Category Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming

What is Lethality?

Shawn Woodford did a blog post last month about Trevor Dupuy’s Definitions of Lethality:

Trevor Dupuy’s Definitions of Lethality

As he noted in a recent email to me:

I went back to look at the blog post on how TND defined lethality and it dawned on me that he actually stated it in at least two different ways:

AND

 

Well, I am not sure that Trevor invested a whole lot of time in the definition or discussion of the meaning of lethality. I did work directly with him for several years and I don’t recall it ever coming up in conversation.

I think lethality is both, the destructive power of weapons and the ability to injure and kill people. It depends on the weapon and what you are shooting at. Also, depends on the measuring construct you are using. Trevor Dupuy’s models, the QJM/TNDM, were focused on estimating human losses in combat. Other combat models are built around a SSPK (Single-Shot Probability of Kill) calculation and “lethal area” calculations. This certainly includes CAA’s  COSAGE/ATCAL/CEM and the RAND/CAA’s COSAGE/ATCAL/JICM hierarchy of models. This approach is oriented toward measuring weapons system losses. Their personnel casualties are then calculated from there. I think they are both trying to measure lethality, just using slightly different metrics.

Lethality is clearly not the same as combat effectiveness. There is a lot more to combat effectiveness then what comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Counting Holes in Tanks in Tunisia

M4A1 Sherman destroyed in combat in Tunisia, 1943.

[NOTE: This piece was originally posted on 23 August 2016]

A few years ago, I came across a student battle analysis exercise prepared by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute on the Battle of Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943. At the time, I noted the diagram below (click for larger version), which showed the locations of U.S. tanks knocked out during a counterattack conducted by Combat Command C (CCC) of the U.S. 1st Armored Division against elements of the German 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions near the village of Sidi Bou Zid on 15 February 1943. Without reconnaissance and in the teeth of enemy air superiority, the inexperienced CCC attacked directly into a classic German tank ambush. CCC’s drive on Sidi Bou Zid was halted by a screen of German anti-tank guns, while elements of the two panzer divisions attacked the Americans on both flanks. By the time CCC withdrew several hours later, it had lost 46 of 52 M4 Sherman medium tanks, along with 15 officers and 298 men killed, captured, or missing.

Sidi Bou Zid00During a recent conversation with my colleague, Chris Lawrence, I recalled the diagram and became curious where it had originated. It identified the location of each destroyed tank, which company it belonged to, and what type of enemy weapon apparently destroyed it; significant battlefield features; and the general locations and movements of the enemy forces. What it revealed was significant. None of CCC’s M4 tanks were disabled or destroyed by a penetration of their frontal armor. Only one was hit by a German 88mm round from either the anti-tank guns or from the handful of available Panzer Mk. VI Tigers. All of the rest were hit with 50mm rounds from Panzer Mk. IIIs, which constituted most of the German force, or by 75mm rounds from Mk. IV’s. The Americans were not defeated by better German tanks. The M4 was superior to the Mk. III and equal to the Mk. IV; the dreaded 88mm anti-tank guns and Tiger tanks played little role in the destruction. The Americans had succumbed to superior German tactics and their own errors.

Counting dead tanks and analyzing their cause of death would have been an undertaking conducted by military operations researchers, at least in the early days of the profession. As Chris pointed out however, the Kasserine battle took place before the inception of operations research in the U.S. Army.

After a bit of digging online, I still have not been able to establish paternity of the diagram, but I think it was created as part of a battlefield survey conducted by the headquarters staff of either the U.S. 1st Armored Division, or one of its subordinate combat commands. The only reference I can find for it is as part of a historical report compiled by Brigadier General Paul Robinett, submitted to support the preparation of Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West by George F. Howe, the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s (CMH) official history volume on U.S. Army operations in North Africa, published in 1956. Robinett was the commander of Combat Command B, U.S. 1st Armored Division during the Battle of Kasserine Pass, but did not participate in the engagement at Sidi Bou Zid. His report is excerpted in a set of readings (pp. 103-120) provided as background material for a Kasserine Pass staff ride prepared by CMH. (Curiously, the account of the 15 February engagement at Sidi Bou Zid in Northwest Africa [pp. 419-422] does not reference Robinett’s study.)

Robinett’s report appeared to include an annotated copy of a topographical map labeled “approximate location of destroyed U.S. tanks (as surveyed three weeks later).” This suggests that the battlefield was surveyed in late March 1943, after U.S. forces had defeated the Germans and regained control of the area.

Sidi Bou Zid02The report also included a version of the schematic diagram later reproduced by CMH. The notes on the map seem to indicate that the survey was the work of staff officers, perhaps at Robinett’s direction, possibly as part of an after-action report.

Sidi Bou Zid03If anyone knows more about the origins of this bit of battlefield archaeology, I would love to know more about it. As far as I know, this assessment was unique, at least in the U.S. Army in World War II.

Peter Perla on Prediction

Col. Trevor Nevitt Dupuy Arlington, Virginia, 2 June 1995 Photograph by Gary S. Schofield

Peter Perla has been around the industry a while, although I have never intersected with him. He was the keynote speaker at the Connections Wargaming Conference in 2017. His presentation was “Peter Perla on Prediction,” which has great alliteration. It is here: https://paxsims.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/connections-us-2017-wargaming-conference-proceedings.pdf

Early in his presentation he quotes Trevor Dupuy (on page 5 of his presentation). He states that he said to Trevor Dupuy “Good grief, Trevor, we can’t even predict the outcome of a Super Bowl game much less that of a battle!” Trevor Dupuy responded “Well, if that is true, what are we doing? What’s the point?”

He then quotes Jim Dunnigan as saying (on page 7): “If you want your wargame to predict the future, you better make sure it can predict the past.”

Of course, this last point is why The Dupuy Institute has developed databases on the Battle of the Bulge, Kursk, Battle of Britain, some 1200 battles since 1600, and over 100 post-WWII insurgencies.

Now, I do happen to agree with those two gentlemen. Dr. Perla presentation then goes on for a while (and I have gotten into the shameful habit of speed reading most things now) and finally concludes (on page 43) in response to the question “Why do we wargame?” with  “We do it to help us all make more accurate predictions by leveraging all our combined knowledge, experience and creativity, so that we can make more effective decisions in complex and uncertain situations.”

Let quote his entire paragraph, so I don’t look like I am just cherry-picking the phrases I want (as opposed to how some people our using our report The Historical Combat Effectiveness of Lighter-Weight Armored Forces):

We do it to help us all make more accurate predictions by leveraging all our combined knowledge, experience and creativity, so that we can make more effective decisions in complex and uncertain situations. We do it to question, to learn and to understand. We do it because Wargames entertain; they stir the imagination. Wargame engage; they stimulate the intellect. And Wargames enlighten; the create synthetic experience. And it is experience, both real and synthetic, that makes abstract risks tangible and effective planning possible.

And as Matt Caffrey has said on so many occasions, we do it because wargames save money, and most importantly, wargames saves lives. That’s why I have been doing this for forty years. I hope you all will continue to do it for forty more.

I gather this is different than what he used to state.

Anyhow, the next Connections Wargaming Conference is up in Carlisle, PA on 13-16 August, 2019. See: https://connections-wargaming.com/. I probably will not be attending. Still, this is a worthwhile effort that has been run for decades by Matt Caffrey, now of the Air Force Research Laboratory, along many others.

 

P.S. In Peter Perla’s presentation he uses this picture of Trevor Dupuy. The photograph was taken by Gary. S. Schofield on 2 June 1995.

No Action on Validation In the 2020 National Defense Act Authorization

Well, I got my hopes up that the Department of Defense modeling and simulation community was finally going to be forced, kicking-and-screaming, to move forward; ensuring that their models were properly validated, not build upon a “base of sand” and making sure they are not assembled like some “house of cards.” This was to come about through four paragraphs in the Senate’s initial markup of the National Defense Authorization Defense Act (NDAA) of 2020 that instructed DOD to assemble a team “..to assess the quality of these models and make recommendations…not later than December 31, 2020.”

The original four paragraphs are here:

U.S. Senate on Model Validation

Well, it looks like this is not going to happen !!!

According to a little research done by Shawn Woodford, it turns out that that modeling and simulation validation proposal in the original Senate Armed Services Committee report for the 2020 NDAA dated 11 June 2019 did not make it to the final Senate 2020 NDAA bill, passed on 2 July 2020. The proposal was also not included in the House version. The House and Senate versions are now being reconciled in committee and the final 2020 NDAA will probably be approved soon now that there is a general bi-partisan overall budget agreement. There will be a defense budget, but, it appears that it won’t address validation. There is a slim possibility this could change if it is added back in by committee at the last minute.

The 2020 NDAA SASC Report, 11 June 2019:
https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/srpt48/CRPT-116srpt48.pdf

The 2020 NDAA S. 1790 SASC final markup, 2 July 2019:
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790es.pdf

The 2020 NDAA HR 2500 HASC final markup, 12 July 2019:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500/text

We would love to know who got those four paragraphs placed into the original Senate NDAA mark-up to start with; and afterwards, why they were then stripped out of the final bill. Clearly someone felt it was important enough to be put in there (as do we). We do not know who those “someone” are. And….who was it that stepped in from wherever and made sure those four paragraphs were removed?

If anyone knows anything further about this, please let us know.

P.S.

Source for 1991 RAND “Base of Sand” paper:                                                                 . https://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/N3148.html

The phrase “house of cards” we used in a report we did on casualty estimation methodologies (Casualty Estimation Methodologies Studies, 25 July 2005, The Dupuy Institute, page 32). To quote:

In 1991, Paul Davis and Donald Blumenthal employed the term “base of sand” to describe the essential modeling problem of the day. They described one of the core problems as a lack of a vigorous military science.

Unfortunately, this was the responsibility of the operations research community. Understanding military science was part of what ORO [Operations Research Office] was attempting to do in its early days. It was the operations research community who proposed the models, felt they could develop models, sold them to the military, spent the budget and finally produced the models built upon a “base of sand.” As such, they are the community that needs to correct the problem and produce this theory of combat. They are the scientists.

Yet, the problem is bigger than a “base of sand.” This phrase implies that there is a shortfall of data to start with. Yet every complex model (and most of these models are complex) is built from a number of interrelationships within the model. This is even more so for hierarchy of model structures. Each of these inter-relationships, which are often model unique constructs, is often built upon “expert judgment.” Therefore, the “base of sand” does not just start at the bottom, but carries through to each individual function within a model. As such, what has been built upon this “base of sand” is a “house of cards.”

Validation of Wargaming Simulation Models – Confusion !!

[Clinton Reilly has been a regular commentator on this blog. We present here a guest blog post from him]

Originally, I was heartened to read in your blog that the U.S. Congress is setting up a committee to oversee the validation of wargaming models, which were seen to be of doubtful validity. Validation is obviously a ‘good thing’ as it enhances models and so they produce more useful and reliable results. Your blog has put forward several articles to this effect.

I hastened to communicate this to a senior member of the Australian Defence Science and Technology (DST) group expecting an enthusiastic response, in anticipation of the Australian government following suit. However, much to my surprise, the said member addressed the MORS Modelling and Simulation Community of Practice (CoP) saying that this was a matter of some concern as the testing and validation may not be tailored to the objectives of the individual models. Members were asked to comment on this alarming prospect. There was no comment.

While this is a possibility, it seems to me that in such a rational field the logical argument that tests must be tailored to objectives would prevail. It seems hardly worth saying!

So, I replied with a more heartening email to CoP members that validation was only to be seen as a boon and should be welcomed and encouraged. Wargames would be improved. I also emailed the MORS Wargaming CoP with a similar message, again asking for comment on the posts in the MORS Modelling and Simulation CoP.

Now this is where the confusion sets in. In the weeks since the emails were sent no one has replied. There has been no direct comment to me either. Why I ask? In a military community where modelling and wargaming is a central activity – why has no one replied on either the validity of current models or the need for greater validation?

I am submitting this to your blog in the hope that someone in the worldwide wargaming community has an opinion. Is there a problem with extensive validation of existing models? Is a program of validation needed to improve a low level of validity?  Does anyone care about the standard of current models and their outputs?

Does anyone reading this blog have a comment?

Clinton Reilly

Managing Director

Computer Strategies Pty Ltd

Sydney, Australia

Status of Defense Act

A month ago, I flagged pages 253-254 of the report 116-48, supporting the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. This report is here: https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/srpt48/CRPT-116srpt48.pdf

This kicker was the statement that “The committee is concerned that…these models…has not been adequately validated….using real world data….[and] are simplistic by comparison…” The entire four paragraphs are quoted in this blog post:

U.S. Senate on Model Validation

The current text of the actual Defense Act, dated 6/27/19 is here: https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790es.pdf

Now, I don’t know how these two 609- and 1726-page documents connect, but I gather the requirements still exist to have a team “..to assess the quality of these models and make recommendations…not later than December 31, 2020.”

Does anyone know anything further about this effort?

Today – Speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July

I will be speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July, at 6 PM. Historicon is one of the three major annual wargaming conventions run by the Historical Miniatures Gaming Society (HMGS). It will be run from 10 July-14 July, 2019. Their website is here: https://www.hmgs.org/general/custom.asp?page=HconHome

As part of this large convention, they have organized a “War College.” This is an impressive effort that includes 18 lectures on Thursday, Friday and Saturday. I have the last lecture on Friday, from 6 – 7 PM. The speakers for this series include published authors Paul Westermeyer, Pete Panzeri, Steve R. Waddell and John Prados, among others. Lecture descriptions are here:                                                                               . https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.hmgs.org/resource/resmgr/historicon/hcon_19/pels/19_war_college_pel_6-19-2019.pdf

I will be doing a presentation similar to the one I did at the New York Military Affairs Symposium (NYMAS). It is based upon part of my book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat.

The Hierarchy of Combat

The second conceptual element in Trevor Dupuy’s theory of combat is his definition of the hierarchy of combat:

[F]ghting between armed forces—while always having the characteristics noted [in the definition of military combat], such as fear and planned violence—manifests itself in different fashions from different perspectives. In commonly accepted military terminology, there is a hierarchy of military combat, with war as its highest level, followed by campaign, battle, engagement, action, and duel.

A war is an armed conflict, or a state of belligerence, involving military combat between two factions, states, nations, or coalitions. Hostilities between the opponents may be initiated with or without a formal declaration by one or both parties that a state of war exists. A war is fought for particular political or economic purposes or reasons, or to resist an enemy’s efforts to impose domination. A war can be short, sometimes lasting a few days, but usually is lengthy, lasting for months, years, or even generations.

A campaign is a phase of a war involving a series of operations related in time and space and aimed toward achieving a single, specific, strategic objective or result in the war. A campaign may include a single battle, but more often it comprises a number of battles over a protracted period of time or a considerable distance, but within a single theater of operations or delimited area. A campaign may last only a few weeks, but usually lasts several months or even a year.

A battle is combat between major forces, each having opposing assigned or perceived operational missions, in which each side seeks to impose its will on the opponent by accomplishing its own mission, while preventing the opponent from achieving his. A battle starts when one side initiates mission-directed combat and ends when one side accomplishes its mission or when one or both sides fail to accomplish the mission(s). Battles are often parts of campaigns. Battles between large forces usually are made up of several engagements, and can last from a few days to several weeks. Naval battles tend to be short and—in modern times—decisive.

An engagement is combat between two forces, neither larger than a division nor smaller than a company, in which each has an assigned or perceived mission. An engagement begins when the attacking force initiates combat in pursuit of its mission and ends when the attacker has accomplished the mission, or ceases to try to accomplish the mission, or when one or both sides receive significant reinforcements, thus initiating a new engagement. An engagement is often part of a battle. An engagement normally lasts one or two days; it may be as brief as a few hours and is rarely longer than five days.

An action is combat between two forces, neither larger than a battalion nor smaller than a squad, in which each side has a tactical objective. An action begins when the attacking force initiates combat to gain its objective, and ends when the attacker wins the objective, or one or both forces withdraw, or both forces terminate combat. An action often is part of an engagement and sometimes is part of a battle. An action lasts for a few minutes or a few hours and never lasts more than one day.

A duel is combat between two individuals or between two mobile fighting machines, such as combat vehicles, combat helicopters, or combat aircraft, or between a mobile fighting machine and a counter-weapon. A duel begins when one side opens fire and ends when one side or both are unable to continue firing, or stop firing voluntarily. A duel is almost always part of an action. A duel lasts only a few minutes. [Dupuy, Understanding War, 64-66]

Reminder – Speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July

I will be speaking at Historicon in Lancaster, PA., Friday 12 July. Historicon is one of the three major annual wargaming conventions run by the Historical Miniatures Gaming Society (HMGS). It will be run from 10 July-14 July, 2019. Their website is here: https://www.hmgs.org/general/custom.asp?page=HconHome

As part of this large convention, they have organized a “War College.” This is an impressive effort that includes 18 lectures on Thursday, Friday and Saturday. I have the last lecture on Friday, from 6 – 7 PM. The speakers for this series include published authors Paul Westermeyer, Pete Panzeri, Steve R. Waddell and John Prados, among others. Lecture descriptions are here:                                                                               . https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.hmgs.org/resource/resmgr/historicon/hcon_19/pels/19_war_college_pel_6-19-2019.pdf

I will be doing a presentation similar to the one I did at the New York Military Affairs Symposium (NYMAS). It is based upon part of my book War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat.

Trevor Dupuy’s Definition of Military Combat

Ernst Zimmer: “Das Lauenburgische Jäger-Bataillon Nr. 9 bei Gravelotte” [Wikipedia]
The first element in Trevor Dupuy’s theory of combat is his definition of military combat:

I define military combat as a violent, planned form of physical interaction (fighting) between two hostile opponents, where at least one party is an organized force, recognized by governmental or de facto authority, and one or both opposing parties hold one or more of the follow-on objectives: to seize control of territory or people; to prevent the opponent from seizing or controlling territory or people; to protect one’s own territory or people; to dominate, destroy, or incapacitate the opponent.

The impact of weapons creates an environment of lethality, danger, and fear in which achievement of the objectives by one party may require the opponent to choose among: continued resistance and resultant destruction; retreat and loss of territory, facilities, and people; surrender. Military combat begins in any interaction, or at any level of combat from duel to full-scale war, when weapons are first employed with hostile intent by one or both opponents.  Military combat ends for any interaction or level of combat when both sides have stopped fighting.

There are two key points in this definition that I wish to emphasize. Though there may be much in common between military combat and a brawl in a barroom, there are important differences. The opponents in military combat are to some degree organized, and both represent a government or quasi-governmental authority. There is one other essential difference: the all-pervasive influence of fear in a lethal environment. People have been killed in barroom brawls, but this is exceptional. In military combat there is the constant danger of death from lethal weapons employed by opponents with deadly intent. Fear is without question the most important characteristic of combat. [Dupuy, Understanding War, 63-64]