far as 200 meters east of the Bogoroditskoye church. Bogoroditskoye is often not marked on maps, but it is south of the Psel just west of Vasliyevka. Bogoroditskoye was defended by German armor (tanks or assault guns or Marders) and the Soviets claim at one point that they repulsed German counterattacks by 50 tanks from the Bogoroditskoye area (see page 318 of my Prokhorovka book or page 931 of my Kursk book). We have never clearly identified who that German armor unit was. I believe the Bogoroditskoye church is the church marked on Map M37-26C just west of the ravine west of Vasileyevka and is between Kozlovka and Vasilyeka. The Totenkopf SS two bridges were just west of Bogodoritskoye.

At 1600 (Moscow time) the XVIII Tank Corps’ II Battalion, 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade is claimed to be deployed from the Psel River to the center of Bogoroditskoye.

The eastern edge of the Andreyevka (assuming the gully marks the eastern edge) is some five kilometers almost due west of height 252.2. See 1:50000 scale Map M37-26C (there are copies of this map in both of my Kursk books). The village of Mikhailovka is just to the northeast of Andreyevka, along the Psel River (see story below). The XVIII Tank Corps moved through it during their attack.

Below is an aerial photograph of Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. The picture should be rotated 90 degree clockwise.:

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

Andreevka

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Thanks

 

 

 

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

P.S. In an email dated 12 April 2021, sent after this initial post, the game map designer informed me that “In the scenario, every hex North of the road A12-CCC10, on level 1 (the lower level), is Mud, so the vehicles and manhandled Guns may bog, the infantry goes slower and HE rounds effect is a bit “cushioned” (look at D8.23 and E3.6 in ASL Rulebook).”

P. P.S. My Mikhailovka story: In 1996, while leading a tour of mostly former German and American officers of the battlefield, we arrived at Mikhailovka while they were doing their presidential elections (back when Yelstin was running for re-election). Our American officers, led by a retired general, decided that this was a unique opportunity to see this new Russian democracy in action. So they decided to go into the town hall and watch the election unfolding. Needless to say, the local election officials were a little overwhelmed with the sudden arrival of rather large contingent of foreigners at their site. They initially said that we would have to leave, and then after conferring for a bit, they decided we could come in and observe the election in pairs. So we did. A rather informal observation of the 1996 Russian elections as conducted in the village of Mikhailovka by former German and American officers.

This trip is also discussed in a chapter in the book Becton: Autobiography of a Solider and Public Servant.

Stalinskii Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. The game map covers the area around Stalinskii Sovkhoz (State Farm). Elements of the 25th Tank Brigade and 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade had pushed through to this small village. It was retaken by the Germans in the early afternoon., The village is in between Storozhevoye and height 252.2 (the previous two maps). It is some two kilometers north of Storozhevoye and a little over 1 and 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2. See Map M37-26C.

Below are two aerial photographs of the Stalinskii State Farm.

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

PROKHOROVKA! – SSF BOARD

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Thanks.

 

 

 

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Oktyabrskii Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. The game map covers the area around Oktyabrskii State Farm and height 252.2, part of the tank fields of Prokhorovka. The road to Prokhorovka runs down the right edge of the map. One the previous map, Storozhevoye, is some 3 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2. This is an aerial photograph of Oktyabrskii State Farm.

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

PROKHOROVKA! – Tank Fields BOARD

The road running down the right edge of the board it the road to Prokhorovka, heading northeast. Also worth looking at is the 1:50000 scale map M 37-26C in my Kursk and Prokhorovka books. The area is mostly in between the grid lines 35 and 37 and 55 to 58 (six square kilometers).

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Now, I never walked the ground right around Oktyabrskii Sovkhoz. It was still a working farm when I first toured the battlefield in 1995. But you could see it from height 252.2.

Thanks.

Other Photos:

OSF building (1)

And a photo from my books:

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Storozhevoye Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. This is is one of the aerial photographs they are using. It is of the area Storozhevoye, some 3 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2.

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

PROKHOROVKA! – Storozhevoje BOARD – VERSION 23-1-21

It helps to spin the image 90 degrees to the right to match it up with the aerial photograph. Also worth looking at is the 1:50000 scale map M 37-38A in my Kursk and Prokhorovka books. The area is mostly in between the grid lines 35 and 36 and 51 to 53 (two square kilometers).

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Thanks.

 

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming in the U.S. Army

I was asked recently about wargaming in the U.S. Army, and I kind of punted on the question. I then got a friend of mine to answer it. The wargaming efforts we have been involved in have been primarily for analysis and casualty estimation efforts. We have not been involved in wargaming for training, officer development, or development of planning. Other people have been doing that, I gather with mixed results. Here is two recent articles on the subject that were forwarded to me:

1. Educational and Tactical Use of Wargames with the U.S. Army: https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/wargaming-room/tactical-edge/

2. Wargaming the Gray Zone:

https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/whispers-from-wargames-about-the-gray-zone/

 

Summation of Argument on LSSAH PzRgt Organization in July 1943

In the case of how the LSSAH Panzer Regiment was organized in July 1943 (as there is no clear documentation of this), there are three options:

1) The regiment consisted of only the II Panzer Battalion with 5th, 6th, and 7th panzer companies, and the 13th panzer company for the Tigers.

2) The II Panzer Battalion had the 8th panzer company active.

3) The regiment consisted of the II Panzer Battalion with the 5th, 6th, and 7th panzer companies, and the 143h panzer company for the Tigers, and an ersatz I Panzer Battalion of maybe three companies.

Let me briefly outline the strengths and weaknesses of these three arguments:

  1. The three medium panzer company argument:
    1. Strengths
      1. This is the traditional position.
      2. This is what all the post-war narratives say.
      3. There is nothing that solidly disproves this.
    2. Weaknesses
      1. This makes little sense with 90 Pz III and IVs and 9 Panzer III Command tanks (in addition to the Pz I command tank).
      2. The companies would have had 31 tanks to start the battle with.
        1. But Ribbentrop says they started with 22.
      3. On 12 July, if Ribbentrop had 7 tanks, then the other two companies had at least 22 tanks each. 
  2. The four medium panzer company argument
    1. Strengths
      1. You can almost fit the 90 tanks into four companies at 22 tanks a company.
      2.  Compromise answer that avoids creating an ersatz Panzer battalion.
    2. Weaknesses
      1. Not documented in any unit records I have seen.
      2. The one source mentioning the 8th company specifically states that it was not used for Citadel due to “lack of tanks”.
  3. The two battalion argument
    1. Strengths:
      1. Accounts for all the tanks on 4 July.
      2. Accounts for all the tanks on 11 July (based upon Lehmann’s claim that II Panzer Battalion had 33 tanks).
      3. This is what Das Reich did.
      4. The “I Panzer Battalion” is actually referenced twice on 8 July 1943 in German records.
    2. Weaknesses
      1. Was never mentioned in any of the post-war accounts.

So readers…did the LSSAH Panzer Regiment in July 1943 have 1) only II Battalion of three medium companies, 2) only II Battalion of four medium companies, 3) or an ersatz I Battalion in addition to the II Battalion of three medium panzer companies?

Recent posts on the subject:

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Did II Panzer Battalion LSSAH have 33 tanks on 11 July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Attrition has been discounted to $877.95

One can find a copy of Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties and Equipment Losses in Modern War on Amazon.com for $877.95. It used to sell for $890.

Attrition for $900 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

On the other hand, we are still selling new copies for the list price of $19.95. See here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/booksfs.htm

Ordering information is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/order.htm

Did II Panzer Battalion LSSAH have 33 tanks on 11 July 1943?

There is a post-war account (published in 1990) by the LSSAH Division chief of staff Major Rudolf Lehmann where he states that the II Panzer Battalion had 33 panzers. That is sometimes interpreted as meaning that the afternoon or evening of 11 July 1943 there remained near height 252.2 around 33 panzers. This would be II Panzer Battalion, the Battalion HQ and possibly the Panzer Regiment HQ. He specifically states: “Sturmbannfuehrer Gross [commander of II Panzer Battalion] managed to bring this battle to a successful conclusion despite the crushing numerical superiority of the enemy; he had at this point only thirty-three Panzers.” (page 236). I doubt this is a number he remembered of the top of his head 47 years after the fact, so I assume he got it from a diary or notes or a document from the time. I have not seen this figure documented anywhere else.

Now, this could mean that they had 33 tanks on the evening of the 11th or before the fighting on the 12th or after the fighting on the morning of the 12th. If they had 33 tanks after the fighting on the morning of the 12th, then this may imply that they started the battle with 37 tanks. Now, this quote is placed in the narrative for 12 July right after discussing the 6th panzer company having seven tanks and having lost 4 in their retreat. Regardless it appears the II Panzer Battalion had either 33 or 37 tanks. The problem is that the Panzer Regiment is reported to have 69 tanks on the evening of 11 July.

Height 252.2 is just to the southwest of Prokhorovka. The panzer were then pulled back to behind the tank ditch except for Captain Rudolf von Ribbentrop’s 6th Panzer Company. Captain Ribbentrop was the son of the Nazi foreign minister. So the 6th Panzer Company remained near 252.2 while the 5th and 7th Panzer Companies moved further back to the rear. According to Lehmann, these two panzer companies were located around 800 meters to the rear.

According to Ribbentrop, the 6th panzer company had 7 tanks on the morning of 12 July. Lehmann also states that. One could infer from this that the 5th and 7th panzer companies each had around 12 to 16 tanks, less 2 or 3 tanks for the battalion command (7 + 12 + 12 + 2 = 33 or 7 – 4 + 15 + 16 + 3 = 37)  

Now, according to the Kursk Data Base, as of the evening of 11 July the LSSAH Division had 2 Panzer Is, 4 Panzer IIs, 1 Panzer III short, 4 Panzer III longs, 7 Panzer III Command tanks, 47 Panzer IV longs, and 4 Panzer VIs for a total of 69 tanks in the panzer regiment (see footnote 34, page 165, of The Battle of Prokhorovka).

So, 69 tanks in the panzer regiment and the II Panzer Battalion appears to have had 33 or 37 tanks. There are 4 Tigers for 13th Panzer Company, which was not with them. That would leave 28 to 32 or so tanks for an ersatz I Panzer Battalion and the panzer regiment headquarters (2 or 3 command tanks and probably the 2 Panzer Is and 4 Panzer IIs). This leaves two Panzer III Command, four Panzer III longs and 13 to 18 Panzer IVs for an ersatz I Panzer Battalion.  

Now, I have been arguing for a while that the LSSAH may well have had two operational panzer battalions at Kursk. This debate first started as a series of emails between Niklas Zetterling and I, and continued as a series of posts and debated between Dr. Wheatley and I. If Lehmann’s account is correct, and if Ribbentrop’s account on 12 July is correct, then this would strongly argue that there was indeed an ersatz I Panzer Battalion at Prokhorovka.

My previous post on the subject is:

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

P.S. Lehmann’s book is references in July an 8th Panzer Company. It is identified on page 450 as under command of “Ost. Amberger” with the note “The 8. Kompanie did not take part on Operation Zitadelle because of an insufficient number of panzers.” With the LSSAH Division starting the battle with 90 Panzer IIIs and IVs, this statement does not make sense unless there was an ersatz first panzer battalion.

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943?

This subject has been discussed here before, but I am now preparing a little write-up for Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com) So, as this is a controversial argument, I wanted to present it here again.

———-the write-up———————-

I am of the opinion that the LSSAH Division had more than three medium panzer (tank) companies in action that day. The location of the 5th and 7th panzer companies is known through Ribbentrop’s post-battle account where he states that the other two panzer companies in his battalion were behind the tank ditch. He later reports in his account that the other two panzer companies fired upon the advancing Soviet tanks from behind that ditch.

The LSSAH Panzer Regiment sent its I Panzer Battalion back to German before July 1943 to refit with Panther tanks. This, and other evidence, has led many to conclude the LSSAH Division on 12 July 1943 had only one operational panzer battalion consisted of three medium companies and one heavy (Tiger) company. The issue is that the LSSAH Division on 4 July had 90 Panzer III and IV tanks and 9 Panzer III Command tanks. One cannot fit all these tanks into three companies of 22 tanks each. Twenty-two tanks is the authorized strength of the panzer company and Ribbentrop states that is what his company had on 5 July 1943.

Therefore, as a minimum the LSSAH Division had an 8th company. This company is reported as being in existence on the 20th of July. It may have been in existence before 20 July 1943. It is stated in a book written in 1990 by Rudolf Lehmann, the former chief of staff of the division, that ““The 8 Kompanie did not take part in Operation Zitadelle because of an insufficient number of Panzers.” With operational 90 Panzer III and IV tanks, this statement makes no sense. The statement also indicates that the company was in existence before 20 July. If they used the 8th company, then with a panzer battalion of four medium tank companies, then this comes out to exactly 22 tanks a company, if one assigns 6 tanks to the battalion and regiment commands, ignore five spare Panzer IIIs (the Tiger companies no longer had five Panzer IIIs with them), and places the four Panzer IIs and the three Panzer Is under regimental command. There is no mention made of an 8th company on 12 July 1943.

On the other hand, there is a report (twice) in the division and corps records on the 8th of July 1943 of a I Panzer Battalion of the 1st SS Panzer Regiment. This could be a typo, except, the Das Reich SS Division also sent its I Panzer Battalion back to Germany for refit. They substituted an antitank battalion to serve in its place, so that the Das Reich SS Panzer Regiment has two battalions of seven medium panzer companies and one heavy panzer company for its 111 light and medium tanks and 12 Tigers. The Totenkopf SS Panzer Regiment has two battalions of six medium panzer companies and one heavy panzer company for its 114 light and medium tanks and 12 Tigers. The LSSAH Panzer Division records does not state how its armor was organized for June and July of 1943. It would be logical, as they were all under the same command (General Paul Hausser), that the LSSAH was also organized with two battalions of 6 to 8 medium panzer companies for its 106 light and medium tanks. This organization seems more logical than one battalion of three or four panzer companies. This would give the average tank strength of each panzer companies between 12 and 16. For the Das Reich it was an average of around 16 tanks per medium tank company and for the Totenkopf it was an average of around 19 tanks per medium tank company. Did the LSSAH do something radically different (around 30 tanks in a medium tank company) or did they match their two neighboring sister divisions?

There is the added confusion that Ribbentrop reported only 7 tanks on the 12th of July. If he started with 22, then he is looking at 68% losses over the previous week of fighting. Yet the division had 65 operational light and medium tanks (6 light and 7 Panzer III command) on the evening of 11 July. The panzer regiment’s light and medium tanks had been attrited 39%. If the 6th Panzer Company had 7 tanks, then the average of the 5th and 7th Panzer Companies would be at least 22 tanks or the average of a 5th, 7th and 8th Panzer Companies would be at least 15 tanks. Did one tank company take horrendous losses and the rest of the companies were left relatively unscathed? And if so, then why would that much weaker company be the panzer company that was left forward the night before the attack on the 12th? This argues for there being two battalions in the LSSAH Panzer Regiment and that the starting the strength of the 6th Panzer Company and all the other medium panzer companies, were really more like 16 tanks (assuming six medium panzer companies).

It is reported by the division chief of staff, Rudolf Lehmann, in his book that II Battalion commander has only 33 panzers. Other sources claim that they had around 33 panzers at hill 252.2 on the afternoon or evening of the 11th. Losses during the 12th are reported by Lehmann to be four panzers from the 6th company and one from the 7th.  So, depending on whether that figure is a count of 33 panzers from before the start of the engagement or after, it would appear that II Panzer Battalion had 33 to 37 tanks. Yet on the evening of the 11th July the division had 65 operational light and medium tanks.

It has been reported that the entire II Panzer Battalion moved up there on the 11th, and then pulled back their 5th and 7th companies, leaving the 6th company in the area of hill 252.2. The 6th Panzer Company was reported to have only 7 tanks operational on the morning of the 12th. So, II Panzer Battalion may have had three companies of 7-12 tanks each, and the battalion staff with three Panzer III Command tanks. This leaves 32 tanks unaccounted (including regimental command tanks and six light tanks). That could well be the complement of a temporary I Panzer Battalion.

So, it is not known of the LSSAH Panzer Regiment consisted of 1) one panzer battalion of three overstrength medium panzer companies and a heavy tank company, 2) one panzer battalion of four full-strength medium panzer companies and a heavy tank company, or 3) two panzer battalions of six to eight medium panzer companies and a heavy tank company. It is known that the heavy tank company, renamed recently as the 13th panzer company consisted of only four operational Tiger tanks on 12 July 1943 and started the battle in a reserve position.

——end of write-up—————————–

Just for reference:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Panzer Battalions in LSSAH in July 1943 – II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Summation of Open Questions on Prokhorovka | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)