Category Sea Warfare

Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The U.S. Navy

The third and last of three recent articles from William (Chip) Sayers. The conclusions are his:

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Wargaming 101 – Sayers vs. The US Navy

Early in the Reagan Administration, his Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, adopted “The Maritime Strategy,” a doctrine that would send the US Navy aggressively into the face of the Soviet Union in the case of general war. Since the late 1930s, navies had been circumspect in sending their capital ships into the range of land-based airpower.  The wisdom of this reticence was most spectacularly demonstrated two days after Pearl Harbor when the Royal Navy’s battleship HMS Prince of Wales and battlecruiser HMS Repulse were sunk while underway on the open ocean by Japanese bombers based outside of Saigon. 

But 40 years later, SECNAV Lehman was seemingly throwing the hard-learned lessons of history to the wind. His plan was to send US Navy carrier battlegroups (CVBGs) into waters menaced by Soviet land-based airpower in order to threaten enemy base areas with nuclear-capable bombers. Secretary Lehman believed by bringing the CVBGs in close, it would unnerve Moscow and throw them off their game, possibly forcing mistakes that would ease the pressure on the central front. Writing years after he left Government, Lehman went so far as to say that the Maritime Strategy was instrumental in bringing down the Soviet Union.[1]

My math saw it a bit differently. The average carrier air wing of the 1980s consisted of two fleet air defense squadrons with 12 F-14 Tomcats, each; two light attack squadrons with a total of 24 A-7 Corsair IIs (later replaced by F-18 Hornets), one attack squadron with 10 A-6 Intruders — the heavy punch of the fleet — a fixed-wing anti-submarine squadron with 10 S-3 Vikings, a rotary-wing anti-submarine squadron with 8 SH-3 Sea Kings and roughly 16-20 radar warning, electronic warfare, cargo, tanker and reconnaissance aircraft. The F-14 was specifically designed to protect the CVBG from Soviet Naval Aviation (AV-MF, or in English, SNA) bombers, though it was also the only aircraft capable of escorting for the carrier’s bombers until the F-18s gradually replaced the A-7s over the course of the 1980s. Depending on how one counts the F-14, about 45% of the air wing was dedicated to defense of the battle group. Put another way, disregarding operational readiness rates, a carrier could dispatch 34 bombers against enemy targets. Compare that to a USAF F-111 wing that could put up considerably more bombers with significantly greater range and load-carrying capacity. Secretary Lehman’s big stick didn’t look so big in that light.

The Soviet Union was a Continental power and has always looked at military force from that perspective. To the Soviet General Staff, the Soviet Navy was a supporting arm whose primary responsibility was to aid the Army in securing its flanks. As such, the Navy took a backseat to the Army and Strategic Rocket Forces when it came to resources and emphasis in planning. In reality, it wasn’t as simple as this: Khruschev’s emphasis of nuclear missile forces at the expense of conventional forces gave the Navy not only a strategic offensive mission with their Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs), but also an important and frequently overlooked mission of securing the sub patrol areas near Soviet home waters when the range of their SLBMs made that possible in the mid-1970s.

To secure these “bastion” areas, the Soviet Navy devoted powerful combined-arms forces to keep the US Navy at bay. First, the Soviets deployed the world’s largest submarine fleet, comprised of a large number of modern, nuclear attack submarines along with a huge number of (albeit, mostly old) diesel-electric boats, and the only dedicated anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) submarines in any navy. The second leg of this triad was a fleet of “rocket” cruisers with large, long-range anti-ship cruise missiles capable of destroying any ship smaller than an aircraft carrier with a single hit, and a carrier with multiple hits. These missiles were very long-ranged (240-340nm) compared to Western counterparts and exploitation of that capability may have been problematic, but the Soviet fleet was betting that they could overcome the targeting difficulties inherent to over-the-horizon missile shots. These missiles were as large as small fighter aircraft and, in addition to carrying a very large armor-piercing warhead, would hit the target moving at several times the speed of sound. Given the basic physics formula of energy = mass x velocity2, they would not even require a warhead for most targets.

The big stick on this combined-arms team, however, was the bomber regiments of Soviet Naval Aviation. Each Soviet fleet had two or three medium bomber regiments of 24-30 aircraft, each. Tu-16/BADGERS could carry two anti-ship cruise missiles, while supersonic Tu-22M/BACKFIRES could carry one on long-range missions, or up to three closer to home. These Kh-22 (AS-4/KITCHEN) ASCMs were about 2/3rds the size of a MiG-21 fighter, but could fly at Mach 4.6 and 90,000 feet while carrying a 1,000kg warhead. The Backfire was the threat the F-14 was developed to counter and, as a single SNA regiment could launch as many as 90 KITCHENs at a CVBG, it is clear why the F-14 — capable of carrying up to six long-range AIM-54 Phoenix bomber killing missiles — and the later cruiser-based Aegis high-volume-of-firepower Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system had to be developed.

To illustrate the utility of wargames in analyzing how the enemy views his Courses of Action (COAs), I would cite an unusual example. During the research phase for his novel Red Storm Rising, Tom Clancy asked a couple of mutual friends to help him wargame a troop convoy crossing of the Atlantic, intended to be the centerpiece of the story. Larry Bond and Chris Carlson (now hugely successful novelists in their own right) used Larry’s naval miniatures wargame Harpoon to facilitate the study. They quickly found that the SNA bombers in repeated trials were running to a brick wall formed by a USAF squadron of F-15 Eagles based at Keflavik, Iceland. The SNA never got close to the convoy. It was shaping up to be a boring novel, when one of the team members (I’ve heard it was Chris, though he denies it) thought of mounting a Spetsnaz commando raid prior to H-Hour to take out the pesky Eagles. This story was so compelling, it ended up as a major plotline in the novel. And the rest, as they say, is history.

The idea that the Soviet Navy was planning to shoot through the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap and sweep the North Atlantic of NATO seapower was never a part of Soviet doctrine and Tom Clancy’s wargame experience shows why it was unrealistic. If a small number of USAF fighters could unhinge the entire operation, what would happen with many times that number of F-14s and Aegis cruisers? What of the powerful and practiced US and UK submarine force? Harpoon ASCM-firing B-52s? The enemy gets a vote when considering COAs, and NATO had a mind-boggling array of options to foil such a move by the Soviet Northern Fleet at the bleeding edge of its capabilities. This view was completely at odds with Soviet doctrine, which had the Soviet Navy playing — as it had in WWII — a primarily defensive role in support of the Army and the SLBM force.[2]

Far from counter-punching the Soviet Navy, the Maritime Strategy proposed walking face-first into a well-prepared, multi-faceted defense. However, Secretary Lehman was himself a naval aviator and he wasn’t suicidal. He did have ideas on how to mitigate the SNA threat. One was the use of Norway’s Vestfjord to provide his CVBGs with cover.[3]

USS America in Vestfjord clearly showing how the mountains would block the line of sight of missile-carrying bombers until they were very close to the target. (USNI Proceedings)

Vestfjord is created by the Lofoten Archipelago that forms the northern side of Ofotfjord at Narvik and extends about 100nm into the North Sea. The dramatic vertical relief provides an excellent radar shadow protecting ships operating in the deep waters close inshore from airborne radars searching from the north. If that were the only trick up the Soviet sleeve, hiding in Vestfjord’s radar shadow would provide extra time for the CVBG’s F-14s to whittle down the attacking bombers before they could achieve line of sight and launch their missiles. That wasn’t, however, the end of the story. In fact, it was just the beginning for me.

Over a period of about three years in the late 1980s, I participated in a number of wargames where this issue came up. As a Soviet Air Forces analyst, I brought a different perspective to the problem. Secretary Lehman was well aware of the threat SNA posed to his CVBGs, but he was undoubtedly unversed on Soviet Air Force (VVS) capabilities and formations, since it would not have been a factor for him until he sent the Navy into Vestfjord

While duking it out with the Navy, I ran into a phenomenon well-known within the wargaming community where the Navy under no circumstances would allow one of their aircraft carriers to be portrayed as being sunk or even seriously damaged. In one exercise, I was told that an attack by 90 bombers had managed to slightly damage one catapult. In another, my pilots had mysteriously mistaken a Royal Navy jump-jet carrier for a US CVN four times its size. After taking major losses on that raid, I nonchalantly told the Blue Navy player that I would whistle up another bomber division (like we “had plenty more where that came from”) and go at it again, tomorrow. He winced and admitted to me that there wasn’t any point because they would never allow me to sink a carrier. I replied that I just wanted him to admit that out loud before I let it go.

Yellow:  SNA ASCM-carrying bombers fly from bases on and near the Kola, around the North Cape and down the coast of Norway. Large purple circle: Kh-22 300nm launch line. Small purple circle: Kh-22 67nm launch line (reduced by the radar shadow in Vestfjord). Blue: USN F-14 fleet defense fighters push north to intercept the SNA before they can get radar line-of-sight to the CVBG. Red: VVS Bomber Aviation Division uses the mountains to screen its attack on the CVBG.

The final showdown came when I was called to the Pentagon and asked to give all the details of my tactics in a mano a mano combat with a Navy officer and a rather large crowd of onlookers. My final plan went like this: I sent a major SNA raid from the north to threaten the two-carrier CVBG hugging the southern slope of the mountains in Vestfjord. My opponent, knowing the broad strokes of my strategy, tried to hold back F-14s in reserve. However, he was quickly cut off by another Navy officer who said that the F-14s would have to “honor the threat” by committing the interceptors against the SNA bombers. 

While the F-14s were tied up 100-200nm north of Vestfjord, I sent in a bomber aviation division with about 90 Su-24/FENCER light bombers armed with a pair of 1,500kg Laser-guided bombs apiece. This force went into Vestfjord in a long trail formation covered by Su-27/FLANKERS. My opponent raised the difficulties of finding the target ships, but I countered that in a trail formation, all the later aircraft need do would be to follow the smoke columns from the fires of shot down aircraft and damaged ships. 

The FENCERS hugged the mountains so that their radars were looking out to sea for the CVBG, while the US radars were trying to pick out FENCERS from the radar clutter of the mountains behind them. What had been sauce for the goose had suddenly become sauce for the gander. The Navy knew from experience that picking out fighter aircraft from the mountains was a nasty challenge. This gave the VVS bombers a real chance to make it through to the target.

While nearly all modern warships lack any kind of significant armor, US Navy aircraft carriers are the exception. The Navy keeps the details close to their chest, but even if they don’t have conventional armor plate like a battleship, the use of fuel and water tankage can create a reasonable facsimile, while the sheer size of a carrier and the compartmentation available ensure that any damage is isolated and kept away from the vital areas of the ship. To do real harm takes a large bomb with real penetrative capability. Both of these are embodied in the 1,500kg bomb. Further, while dropping from low altitude — deck height or lower — the bomb would impact almost perpendicular to the side of the ship, ensuring maximum penetration. Laser guidance wouldn’t add too much to the equation, but it did give me an extra argument to deflect disputes about accuracy. With the bombs detonating inside the ship, there would be no danger from fragging one’s own aircraft and little danger to following planes, as well. A further advantage to dropping from such low altitude would be that it would be nearly impossible to mistake the target carrier with anything else — no other ship would tower over the bombers so they need only steer for the biggest object ahead of them.

Squirm as he might, my opponent was frustrated at every turn. Each idea he came up with was shot down by the onlookers. The Navy observers looked at our little desk-side exercise and could find no way out. They were finally forced to concede that their carriers were not invincible, after all. From that day to this, I haven’t heard the Navy talk about Vestfjord or taking on land-based air. My campaign may not have been what caused the Navy to rethink The Maritime Strategy, but it assuredly provided at least one nail in the coffin.

Naval wargaming is simple and straightforward when compared to wargaming ground combat. Naval warfare lends itself to mathematical fights between weapons systems.  There are little, if any, terrain considerations and all the combatants can be discretely modeled. Further, there is little of the human element to be considered as most of the interactions are, in reality, controlled by computer. In contrast, a land battle has a nearly infinite number of interactions and the human factor is the most important single determinate of defeat — you defeat the enemy by breaking his will to stand his ground — while weapons are merely tools to get inside his head. Elsewhere in this blog, I have stated that I had $40 commercial wargames in my closet that could do a more realistic job than the Pentagon’s million-dollar computer models. The cost factor only grows larger with naval wargames.

Perhaps this is why the US Navy has traditionally invested in wargames: the inherent simplicity, clarity and believable results of naval wargames make them accessible and instructive. After WWII, Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz was asked if anything surprised him during the battles of the Pacific war. His answer, that only the Japanese use of Kamikaze tactics had not been foreseen and wargamed before the war ever began, is informative on the utility of naval wargaming. The US Naval War College continues to this day to run annual wargames with its students working on fleet problems with real-world relevance. The War College’s own website declared that, “Simulating complex war situations—from sea to space to cyber—builds analytical, strategic, and decision-making skills. Wargaming programming not only enriches our curriculum, but it also helps shape defense plans and policies for various commands and agencies.” Thus saith the Navy. The Air Force would agree. If we can get the Army in on it, we might have something of use to the nation.

[1] Zakheim, Dov S. and Lehman, John (2018) “Lehman’s Maritime Triumph,” Naval War College Review: Vol. 71 : No. 4 , Article 11. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss4/11.

[2] Watkins, James D. Admiral USN, The Maritime Strategy, US Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1986, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1986/january-supplement/maritime-strategy-0.

[3] Ibid.

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His other recent and related articles are:

The Easy Button | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101 – The 40-60-80 Games | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101 – In the Bowels of the Pentagon with J-8 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101: The Bad Use of a Good Tool | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Wargaming 101: A Tale of Two Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

He is doing a presentation at HAAC on Day 2 (Wednesday, Oct. 18) on Wargaming 101: Schedule for the Second Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 17-19 October 2023 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

Bigger Fleets Win

This article just came across my desk courtesy of a friend: Bigger Fleets Win | Proceedings – January 2023 Vol. 149/1/1,439 (usni.org) 

I will avoid discussing the article, instead I will only discuss the two references to me (A little bit of vanity here).

First there is footnote 24, which references my book War by Numbers. There problem is that the discussion that he is footnoting does not something I recall writing. He may be paraphrasing me, but I do really recall making that point. Still, I appreciate the shout out.

The next paragraph also repeats footnote 24 following the sentence “Why bother discussing such ancient history when ‘everything is different now?’. I actually do not recall making such a statement, but maybe I did somewhere. Between a thousand+ blog posts, 60+ reports, 7+ books, etc. I could have said that. I don’t remember saying that. The article having two footnotes 24 and no footnote 25 leads me to suspect that the footnoting got garbled.

Later on in the article, they claim that “the DuPuy Institute finds it difficult to validate models of future combat based on past data because ‘there are no real-world examples in the past twenty-five years of combat between conventional armed forces with similar levels of advanced technology and military competence.'”

The first part of this…the “finds it difficult” part really does not sound like anything I have said. My attitude it that you go ahead and test a model to the past, because if it cannot predict the past, if it cannot predict the actions of lower tech weapons; then you can be pretty damn sure it is not also predicting modern combat. So this does not seem to be a claim I would make. 

Now the quote that is attached to that sounds exactly like something I would say or did say. I kind of remembering saying that in a phone interview. I don’t remember when or where. The reference is to footnote 30, an article on F-35s published in Breaking Defense two years ago. It is here: HASC Chair Slams F-35, 500-Ship Fleet; Highlights Cyber – Breaking Defense. Now, I don’t see any references to The Dupuy Institute there. Perhaps it is in one of the linked articles.

Anyhow, nice to be referenced and quoted. Would be nicer if it was in proper context. 

Update: Found the quote from my book. The article says:

“The Dupuy Institute, one of the most notable independent centers of operational research on land warfare, and one that models combat outcomes based on historical data, expressed this concern in 2017:

“Many have postulated… a revolution in warfare created by the synergetic effects of increased weapons accuracy… [etc., see above]. Recent U.S. conventional operations have increased this perception due to our opponents being technologically inferior, not particularly well trained, or simply incompetent, while the United States had enjoyed air supremacy and the luxury of outgunning our opponents.”

Now this is something I have said. It is footnote 29, the Freedberg article quoted above, which does not quote me. So, clearly the footnotes have gotten garbled.

I do have to thank Captain Tangredi, who I have never met, for calling us “one of the most notable independent centers of operational research on land warfare.” The quote from 2017 is clearly referring to War by Numbers (published 2017).

Beyond Lanchester

The publication of the book Beyond Lanchester last year had escaped me. See Beyond Lanchester: Stochastic Granular Attrition Combat Processes

His blurb on the book:

F.W. Lanchester famously reduced the mutual erosion of attrition warfare to simple mathematical form, resulting in his famous “Square Law,” and also the “Linear Law.” Followers have sought to fit real-world data to Lanchester’s equations, and/or to elaborate them in order to capture more aspects of reality. In Beyond Lanchester, Brian McCue–author of the similarly quantitative U-Boats In The Bay Of Biscay–focusses on a neglected shortcoming of Lanchester’s work: its determinism. He shows that the mathematics of the Square Law contain instability, so that the end-state it predicts is actually one of the least likely outcomes. This mathematical truth is connected to the real world via examples drawn from United States Marine Corps exercises, Lanchester’s original Trafalgar example, predator-prey experiments done by the early ecologist G.F. Gause, and, of course the war against German U-boats

This is an in-depth discussion of the subject of the use Lanchester equations by Dr. Brian McCue, previously of CNA (Center for Naval Analysis) and OTA (Congressional Office of Technology Assistance). We have also posted and written before about Lanchester (see War by Numbers). Some of our old blog posts on Lanchester are here:

Lanchester equations have been weighed…. | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

TDI Friday Read: The Lanchester Equations | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Lanchester Equations and Historical Warfare | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)


The book is 121 pages. The Table of Contents for Brian McCue’s book includes:

Introduction

Lanchester’s Theory

A New Look At Lanchester

Trafalgar

Subsuface Combat in a Test Tube

Weaknesses of the Deterministic, Continuous-Variable Approach

A Probabilistic, Event-Driven Revision of Gause’s Work

Theory and Experiment

Implications for Military Operations Research

Applying Hughes’s “Salvo Equations” to Engagements between U-Boats and Convoy Escorts

Wartime Analysis

Using Simulated Annealing to Solve a Problem of “Ecological” inference

Results

Back to Attrition: The Salvo Equations

Results: Fitting HESSE to the North Atlantic Data

Goodness-Of-Fit

Final Thoughts

 

Anyhow, having just discovered it, I have not read it yet. Brian McCue is an old friend of mine and previously published U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay. See: U-Boats in the Bay of Biscay: An Essay in Operations Analysis


 

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight?

So, the question is, what are we really looking at for an invasion of Taiwan?

A few caveats: 1) I am no China expert, 2) I have never been involved in gaming or analyzing the defense of Taiwan, and 3) I have no real “insider” knowledge of the subject at hand.

The armed forces of Taiwan consist of (according to Wikipedia) 163,000 active personnel and 1,657,000 reserve personnel. Their defense budget is $13.1 billion in 2020 and that makes up 2.3% of their GDP. That last figure is very interesting, for the United States spends 3.4% of our GDP on defense (2019). So, if there is a imminent threat of invasion (like in the next six years). then why are they not spending more? Does Taiwan discount this threat or are some people outside of Taiwan overrating the possibility of it occurring? Do some people sitting in the United States understand the threat and possibility of it occurring better than the people sitting in Taiwan?

Now, Taiwan is 81 miles off the coast of China at the narrowest part. There are also a few smaller islands controlled by Taiwan in between them.  So, what we are looking at is:

  1. Operations to seize some of these outlying lslands like Kinmen (Quemoy), Wucious and Matsu. Kinmen (Quemoy) is only 1.5 miles off the coast of Red China. 
  2. Some fifth column or hybrid warfare arrangement to seize the main island. Unless there is some large armed fifth column currently located in Taiwan that is strong enough to seize port facilities, etc., I don’t think this is a practical possibility.
  3. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan across the 80+ miles of the Taiwan Strait.

Needless to say, China is probably not interest is taking the economic hit for taking a couple of small islands and I don’t think any form of warfare less than an actual amphibious invasion will actually take the main island… so, I think the scenario we are looking at is invariably a “hot war” scenario of a conventional amphibious invasion.

So, how big would such an invasion force have to be?

Well, the Taiwanese Army is around 130,000. It is estimated that 80% is located on Taiwan, while the rest are stationed on the various smaller island. The forces consist of 4 armor brigades, 5 mechanized infantry brigades, 3 air cavalry brigades, 9 active infantry Brigades, and 24 reserve brigades (to be activated in time of war), and lots of other odds and ends and support troops. This is a modern, well-developed armed force. It does not have any combat experience, but neither does the Red Chinese Army (unless you count getting your ass handed to you by the Vietnamese Army in 1979). 

Now, the Taiwanese armor and offensive assets are significant. I gather their plan includes counterattacking any establish beachheads with their armor forces. This forces included 460 M60A3s, 450 CM-11s, 100 CM-12s, 50 M48A, and even around a hundred M41s. Some of these are with reserve forces. They also have 414 CM-32 IFVS, 300 V-150s and a spare thousand M-113s. This is a pretty significant force. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Republic_of_China_Army

Their supporting helicopters included 29 AH-64 Apaches, and 62 AH-1 Supercobras. So, mixed in with 9 armored and mechanized brigades and 3 air cavalry brigades, there is some real offensive punch here.

So, how big of a force would Red China have to send across? Well, I think it would have to be a well-sported force of tens of thousands to initially establish a beachhead. On D-day (6 June 1944) the Americans, British and Canadians landed 156,115 men. This is the largest invasion in history. So, we are looking at something here of at least 20,000 to 40,000 on the first day, and having to be reinforced heavily over the next few days. It will have to be a force capable of defeating the fully mobilized 1.8 million man Taiwanese Army. This is a major undertaking. 

Now… invading is one thing, but invasion forces have to be sustained. They will have to build up an army of 100,000 or more across the straits. Each person needs at least 10 to 20 pounds of food, water and fuel a day. If it is a mechanized force, it will be more. So, probably a thousand or more tons of supply that have to be transported across the strait every single day. The ships carrying these are targets. This can be intercepted by air or sea forces.

So, there is the Taiwanese air force. Their main fighter force consists of 113 F-16s, 46 Mirage 2000, 103 AIDC F-CK-1 (their own multirole fighter made in Taiwan). So, 262 fighters, plus trainers (another 62 fighters) and support aircraft.

This air force I assume will be supported by the U.S. Navy and the U. S. Air Force. That is some 40 to 60 fighters per carrier committed (I am guessing at least three) and however many fighters we choose to fly over there (we have around 1,700 fighters). Of course the Chinese have a load of fighters also, around 1,300 but lot of them are J-7, which are Chinese variants of very obsolete Mig-21s. Their more modern fighters include around 700 planes, most of them being J-10s and J-11/16. They are certainly not superior to the planes used by Taiwan or the United States. So we are looking at an air battle of maybe on the Taiwanese side of 262 + 62 + 180 (carriers) + 200 (USAF) = 704 vs 700 Chinese fighters. So this will certainly be a contested air fight and the U.S//Taiwanese aircraft will probably have the advantage. I recall only one amphibious invasion that occurred during an extended contested air fight (Falklands). I can’t recall any successful amphibious invasions that occurred where the defender had air superiority. Will the Chinese be able to establish air superiority? Will Taiwan and the U.S. be able to establish air superiority?

Needless to say, the air situation is not particularly positive for mainland China and argues against them attempting such an invasion…and that is before looking at the naval assets.

Naval assets are pretty one-sided. The Taiwanese fleet consists of 26 frigates and destroyer and 4 subs. I assume it would be supported by the U.S. Navy, which is in whole different league in size and seriousness. I don’t even need to do a “net assessment” comparison here on this one, the data is below, and it is pretty lopsided.

See: The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And: Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The U.S. Navy is here: U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

This does not address any support provided by the U.S. allies in the region, Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc. They may well provide additional air and naval assets.

Finally, if this did grow into a “hot war” scenario then the United States would certainly maintain control of the seas away from the Chinese coast. So in addition to being able to intercept almost all seaborne trade and oil going to and from China, they could easily take control of Chinese facilities and bases at the Spratley islands. Nothing China could do about that. So, any “hot war” scenario would include a loss of 60-80% of their trade, a loss of 60% of their oil, the loss of the Spratly Islands (perhaps handed back to the Philippines and Vietnam) and the other resulting long term economic impact. This is not a cheap or convenient effort. It is not the same as Russia taking Crimea.

Now, there are some relevant links I can point you too. They are below. Some of these I question. Mainland China can certainly get a significant force across the straits, but may not be able to maintain air superiority and may not be able to maintain control of the Taiwan Straights. Nothing like sending a 100,000 people across the straights and not being able to feed them. I do find the idea that mainland China will invade Taiwan in the next 6 years to be somewhat loopy.

For mainland China to seriously consider invading Taiwan, it is going to take another decade of two of serious development of their air force and particular their fighter arm. They only have about 50 modern “stealth fighters.” It will also need to have a naval force at least capable of securing the Taiwan Straights. Can’t envision they will have a naval force in the next 20 years large enough to protect the Spratley Islands from the U.S. or secure their overseas trade and oil.

 

——-Other Articles and blog posts———–

https://www.realclearinvestigations.com/articles/2020/08/17/the_scary_war_game_over_taiwan_that_the_us_loses_again_and_again_124836.html

http://theglitteringeye.com/wargaming-a-china-u-s-war/

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/09/01/what-war-with-china-could-look-like/

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/can-america-successfully-repel-chinese-invasion-taiwan-166350

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/12/09/if-china-invades-taiwan-taipei-plans-to-throw-a-thousand-tanks-at-the-beachhead/?sh=be8a96a6f93b

https://nypost.com/2021/03/11/us-war-games-over-china-threat-warn-of-likely-defeat-report/

https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2021/04/taiwan-defense-asymmetric-indigenous-capabilities/

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1217.html

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – wherefore and why?

Last month Admiral Phillip Davidson, Indo-Pacific Command, said that “I worry that they’re [China] accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States and our leadership role in the rules-based international order. They’ve long said they want to do that by 2050, I’m worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before that, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade. In fact, in the next six years.”

Now, I don’t know exactly what he meant by that statement, but I now see some buzz about China invading Taiwan in the next six years. For example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N7TbBZlCTdg. Note that Gen. Jack Keene does not actually say that they will be invading Taiwan in six years.

Also see:

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/10/china-could-invade-taiwan-in-next-six-years-top-us-admiral-warns

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/mar/23/taiwan-china-threat-admiral-john-aquilino

Note that Admiral John Aquilino “…disagreed with the outgoing Indo-Pacom commander Adm Philip Davidson’s recent comments that China could attempt to attack and take over Taiwan as soon as six years from now.”

Anyhow, is this really likely? I am going to briefly discuss the subject in two posts, this post focused on the “wherefores and why” of such an operation and a later post on the doing an actual invasion. 

A few caveats: 1) I am no China expert, 2) I have never been involved is gaming or analyzing the defense of Taiwan, 3) I have no real “insider” knowledge of the subject at hand, and 4) I am not an economist. 

I do find it a little difficult to believe that the Chinese, whose economy is heavily dependent on trade, is going to do something that would seriously disrupt this trade. The economy is 20 percent dependent on “Exports of good and services.” Their five major trading partners are the U.S., EU. Japan, S. Korea and Taiwan (!!!). The 2018 figures show total trade of 4,107.1 billion. Of that the U.S. makes up 583.3 (14%), the EU makes up 573.08 (14%), Japan makes up 303.0 (7%), Hong Kong makes up 286.5 (7%), South Korea makes up 280.2 (7%), Taiwan makes 199.9 (5%), Australia makes up 136.4 (3%) and Vietnam makes up 121.9 (3%). Other trade partners account for around 40% percent of the total. Almost all of it must be transported by sea or air. Overland trading partners to China are limited primarily to Russia (84.2), North Korea and Mongolia, and places like Vietnam (121.9), Laos, Thailand, Burma, Thailand, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and nominally Afghanistan and of course, the subcontinent of Pakistan, India and Nepal via Tibet (India is 84.3). Only three of these places is listed as among their top 20 trading partners (Vietnam, India and Russia, which make up 7% of their trade, assuming they were doing it all overland).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_China

Now, the question is whether or not their would be a full economic blockade. The international response was tepid when Russia seized Crimea. But seizing Taiwan is a whole lot bigger bite (24 million vice 2.4 million). Certainly they will loose the trade with Taiwan and the trade with the U.S., and maybe South Korea, Japan and EU. As taking Taiwan is almost invariably a “hot war” scenario, hard to see how things would continue as business as normal. Added to that, the U.S. Navy has absolutely superiority in the deep seas, so the U.S. could establish an effective blockade (See: U.S. Fleet versus Chinese Fleet | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org))

So as a minimum, we are probably looking at China losing 60% to 80% of its trade. This is at least 12-16% of its economy. As things in economies tend to ripple (like local consumer spending and services) then the potential economic impact on China is very significant.  

Are they really looking to destroy their trade in the next six years? It will have a big impact on their economy. Trade embargoes tend to drag on for a while. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, the trade embargoes were limited, and by the mid-1990s China there was no clear long-term impact. But, the trade impact of directly invading Taiwan would probably be worse than Tianamen Square, and it would involve direct military engagement with one or more of its major trading partners.

Added to that, around 60% of their oil is imported. This is done by sea. We could also interdict that. Now, their neighbor Russia does have oil, so this can be partially compensated for over time.

So, by embargo and even more effectively, by naval interdiction (which is certainly within our capability), we could possibly temporarily shut down 80% of their trade and 60% of their oil. If that was the case, then we are probably looking at something more like a 30-40% decline in their GDP. This depressed economy that could continue for several years.

When economies stagnate or decline, governments often get overthrown. Is this something they are willing to risk for the sake of taking Taiwan?

So the big question is: Is taking Taiwan so important to the current leadership of China that they were willing to take the hit and the risk that goes with it? 

 

U.S. Fleet versus Chinese Fleet

This subject has been addressed in a few cases in our past posts. Let’s dredge up a few:

From January 2020:

The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

From August 2016:

Chinese Carriers | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Chinese Carriers II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

To summarize:

………………………….US…China…Size

Aircraft Carriers………..11……………..100,000-106,300 tons

Small Carriers……………0…….2………..54,500-58,600

LHA/LHD (Carriers !)……9 * ……………..41,150-45,693

Cruisers…………………..22………………….9,800

Destroyers……………….69………………….8,315-9,800

Destroyers……………………….36………….3,670-12,000

LCS……………………….20………………….3,104-3,900

Frigates……………………0…….52………….2,000-4,200

Corvettes…………………0…….42…………..1,400

Missile boats……………………109…………..170-520

Submarine chasers…………….94

Gunboats………………………..17

 

LPD…………………………11..,…6……………25,000-25,300

LSD…………………………12…………………..15,939-16,100

LST…………………………..0…..32…………….4,170-4,800

LSM………………………………..31…………….800-2,000

Mobile Landing Platform………….1

Special-purpose……………7……………………895 – 23,000

MCM………………………..11…..20

PC…………………………..13

 

SSBN………………………14………………….18,750

SSBN………………………………..7……………8,000-11,500

SSGN……………………….4…………………..18,750

SSN………………………..48…………………….6,927-12,139

SSN…………………………………12……………5,500-7,000

SSK…………………………………55……………2,110-4,000

 

 

*This excludes the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), which is still on the rolls but because of the fire of 12 July 2020 is clearly never returning to duty.

Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2

So, China has 2 carriers, 36 destroyers, 52 frigates and 67 subs (SSN and SSK) to enforce it’s claims to the South China sea. All the nations that have competing claims (Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam) have a total of 4 destroyers, 43 frigates and 17 subs (SSK). This is not an even match. But, there are a few other players in the immediate region and there are a few other players in the Pacific that may have some influence. Lets look at them:

Also in the area are the following countries:

…………………….Singapore…..Thailand…..Cambodia

Small carrier………………………….1

Destroyers……….0
Frigates……………6………………..7

Corvettes…………6…………………7

Littoral……………..8

Submarines……..4………………….1

Patrol vessels…..2………………….8

Patrol ships…………………………22……………..21

Patrol boats…………………………23

LPD………………..4………………..1

LST……………………………………2

LCU…………………………………..9………………1

Mine Sweeper…..4………………….5

Others……………3………………….5

Auxilleries…………………………..17

Riverine Patrol Boats…………….189

 

Not connected to the South China Sea, but close enough to get our attention are the following:

………………………….S. Korea……N. Korea…..Japan…..Australia….New Zealand

Helicopter carriers……1……………………………….4……………2

Cruisers…………………………………………………..8

Destroyers…………….12………………………………22…………..2
Frigates………………..11…………….3………………10…………..8…………….2

Corvettes……………..12…………….14………………6
Submarines…………..18…………….70……………..20…………..6

Patrol vessels………….0……………………………………………………………..2

Patrol ships…………..71……………………………….13………………………….2

Missiles boats…………………………30

Torpedo boats……………………….247

Patrol boats…………………………..191……………….6…………..2

LSD……………………………………………………………………….1

LST……………………..8…………………………………3

Other Amphib………….5………………………………..2………………………….1

Mine warfare………….11……………30………………26…………..6

Other……………………2………………………………..8…………..7…………….1

Auxiliary……………….20……………………………….21………….2

 

Needless to say, in an extreme emergency (which would probably involve the U.S.) we would probably expect Japan, Australia, South Korea and Taiwan to cooperate. This is a total of 7 carriers, 8 cruisers, 40 destroyers, 51 frigates and 48 submarines compared to China’s 2 carriers, 36 destroyers, 52 frigates and 67 subs (SSN and SSK)

 

Finally there is the Russian Navy, which has 1 carrier, 2 battle cruisers, 11 destroyers, 10 frigates and around 45 submarines (SSGN, SSN and SSK), although not all will be in the Pacific. Then there is the United States which has 11 carriers, 9 amphibious carriers, 22 cruisers, 69 destroyers, 20 Littoral Combat Ships and 52 submarines (SSGN and SSN). Not all of these will be it the Pacific either. Details are here:

U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy

 

The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1

These has been a little rumbling lately in the news about Malaysia and Vietnam asserting their territorial rights in the South China Sea. Of course, part of the area they asserting is part of their 200 mile economic exclusion zone happens to be territory that Red China also claims. These are not the only countries that have such conflicts. Bordering the South China Sea is China, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. There countries with competing claims are China, Taiwan, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Let us look at their naval assets for a moment.

China has the largest navy in the region. Their fleet (the People’s Liberation Army Navy) consists of:

2 new carriers – 54,500 to 58.600 tons (one commissioned in 2019)

36 Destroyers – 3,670 to 12,000 tons

52 Frigates – 2,000 to 4,200 tons

42 Corvettes – 1,400 tons

109 Missile boats – 170 to 520 tons

94 Submarine chasers

17 gunboats

20 mine countermeasures vessels – 400 to 1,200 tons

6 Amphibious transport docks (LPD) – 25,000 tons

1 Mobile Landing Platform

32 Landing Ship Tanks (LST) – 4,170 to 4,800 tons

31 Landing Ship medium (LSM) – 800 to 2,000 tons

7 Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) – 8,000 to 11,500 tons

12 Nuclear attack Submarines (SSN) – 5,500 to 7,000 tons

55 Attack submarines (SSK) – 2,110 to 4,000 tons

The fleet also includes a 12 replenishment oilers and 232 various auxiliaries. The fleet is definitely growing and will have a third carrier around 2022.

The other countries have:

…………………….Taiwan……Philippines…..Indonesia….Brunei….Malaysia….Vietnam
Destroyers………..4
Frigates…………..22…………..(2)……………..8…………………………..6……………..9

Corvettes………….1…………….1…………….10…………………………..6……………14
Subs (SSK)………4……………..0……………..5……………………………2……………..6

ASW Corvettes…………………………………14

Patrol Vessel……………………11………………………………4…………..8

Patrol ships……….12…………..7……………37……………..9…………..8

Missile boats……..31………………………….15……………………………8

Mine sweepers….10………………………….12…………………………….4……………..8

Patrol boats……………………58…………..104……………23………….17……………54?

LSD…………………..1………….2……………..5

LST…………………..2………….5…………….12

LSM………………………………………………12…………………………………………..6?

Auxiliaries…………..5……….13………………42…………………………..14…………..12

 

The Taiwanese corvette is 567 tons, their patrol ships are 580 tons, their missile boats are 171 tonnes. The small Philippine fleet will get two frigates (2,600 tons) in 2020. Their corvette is 1,200 tons. Their offshore patrol vessels range from 712 to 3,250 tons. The patrol ships range from 140 to 357 tons, their patrol and missile boats are all less than 60 tons. The Indonesian ASW Corvettes 950 tons, East German built (we have a piano from East Germany).

There are some other countries on the periphery of this conflict, like Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia. We will address them in a subsequent post.

U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy

An elevated port side view of the forward section of a Soviet Oscar Class SSGN nuclear-powered attack submarine. (Soviet Military Power, 1986)

One person commented on this blog about the danger posed by Russian submarines. Probably a good time to look at what the threat is.

I did start my career in the U.S. defense industry working with submarine sonars and spectrum analyzers. This was back in the bad old days, when there were hundreds of subs out there. In our new found more peaceful world, there are a lot less.

Russian has around 56 submarines, according to Wikipedia. How many of these are fully operational is not something I know. Of those, 11 of them are boomers or ballistic missile submarines. These are submarines that carry nuclear missiles and would not be part of any fleet-on-fleet battle. They also list 6 “special-purpose submarines,” two are old converted attack submarines. The group of subs that threaten our control of the seas are 8 cruise missile submarines (SSGN) and 15 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). There are also 22 smaller diesel-power attack submarines. This is 45 or less operational subs to threaten our carrier fleets.

The biggest danger from Russian fleet is their 8 cruise missile submarines. These really are a threat to our carriers.

The United States has around 66 submarines. Of those, 14 are boomers.

 

Comparative Ship Count:

…………………………U.S……Size…………………….Russia…….Size

Aircraft Carriers………11…….100,000-106,300………..1….,…….58,600 tonnes

LHA/LHD……………….9……..41,150-45,693 tons (these are carriers !!!)

Battlecruisers………….0……………………………………2…………28,000 tons

Cruisers……………….22……..9,800 tons………………..3………….12,500 tons

Destroyers…………….69……..8,315-9,800…………….11…………7,570 – 7,940 tons

LCS…………………….20…….3,104-3,900 (“Littoral Combat Ships”)

Frigates…………………0…………………………………..10………….1,930 – 5,400 tons

Large Corvettes………………………………………………6………….2,200 tons

Corvettes……………………………………………………..76………..500 – 1050 tons

 

LPD…………………….11……25,300 (“Landing Platform Dock”)

LSD…………………….12…..15,939-16,100 (“Landing Ship Dock”)

LST (Landing Ship Tank)…………………………………..20…………..4,080 – 6,600 tons

Special-purpose………7…..895-23,000…………………18…………..500 – 23,780

Patrol Ships…………………………………………………..2…………..1,500

MCM……………………11……….1,312 tons (mine countermeasures)

PC………………………13………….331 tons (coastal patrol)

 

Large SSBN…………………………………………………..1………….48,000 tons

SSBNs………………..14……..18,750 tonnes……………10…………13,700 – 24,000 tons

SSGN…………………..4………18,750 tonnes…………….8………….19,400 tons

SSN……………………48…….6,927-12,139 tonnes…….15…………7,250 – 13,800 tons

SSK…………………….0……………………………………..22…………2,700 – 3,950 tons

Special purpose subs…………………………………………6………….600 – 18,200 tons

 

I did not bother to list landing craft (Russia has 37 of 555 tons or less), patrol boats (Russian has 37 of 139 tons or less), mine countermeasure vessels (Russian has 6 of 1,100 tons or less), auxiliaries (cargo ships, ice breakers, logistic vessels, salvage vessels, tugs, tankers, oilers, transports, etc.), LCCs (amphibious command ships), submarine tenders, maritime prepositioning ships (T-AK), the USS Pueblo, and the USS Constitution.

What is a ton:

Short ton (U.S.) = 2,000 pounds

Metric Tonne = 2,204.6 pounds

Long ton (UK) = 2,240 pounds

 

Kuznetsov on Fire

[Photo deleted at the request of AFP]

Just noted this article:

https://news.yahoo.com/russias-only-aircraft-carrier-fire-port-news-agencies-100747109.html

This is Russia’s only carrier. It is in dock in Siberia undergoing refitting. It is supposed to be done in 2021…but this is doubtful. The Russian fleet is still extremely limited in capability.

We have written about this before.

Lives Of The Russian (And Ex-Russian) Aircraft Carriers

The Admiral Kuznetsov Adventure

Russian Fleet Strength

Our count of carriers throughout the world in 2016 is given in this post:

Chinese Carriers

2016 count:

  • U.S. 19 carriers
  • U.S. Allies: 14 carriers
  • Neutrals: 5 carriers (India, Brazil, Egypt, Thailand)
  • Potentially hostile: 2 carriers (China, Russia)
  • Total: 40 carriers