Category War by Numbers

Conference: Current Perspectives on the History of Guns and Society

I will be speaking at the Center for the Study of Guns and Society at Wesleyan University in Middleton, Conn. on 14-15 October 2022. The link to it is here: Center for the Study of Guns and Society – Wesleyan University-based center dedicated to interdisciplinary humanities study and teaching on the social and cultural history of firearms (gunsandsocietycenter.com). Click on this: Quantifying Arms Lethality in Historical Perspective – Center for the Study of Guns and Society (gunsandsocietycenter.com). Should be interesting. I have never actually attended an academic conference.

I gather the conference is open invitation:  Conference – Center for the Study of Guns and Society (gunsandsocietycenter.com).

This has been discussed here before: Common Use, Lineage, and Lethality | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Economist Article on Urban Warfare

The Economist published an in-depth article this week on urban warfare. It is here: Armies are re-learning how to fight in cities | The Economist

You will not be able to read the entire article without a subscription, but I think I can quote the two most important paragraphs as fair use:

The biggest question is whether a lack of familiarity with city fighting has over-amplified its grim reputation. A study by Christopher Lawrence of the Dupuy Institute, which collects historical data on warfare, analysed urban operations towards the end of the second world war, including three battles over Kharkiv, a Ukrainian city which has been battered in the current conflict. It found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that cities slowed down armies: rates of advance were one-third to one-half what they were in non-urban combat.

But cities were not necessarily deadlier than other battlefields. The attacker’s casualties were no higher in urban operations than non-urban ones, and losses of vehicles were the same or lower. In more recent urban battles—those for Fallujah in Iraq in 2004 or Marawi in the Philippines in 2017—the attackers’ casualties were low, just over one death a day, and far lower than those of defenders. In fact the highest casualties in urban offensives have been borne by Soviet or Russian armies—a fact which says as much about Russian tactical prowess as it does about urban warfare.

Anyhow, thanks to the Economist for the shout-out. The three urban warfare studies that we did were done by both Richard C. Anderson and I. The first study (see: Microsoft Word – Urban Warfare Phase I _W2K_.doc (dupuyinstitute.org)) was a joint effort by the two of us. The sections on combat stress and logistical expenditures from pages 58 to 75 was Richard Anderson’s work based upon Richard Anderson’s idea.

The second study on the three battles of Kharkov was primarily my work. The third study, which covered Manila and Hue was mostly Richard Anderson’s study. The fourth study was cancelled by Hurricane Katrina: Urban Phase IV – Stalingrad | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

and then there is this following paragraph:

Nor does this sort of fighting seem to be uniquely traumatic (at least for those carrying guns). A report by the Rand Corporation, an American think-tank, concludes that rates of combat stress—what was once called shell shock—were no higher than usual in the battles for Brest in Brittany in 1944, Manila in the Philippines in 1945 or Hue in Vietnam in 1968 (though most civilians had, wisely, left before the fighting started). The report suggests that the intensity of urban combat paradoxically gave soldiers a greater sense of initiative, control and purpose than those fighting in open terrain. Anecdotally, Ukrainian forces facing distant and relentless shellfire in Donbas say that the inability to see the enemy is as demoralising and disempowering as anything else.

Now, this was really Richard Anderson’s work redone as a RAND study. In our first report, I put in a section called “Appendix VII: Recent MOUT Literature” (page 112-121). This was because I was appalled at what other people were claiming about urban warfare and their methodology for how they developed these ideas. While I usually try to refrain from addressing other people’s work, sometimes I can’t help myself. Anyhow, this resulted in RAND doing another study on urban warfare in 2005 called Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare (see: Steeling the Mind: Combat Stress Reactions and Their Implications for Urban Warfare | RAND) This effort included a section done by Dr. Todd C. Helmus (Chapter 4, pages 39-67) that was really the core of the RAND report. This effort repeated the research done by Richard Anderson. In fact, Dr. Helmus called us, and Richard ended up giving him a list of the exact NARA files we looked at. Our work is footnoted in Chapter Four the RAND study on pages 46 (along with the comment: “We would like to thank the authors of this report for their helpful comments”) and is listed in the bibliography on page 145. Otherwise, we are not mentioned, even though clearly the entire reason for their revised study was because of our study. 

Now, overall this is a good thing. We produced a report that contradicted previous RAND studies, they then conducted an independent effort to replicate our research and double-check our results. The end result is that they found our research was good and our finding were correct. This is kind of how part of the scientific process should work. 

Now, perhaps I am overly sensitive about this, but the RAND report that was published never stated up front that it was a revision of their previous work. In fact, it directly contradicted some of their previous work. Furthermore, they never stated that the basic idea for the research and the conclusions were The Dupuy Institute‘s or Richard Anderson’s. They kind of carefully avoided mentioning us other than one footnote in Chapter Four of the report. In my view, this kind of looks like they stole our ideas, claimed them as their own, and did not give us proper credit. Maybe I am truly overly sensitive about this, but this is not the first time that people at RAND have done that and this was not the last time it happened. So yea, still carrying a little bit of a grudge. Especially as before the end of 2005 I had to lay Richard Anderson off because of a lack of budget. In the end, it was our ideas, research and work, not RAND’s.

The Defensive Value of Urban Terrain

I probably should have blogged about this long ago, but you now, it is hard to stay on top of the blog and keep working on all various books that I keep signing contracts for.

Anyhow, we started getting hits on this blog from this article:  Urban Operations in Ukraine: Size, Ratios, and the Principles of War – Modern War Institute (usma.edu)

They specifically say:

“A military axiom is that an attacking force should outnumber defenders at the tactical level of war by a ratio of 3:1 to have a reasonable chance for success. Some analysts, including those responsible for US Army doctrine, believe a ratio as high as 6:1 is sometimes necessary to achieve success in urban operations because of the increased strength of the defense on urban terrain. Regardless of the actual requirements, force ratios are relevant for urban planners.”

This link to us is in reference to the 6:1 figure, and leads to blog post: U.S. Army Force Ratios | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Now, I do not know why they would use that link. I clearly am disputing the army doctrine figures with my charts from page 10 and 210 of War by Numbers:

European Theater of Operations (ETO) Data, 1944

 

Force Ratio                       Result                          Percent Failure   Number of cases

0.55 to 1.01-to-1.00            Attack Fails                          100%                     5

1.15 to 1.88-to-1.00            Attack usually succeeds        21%                   48

1.95 to 2.56-to-1.00            Attack usually succeeds        10%                   21

2.71-to-1.00 and higher      Attacker Advances                   0%                   42

 

Force Ratio…………Cases……Terrain…….Result

1.18 to 1.29 to 1        4             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

1.51 to 1.64               3             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

2.01 to 2.64               2             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

3.03 to 4.28               2             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

4.16 to 4.78               2             Urban         Defender penetrated

6.98 to 8.20               2             Nonurban   Defender penetrated

6.46 to 11.96 to 1      2             Urban         Defender penetrated

 

Now, my specific discussion on this is part of a three-page section on pages 209-211 called The Effect of Urban Terrain on Outcome. To quote from part of it:

The lack of any failed urban attacks is due to the favorable force ratios. The lowest force ratio of an urban attack is 1.72 to 1, and only four attacks are less than 2.00 to 1. Of the nine nonurban attacks between 1.71 and 2.00 to 1, only three failed. No attacks, urban or nonurban, executed with above 2.56 to 1 failed. There were a total of ten urban attacks made between 2.00 to 1 and 2.56 to 1 and nine nonurban attacks made in the same range. Two of the nonurban attacks in these cases failed.

This it appears that force ratios are a major factor in determining outcome. It does not appear that the difference between urban and nonurban terrain significantly influenced this result, nor can a difference be seen between rugged terrain and nonrugged terrain. Also the difference between rolling and mixed, rugged and mixed, or rugged and wooded terrain does not seem to have significantly influenced the outcomes. If a difference in the effect between rolling terrain and rugged terrain cannot be demonstrated, then the difference in effect between urban and nonurban terrain is also likely to be of the same order of effect, or less. However, the difference in terrain could affect combat power, and the difference caused by this effect could be 20 to 30 percent without it showing up in this analysis. Such small differences cannot be conclusively demonstrated given the small number of cases and the considerable variation found in this data.

Table 16.4. Summation of Force Ratios Compared to Outcomes, ETO

Force Ratio                                         Result

0.55 to 1.01 to 1.00                            Attack fails

1.15 to 2.56 to 1.00                            Attack may succeed

2.71 to 1.00 and higher                     Attack Advances

 

It is in the “attack may succeed” area where we may detect some differences caused by terrain effects. In the range of 1.15 to 2.56 to 1.00 we also found the statistics in table 16.5. For the urban versus nonurban cases, we found the statistics in table 16.6.

Table 16.5 Outcomes for attacks from 1.15 to 2.56 to 1.00

Cases            Attack Fails              Attack Advances             Defender Penetrated

55                   12 (21.82%)              35 (63.64%)                       8 (14.55%)

 

Table 16.6. Outcomes Based upon Terrain

                  Cases             Attack Fails         Attack Advances     Defender Penetrated

Urban        14                      0                         14                              0

Rolling        25                     6 (24.00%)         17                              2

Rugged       30                    6 (20.00%)          18                              6

 

Little can be concluded from this data, which appear to support a null hypothesis. That is, the terrain (be it urban vs. nonurban or rolling vs. rugged) has no significantly measurable included on the outcome of the battle.

Now, this is all kind of carefully worded to make sure I do not step beyond my data. Let me try to simplify this in three simple points:

  1. Urban terrain does not favor the defender more so than other terrain (rolling or rugged). In fact, it appears less. 
  2. Needless to say, the statement in the Modern War Institute article that “…ratio of 3:1 to have a reasonable chance of success” has little meaningful value. The attacker can be seen succeeding almost 80% of the time at ratios between 1.15 to 2.56 to 1. They reference the blog post that establishes this in their article.
  3. The statement that “ratio as high as 6:1 is sometimes necessary to achieve success in urban operations because of the increased strength of the defense on urban terrain” is simply out there. We did three studies on urban warfare, using more cases than anyone else has done. While we did not establish what was the defensive value of urban terrain, it clearly was not massive. 

Common Use, Lineage, and Lethality

Below is an article from the UC Davis Law Review that references Trevor Dupuy 75 times, references me 9 times and references Susan Rich 8 times. The article is Common Use, Lineage, and Lethality by Darrell A. H. Miller & Jennifer Tucker: Microsoft Word – 55-5_Miller_Tucker.docx (ucdavis.edu).

It still seems strange to me that a group of legal scholars are actually paying attention to the Theoretical Lethality Index (TLI) that Trevor Dupuy came up with in 1964, but we are flattered by the mention. This has been discussed before: Opinion: Now that guns can kill hundreds in minutes, Supreme Court should rethink the rights question | CNN. And then there is this: The Left’s Shark-Jumping Conclusions On NY Carry Case – Bearing Arms. These are all linked to this blog post: What Is The Relationship Between Rate of Fire and Military Effectiveness? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

I will be speaking at the Center for the Study of Guns and Society at Wesleyan University in Middleton, Conn. on 14-15 October 2022. The link to it is here: Center for the Study of Guns and Society – Wesleyan University-based center dedicated to interdisciplinary humanities study and teaching on the social and cultural history of firearms (gunsandsocietycenter.com). Click on this: Quantifying Arms Lethality in Historical Perspective – Center for the Study of Guns and Society (gunsandsocietycenter.com). Should be interesting. I have never actually attended an academic conference.

I gather the conference is open invitation:  Conference – Center for the Study of Guns and Society (gunsandsocietycenter.com).

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

One thing that stands out on this battlefield is that there is not a lot of troops covering a lot of area. As far as I can tell, for this war in Ukraine, each side has about 200,000 or so regular troops, after all new recruits and old losses are counted for. I actually have never seen any strength figures since the war has started. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army has said that they have a front width of 2,450 kilometers (1,522 miles) of which 1,105 (687 miles) are active fighting. By active fighting, I assume that means the area from Kharkov to Severodonetsk to Kherson. The border with Belarus is 891 kilometers (554 miles), which I assume is part of the “inactive area.” The Ukrainian border with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). Anyhow, not sure exactly how this active front is calculated, but I will use the Ukrainian Army figures for now (until I get the energy to pull out a ruler and painstakingly measure it myself). 

So, 200,000 troops divided by 1,105 kilometers is 181 men per kilometer, except: I suspect that some of those people are protecting Kiev and other such places away from the active front, and some are in reserve and rear positions. So, it might be two-thirds of that figure (121 men per kilometer). This is less than a tenth of World War II standards for this area.

During the Battle of Kursk before 5 July 1943, in the south around Belgorod, the frontage from the German 332nd Infantry Division through Totenkopf (the main two-corps German attack) covered 54 kilometers. This was covered by 146,443 troops, for a density of 2,712 troops per kilometer. In contrast, the part of the Soviet Sixth Guards Army’s first echelon that was facing them consisted of only 46,412 troops or 859 troops per kilometer (see page 148 of my big Kursk book). This Sixth Guards Army defense, considering both echelons, came in at 1,301 men per kilometer covering 66 kilometers of front, while the neighboring Seventh Guards Army had 1,568 men per kilometer of front covering 55 kilometers (see page 210). 

Just do a spot check of several division-level engagements (yes, I do have all this data for the southern Kursk and the Kharkov battles in 1943 in our database, the Division-Level Engagement Data Base or DLEDB): 1) the linear density of the LSSAH Panzer Grenadier Division on 12 July 1943 at the tank fields of Prokhorovka was 1,922.64 men per kilometer of front. The attacking Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps came in at 3,151.27 men per kilometer of front, 2) The linear density of men for the GD Panzer Division, 332nd ID and 3rd PzD attack on 5 July 1943 was 2,204.88 men per kilometer of front. It was 612.89 for the defending Soviet 71st Guards Rifle Division. Going to the battles around Kharkov, 3) the linear density of the Soviet 40th Army at Prudyanka-Dergachi on 12 February 1943 was 203.65 while the defending German GD ID was 510.38. 4) The linear density of the LSSAH assault on Kharkov on 12 March 1943 was 753.04 while the defending Soviet 19th Rifle Division, 17th NKVD Brigade and 86th Tank Brigade was 472.65. By the 14th, this had increased to 2,436.43 for the Germans and 1,739.29 for the defending Soviets, 5) The most sparsely deployed unit I have in my database for the fighting in and around Kharkov in February to August 1943 was 280.00 men per kilometer for the attacker and 169.75 for the defender at Merafa III engagement on 13 March 1943. 6) the densest is the 106th ID Defense III on 20 August 1943 with the attacking Soviet 48th Guards Rifle Corps and 375th RD deployed at 3,457.80 men per kilometer of front while the defending 106th ID was at 1,766.00 men per kilometer of front (I do have 3,649.13 for the attacker South of Kharkov on 15 March, but the defender only has 424.38). 7) The most sparsely deployed engagement I have for the Kursk fighting is nominally Soldatskoye VIII on 18 July 1943, where the attacking Soviet elements held a front of 392.25 men per kilometer and the defending German 255th ID held the front at 319.33 men per kilometer (there are a number of other engagements where one side had less density than these) 8) the densest engagement is LSSAH Division’s clash with the 31st Tank Corps on 7 July 1943, where the Germans had a density of 8.,475.00 men per kilometer and the Soviets were at 4,328.85 men per kilometer. This is mostly driven by the LSSAH frontage being temporarily reduced to 2.6 kilometers. This is all drawn from 256 division-level battles on the Eastern Front in February-August 1943 (192 from Kursk and 64 from Kharkov), with all the data drawn from the unit records of both sides. The average for the front now in Ukraine may be 121 men per kilometer, and they are not evenly distributed.

So, what does this all mean?

Well, from a theoretical point of view, it is showing the changes in linear density over time. As firepower increases, density of troop deployments decrease. This has been occurring for hundreds of years. See  Dispersion versus Lethality | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and TDI Friday Read: Lethality, Dispersion, And Mass On Future Battlefields | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Effects Of Dispersion On Combat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).  Also see my book War by Numbers.

From a more practical point of view, that means that there are many places that are holding their lines with less than 121 men per kilometer. Does this mean that any concentrated offensive force can push through these areas “if they achieve surprise.” So, should we be seeing more fluid lines?

But, in fact, we are not seeing more fluid lines. This looks less fluid than I expected. So why? Is it because U.S. intel assistance is so good that any concentration of force is immediately fired upon? Is it because any concentration of force is immediately spotted and responded to, by either firepower or movement of reserves?

I don’t really know for sure, just looking at linear densities.

A Strategy Page Article and Trevor Dupuy and Validation

An article appeared this week in the Strategy Page, which while a little rambling and unfocused, does hit on a few points of importance to us. The article is here: Murphy’s Law: What is Real on the Battlefield. Not sure of the author. But let me make a few rambling and unfocused comments on the article.

First they name-checked Trevor Dupuy. As they note: “Some post World War II historians had noted and measured the qualitative differences but their results were not widely recognized. One notable practitioner of this was military historian and World War II artillery officer Trevor Dupuy.”

“Not widely recognized” is kind of an understatement. In many cases, his work was actively resisted, with considerable criticism (some of it outright false), and often arrogantly and out-of-hand dismissed by people who apparently knew better. This is the reason why four chapters of my book War by Numbers focuses on measuring human factors.

I never understood the arguments from combat analysts and modelers who did not want to measure the qualitative differences between military forces. I would welcome someone who does not think this is useful to make the argument on this blog or maybe at our historical analysis conference. Fact of the matter was that Trevor Dupuy’s work was underfunded and under-resourced throughout the 33 years he pursued this research. His companies were always on the verge of extinction, kept going only by his force of will. 

Second, they discussed validation and the failure of the U.S. DOD to take it into account. Their statement was that “But, in general, validation was not a high priority and avoided as much as possible during peacetime.”  They discuss this as the case in the 1970s, but it was also true in the 1980s, the 1990s and into the current century. In my first meeting at CAA in early 1987, a group of analysts showed up for the purpose of getting the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) cancelled. There was open hostility at that time to even assembling the data to conduct a validation among the analytical community. We have discussed the need for validation a few times before here:  Summation of our Validation Posts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and here: TDI Friday Read: Engaging The Phalanx | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and here: TDI Friday Read: Battalion-Level Combat Model Validation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and here: No Action on Validation In the 2020 National Defense Act Authorization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and in Chapters 18 and 19 of War by Numbers.

Nominally, I am somewhat of a validation expert. I have created four+ large validation databases: the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, and Battle of Britian Data Base (primarily done by Richard Anderson) and the expansion of the various DuWar databases. I have actually conducted three validations also. This is the fully documented battalion-level validation done for the TNDM (see International TNDM Newsletters Volume I, numbers 2 – 6 at http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub4.htm), the fully documented test of various models done in our report CE-1 Casualty Estimation Methodologies Study (May 2005) at http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub3.htm and the fully documented test of division and corps level combat at Kursk using the TNDM (see Chapter 19 of War by Numbers and reports FCS-1 and FCS-2 here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub3.htm). That said, no one in DOD has ever invited me to discuss validation. I don’t think they would really agree with what I had to say. On the other hand, if there have been some solid documented validations conducted recently by DOD, then I certainly would invite them to post about it to our blog or present them at our Historical Analysis conference. There has been a tendency for certain agencies to claim they have done VVA and sensitivity tests, but one never seems to find a detailed description of the validation they have conducted.

I will not be specifically discussing these databases or validation at the Historical Analysis conference, but my discussion on the subject in War by Numbers and in over 40 blog posts on this blog.

Wounded-to-killed ratios in Ukraine in 2022

I made a post on Friday that unsurprisingly got some pushback on twitter. It is here: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

One of the twitter complaints is that I used a wounded-to-killed ratio of 4-to-1 for my challenge of the Ukrainian kill claims. This was based upon the only set of aggregate wounded-to-killed statistics offered in the conflict, the reports from the Donets Peoples Republic (DPR) who are reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,912 soldiers killed and 7,919 wounded (a 4.14-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). 

This also generated another twitter criticism because I was using DPR data. Yet, this last week Zelensky has stated that they are losing between 60 – 100 Ukrainian soldiers a week. An additional 500 are wounded. This is at least 5-to-1 wounded to killed ratio (or 8.33-to-1). 

Apparently, some other people have been using a 3-to-1 wounded to killed ratio (not that this lower figure changes my argument one iota). What is the basis for people using 3-to-1? WWII data? Lack of artillery?

It almost certainly is a traditional figure drawn from Trevor Dupuy or WWII data or convention. Now, wounded-to-kill figures vary by 1) definition, 2) posture, 3) medical care, 4) how Died-of-Wounds (DOW) are counted, 5) mix of wounding agents, 6) number MIA or captured, 7) use of body armor and 8) the nature of the targets (airplanes or tanks compared to infantry). This is discussed in depth in Chapter 15 of my book War by Numbers.

Let my post a table from my book:

German

                                                                        U.S. Army      UK Army       Army[1]

Ardennes from 16 – 23 December                  4.85-to-1         1.67-to-1         3.25-to-1

Ardennes from 24 December – 1 January      5.65-to-1         2.89-to-1         3.08-to-1

Ardennes from 2 – 16 January                        5.12-to-1         4.59-to-1         2.99-to-1

 

                                                                        German Army[2]          Soviet Army[3]

Kursk from 4 – 11 July                                   5.11-to-1                     2.29-to-1

Kursk from 12 – 18 July                                 4.54-to-1                     2.68-to-1

See my book for the footnotes.

So, 3-to-1 or greater for WWII data. The Soviet Army at Kursk, when on the defensive and having divisions being overrun with large numbers of MIA and captured had lower than 3-to-1. But, when the Soviet missing was less than 10% of the casualties, the wounded to killed ratio rose to 3-to-1. This is discussed in more depth in my book along with supporting data. Anyhow, 3-to-1 is kind of the minimal figure to be used for most ground combat in WWII and as you can see from the table above, it is sometimes higher. 

The wounded-to-killed ratios since WWII have been higher. In some cases much higher (like 13-to-1 for the U.S. Marine Corps in Afghanistan). All this is discussed in depth in my book. 

From a practical point of view, I do not know what the wounded-to-killed ratio will be for the fighting in Ukraine. I expect it to be more than 3-to-1. This is the old WWII figure and medical care has improved since then and many people are now wearing body armor. Body armor certainly increases survivability from blast and fragmentation wounding, which is the majority of wounding on most battlefields.

Therefore, the DPR wounded-to-killed figures of 4-to-1 looked reasonable to me. They may be low, depending on how they are counting wounded (not all lightly wounded are counted as wounded). Zelensky’s off-the-cuff figure of 5-to-1 (or higher) also seems reasonable. 

On other hand, for those using a 3-to-1 figure, then I have to ask what is their basis for using this figure (WWII data or tradition?) and what is their basis for not revising it to reflect better medical treatment improvements over the last 75 years and the rather extensive use of body armor now?

Now, as this war continues, I expect the wounded-to-killed ratio to actually increase. This is because both sides are making more use of artillery and more of the engagements are using dismounted infantry. This changes the mix of causative agents and targets in a manner that should result in more people wounded per person killed (or to express it another way, less mortality per casualty). 

 

 

P.S. Final note: in the fall of 2020 I was hoping to obtain contracts based upon two proposals submitted to CCCRP (Combat Casualty Care Research Program) to further examine wounded-to-killed ratios and the analysis of combat casualties, including a combat casualty modeling effort. This effort died because some reviewers did not feel a strong need to further examine this subject. I still feel this subject needs to be fully explored. Tempted to do a further blog post on this. To date, my book is the most complete discussion on the subject that I am aware of.

Talking Force Ratios Once Again

I guess we need to talk about force ratios once again. Not sure why. This has been discussed in depth by us. It was discussed in Trevor Dupuy’s Understanding War and was discussed in my book War by Numbers. But let me start first with some Clausewitz quotes:

In tactics, as in strategy, superiority of numbers is the most common element in victory.

and

If we thus strip the engagement of all the variables arising from its purpose and circumstance, and disregard the fighting value of the troops involved (which is a given quantity), we are left with the bare concept of the engagement, a shapeless battle in which the only distinguishing factors is the number of troops on either side.

These numbers, therefore, will determine victory. It is, of course, evident from the mass of abstractions I have made to reach this point that superiority of numbers in a given engagement is only one of the factors that determines victory. Superior numbers, far from contributing everything, or even a substantial part, to victory, may actually be contributing very little, depending on the circumstances.

But superiority varies in degree. It can be two to one, or three or four to one, and so on; it can obviously reach the point where it is overwhelming.

In this sense superiority of numbers admittedly is the most important factor in the outcome of an engagement, as long as it is great enough to counterbalance all other contributing circumstance. It thus follows that as many troops as possible should be brought into the engagement at the decisive point.

and also:

Numerical superiority was a material factor. It was chosen from all elements that make up victory because, by using combinations of time and space, it could be fitted into a mathematical system of laws. It was thought that all other factors could be ignored if they were assumed to be equal on both sides and thus cancelled one another out. That might have been acceptable as a temporary device for the study of the characteristics of this single factor; but to make the device permanent, to accept superiority of numbers as the one and only rule, and to reduce the whole secret of the art of war to a formula of numerical superiority at a certain time and a certain place was an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a moment against the realities of life.

OK…in its most basic form, combat power is numbers x equipment x human factors x conditions of combat (including posture, terrain, weather, surprise, etc.). Nothing earthshaking here, but this often gets lost in the discussion. 

In Trevor Dupuy’s Understanding War, which is his most significant work, he has Chapter 3: Clausewitz’s Theory of Combat, which has a section on “The Law of Numbers.” and Chapter 4: “The Three-to-one Theory of Combat.” These are worth reading.

My book War by Numbers covered some of the same ground. Chapter Two is called “Force Ratios.”

An article from the Wall Street Journal was published on Friday that addressed this subject, somewhat incompletely: https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-simple-ratio-came-to-influence-military-strategy-11652434202. The author did reach out to me by email on 27 April, but I don’t check that mail box that often, so never got back to him in time for the article.

I am not going to discuss or debate this article, but instead point out that this has been discussed before. So not sure why we are back drinking from the same well using the same tables that we know are not correct. In particular I am talking about the table from the U.S. Army’s COFM (Correlation of Forces and Means).

This is discussed in this blog post: How Does the U.S. Army Calculate Combat Power? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Table in question is here:

A copy of the COFM is here: COFM. Do not know if this is the most current or recent version, nor do I care, because it is flawed.

We have discussed this many times before. See: How Does the U.S. Army Calculate Combat Power? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and TDI Friday Read: The Validity Of The 3-1 Rule Of Combat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Summation of Human Factors and Force Ratio posts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Summation of Force Ratio Posts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The COFM is called out five times in the ATP 5-0.2-1 Staff Reference Guide. The guide is discussed here: Staff Reference Guide | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Other people have also discussed this:  

1993: Correlation of Forces: The Quest for a Standardized Model by Major David Hogg: Correlation of Forces. Note that the COFM table is quote in figure 1 in this paper.

2007 or later: Demystifying the Correlation of Forces Calculator: https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/Magazine/issues/2017/JAN-MAr/pdf/7)Spurlin_CoFCalculator_txt.pdf. They reference the paper above by LTG (then Major) David Hogg.

2019: An Examination of Force Ratios: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1083211.pdf. This last paper actually references my book War by Numbers.

The Attack on Kharkov – part 5 of the First Phase of the War discussion

This is the fifth in a series of extended posts examining the First Phase of this war. The first post is here: The Assault on Kiev – part 1 of the discussion on the First Phase of the War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Second post is here: The Assault on Kherson – part 2 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The third post is here:  The Attack on Mariupol – part 3 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The fourth post is here: The Advance in the Northeast – part 4 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Kharkov:

Kharkov (pop. 1,433,886) in my mind is extremely important to this entire war. Not only is it the second largest city in Ukraine, but it is largest Russian speaking majority city in Russia. Its unwillingness to join with Lugansk and Donetsk in revolting against the new Ukranian government in 2014 was significant then. A sniper did try to assassinate the mayor of Kharkov in April 2014, shooting him in the back and partly crippling him for life. He was a supporter of the Russian-favoring over-thrown Ukrainian President Yanukovich. Yet he opposed the Russian separatists in Kharkov. He died of Coronavirus in 2021 while still mayor.

The city’s willingness to defend itself now is also significant. It is right next to Russia, just south of Belgorod and the area of the Battle of Kursk. It was fought over four times during World War Two, once in 1941 and three times in 1943. It was the largest Russian city fought over in World War II and was used in our urban warfare studies. See: U-1, U-2 and U-3, Measuring the Effects of Combat in Cities, Phase I, II and III: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. Also see Chapter 16: Urban Legends and Chapter 17: The Use of Case Studies in War by Numbers.  It is a big sprawling city, 24.3 kilometers from north to south and 25.2 kilometers from west to east. 

The Attack on Kharkov:

Being only 19 miles south of the border, Kharkov (Kharkiv in Ukrainian) came under attack early in the campaign from forces advancing from Belgorod. They encountered resistance on the first day, slowing down their advance. They did shell the city the first day, 24 February 2022.

On the second day, the Russian advance had reached northern suburbs of the city, the village of Tsyrkuny. There the Ukrainian army put up a fight. See video (2:07): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDIQf10kHzY. Not the best weather for operations.

Heavy fighting continued outside the city the following day with Russian forces entering the city on the morning of the 27th. By the end of the day they were thrown back. A video of some of the fighting is here (1:59): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UreR-qYgZwU and here (2:46): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ndTla7HQiFw

It is not sure what the strength was of the attacking Russian forces, but they did not seem significant. Not sure of the strength of the defenders either. It does seem like, as in the case of number of the other Russian advances, that they led into these suburban and urban areas with mobile forces with limited infantry support. The results were as expected. 

On 27 February, the Russian forces were clearly repelled from Kharkov. It came under heavy artillery fire on the 28th. It is during these bombardments against the Kharkiv Tractor Plant, Moskovskyi district and Shevchenkivskyi district that cluster munitions were used (no need to use the word “alleged,” they clearly leave behind identifiable fragments).

This kind of became the norm from the subsequent month, with Russian forces operating just outside of the city, regularly bringing it under artillery fire. The governor of Kharkov said that between 24 February and 14 April, at least 503 civilians had been killed in the Kharkov region. Between 24 February to 28 April, 606 civilians were reported killed in the Kharkov region, according to the National Police. One Algerian student was reported killed by a sniper on 28 February, but I gather most civilians were killed due to artillery, missile and air strikes.

This was a strange operation, so it appears that the Russians never arrived with significant forces to take the city and did not have the forces to surround the city. Part of the reason may have been that Kharkov was better defended than Chernigov, Sumy, Kherson, Melitopol, etc. The Russians forces took over three days before they could advance into the city, and they never really seriously attempted to surround it. It is a case where the defenders not only held the city, but they held the countryside on both sides.

Military casualties are only hinted at with a report on 7 March 209 people had been killed, including 133 civilians, and 443 people has been wounded, including 319 civilians. This implies military deaths of 76 killed and 124 wounded, a 1.63-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio. Russian losses are not known, although it no reason to believe they were higher than Ukrainian losses. Unlike other operations and areas, there are no claims of BTGs getting destroyed, heavy fighting after the 27th of February, or anything similar. For a city this important, not that much happened.

Were the Russians trying to take too much with too little?

This does go to the question of the entire initial Russian operational forces. They sent significant forces to Kiev, a force of 3 to 6 BTGs to Chernigov and eventually to Kiev, forces to surround Sumy and forces to march through Konotop towards Kiev. This pretty much grabbed most of the northeastern Ukraine. Yet, they did not send significant forces to take, threaten, or surround Kharkov. Kharkov, for all practical purposes, anchored the entire northern flank of the Ukrainian Army holding the areas of Lugansk and Donetsk provinces. A significant Russia armed force driving between Kharkov and Okyturka, a front over 60 miles wide (100 kilometers), could have potentially enveloped the city from the north. Instead 20,000 to 30,000 forces were encamped outside of Kiev, other forces that may have numbered more than 10,000 were taking the rest of northeast Ukraine. Meanwhile, Kharkov was holding out, and anchoring the entire line from the north. One can see the Russian line running northwest from Kharkov to Bohodukhiv (town of 14,882 which was never taken) to Okhtyrka (discussed in the last post). This was mostly open country. A concentrated force of 30,000 pushing in that area would have been hard to stop and probably could have surrounded Kharkov. That would have started a process that could have put Izium, then Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk in danger. Instead, tens of thousands of Russian troops were stalled out in the marsh lands to the north of Kiev while thousands more were grabbing open ground in the rest of northeast Ukraine, while Kharkov held firm.

It does appear that the original Russian plan was to march in columns of troops from everywhere to everywhere, strongly indicating that they really did not expect any real resistance. If that was true, then their planned operations makes sense. As that was not the case, then their plan appears to make no sense. A discussion of the Russian thinking behind this is hard to address without more research, including interviews of the participants and decision makers.

How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2

Posted this article up at the beginning of the month: How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The article stated that (in bold): “It does appear that Ukraine is getting significant help from the U.S. intelligence assets.” 

A few updates:

  1. U.S. gave Ukraine exactly when and where Russian missiles and bombs were intended to strike, allowing Ukraine to move air defenses and aircraft out of harm’s way. See article: U.S. intel helped Ukraine protect air defenses. Also see: Mystery of early Russian failures in Ukraine explained with new revelations of US intelligence help
  2. It does appear that U.S. intel notified the Ukrainians on 24 February (the first day of the invasion) about Russian attempts to reinforce the recently seized Hostomel airport and this resulted in the Ukrainians shooting down a reinforcing transport plane with hundreds of troops on board. We have no independent confirmation that this occurred but are guessing this is the case. We have also updated our account of The Assault on Kiev: The Assault on Kiev – part 1 of the discussion on the First Phase of the War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
  3. Of course, my original blog post was based upon a number of other events I had seen, in particular the helicopter strike on the Russian depot near Belgorod.
  4. I also noted in that blog post that this might include: “1) the picking off of six Russian generals, 2) the preplanned ambush that halted the Russian armored column at Brovary, and 3) the attack on the airbase near Kherson that took out at least ten Russian helicopters.”
  5. I also flagged in my daily war posts that Ukrainian ability to resupply Mariupol with helicopters may have also been possible due to U.S. intel.
  6. I also flagged in my daily war posts that the tracking and targeting of the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva may have also been done using U.S. intel.

Anyhow, I suspect there is more to come on this story.

It does appear that Russia is fighting at a disadvantage because of U.S. intelligence. We did do the only study on the subject I am aware of using real world data. It was based upon 295 cases of divisional-level combat. This was 149 division-level engagements from the Western Front in 1943-1945 and 146 division-level engagements from the Eastern Front in 1943. The Eastern Front consisted of 91 engagements from the Battle of Kursk and 55 cases from the battles in and around Kharkov in 1943.

This is discussed in depth in Chapters 10 and 11 of my book War by Numbers (“The Combat Value of Superior Situational Awareness” and “The Combat Value of Surprise.”). The entire report is available here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. It is SA-1. Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (May 2004) (Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment) (2 Vol) – Pages: TBD. The report includes the data used for the analysis.