Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
Excellence in Historical Research and Analysis
The following are reported deployed near Ukraine (according to U.S. statements). See: Roughly 75% of Russian conventional forces deployed against Ukraine:
So, 500 Russian fighter and fighter-bombers versus Ukraine’s 100. They will clearly have air superiority. Makes me wonder what the 35 air defense battalions are going to do?
There is a big mismatch in airpower between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian Air Force can field about 100 modern aircraft, Russia can field over 1,300. Actual count according to Wikipedia is:
This does not include Russian Naval aircraft: 22 MiG-29s, 42 MiG-31s, 22 Su-24s, 4 Su-25UTG, 6 Su-27s, 26 Su-30ss, and 18 Su-33s for a total of 140.
It is clear that Russia will dominate the air. For Ukraine to have a fighting chance, it would need significant air support from the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. providing such air support is not an option I have heard discussed anywhere. Such a promise would have deterrence value.
Not discussed: Helicopters and drones.
Reporting I saw a couple of hours ago (courtesy of Kaitlan Collins’ twitter feed): U.S. ambassador Michael Carpenter: “We assess that Russia probably has massed between 169,000-190,000 personnel in and near Ukraine as compared with about 100,000 on January 30. This estimate includes military troops along the border, in Belarus, and in occupied Crimea; Russian National Guard and other internal security units deployed to these areas; and Russian-led forces in eastern Ukraine.”
So, this estimate includes Russian-backed separatists, which I gather were not part of the previous estimates of 150,000. It also includes “Russian National Guard and other internal security units” which are usually not offensive forces.
The Ukrainian Army has 170,000+ mobilized. Don’t know how many they have recently mobilized but would not be surprised to find their mobilized strength currently exceeds 200,000.
The real difference in strength is in airpower, which I will post about soon.
There is a big difference between 72 hours and never.
See: Russia ‘will not capture’ any of Ukraine’s cities, Ukranian defense minister says
Now, I have no inside knowledge or deep understanding of Ukrainian defensive capabilities, so cannot comment on who is right. But U.S. General Miley did suggest that Kiev could fall within 72 hours. That seems like a pretty bizarre statement to me; as I don’t think that even if Russia starts a conventional warfare operation next week, Kiev will be the objective.
On the other hand, I am concerned about Kharkov (second largest city in Ukraine) and Mariupol (which connects to Crimea).
Anyhow, the Ukrainian defense minister says the Russians “…will not capture either Kyiv, Odessa, Kharkiv, or any other city.” That may be true, as I still suspect we are not going to see any major conventional warfare in Eastern Europe this month. If there was, I do not have the knowledge to say that this would be the case. As Russian will have air superiority, hard to imagine they won’t be able to make some progress.
Old posts on the subject:
So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion.
Saw this article from the Daily Beast this morning. Nothing new here, but reinforces my previous post on this subject: Putin’s Army Forces Ukraine’s Frontliners Into “Fight or Flight” Hell
The closest I have been to this area is the countryside around Belgorod (for obvious reasons).
Previous post: So, what is everyone about to go to war over? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And then there is this article: Troop-to-Task: A Russian Invasion of Ukraine
What catches my attention about this article is the discussion of whether “troop-to-task” ratios, also known as tie-down ratios, sometimes also known as force ratios; should be measured based upon population or based upon insurgent strength.
To quote from his article: “Throughout the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, American analysts and military officials referred to a 20:1,000 (2%) troop-to-population ratio for successful counterinsurgency.”
He also notes: “These troop-to-population security ratios are notoriously unreliable and have weak empirical basis for planning.”
That is more polite than how I refer to them in private. I did discuss this subject on pages 70-71 of my book America’s Modern Wars.
He then states: “Another popular way to analyze troop requirements in through troop–to-insurgent ratios.”
Popular? I have not seen anyone do this in recent times. I do have a book published on the subject (America’s Modern Wars). Perhaps I am missing out on something that is going on in the basement of the Pentagon.
He does note that “This approach falls apart at step one: Counting insurgents.”
I have a chapter on the subject (Chapter 11: Estimating Insurgent Force Size, pages 115-120). It is possible. It is not perfect or easy; but doing something vague and difficult is better than doing something that is conceptually flawed. To date, I have not seen anyone else do anything further on estimating insurgents. My work was a tentative first cut on the subject. My customers were completely uninterested in this analysis, and nothing further was done. Clearly something further needs to be done. I think that is better than doing something that is conceptually flawed.
I have discussed this before on this blog and in my book: America’s Modern Wars. My discussion of the previous RAND work on the subject is on pages 70-71. It includes the following table from our work:
If anyone can tell me from that table where a 2% figure could come from, have at it.
Listed below are a collection of four relevant blog posts on the subject (there are some 1,288 posts on this blog). We do have categories like “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” “Force Ratios” and “Estimating Insurgent Force Size” this blog. We have done a few posts on the subject.
Needless to say, I think that basing the “troop-to-task” ratios on population is at best marginally relevant. For example, the troop-to-task ratio for Vietnam was 88.4. We did not win that one. On the other hand, when the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) with its two dozen members, raised hell in San Francisco and Los Angeles in the early 1970s, doing a political assassination, kidnapping Patty Hearst, and robbing banks, we took care of it using the LA police. We did not need to deploy 2% of the population of the United States (estimated at 213 million in 1974) to deal with the SLA. We did not need to raise over 4 million troops to suppress this insurgency.
I do think the size of the insurgency is relevant.
Related posts:
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency III | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Force Ratios and Counterinsurgency IV | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
and many, many others….
My opinion of this potential conflict is summarized in these two posts.
So Is Russia going to actually attack Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
The first post “Russian Invasions” was made on 5 December 2021. The next one was done on 22 January 2022. Over the last two months, nothing that has happened has changed my opinion.
If I was going to invade Ukraine, I would use surprise, overwhelming force and hit them during good weather. This is not what is happening right now. So, I still have a hard time believing we are about to see a major conventional war starting this month.
On the other hand, a lot of people are saying something very different. Let me address a few of their points:
Time:
Apparently, the current U.S. administration is saying that the attack may happen in the second half of this month. To quote from the New York Times article by Helen Cooper and David E. Sanger that I found here: U.S. Warns of Grim Toll if Putin Pursues Full Invasion of Ukraine
“Should Mr. Putin decide to invade, American officials believe he is not likely to move until the second half of February.”
So, maybe a five-week campaign season? Two weeks in February and maybe three weeks in March. In 1943, the German offensive past Belgorod was called off around 24 March 1943 because of mud. Don’t know if “mud season” arrives sooner now and have not done any analysis of the currently mobility of the modern Russian army in poor weather conditions, but I am guessing it will still be a problem. The “American officials” quote in the NYT article are apparently aware of this with their next sentence “By that point, more ground will have frozen, making it easier to move heavy vehicles and equipment….”
So… five, maybe six, weeks campaign season, then mud.
As they note in the NYT article “…the officials warned that if Mr. Putin chose the most aggressive of his options, he could quickly surround or capture Kyiv…”
Maybe. Back in 1943, the Russians during the Battle of Kursk started their offensive north of Belgorod on 3 August 1943 and took Kiev on 6 November 1943. I am assuming that the 170,000+ Ukrainian Army will have some ability to slow the Russians down (unlike the Afghani army in August of last year).
Force Levels:
I gather Russia currently has around 110,000 troops and according to NYT “…the Russian military had assembled 70 percent of the forces it would need to mount a full invasion of Ukraine…who assessed that Mr. Putin had concluded that he would need some 150,000 troops from 110 battalion tactical groups to conquer Ukraine….”
So, they will have 150,000 troops “…to conquer Ukraine…”. I gather this includes the “Thirty thousand troops…now in Belarus.”
The Ukrainian Army is 170,000+. Now, I do not know how good the Ukrainian Army is relative to the Russian Army. Suspect the Russian communications, recon, spotting and artillery are pretty good (see: The Russian Artillery Strike That Spooked The U.S. Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)). They will certainly have air superiority (unless NATO decides to directly support Ukraine). So, they will have the advantage. The range of casualty estimates (see below) seem to give credit the Russians with a 1.7-to-1 to 2.5-to-1 advantage in casualty effectiveness.
Still, I do expect the Ukrainian army, on the defensive, in prepared positions, fully warned, recently supplemented, and maybe somewhat motivated to defend their homeland, is something more than just speed bumps. I don’t really see how Russia is going to take Kiev in a five-week campaign.
Casualties:
This one gives me real heartburn. My suspicion is that the officials briefed “casualties” and it ended up in the NYT as killed. Keep in mind “casualties” include killed, wounded, wounded and later died of wounds, missing and captured (and deserters). The number of wounded usually outnumbers the number killed by 3- or 4-to-1 and sometimes as high as 10-to-1. I do have a full chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers.
The NYT says “…potential deaths…of 5,000 to 25,000 members of the Ukrainian military…”
25,000 deaths times three wounded per person killed is 100,000 casualties. 100,000 casualties from a force of 170,000 is almost 60% losses. Are they really talking about an army-level force taking 60% losses in a five-week campaign? That has not happened a lot. Do those losses include the various reserves and militias that Ukraine can call up? If so, the numbers mesh together better.
The armed forces of Ukraine are 215,000 active (2022). Their reserves are 250,000 (2022). Available for military service is 11,139,646, ages 16-49 (2015). Fit for military service is 6,979,035 (2015). Reaching military age annually is 470,406 (2021). So, how big of a Ukrainian military are we talking about here? 170K in ground forces, or half-million or more counting reserves, militia and new call-ups? If Ukraine calls up its reserves and draft militia, is Russia really going to take (and hold) a lot of Ukraine with an army of 150,000? Anyhow, a lot of things don’t match up here. Perhaps that is because the NYT did not properly quote the “officials,” perhaps because of the details of some of the scenarios they drafted (which may be improbable), or perhaps because they have garbled their calculations (this has happened before, remember Afghanistan in August 2021).
Anyhow, it is hard for me to evaluate the data in the NYT article. In the meantime, I will stick to my opinions given in my first two blog posts on the subject.
With all the talk of war over Ukraine, it is always useful to look at the area they are actually talking about. I am sure there are more sophisticated analyses of the subject, but I particularly like the videos on www.youtube.com done by “bald and bankrupt.”
This first one is of the areas near Donetsk, on the Ukrainian side. It is a 35-minute video posted on March 8, 2021. Note the weather.:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2bNzjBJF_G0
Also worthwhile are these 16-minute videos from Moldovia and 18-minute videos from Transnistia posted in 2019:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnDxHTaeNX0
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kVnrqBb6y4
While these are hardly scholarly works, I do find them both educational and entertaining. He has a lot more videos on his channel.
Based upon on the buzz lately in the news and comments by some Western politicians, it appears that is only a question of when, not if, that Russia is going to attack Ukraine. Yet, Russia is saying they are not going to attack. So… who is right?
It still doesn’t look to me like they are going to attack. This opinion is not based upon any inside knowledge or deep understanding of the situation. I only know what I read in the news. But a few things get my attention:
Force Ratios: First of all, Russia has amassed a 100K+ troops along the border, plus some forces are in a training exercise in Belarus. I gather the actual figure is on the low side of 100,000, vice being near 200,000. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army, before mobilization is almost 200,000. So, is Russia really massing so it can attack while outnumbered?
Now, there are a few other factors in what is not that simple of a comparison. First of all, Russia can move more troops into the area(s) of interest on short notice. So that buildup of 100K+ could quickly turn into 300K+. If Russia had more than 300K troops in the area, I would become very concerned. But right now, they do not.
Weather: People are making noise like something will happen in February. It is freakin’ cold at that time of year. There is snow on the ground. Do they really want to attack then? I would wait until after the spring thaw, like the Germans did in 1941, 1942 and 1943, when you have a nice long summer for your campaign.
Warning: Surprise is a nice force multiplier. I have a chapter on the subject in my book War by Numbers. It is now no surprise if an attack comes. Furthermore, they even lack strategic surprise, so Ukraine has been able to lobby for more aid and has received more weapons. Why would Russia help their potential adversary get prepared, which is what has happened over the last couple of months? Ukraine is receiving weaponry and support that is probably would not have otherwise received. So, did Russia really choose to give Ukraine 2-3 months of warning to prepare before they attack them? This seems counter-intuitive.
Again, I go back to my original post, which is here:
Russian Invasions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
I may be proven wrong come February and Russia suddenly comes swarming across the border to take the rest of “New Russia,” to take Kharkov (the second largest city in Ukraine) and to cross the Pripet marshes and Chernobyl/Pripyat area to threaten Kiev, but right now, I am not sure this is the real scenario.
I still think the threats are part of a larger negotiation strategy (although I don’t rule out that the Russia government has simply made a mistake).
As I am sure a lot of people have noticed, Kazakhstan has been in the news this week. The protests there have been large and violent. They are now saying that at least 164 people have died, including 18 police. It has put an end to the influence of the longest serving FSU (Former Soviet Union) dictator, Nursultan Nazarbayev. He had been in office since 1990 (when the Soviet Union still existed). Good riddance, although I am not sure he is going to be replaced by anyone any better. It does not look like this is going to turn into a budding enlightened democracy any time soon. With Russia troops in the country, who knows exactly what path this will take.
The intervening force is CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which had been around since 1992/1994. It has six members, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kygyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia has the largest military of the six, with 900,000 active troops. The next largest military is 45,000. I gather most all of the members have sent troops to Kazakhstan, but clearly Russia is the dominate player. The current secretary general of CSTO is from Belarus.
At the moment, I don’t have much to say beyond what is being reported. Life has become uncomfortable for certain leaders in the FSU. The democratically elected but Russian aligned leader of Ukraine, Yanukovich, was thrown out of power in 2014 in the Euromaiden protests; the leader of Armenia, Sargsyan, was removed from office in 2018 (the Velvet Revolution); the leader of Belarus, Lukashenko, came pretty close to being thrown out of power in 2020/21 (the Slipper Revolution); and now the longest serving dictator in Kazakhstan has been thrown out of power in 2022. One does wonder who is next.
Update (1/13/22):