Category Russia

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 72 (ground actions)

Christopher A. Lawrence
May 6, 2022

Week eleven of the war. It rained on Wednesday. Clear weather until Monday. Waiting now for the war resume in earnest as I have a hard time believing that what we saw last week was the Russian spring offensive. The major action for the last few days appears to be a limited Ukrainian offensive to the north of Kharkov that took five villages in the last couple of days and took yet one more village Wednesday. It does not appear that Russia is actually moving forward at the moment and has not for several days.

A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. It is a relatively quiet day.

Is it now time for Russia to start its main offensive in earnest? Does a renewed Russian offense push southwest (towards Dnipro) or south (to encircle Slovyansk and Kramatorsk)? It does appear that they thinned their forces around Kharkov and concentrated everything around Izium.

The real objective here seems to be the cities of Siervierdonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) in the Lugansk and Donetsk provinces. These are all very close to each other. Is Russia going to limit themselves to cleaning up the rest of the areas claimed by the LPR and DPR (and then try to negotiate a cease fire), or are they going to strike towards other areas, like Kharkov and Dnipro?

Russia controls the majority of isolated Mariupol, with a group of over a thousand Ukrainians holding out in a steel mill. Russia renewed assaults on the steel mill the last couple of days. Russian troops are now inside the compound and the fighting continues. They are not going to be relieved. Ukrainian Army remains over 60 miles away.

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have 20 BTGs in Russia.

Russia continues to occupy three cities, Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). Russia has taken all of Izium (pop. 45,884) as of 1 April.

We are looking at six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol
6. Crimean border/Kherson

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. See: Transnistria and the invasion of Odessa | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Video from near the famous Snake Island (just off the Romanian/Ukranian border): Shocking video shows Ukrainian drone destroying 2 Russian patrol boats

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being shelled. The Ukrainian army is pushing the Russian army away from Kharkov and captured the village Wednesday of Molodova.

A Ukrainian advance to the SE of Kharkov on 18 April has reached Pechenihy (pop. 5,058), which is now being contested. Ukraine is also reported contesting Kochetok (pop. 2,968) on 18 April and Kazacha Lopan (pop. 5,0005) on 22 April. Kazacha Lopan (Cossack Lopan) is due north of Kharkov and is three miles from the Russian border. The Ukrainians took control on 28 April of the village of Kutuzovka to the north of Kharkov. They also re-took Ruska Lozova on 29 April, just on the northern outskirts of Kharkov. They re-claimed five villages on Sunday. These are Verkhnyaya Roganka (23 km ENE of Kharkov), Slobodskoye, Prilestnoye, Momotove and Kutuzivka. Ukrainian video (2:01) but gives a view of these areas: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osanIeHUD2w

Map from General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, operational information as of 18:00 on 30 April 2022. Pulled from Dr. Michael MacKay at @mhmck.

It does appear that Russia has thinned out its forces in this area and Ukraine is taking advantage of that. They are still fighting over a front of over 900 kilometers or 600 miles (this is a rough eyeball guess, I have not measured it exactly). Russia supposedly only has 92 BTGs deployed in Ukraine, so if one is concentrating forces around Izium, still has a couple BTGs tied down in Mariupol, still has some holding Kherson, the area NE of Kherson, Melitopol and surrounding areas, etc., then this does not leave a whole lot for the Kharkov area. This is a problem Russia has warring with a defender who is roughly equal in deployed manpower.

This analysis was inspired by a twitter posting by @PhillipsPObrien.

There was an explosion on 3 May in the Belgorod region at Tomorovka (map in my Kursk book). A rail bridge also went down near Kursk. The provincial governor said it was sabotage. On 26 April an ammo depot near Belgorod, Russia was attacked. There was also a major fire also reported at an oil storage facility this last week in the Bryansk region near the border. There was a report this weekend of a Ukrainian aircraft “shelling” a village of Zhecha in the Bryansk Region in Russia.

The Russians continued to expand southward from Izium, which is listed here as it is in the Kharkov Province even though their advance is heading south. They have captured the town of Zavody and the NE outskirts of Velyka Komyshuvakha. The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few days. Are they taking a breather before the start of the main offensive?

A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

The Russians have two options for an encirclement of the Ukrainian areas of Lugansk and Donetsk province. One is the “smaller option” of striking from Kreminna and near Soledar to surround Sieverierodonesk and Lysychansk. The other is a “larger option” to strike from Izium and surround Sloviansk and Kramatorsk also. They may try both. If they are doing that, then I assume options like a renewed assault on Kharkov or a drive towards Dnipro (which is a good distance away) are off the table.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 28 April that they had 1,523 soldiers killed and 6,167 wounded (4.05-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 38% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

Sievierodonetsk (pop. 101,135) might soon come under assault or possibly siege. It is already in danger of being surrounded, with Russian or DPR forces near Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692) and pushing down from the north from Kreminna and Rubizhne and from the south from Novotoshkivske.

The Russian and LPR (Lugansk People’s Republic) have taken Kreminna (pop. 18,417). This village is to the NW of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk (pop. 95,031). Videos verified by CNN show Russian forces in central Rubizhne (pop. 56,066). I gather it is still being contested. It does look the Russians are slowly advancing towards Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk from the north. This metropolitan area has a combined population of around 350,000.

They are reporting advancing to the north of Lyman (pop. 20,469), capturing the town of Zarichne (Ukraine report). Torske (pop. 1,653) is reported as contested, but I gather is still in Ukrainian hands.

To the northwest of Sievierodonetsk, Rubizhne (pop. 56,066) is still reported as contested with CNN showing a video of Russian troops in the center of the city on 20 April.

The Russians are reported to be advancing to the south of Sievierodonetsk, capturing the town of Novotoshkivske (pop. 2,170) according to a Ukraine report. Popasna (pop. 19,672) is also reported as contested, but it appears that Ukraine is still holding it.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands.

Between the advances south of Izium, near Lyman, at Rubizhne and south of Sievierdonetsk, I am guessing that these are preparatory actions before the main Russian offensive. If this already is the main Russian offensive, then this is kind of sad.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) to its west is also expected to come under assault.

Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084), located just to the south of Sloviansk. It had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. There is still fighting “in the direction of” (but not at?) Maryinka, Novomykhailivka, and Trudoliubivka, on the route to Zaporizhzhia.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Day sixty-six of the siege! The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. Russia did agree to let 100 civilians evacuate out of the encircled Azovstal steel mill. Ukraine is now reporting 344 people were evacuated from Mariupol and surrounding areas to Zaporizhzhia. On 3 May the mayor said there were still more than 200 civilians trapped in the steel mill. There were reports yesterday that the Russians were assaulting the steel mill, but it has not fallen yet.

There have been unconfirmed reports of phosphorus bombs and munitions being used in Mariupol, including claims made by the Azov Regiment on 27 April. All claims I have heard have only come from the Azov Regiment, which does maintain its own website.

Major Sergiy Volina, CO 36th Marine Brigade

The failure of the Russians to complete the conquest of Mariupol is probably due to a shortage of good infantry. If you are going to do urban operations, you need infantry. Otherwise, you are going to have to shell everything to oblivion, which appears to be what they are doing. Following video of street fighting in Mariupol was just released by the Azov Regiment (0:58): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q6UOYKQ8JD8

According to the DOD on 18 April there are almost a dozen BTGs in Mariupol. As each BTG has about 200 infantry, then 11 x 200 gives us 2,200 infantry. They have already probably had heavy infantry losses though, so could have less than half of those troops available.

The Russian military are now estimating the 2,000 fighters are holding out around the Azovstal steel mill in the city. The Mariupol city council reported more than 1,000 civilians and Ukarinian troops are in the steel mill complex, which covers 4 square miles and includes a network of tunnels. Added to that they reported on 13 April that 1,026 Ukrainian troops of the 36th Marine Brigade surrendered at the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works. Parts of the 36th Marine Brigade are still engaged there though, with the commander there reporting that had more than 600 wounded fighters and hundreds of civilians on 27 April.

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, is claiming that that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. The vice-mayor of this city said on 3 March that they can hold out for five days.

If the Russians decided to just pen in the defenders and leave them there, then they have to leave forces, 1,000 or 2,000 or more, to hold them down. So they started with almost a dozen BTGs in Mariupol, probably have to leave a couple behind, have to garrison the area also, and their remaining BTGs have been depleted. So, the forces coming out of Mariupol to rejoin other operations is less than 10 BTGs. The U.S. DOD claimed yesterday that 2,000 troops and some Chechen fighters are still in Mariupol and that 10 BTGs are now moving north. Does this portend an offensive south of Sievierdonetsk pushing north in the next few days? They do indicates that some of the BTGs appears to have paused to be refitted, which is not all that surprising.

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave is now reported.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? There does appear to be a Russian push near Oleksandriivka (pop. 5,095), on the route towards Mykolaiv.

It looks like some fighting is developing to the NE of Kherson, on the route towards Kryvyi Rih and Nikopol. Ukraine is claiming an attack on an ammunition depot at Russian-held Velyka Oleksandrivka. My suspicion is that Ukraine is going to launch an operation to try to reclaim Kherson and Kherson Province.

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: 61 degrees (16 Celsius) and sunny. Low tonight 41 degrees (5 Celsius). Rain forecasted for next Monday and next Thurdays. Almost perfect campaign weather. I am assuming that major operations can begin any day now.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia reports 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. There are some foreign volunteers (including two Chechen battalions who have been there all along and a Georgian unit). I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See: How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information.

Russian Army Build-up: I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. I don’t know what that really means. Who? From where? What will be their training? How long will it take?

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. Right now, there is talk about Putin declaring war on Ukraine. This is almost certainly related to this point, as he probably is going to need to mobilize if Russia is going to continue this war.

The Russian Home Front: Latest video from Moscow: (20+) Facebook

The discussion of the home front and the economic situation in Russia is reported in a separate blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukranian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. We take that claim at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). If Ukrainian military deaths are between 2,500 and 3,000, then I assume Russian military deaths are at least as many. Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated?

The UN is reporting on 4 May at least 3,280 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 1,727 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 105 in territory controlled by Russian separatists.

It is clear that more than 12,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 3,280 (Civilians) + 1,523 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 11,754). It is probably in excess of 15,000 total deaths depending on Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov.

The pilot Major Stepan Tarabalka, age 29, died on 13 March piloting a MiG-29. Some claimed he was the “Ghost of Kiev.” The Ukrainians claim as of 30 April 190 Russian aircraft destroyed, and the “Ghost of Kiev” is credited with 40 kills. The videos evidence has confirmed as of 2 May that 23 Russian jets destroyed.

Somewhat relevant (23 x 8 = 184):

Soviet versus German kill claims at Kursk | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

And don’t have a publication date yet, but the publisher has the manuscript:

Aces at Kursk – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This is beginning to look like an extended war.

Atrocities: The stories coming out of Bucha are pretty appalling. At least seven civilians have been reported killed in incidents not related to combat, 18 civilians were found dead in a basement, and another 20 civilians were found lying dead in the street, two with hands bound. The mayor of Bucha says they were executed. There are other claims scattered about Ukraine. How extensive and widespread this is still not certain, but this appears to be well beyond what one would expect from “collateral damage” from combat, and some appears to be deliberate. It does indicate, as a minimum, a lack of military discipline in some Russian units. This story is continually being updated right now. The latest figure (12 April) is that 403 civilians were killed in Bucha. The deputy mayor of Bucha says that 50 of the victims have been confirmed as extrajudicially executed. Additional reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. This has not been independently confirmed. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot.

Other Issues: Azerbaijani troops have occupied an area in Nagorno-Karabakh that they are claiming is theirs. The Russian peacekeeping troops there have not expelled them. Widespread protests in Armenia this weekend over Nagorno-Karabakh followed by 180 detentions. There were more protests this Sunday and another 237 protesters were detained.

Finland and Sweden are seriously discussing joining NATO later this year. They are rumored to be submitting their applications together by 22 May. I assume NATO will welcome them with open arms.

Ukraine may be on the fast track to join the European Union (which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013). EU member Austria has objected. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin.

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 6 May. They are showing Popasna in Russian control, which does not match with the reports I have seen which clearly reports Popasna in Ukrainian hands and being shelled. There appears to be no updates to the map in the last six or so days.

Eastern Europe Russia

The Advance in the Northeast – part 4 of the First Phase of the War discussion

This is the fourth in a series of extended posts examining the First Phase of this war. The first post is here: The Assault on Kiev – part 1 of the discussion on the First Phase of the War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Second post is here: The Assault on Kherson – part 2 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The third post is here: The Attack on Mariupol – part 3 of the First Phase of the War discussion | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Advance in the Northeast:

The northeast part of Ukraine includes a number of medium sized cities that are scattered about. From west to east, they include Chernigov (pop. 285,234), Konotop (pop. 84,787) and Sumy (pop. 259,660) and Okhtyrka (pop. 47,216). After that we kind of wander into Kharkov territory, which is the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest primarily Russian speaking city in Ukraine. This will be the subject on its own post.

These urban areas are kind of spread out and limited in number, leaving these cities as “islands” among the farmland and villages of this area. There is not any line of continuous urbanization, meaning each city stands alone. Furthermore, they make up a significant part of populations in these regions. For example, the Chernigov Province (oblast) has 1,511 settlements yet Chernigov city alone makes up almost a third (29%) of the population of the province. The second largest town is Nizhyn with only 66,983 people, the third largest town is Pryluky with only 52,553 people and no other towns in the province has more than 20,000 people.

Sumy province is a little more populated and a little more densely populated, containing the cites of Sumy, and the towns of Konotop, Orktyrka, Romny (pop. 38.305) and Shostka (pop. 73,197) and a whole lot of smaller towns and villages. Still, beyond the few larger towns in the direct path of the invasion, it is not very urban.

It appears that the forces used for this advance were not the best prepared Russian front-line forces. These were reserved for Kiev and other axis. Most of these forces were armed with T-72s (now an over 50 year old tank design) and had a large number of conscripts. In some cases, it does not appear that they were told they were going to war. The units appeared to be poorly prepared. The infamous video of a Ukrainian driving by a out-of-fuel tank column and talking to them is from the Sumy area. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14gVDF2b1vA.

The Advance on Chernigov: Chernigov (called Chernihiv in Ukrainian) came under threat on the first day of the war. It was close to the Russian border and on the route to Kiev from the northeast. The Russian Army made no serious attempt to take it. Forces in the area were determined to include elements of the 11th Guards Air Assault Brigade and the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade. The fact the Russian soldiers from these units were reported surrendering on the first day of the war is surprising. In the case of the 74th Motorized Rifle Brigade, it was an entire reconnaissance platoon along with its commander, Konstantin Buynichev. Ukraine provided pictures of them. Either these units were truly poorly motivated or this is a very clever cover story to cover for the U.S. intelligence the Ukrainians were receiving. Suspect the former.

Also the 35th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade was reported operating in the area, and according to one Ukrainian sources it took heavy losses in early March. Intercepted communications reported by the Ukrainians indicated that at least 45 soldiers died and it may have been as many as 132. At least one death has been confirmed by name.

The Russians did attempt to attack Chernigov on the first day of the war, but quickly switched the seizing the surrounding territory instead. The failure to take this city was a pattern we would see throughout this offensive. They either assumed it would fall when they showed up or they had intended to bypass it from the start. It was bypassed and Russia declared that it was surrounded the following day, except it was not. It was designated a “Hero City” on 6 March. On 10 March, the mayor announced that the city had been completely encircled. This was rather slow progress for an invasion that was already 15 days old against a city that was less than 50 miles from the border.

Fighting continued around Chernigov throughout this period, but it was mostly a loose siege operation with occasional artillery shelling. During the course of siege, more than half of the city’s population fled. Also, on 17 March, the American civilian, James Whitney Hill, was killed by a Russian artillery strike as he was standing in a food line.

There was some real fighting in and around Chernigov. According to estimates derived from Ukranian statements 300-350 soldiers were killed defending Chernigov and the surrounding areas. Ukraine claimed on 2 March that 132 Russian soldiers had been killed and 50-100 captured. A Russian Su-34 was shot down over Chernigov and the area was laced with mines, which the Ukrainians now have to clean up. The mayor of the city estimated that 350-400 civilians has been killed.

The Ukrainian armor column that attacked Brovary on 10 March was from this force that bypassed Chernigov. It appears to have been a single BTG (Battalion Tactical Group).

Not sure what the overall forces were that were committed to this advance, but based upon the extremely limited results of this advance, it was probably only 3 to 6 BTGs. They did surround Chernigov, sent a column of the 90th Guards Tank Division to Brovary to get shot up, and grabbed a whole lot of area in between, but the fighting was otherwise limited. At least two BTGs were shot up pretty badly.

On 31 March, the advancing Ukrainian forces opened the highway connecting Kiev and Chernigov and the mayor reported the first quiet night there since the war began. The Russian army withdrew from the area around 4 April, ending the fight.

The Advance on Konotop: Konotop is a weird story, because the Russians advanced on it on 24 February to attack it with a column of up to 300 vehicles (is this one BTG?). Konotop is also less than 50 miles from the Russian border and the Russian forces arrived outside the city on the first day before 1700. The Sumy state administration said that it was surrounded as of 1:30 AM on 25 February. This sort indicates that there was no real defense along the border, but only at the major cities and towns inside the country.

The mayor of Konotop, a representative of the neo-fascist Svoboda Party, claimed that he was prepared with the militia to fight to the last man for control of the town. He then negotiated with Russians and it was agreed that the Russian forces could pass through (not that any of the accounts actually say this) as long as the residents did not attack them. Russia also agreed not to change the city’s government, deploy troops in the city, obstruct transportation or remove the Ukrainian flag. So Instead they bypassed it and even moved through it but did not occupy the town. It was reported for Konotop on 26 February that two soldiers and 3 civilians had been wounded.

The neo-fascist Svoboda Party (Svoboda means freedom) holds only 1 out of 450 seats (0.2%) in the Ukrainian parliament. It held 37 seats in 2012 election but has been in decline since then. It holds 890 local positions out of 43,122 in regional elections (2.1%), the Mayor of Konotop is one of them.

The advance past Konotop went westward towards Kiev, although not sure these forces ever got as far as the outskirts of Kiev.

On 3 April, Russian forces had withdrawn from Konotop region (raion).

The Advance on Sumy: Sumy, the other major city in the northeast was also not taken. It came close to being one of the early Russian prizes coming under attack on the first day. The Russian ground forces in the area were commanded the 1st Guards Tank Army, including the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division, 4th Guards Tank Division, 47th Guards Tank Division, and 27th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. A mix of Ukranian Army forces (including 27 Artillery Brigade) and militia formed the defense. The Russians did enter the city, burning down a church there and getting in a fight near the Sumy State University in the evening (battle began at 22:30). During the night, the Russian forces withdrew from the city (at about 1:39 AM).

The Russian pushed into the city two days later, with the Russians advancing half-way into the city, according to a twitter post by Zelensky. They were then pushed back out by the end of the day, putting the whole city was back in Ukrainian hands. It would remain that way. If this account is correct, then it does raise the question as to why a force could manage to penetrate halfway into the city and not manage to deploy troops and supporting forces into the city to hold onto it for a while. It appears that this may have been company-size or a best unsupported battalion-size force thrust into the city that did not have the size or confidence to hold onto their positions. Again, one gets the sense with the back-and-forth in places like Sumy and Kherson, that the initial forward Russian forces were simply not that strong.

The Russians then partly enveloped the city and held in place around three-fourths of it for the next month, fed by a road from the south. Ukrainian casualties are claimed to be at least 81 soldiers killed, but this source is Wikipedia and does not appear to be properly backed by sources. Four soldiers were killed along with 22 civilians on an airstrike on 8 March. At least 25 civilians were killed and maybe over 100 civilians were lost during the month of fighting there. Russian casualties included 104 reported captured as of 11 March. The Ukrainians claimed a hundred Russian tanks destroyed. Most of these claims (96 tanks) come from a strike on Russian armor on 28 February by Bayraktar TB2 drones and GM-31 Grad launchers. As a BTG usually only has around 10 tanks, one wonders what formation or operation was being done that gathered that many tanks together. We doubt these counts of tank losses.

Sumy was relieved/abandoned on 4 April. On 8 April the governor said that the Russians had left Sumy province.

Two large outlying towns, Okhtyrka just to the south of Sumy, and Shostka far to its north also came under attack on the first day. The Russians threatened the outskirts of Okhtyrka on the first day in the morning and then pulled back that night or the following day. They then did not attempt to take it again but did occasionally shell and send missiles at the town. Two Danish journalists were fired upon in their car and wounded on 26 February. On 28 February a military base was hit by an artillery strike that killed more than 70 Ukrainian soldiers. It is this strike that led to claims that a thermobaric (vacuum) bomb was used. This has not been confirmed. The claim that it was a thermobaric bomb was made by the Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. I do not know if there is any other confirming evidence. For example see: Is Russia Using Thermobaric Weapons in Ukraine? International law does not prohibit the use of thermobaric munitions, fuel-air explosive devices, or vacuum bombs against military targets.

On 26 March Russian forces withdrew from the area. At least ten civilians had been killed in Okhtyrka and over 70 Ukrainian soldiers.

In the case of Shostka it was occupied by Russian troops without fighting. They withdrew in early April.

The town of Romny, the home of Ukrainian nationalist poet and writer Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861), was never occupied.

The Value of the Counterattack:

What does stand out in these accounts to the presence of multiple counterattacks on the part of Ukranian armed forces. This includes the counterattack at Hostomel on day 1 of the invasion, the counterattack on day 2 of the invasion in Kherson which briefly reclaimed the city, and the counterattack at Sumy on day 3 of the invasion. This points to an army that was confident, competent and willing to fight. While these counterattacks did not save Kherson, they may have saved Sumy and certainly messed up Russian operations north of Kiev. There is an untold story of how and why these counterattacks were organized and who ordered them.

An Independent Effort to Use the QJM to Analyze the War in Ukraine

Christopher A. Lawrence
May 5, 2022

The QJM is the old version of Trevor Dupuy’s Quantified Judgment Model, as described in his book Numbers, Predictions and War. The Dupuy Institute currently uses and markets the TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model), which is Trevor Dupuy’s updated version of the model.

We have recently had various discussions about staffing The Dupuy Institute so as to conduct analysis of various conflicts and potential conflicts around the world and publishing the results for the general public. So far, these discussions have not generated the budget to do so.

On the other hand, even though The Dupuy Institute is not doing this, we have discovered that some other people that are independently doing this. They are using the openly published versions of the QJM for their work (there were updates made to the QJM that were not published). None of this was coordinated with us and we only discovered it through twitter though the account of Jomini of the West at @JominiW

One of his more interesting tweets is that one:

I have no idea how accurate this map is and have been hesitant to post it before.

The modeling effort being done is by @HM_Schlottman and @HelloMrBond. They summarize their effort as:

Now, it does appear that their analysis is a “paper and pencil” analysis done using that which is derived from Understanding War, vice using the entire model as described in Numbers, Predictions and War.

Just to talk through what they did:

They analyzed a division-sized engagement (33,0000 vs 23,000)
Terrain was given as rugged mixed/urban.
Season was spring-temperate
Defense was “prepared”
Not sure what they did with air superiority, but it appears that they made it equal. Pretty sure that Russia still has air superiority. On the other hand, the Ukrainian intelligence assets are vastly superior (being American), and one of the aspects of air superiority is superior intelligence, so this may be a good compromise selection for now.
They give Ukraine a morale advantage (basically multiplying Russia’s combat power by 0.8), but not a big one. More on this in a subsequent post, as I know someone who is doing a similar QJM based analysis.
They do conclude that combat power advantage lies with the Russians at 1.4-to-1 ratio, which “is sufficient to achieve a breakthrough.”

Now, I always hate to comment on other people using the QJM. First, I am glad to see that they are using it and second, it is an estimation. My biggest fear is that my comments will turn into the “death by a thousand cuts,” masking what I think is otherwise worthwhile effort. But, I do have to make a few comments. Hopefully, they will not appear overly critical.

First, having a force preponderance does not mean a breakthrough. It means the Russians should advance. As they advance, they may achieve a breakthrough, dependent on the depth of the defender and the changing conditions of the battlefield. The model does determine win, lose or draw and rate of advance in kilometers. It does not determine whether there is a breakthrough or not. That has to be determined by the depth of the defender versus the distance advanced, often over several days. Obviously, when the distance advanced exceeds the defender’s depth, a breakthrough is achieved. This usually takes several days. As this development of the battle is often modeled using maps, acetates and grease pencils, then over the course of several days, conditions are likely to change, with the defender either being reinforced, or withdrawing, or other counterattacks or operations developing. This starts getting complex and is where the analyst takes over from the model.

Second, the force strengths for both sides “does not include supporting arms outside of BTGs (artillery, air defense, logistics brigades, etc.).” Well, the supporting material, translated into combat power in the form of supporting artillery and supporting air and drone strikes, is significant. In some battles the supporting air and artillery for an operation makes up the majority of the combat power. Not sure how you model that with any confidence in the current situation, but they do matter.

Third, he used his own combat power formula. So, for example, he made the combat power of a tank equal to “75 troops + their share of supporting weapons.” This is certainly a simplification, but probably one he had to do as researching and scoring all the weapons is a fairly time consuming process. The original QJM has a formula for calculating the combat power of each and every weapon, and then their combat power were modified by the conditions of combat. The TNDM used a revised formula for armor vehicles that we developed by Chip Sayers, the author of this blog post: A story about planning for Desert Storm (1991) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). He will be presenting at our conference in September: Schedule of the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 6 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Now, there is a wonderfully detailed chart dated 1 May 22 on the right side of their graphic that is worth looking at. You do have to copy the image and blow it up. But it is clear that it is the basis for his strength estimates. It would be nice to get a full explanation of what he is looking at here and what it says.

Anyhow, that is all on the QJM analysis so far. It is looking at a fight around Izium and I gather north of Sievierdonetsk. I gather it concludes that the Russians should be advancing. I don’t see anything here I fundamentally disagree with.

I am assuming that @JominiW, @HM_Schlottman and @HelloMrBond are following this blog. None are known to me, but they are welcome to contact me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com.

Eastern Europe Modeling, Simulation & Wargaming Russia

The Russo-Ukranian War of 2022 – Day 71 (ground actions)

Christopher A. Lawrence
May 5, 2022

Week eleven of the war. It rained yesterday. Clear weather until Monday, then more rain. Waiting now for the war resume in earnest as I have a hard time believing that what we saw last week was the Russian spring offensive. The major action for the last few days appears to be a limited Ukrainian offensive to the north of Kharkov that took five villages in the last couple of days and took yet one more village yesterday. It does not appear that Russia is actually moving forward at the moment and has not for several days.

A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics.

Russia controls the majority of isolated Mariupol, with a group of over a thousand Ukrainians holding out in a steel mill. Russia was assaulting the steel mill yesterday and apparently again today. Ukraine appeared to have lost communication with this group of defenders and then reestablished commo. So not sure this fight is over. They are not going to be relieved. Ukrainian Army remains over 60 miles away.

Russia continues to occupy three cities, Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). Russia has taken all of Izium (pop. 45,884) as of 1 April.

We are looking at six major areas of operations right now.