Category Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming

This is the second such effort we are presenting. The first is here: An Independent Effort to Use the QJM to Analyze the War in Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

We have had no involvement in either effort, although we have had a relationship with the author of this second effort that dates back to the early 1990s. The research, results, analysis and conclusions are entirely the author’s own. TDI has had no involvement in preparing this.

This second analysis is done by William (Chip) Sayers, the author of this posting: A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). He will be doing a presentation at the HAAC: Schedule of the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 6 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The version of the model Chip Sayers used was an earlier “pre-programmed” version of the TNDM. Do not know exactly what all is included in it or not included. He assisted Trevor Dupuy in revising the formula for the OLI’s as it addressed modern armor. It was part of a master thesis he was working on.

Anyhow, his presentation is below:

 

————————–prepared by William Sayers—————————

Initial observations:

• Russian doctrine allows for the possibility of a successful operation at the Front-level with a Correlation of Forces (measuring combat potential in both quantitative and qualitative terms) superiority of as little as 1.2:1. Comparing the forces in this case, the Russian Ground Order of Battle : Ukrainian Ground Order of Battle = 1.5:1.  However, If terrain is added (rolling, gentile, mixed = 1.3) to a Ukrainian posture of 1.3 (hasty defense), the CoF is driven below unity.  As the Russian troops have proven to be poorly trained and unmotivated conscripts and the Ukrainians are fighting in their homeland against a very brutal aggressor, a Combat Effectiveness Value (troop quality) advantage seems to be called for and would serve to drive the overall CoF even further in Ukraine’s favor.  Conclusion: The Russian General Staff clearly erred in believing that they had sufficient force to fight this war.  They seem to have gambled on a political collapse on Kiev’s part, and when that did not happen, they were stuck in a losing battle.
• Early claims that the Russian Army had committed 85% of its combat strength to the operation appear to be justified. Every military district has contributed major forces, including the Eastern Military District adjoining the Pacific Ocean.  The upshot is that if the Russian Army does not win this war politically, or on the battlefield with the forces on hand, there is very little hope that they can reinforce sufficiently to win with what they can use of the other 15% of the Russian Army.

Wargame Narrative:

Concept of Operations: Russian 35^th and 36^th Combined Arms Armies attack in the vicinity of the tri-border area with river crossing of Pripyat River:  the 35^th CAA attack with the 38^th Guards and 64^th Independent Motorized Rifle Brigades at Pripyat, with the 35^th in the lead and the 64^th in the second echelon and supported by the 165^th Artillery Brigade, 30 x Mi-24 and 20 x Su-25 sorties, and the 69^th Independent Covering Brigade in reserve.  The 36^th CAA attacks at the city of Chernobyl with the 5^th and 37^th Guards Tank Brigades supported by the 200^th Artillery Bde, 30 x Mi-24 and 20 x Su-25 sorties.  The 29^th Combined Arms Army constitutes the Front’s 2^nd echelon.

The Ukrainian 14^th Mechanized Brigade plus ½ of the 38^th Artillery Brigade and 20 x Mi-24 sorties defends vs. 35^th CAA, while the Ukrainian 15^th Mech Bde plus ½ of the 38^th Arty Bde, 20 x Mi-24 sorties defends vs. 36^th CAA.

Day 1:

The Ukrainian 14^th Mechanized Brigade rebuffs the 38^th Guards Independent Motorized-Rifle Brigade, which takes heavy losses and fails to cross the river opposite the defunct nuclear power plant.  The 38^th Brigade loses 17% of its combat power, four aircraft, nearly half its armored vehicles and 215 KIA, seriously wounded and captured.

On the southern axis, the 5^th Guards Tank Brigade crosses the Pripyat River and secures the highway bridge north of town.  The 37^th Guards Tank Brigade successfully crosses directly into Chernobyl City and both brigades push 1 ¼ km beyond the river.  Losses include 176 troops, 27 AFVs and 2 aircraft.

Day 2:

The 14^th Mech Brigade frustrates a second attempt to force a river crossing.  The 38^th Bde loses another 4 aircraft and 24 armored vehicles, bringing their total losses to over 80% of their tanks and infantry fighting vehicles.  Personnel losses now total over 420 men.

In the south, the 5^th and 37^th Guards Tank Brigades continue to push through the town of Chernobyl, making another 1.5km at minimal loss.

Day 3:

Having lost 30% of their combat power after two days of unsuccessful river crossing ops, the 38^th Guards Ind. MR Bde has been temporarily rendered combat ineffective.  They drop into a holding posture and attempt to fix in place the 14^th Mech while minimizing further casualties.  Rather than attempt passing the second echelon through, the 64^th Guards wait in readiness for the 36^th CAA to flank 14^th Mech and make their position untenable.  Total losses stand at 60 out of 71 tanks and IFVs, 8 aircraft and 475 troops.

The 36^th CAA has pushed the 15^th Bde out of its prepared positions forcing them into a hasty defense posture and accelerating their advance rate to 2km per day.  This opens up a gap between the Ukrainian 14^th and 15^th Mech Bdes, threatening their supporting 38^th Artillery Brigade.  The 38^th is forced to displace to the south, behind the 15^th Mech.  Meanwhile, the 14^th Mech’s right flank is now fully exposed.  Russian losses after three days on the 36^th CAA’s axis are 75 tanks and IFVs, 6 aircraft and 483 men.

Observations after 3 days:

• The only viable river crossing area in the vicinity of the Chernobyl nuclear facility was the area around the railroad bridge. This was a tight squeeze for a single brigade with swampy ground to either side.  This left the Russians to attack the defending Ukrainian brigade at a CoF ratio of less than 1:1, yielding high losses and a stalled attack.  The Russians’ only hope was to fix the Ukrainian defenders in place and wait for the 36^th CAA to turn north into the 14^th Mech’s flank.
• With over twice the combat power available, the 36^th CAA was able to successfully make its river crossing at Chernobyl city and continuously push back the defenders. Eventually this opened up the opportunity to wedge the 14^th Mech out of their positions near the reactor complex.
• In just three days the Russians lost nearly 1,000 men (of which, ~250 would have been KIA), 135 tanks and IFVs and 14 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. If this exercise represents one of eight major axes of advance with similar combat intensities, even the higher published estimates of Russian losses seem plausible.
• In contrast, Ukrainian losses were somewhat lower: 61 tanks and IFVs, 16 helicopters and 794 men (of which ~200 would have been KIA).
• The highest rate of advance the Russians achieved was 2km per day, considerably slower than their Cold War expectations. Beginning on day 4, the Ukrainians would have had to reposition lest the 14^th Brigade be isolated and destroyed.  Once the defenders broke contact, Russian advance rates would have picked up considerably.  At that point, it would be a game of hit and run by the defenders, trading space for casualties until they found another favorable terrain feature with which to anchor their line.  Clearly, the Ukrainians proved capable of mounting a serious defense against the invading force, both in the model and on the ground.

The battle was replayed twice to explore the impact of a Ukrainian advantage in Combat Effectiveness Value, once with a 20% advantage, and once with a 50% superiority.  As mentioned earlier, a CEV superiority for the Ukraine can be assumed because Russian conscripts have proven to be poorly trained and unmotivated while the Ukrainians are fighting in their homeland against a very brutal and existential threat.  These runs were made with the intent of finding the extent of that CEV superiority.

Ukrainian CEV of 1.2

Day 1:

The 38^th Guards Ind. MR Bde takes heavy losses, fails to cross river opposite the defunct nuclear power plant.  38^th Bde loses 26% of its combat power, five aircraft, over ¾’s its armored vehicles and 283 KIA, seriously wounded and captured.

The 5^th Guards Tank Brigade crosses the Pripyat River and secures the highway bridge north of town.  The 37^th Guards Tank Brigade successfully crosses directly into Chernobyl City and both brigades push 1 km beyond the river.  Losses include 226 troops, 42 Armored Fighting Vehicles and 3 aircraft.

Day 2:

The Ukrainian 14^th Mech Brigade frustrates a second attempt to force a river crossing.  The 38^th Bde loses another 6 aircraft and the rest of its armored vehicles.  Personnel losses now total over 550 men.  Having lost nearly 50% of its combat power, the 38^th Bde is now combat ineffective.

The 5^th and 37^th Guards Tank Brigades continue to push through the town of Chernobyl, making another 1.2km, losing 39 tanks and IFVs, 3 aircraft and 211 men.

Day 3:

The 36^th CAA continues to slowly push the 15^th Bde at a rate of 1.3km per day at a total cost of 9 aircraft, 117 AFVs and 636 men, with a total advance of 3.5 km in three days.

Observations:  The battle developed in much the same way as the base run (no CEV advantage), but more slowly and at higher cost to the Russians. 

Ukrainian CEV of 1.5

Day 1:

The 38^th Guards Ind. MR Bde takes heavy losses, fails to cross river opposite the defunct nuclear power plant.  38^th Bde loses eight aircraft, all of its armored vehicles and 400 men KIA, seriously wounded and captured. Having lost 64% of its combat power, the 38^th Bde is rendered combat ineffective on day 1 of the operation.

The 5^th Guards Tank Brigade crosses the Pripyat River and secures the highway bridge north of town.  The 37^th Guards Tank Brigade successfully crosses directly into Chernobyl City and both brigades push 500m beyond the river.  Losses include 301 troops, 70 AFVs and 3 aircraft.

Day 2:

The 5^th and 37^th Guards Tank Brigades continue to push through the town of Chernobyl, making another 600m, losing 74 tanks and IFVs, 4 aircraft and 287 men.

Day 3:

The 36^th CAA continues to slowly push the 15^th Bde at a rate of 700m per day at a total cost of 11 aircraft, 201 AFVs and 840 men. 

Observations:

The Russian force trying to cross the river at the power plant ran into a brick wall.  The rest of the operation continued to develop along the lines of the base case, but at a snail’s pace.  It was not entirely certain that the operation would continue before losses brought it to a halt.  Given that Russian troops took control of the power plant fairly rapidly, a 1.5 CEV is probably too large an advantage.  The 1.2 CEV case fits the results better.

Outlook:

• Given their failure to cause a collapse of political will by indiscriminate bombing and shelling of Ukrainian cities and the probable combat attrition of Russian forces, the redeployment of the Russian Army to the Donbas region seems more of an attempt to salvage something from this campaign gone wrong, rather than a war-winning strategy. Ukrainian forces can redeploy more easily and have likely suffered a smaller percentage of losses than the Russian Army and thus should be in a relatively better position according to the Correlation of Forces than they were at the beginning of the invasion.  Given an upwards of 85% of the Russian Army was committed to the operation, it is highly doubtful that they have significant forces to send as reinforcements.  For instance, it is essentially impossible for Russia to deploy the 11^th Army Corps from Kaliningrad to Ukraine as reinforcements, yet they make up as much of 30% of the combat power of the Russian Army not yet committed to Ukraine.
• The lack of accurate OOB and combat loss information make it impossible to make a confident prediction on the future course of the war. However, one can be fairly confident that the Russians will not be able to mount successful major offensive operations – they are played out and only the massive use of chemical weapons, or the use of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to change the course of the war.  They apparently intend to make a play for Odessa, but it is doubtful that they will be able to successfully cross the major rivers between their forces and the objective, much less sustain operations beyond them.
• The Ukrainian Army has made successful local counterattacks and could possibly mass sufficient combat power to push the Russian Army back to their pre-24 February positions, and possibly out of Ukraine altogether. However, it is more likely that both sides will lose – Russia will not get the territory or control Putin wants, while Ukraine will have to settle for more of their territory being occupied by Russia – at least until Putin is ousted and the UN or EU can work out a withdrawal.

What this analysis reveals about Russian Forces:  In the 1990s, Russia began a movement towards replacing the division with the brigade its main tactical grouping.  This paralleled the US Army’s development of the Brigade Combat Team to allow for greater strategic mobility.  This worked for the US, because with the massive support that could be devoted to a deployed BCT, no formation in the world the Army envisioned fighting could match the BCT’s combat power.  For the Russian Army, it appears to have been a purely economic move, with formations at most levels shrinking one echelon down (i.e., divisions became brigades, regiments became battalions, etc.)  This allowed the Russians to keep the core of the Army, while retaining a more fiscally sustainable organization.

In the 2000s to 2010s, the Russian Army experimented with going a step further, using its brigade formations to generate a Battalion Tactical Group, a reinforced, combined-arms battalion.  This seems reminiscent of British Army system of the 19^th century where a regimental organization at home would deploy a battalion-sized force for expeditionary work.  The BTG system makes sense within that kind of framework, but having a brigade deploy a single battalion for a major war is untenable.  Particularly in an army whose bread and butter are mass and concentration of force.  The General Staff may have realized their mistake as they are rebuilding several divisions and may be headed for a more traditional force structure.  For this war, however, they’ve been caught with one boot on and one off.

Up to a certain point, the Russian’s traditional use of massive amounts of artillery could make up for the lack of maneuver forces.  Certainly, if the General Staff believed that rolling up to the outskirts of a city, using the maneuver forces to provide security for the guns, while the artillery batters the civilian infrastructure until the enemy’s political leadership cries uncle is a theoretically viable strategy.  But what happens if the enemy leadership doesn’t lose its nerve?  How does this pittance of scattered battalions execute a plan B to subdue the enemy?

By my estimation, the Russian Army has deployed about 21 maneuver brigades for the war in Ukraine.  Additionally, up to 42 more maneuver regiments subordinated to divisions may have been deployed.  This, against a Ukrainian force of 39 maneuver brigades.  On average, Ukrainian brigades appear to be somewhat more powerful than Russian brigades.  In an experimental run made earlier, a good Ukrainian brigade with surprise and a CEV advantage routed a weak, and unsupported Russian division.  While this run gave very favorable conditions to the Ukrainian side, there is no doubt that a Ukrainian maneuver brigade can be a formidable force.  39 of these brigades defending against 64 Russian formations of basically the same echelon may acquit itself fairly well, especially if a reasonable CEV is added to the mix.  It does not bode particularly well if the Ukrainian force must go over to the offensive.  However, if each Russian brigade is actually fielding just one reinforced battalion, the equation changes considerably.  That’s only 21 BTGs.  If the divisional regiments are organized the same way, the Russians have invaded Ukraine with 63 Battalion Tactical Groups facing the equivalent of roughly 120 battalions.  According to Clausewitz, that should be a no go by anyone’s mathematics.  

Bottom line:  I’m extremely suspicious of the idea of Battalion Tactical Groups.  Either we are not understanding them properly, or the Russians are using the term as disinformation.  I have a difficult time believing that they invaded Ukraine with 63 independent and uncoordinated battalions and had any success at all.  Worse, once the offensive was checked, the Ukrainians should have been able to make quick work of mopping up these isolated units.  If the Russians were far better at C³, there might be some viability in the BTG concept.  However, the Russians have never been known for their sophisticated Command & Control and certainly have not proven particularly good at it in the present conflict.

What this analysis reveals about Ukrainian Forces:

Initially, most pundits predicted that Ukrainian Forces would fold rapidly in the face of overwhelming Russian numerical superiority.  The TNDM analysis demonstrates that if the Ukrainians were willing to fight back with reasonable competence and vigor, they were capable of stalemating the Russian invaders short of their ultimate objectives.

After the initial shock of Ukrainian success, many analysts turned around their judgments completely and praised the Ukrainian Forces as some kind of elite David taking on a ponderous Goliath.  The TNDM shows that the success of the Ukrainian Army is not necessarily due to unusually proficient or heroic performance, but rather the expected performance of a competent force.  Given the demonstrated poor performance of Russian conscript troops, their terrible morale, and the shambles of the Russian C³ and logistics systems, one might be surprised if the Ukrainian Army didn’t perform this well.  After all, in contrast to the Russian Army, the Ukrainian’s have their backs against the wall in an existential war.  They should be performing at a higher level than Russian conscripts.  If anything, the Ukrainian Army may be underperforming.  That would bear exploration.

Implications for TDI:

The TNDM yields results that are entirely consistent with what we are seeing in the war, so far.  No other model that I have worked with comes close to this performance.  Further, it is extremely easy to use and very agile in its ability to analyze permutations, branches and sequels, and the unforeseen “what-ifs” that come up during the course of a modeling exercise.  While no substitution excursions were explored in this experiment, the model is set up well to replace one equipment set with another and measure the impact of different weapons systems and capabilities on unit performance.

The ability for the TNDM to model a campaign as it happens is limited only by the quality of the intelligence information provided.

—————————————–

The QJM is the old version of Trevor Dupuy’s Quantified Judgment Model, as described in his book Numbers, Predictions and War. The Dupuy Institute currently uses and markets the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model), which is Trevor Dupuy’s updated version of the model.

We have recently had various discussions about staffing The Dupuy Institute so as to conduct analysis of various conflicts and potential conflicts around the world and publishing the results for the general public. So far, these discussions have not generated the budget to do so.

On the other hand, even though The Dupuy Institute is not doing this, we have discovered that some other people that are independently doing this. They are using the openly published versions of the QJM for their work (there were updates made to the QJM that were not published). None of this was coordinated with us and we only discovered it through twitter though the account of Jomini of the West at @JominiW

One of his more interesting tweets is that one: 

I have no idea how accurate this map is and have been hesitant to post it before.

The modeling effort being done is by @HM_Schlottman and @HelloMrBond. They summarize their effort as:

Now, it does appear that their analysis is a “paper and pencil” analysis done using that which is derived from Understanding War, vice using the entire model as described in Numbers, Predictions and War.

Just to talk through what they did:

1. They analyzed a division-sized engagement (33,0000 vs 23,000)
2. Terrain was given as rugged mixed/urban.
3. Season was spring-temperate
4. Defense was “prepared”
5. Not sure what they did with air superiority, but it appears that they made it equal. Pretty sure that Russia still has air superiority. On the other hand, the Ukrainian intelligence assets are vastly superior (being American), and one of the aspects of air superiority is superior intelligence, so this may be a good compromise selection for now.
6. They give Ukraine a morale advantage (basically multiplying Russia’s combat power by 0.8), but not a big one. More on this in a subsequent post, as I know someone who is doing a similar QJM based analysis.
7. They do conclude that combat power advantage lies with the Russians at 1.4-to-1 ratio, which “is sufficient to achieve a breakthrough.”

Now, I always hate to comment on other people using the QJM. First, I am glad to see that they are using it and second, it is an estimation. My biggest fear is that my comments will turn into the “death by a thousand cuts,” masking what I think is otherwise worthwhile effort. But, I do have to make a few comments. Hopefully, they will not appear overly critical.

First, having a force preponderance does not mean a breakthrough. It means the Russians should advance. As they advance, they may achieve a breakthrough, dependent on the depth of the defender and the changing conditions of the battlefield. The model does determine win, lose or draw and rate of advance in kilometers. It does not determine whether there is a breakthrough or not. That has to be determined by the depth of the defender versus the distance advanced, often over several days. Obviously, when the distance advanced exceeds the defender’s depth, a breakthrough is achieved. This usually takes several days. As this development of the battle is often modeled using maps, acetates and grease pencils, then over the course of several days, conditions are likely to change, with the defender either being reinforced, or withdrawing, or other counterattacks or operations developing. This starts getting complex and is where the analyst takes over from the model.

Second, the force strengths for both sides “does not include supporting arms outside of BTGs (artillery, air defense, logistics brigades, etc.).” Well, the supporting material, translated into combat power in the form of supporting artillery and supporting air and drone strikes, is significant. In some battles the supporting air and artillery for an operation makes up the majority of the combat power. Not sure how you model that with any confidence in the current situation, but they do matter.

Third, he used his own combat power formula. So, for example, he made the combat power of a tank equal to “75 troops + their share of supporting weapons.” This is certainly a simplification, but probably one he had to do as researching and scoring all the weapons is a fairly time consuming process. The original QJM has a formula for calculating the combat power of each and every weapon, and then their combat power were modified by the conditions of combat. The TNDM used a revised formula for armor vehicles that we developed by Chip Sayers, the author of this blog post: A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). He will be presenting at our conference in September: Schedule of the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 6 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now, there is a wonderfully detailed chart dated 1 May 22 on the right side of their graphic that is worth looking at. You do have to copy the image and blow it up. But it is clear that it is the basis for his strength estimates. It would be nice to get a full explanation of what he is looking at here and what it says.

Anyhow, that is all on the QJM analysis so far. It is looking at a fight around Izium and I gather north of Sievierdonetsk. I gather it concludes that the Russians should be advancing. I don’t see anything here I fundamentally disagree with.

I am assuming that @JominiW, @HM_Schlottman and @HelloMrBond are following this blog. None are known to me, but they are welcome to contact me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com.