Category Syria

Iranian Losses in Syria

In case you weren’t paying close attention, the Assad government in Syria has been heavily propped up by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia. Iran has had troops there for a while. According to Iran’s Tasnim new agency, they have lost over a thousand of them during the war. That is a surprisingly high figure: Over-1-000-iranian-troops

Flynn is inn

Sorry…..could not resist the cheesy rhyming headline. It looks like Lt. General Michael T. Flynn is going to be nominated as the head of the National Security Council. I don’t know what to make of all the stories positive and negative about him by the various left and right talking heads…..but he did recently publish a book. His “Conclusions” is mostly readable on-line at Amazon.com. Would recommend reading it before reaching any conclusions:

https://www.amazon.com/Field-Fight-Global-Against-Radical/dp/1250106222/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8

It starts on page 157 and goes to page 180, with several pages missing in between. Chapter 4: “How to Win” is not available on-line.

Now, the National Security Advisor is just that: an advisor. They actually don’t run much. Foreign Policy is handled by the State Department, Defense Policy is handled by the Secretary of Defense (neither which are appointed right now). As the National Security Advisor is the person who regularly (daily?) briefs the president on what is going on the world, they often are very influential. Some, like Henry Kissinger, eclipsed the Secretary of State. Some were not near as visible. It really depends on the person and his relationship with the president. This can also change over time.

Lt. General Michael T. Flynn

Lt. General Michael Flynn was the head of DIA for two years before he was fired (2012-2014). I gather he is close to Trump on foreign and defense policy and is in line to be the next National Security Advisor (the next Kissinger…or next Scowcroft, or next Brzezinski, or next Powell or next Rice).

His Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_T._Flynn

He does have a book that was just released. A significant amount of it is actually readable on the Amazon.com site: https://www.amazon.com/Field-Fight-Global-Against-Radical/dp/1250106222/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8

Click on the “look inside” section and flip through pages 157 to 180  (“Conclusion”). Most of that chapter is there.

His co-author’s bio is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Ledeen

Multiple other articles on him are here:

  1. http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/donald-trump-general-michael-flynn-vp-225253
  2. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/us/politics/michael-flynn-donald-trump.html?_r=0
  3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/09/15/michael-flynn-trumps-military-adviser-says-colin-powells-emails-include-really-mean-things/
  4. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/08/15/trump-adviser-michael-t-flynn-on-his-dinner-with-putin-and-why-russia-today-is-just-like-cnn/

I am sure there is a lot more.

 

Questions

Well, the election is done. Oddly enough there was a certain degree of continuity in U.S foreign and defense policy from Bush Junior to Obama and it probably would have continued to Clinton. Are we now looking at any fundamental changes? What will be our defense policies?

  1. In Afghanistan
    1. Significantly increase effort?
    2. Slightly increase U.S. effort?
    3. Keep the same?
    4. Decrease U.S. effort?
    5. Disengage?
  2. In Iraq
    1. Maintain current effort after Mosul falls?
    2. Decrease U.S. effort?
    3. Disengage?
  3. With Syria
    1. No fly zones?
    2. Significantly increase effort?
    3. Slightly increase U.S. effort?
    4. Keep the same?
    5. Decrease U.S. effort?
    6. Disengage?
    7. Negotiate settlement with Russia and Assad?
  4. With Ukraine
    1. Significantly increase effort (probably not)?
    2. Slightly increase U.S. effort?
    3. Keep the same?
    4. Decrease U.S. effort?
    5. Disengage?
    6. Negotiate settlement with Russia?
    7. What about Crimea?
    8. What about Lugansk and Donetsk Peoples Republics?
    9. What about sanctions?
    10. What about EU sanctions?
  5. With Russia
    1. Confront more aggressively?
    2. Keep the same?
    3. Try to tone it down?
    4. Reset?
  6. With NATO
    1. Increase commitment (probably not)?
    2. Keep the same?
    3. Decrease U.S. effort?
    4. Force our NATO allies to contribute more?
    5. Disengage because NATO is obsolete?
    6. Negotiate some arrangement with Russia?
  7. What about Georgia?
    1. Encourage NATO to take them as a member (I am guessing not)?
    2. Continue working with them (Partnership for Peace)?
    3. Decrease commitment to them?
    4. Disengage?
    5. What about Abkhazia and Ossetia?
  8. With Iran
    1. Cancel current deal and try to renegotiate?
    2. Keep the same?
    3. Try to work out some overarching deal concerning nukes, Iraq support, and Assad support?
  9. With Yemen
    1. Keep the same (remain disengaged)?
    2. Re-engage to some level?
  10. War on Terror
    1. What additional actions are they going to take against ISIL?
    2. What about Al-Qaeda?
    3. Any other long-term initiatives to forestall the development of groups in the future or stop their attacks?
  11. With the Defense Budget
    1. Increase defense budget? (He has stated that he will increase the army from 480,000 to 540,000).
    2. Keep the same?
    3. I gather we will end sequestration (which is already on hold)?
    4. Who is going to be the Secretary of Defense?
  12. And then there is East Asia (China, the two Koreas, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, etc.).
  13. With trade
    1. Will TPP be cancelled?
    2. Will TPP be re-negotiated?
  14. Oil and Climate Change
    1. This is an international issue.
    2. Are we going to pump more oil?
    3. Are we going to use more coal (I gather this is the case)?
    4. Will interest and funding for clean energy decline (I gather this is the case)?

I am not sure what President-elect Trump intends to do on any of subjects, although he is probably going to do something on trade.

There are a few articles detailing his plans, like this one: http://www.defensenews.com/articles/trump-defense-plan-detailed

And this one: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/11/09/four-questions-about-how-trump-would-affect-the-military-industrial-complex/

But at this juncture, we really do not know what our future defense policy will be.

Syria and Iraq After The Islamic State

As Iraqi forces close in on the northern city of Mosul, the commander of U.S Joint Task Force-INHERENT RESOLVE, Army Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, indicated on Wednesday that preparations are being accelerated for isolating Raqaa, Syria, the capital of the Islamic State. The attack could begin within two weeks, The Daily Beast’s Nancy Youssef reported on Thursday. Townsend stated that the timing is being influenced by evidence of Daesh planning for terrorist attacks on unidentified targets in the West.

According to Townsend, the projected offensive against Raqaa will include elements of the Syrian Kurd YPG militia. “The only force that is capable on any near term timeline are the Syrian Democratic Forces, of which the YPG are a significant portion,” Townsend said. “We’ll move soon to isolate Raqqa with the forces that are ready to go.”

Although YPG has not stated whether it is willing to participate in an attack on Raqaa, Turkey has expressed its opposition to involving the Syrian Kurds, which it says will “endanger the future of Syria.” Turkey is actively fighting a domestic Kurdish insurgency and has launched military strikes on Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish forces.

The U.S.’s willingness to back the Syrian Kurdish forces over Turkey’s objections are a clear harbinger of the challenges facing the region even after Mosul and Raqaa are liberated from Daesh control. Liberating Raqaa will not end the civil war in Syria and will not spell the end of Daesh. Daesh forces still control wide swaths of territory in Syria. Will the U.S. remain committed to fighting Daesh in Syria after Raqaa falls?

U.S. and Iraqi military leaders have predicted that Daesh will continue to wage an insurgency in Iraq as a potent guerilla force. After Mosul falls, the Iraqi government faces the prospect of a grinding, open-ended counterinsurgency effort fueled by unresolved sectarian divisions. Is the U.S. prepared to maintain its support for open-ended Iraqi counterinsurgency operations after Mosul is recaptured?

Interwoven into these questions are bigger, regional questions. Will the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds be allowed political autonomy in those parts of Syria and Iraq liberated from Daesh control? Will the Free Syrian Forces become the de-facto government over the parts of Syria not under Assad’s control? What is Iraqi Kurdistan’s future in Iraq? While the liberation of Mosul and Raqaa will constitute manifest defeats for Daesh, these forthcoming victories do not appear that they will be decisive in resolving the ongoing local and regional political conflicts.

Dabiq Falls To Free Syrian Rebels

(The Guardian)
(The Guardian)

The Sultan Murad group, a Free Syrian Army (FSA) rebel militia backed by Turkey, announced today that it had captured the town of Dabiq in northern Syria, following the retreat of Daesh fighters. Part of Operation Euphrates Shield, initiated by Turkey in August following a Daesh suicide attack on the city of Gaziantep, FSA forces have cleared a section of Syrian territory north of Aleppo with the aid of Turkish tanks, aircraft, and special operations forces.

Dabiq’s fall is significant for Daesh’s self-proclaimed caliphate, given the role accorded to the city in the group’s propaganda. In hadith, or sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammad, Dabiq was to be the location of the final battle between Muslims and infidels before Doomsday. Daesh featured Dabiq prominently in its messaging and used it as the title for its sophisticated online journal. Several American and British aid workers were executed there.

“The Daesh myth of their great battle in Dabiq is finished,” Ahmed Osman, head of the Sultan Murad group, told Reuters.

The fall of Dabiq is the latest in a succession of military defeats Daesh has suffered this year, including losing control of the historic city of Palmyra and much of the territory it had controlled in northern Syria. Iraqi forces retook Fallujah and most of Anbar province, and the beginning of a long-planned operation to free Mosul in northern Iraq appears imminent.

SU-35 Flanker vs F-15 Eagle

Another comparative analysis article from The National Interest: America’s F-15 Eagle vs Russia’s Su-35 fighter: Who Wins?

This article lacks the depth of the nicely done article in the Armata Tank vs the M-1 Abrams Tank and the TOW missile. A few points:

  1. F-15C Eagle is now nearly 40 years old.
  2. It may be in service for another 20 years.
  3. The Flanker-E clearly has the advantage at low speeds.
  4. The F-15C and F-15E have the advantage at long ranges.
  5. I gather the author considers them overall roughly equal.

But the lines that catch my attention are:

“More likely to happen is that a F-15 would run into a Su-35 operated by some Third World despot. The pilots are not likely to have the training, tactics or experience to fight against an American aviator with a realistic chance of winning.”

I am not sure which “Third World despots” he is considering for his analysis. Indonesia is a democracy. Indonesia is not on bad terms with the U.S. I gather only Russia has the SU-35 with China and Indonesia having ordered them. Indonesia is using them to replace their aging fleet of U.S. F-5E Tiger IIs. The initial buy is something like 8 planes. Perhaps Algeria, Egypt, India, Pakistan, or Vietnam may purchase them at some point, but these are also not countries we are likely to conflict with. It does not appear that places like North Korea, Venezuela, and what remains of the government of Syria is going to obtain them (although Russia deployed at least 4 Su-35s in Syria). I think the author of the article probably needs to re-examine who is actually going to have and use these aircraft. So far, it seems to be only Russia, China (24 of them) and Indonesia (8 of them).

Islamic State Loses Border Area with Turkey

Nice summary of the situation: IS loss of border area with Turkey sharply harms group

A few highlights:

  1. ISIL has been expelled from the last area it controlled on the Turkish border. This effectively cuts it supply lines to the outside world.
  2. People fighting ISIL include:
    1. United States
    2. Turkey
    3. Iran
    4. Russia
    5. Iraqi government troops
    6. Popular Mobilization Forces (Iraqi Shiite militia)
    7. Syrian government troops
    8. Hezbollah (from Lebanon)
    9. Kurdish-led Syria Democratic Forces
    10. Kurdish Peshmerga fighters in Iraq
    11. Sunni tribesmen (Iraq)
    12. Sultan Murad (Syria)
    13. Mountain Hawks (Syria)
    14. Shamiya Front (Syria)
    15. Liberation Army (Syria)
    16. And probably a few others.
  3. In Syria, ISIL killed 4,401 people since June 2014, including 2,369 civilians
  4. In Iraq, ISIL has killed thousands.
  5. Archeological sites damaged/destroyed
    1. Temple of Bel, Palmyra
    2. Temple of Baalshamin, Palymyra
    3. Nimrod in Iraq
    4. Hatra in Iraq
    5. and probably a few others.

Some back-of-the-envelope calculations

Keying off Shawn’s previous post…if the DOD figures are accurate this means:

  1. In about two years, we have killed 45,000 insurgents from a force of around 25,000.
    1. This is around 100% losses a year
    2. This means the insurgents had to completely recruit an entire new force every year for the last two years
      1. Or maybe we just shot everyone twice.
    3. It is clear the claimed kills are way too high, or the claimed strength is too low, or a little bit of both
  2. We are getting three kills per sortie.
    1. Now, I have not done an analysis of kills per sorties in other insurgencies (and this would be useful to do), but I am pretty certain that this is unusually high.
  3. We are killing almost a 1,000 insurgents (not in uniform) for every civilian we are killing.
    1. Even if I use the Airwars figure of 1,568 civilians killed, this is 29 insurgents for every civilian killed.
    2. Again, I have not an analysis of insurgents killed per civilian killed in air operations (and this would be useful to do), but these rates seem unusually low.

It appears that there are some bad estimates being made here. Nothing wrong with doing an estimate, but something is very wrong if you are doing estimates that are significantly off. Some of these appear to be off.

This is, of course, a problem we encountered with Iraq and Afghanistan and is discussed to some extent in my book America’s Modern Wars. It was also a problem with the Soviet Army in World War II, and is something I discuss in some depth in my Kursk book.

It would be useful to develop a set of benchmarks from past wars looking at insurgents killed per sorties, insurgents killed per civilian killed in air operations (an other types of operations), insurgents killed compared to force strength, and so forth.

Islamic State Strength Estimates

We have no way of confirming the accuracy of these estimates (unlike our work during the Iraq and Afghan insurgencies), but a somewhat negative article on the Iraqi Army published in the New York Times in June does provide strength estimates for the Islamic State. The article is: New York Times Article

A few details:

  1. “The Islamic State has roughly 19,000 to 25,000 fighters, about half in Iraq and half in Syria…”
  2. “Most of the 10,000 to 12,000 in Iraq are concentrated around Mosul, in the Tal Afar area, and elsewhere in Nineveh Province.”