Category Syria

More on the Mosul Offensive

The article here is a nice summary of the situation. Mark Perry is an old friend of The Dupuy Institute. It does have a political slant in its introduction, but the rest of it is good analysis. We usually try to avoid politics in this blog.

Mark Perry on Mosul

A few highlights:

  1. Offensive is now tentatively schedule to begin sometime in early October.
  2. …with a final battle for Mosul coming at the end of October (and therefore the political slant to the article).
  3. The attack might be coordinated with an attack on Raqqa in Syria, the capital of the shrinking Islamic State.
  4. U.S. advisors are with Iraqi units at the battalion-level.
  5. Over 200 U.S. advisors are at al-Qayyarah air base, 40 miles south of Mosul.
  6. There is an effort to include local Sunni’s in the effort, along with a CENTCOM estimate that Anbar’s Sunnis can contribute at most 10,000 soldiers to the Mosul effort.

ISIL Oil Revenues

I gather it has kind of been a grind to get to this point, but this article notes that: ISIS Suffers Near Collapse in Oil Revenue

A few interesting quotes:

  1. “The Islamic State, pushed off more than half the Iraqi territory it seized in 2014…”
  2. “….with partial access to just two of the five Iraqi oil fields it once controlled.”
  3. “In May the US estimated that its revenue had been roughly halved to $250 million a year from the territory it controlled in Iraq and Syria”
  4. “The loss of oil revenues has forced the militants to cut salaries by a third….”
  5. “They have also imposed more taxes on farmers, truckers, and traders and increased fines for minor violations of religious bans….”
  6. “At least 100 drivers were killed trying to smuggle crude into Syria. Drivers are refusing to go…..”
  7. “I saw my brother get killed by an airstrike while sitting inside his truck. Other trucks were blown up like in a video game.”

 

Why the Russian Economy is Tumbling

The link here is to a New York Times article that nicely summarizes the situation with the Russian economy. Nothing new here, but nicely presented:

Why the Russian Economy is Tumbling

A few highlights

  1. The country has been operating at a deficit since 2012.
  2. Its Reserve Fund is slated to run out by 2017.
  3. Experts suggest this crisis is more alarming (it is a note on the Budget balance chart).
  4. Russian intervention in Syria cost Russia $482 million (not sure where that figure came from).
  5. Russia is decreasing its defense budget by 5%.
  6. The Russian defense budget is over $50 billion (in contrast, the U.S. defense budget is 610 billion for 2013).
  7. It can, of course, tap into the National Wealth Fund (raid their pensions to cover existing expenses).

 

The Islamic State is in Retreat

[Photo deleted at the request of AFP]

An interesting article today in the Washington Post (photo from Huffington Post):

The Islamic State is in Retreat

A few lines caught my attention:

  1. “The U.S. military estimated earlier this year that the Islamic State had lost 40 percent of the territory it controlled at its peak in 2014.”
  2. “Shadadi was going to be a major six-week operation….Instead, they completely collapsed.”
  3. “We could probably liberate Mosul tomorrow…”
  4. “…troops encountered little resistance, overrunning five mostly empty villages ahead of retreating militant fighters.”
  5. “…it is starting to become possible to foresee the group’s ultimate defeat, said Knights, who thinks that could come by the end of next year.”

Of course, by establishing an “Islamic State,” a guerilla movement has now developed a conventional mission to hold territory. This allows us to develop a more conventional war against them. There may still be a guerilla movement to deal with after the Islamic State has been reduced.

 

 

Influencing the Price of Oil and the War in Syria

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Caption: Kurdish Cavalry, 1915

 

The real problem the Russian economy is suffering from is that oil has dropped from $100 a barrel to $30 a barrel. The Russian government budget was once based upon oil remaining at least $80 a barrel. The current Russian government budget is based upon oil remaining at least $50 a barrel. This is not happening. The end result has been two successive years of 10% budget cuts.

Right now the Russian ruble is moving back up into the range of 60 rubles for a dollar. It was in the 70s, it used to be in the 30s. This recent rise is mostly caused by an increase in the price of oil. Russia and Saudi Arabia have agreed to hold production stable, which is having some impact on the prices. But, this is still not recovery. The Russian economy is going to be declining or stagnant for the foreseeable future (for at least the next two years…which gets us close to their March 2018 presidential election).

So, the question is, what can Russia do to bring the price of oil back up? Obviously, reduce supply or increase demand. In fact, demand seems to be decreasing as the Chinese and some other economies slow. This is probably not something they can control. They could reduce their own supply, which would cause the price to go up. But, this does not solve Russia’s problem as it would be at the expense of less barrels sold, and oil is a major part of their economy and the government budget.

Therefore, their only real option is to reduce supply world-wide. This is really only possible if Saudi Arabia and OPEC decide to. But they have a problem in that Iran, which is also supporting Assad and is an OPEC member, is putting oil back into the marketplace. Iran is now joining the world order and able to sell oil. This was one of by-products of the agreement on nuclear development limitations. Whether or not you agree with the Iran nuclear deal, it is helping us at the gas pump. It is also probably making it impossible for Saudi Arabia to really significantly boost the price of oil.

Of course, they may not want to. Saudi Arabia and Russia are on different sides of the war in Syria. A Russia directly involved in a war in the Middle East is kind of a unique event. They have had multiple wars with Turkey, but their last war ended with World War I (1918). They did occupy the northern half of Iran during World War II, but withdrew after the end of the war. They provided considerable support to the Egyptians and Syrians during the 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars, but stay away from active intervention. But this Russian intervention in Syria provides an additional incentive for Saudi Arabia not to let oil prices rise much, as this only feeds the Russian military. We have seen Russian recently limit and curtail their invention in Syria.

I have known a lot of Russians. Not one has ever told me in private conversation how much they love Bashar Assad and how much Syria contributes to Russia’s economy and defense. In fact, from an economic and military point of view, Russia’s defense of the Assad regime makes little sense. If he was gone from power tomorrow, not sure many in Russia would miss him.

So, what does Russia gain from supporting Assad?

 

 

Left Behind

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Nice article in the Economist:

http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21694996-putin-appears-turn-hard-power-diplomacy-russians-show-their-hand

The interesting point is that they give stats as to what they are leaving behind (have no idea how they know this):

The first is that Russia is not pulling out its forces completely. It will retain its naval presence in Tartus; at least a dozen fast jets will continue to fly from its air base near Latakia; about 1,000 military advisers and special forces will stay; and the recently-installed S-400 air defence system covering the north-west of the country will also be kept in place. Should the fragile “cessation of hostilities” that Russia and America brokered last month fall apart, it can re-escalate very quickly. But for now, Russia can cut the $3m a day cost of its military operation, while preserving much of the leverage it has bought.

Not sure how they got the price tag either. Very cheap compared to U.S. deployments (which usually are in the billions). Maybe we can contract them.

Short and Sweet

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 It would be nice to have short, quick, sharp interventions. Basically, go into a troubled country, kick tail, and then leave shortly thereafter with everything resolved. Sort of like we did in Libya in 2011; or that peacekeeping mission in Lebanon in 1982-1984 that was effectively ended by the barracks bombing that killed 241 Marines; or the brief humanitarian mission to Somalia 1992-1994 that generated the book and movie Black Hawk Down; or the 1991 Gulf War; or one-year deployment to Bosnia in 1995; or any number of short and sweet interventions that were not always so sweet and short.

Obviously the real “short and sweet” list is pretty short. Panama 1989, Grenada 1984 and….and….and…… Most commitments either take much longer that that (like Bosnia), or the conflict continues rattling on long after we left (pretty much the rest of the cases mentioned in the first paragraph), and sometimes they require us to re-engage or they mutate in ways we did not expect (for example: Libya and Somalia). Getting in, kicking tail, taking names, and getting out sounds like a great idea. Just doesn’t work out that way very often.

Russia is now wrapping up its 5 ½ month commitment in Syria. It was not that big, maybe 3,000 to 6,000 uniformed personnel, plus aircraft. Still, this mission was unique in many ways. It was really the first case of Russia doing an intervention away from its immediate borders (and pretty much one of the few cases of the Soviet Union doing one also). Neither Russia nor the Soviet Union had ever played far from home, if you ignore the communist international, world wide revolutionary movements and a few dozen missiles sent to Cuba. Still, Russia/Soviet Union had rarely actually committed conventional forces into combat in a country that is not connected to it by border. Even their failed war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) was connected by a border. They were part of the Kosovo peacekeeping forces. But besides that, Syria is the only case I can think of in the last 100 years of a Russian or Soviet ground invention in a country not connected by a border.

They are now withdrawing (so they claim). Syria is the location of the only Russian military bases outside their country, so obviously some forces are remaining.

But, Syria remains Syria. It is a country of 18 million people that is only around 13% Shia (primarily Alawite). Up until the civil war started five years ago, the Alawite minority ruled the country under Bashar Assad. It is around 10% Christian (which were sometimes allied with their fellow minority, the Alawites), 3% Druze, 9% Kurds (Sunni) and 60% Sunni Arab (and no…these numbers don’t add up to 100%). Of course, having an Alawite minority over the top of the Sunni majority pretty much guaranteed that there would eventually be a conflict. Now the Russia intervention has bolstered the Alawites. Hard to imagine if Russia actually pulls out, how the bolstered Alawites maintain their current position.

Still, perhaps Russia has given Assad and the Alawites enough breathing space for them to now stand on their own. This has not been the case in a number of past interventions (U.S. in Vietnam, USSR in Afghanistan, U.S. in Iraq).