Category Russia

Two American dead, two captured and one missing in Ukraine

There is a good article in Rolling Stone that recounts the American and other foreign fighter losses in Ukraine. Recommend reading the whole article: https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/stephen-zabielski-russia-ukraine-conflict-1371094/

To summarize the losses:

  1. Two American’s have been killed.
    1. Willy Joseph Concel, Jr., 22, died in late April. He was an ex-Marine from New York/Tennessee with no combat experience.
    2. Stephen D. Zabielski, 52, died 15 May 2022. From New York/Florida. Served in the Gulf War (1991) with 101st Airborne Division.
  2. “Three” other western foreigners have been killed in combat.
    1. Ronald Vogelaar, 55, Dutch, killed by shelling on May 4 and buried in Kharkov.
    2. Bjorn Benamin Clavis, German.
    3. Wilried Blerio, 32, France.
    4. A humanitarian volunteer from Australia.
  3. Two Americans have been captured:
    1. Alexander John-Robert Drueke, 39, from Tuscaloosa Alabama. Former staff-sergeant, U.S. Army, served two tours in Iraq.
    2. Andy Tai Ngoc Huynh, 27, from Hartselle, Alabama. Ex-Marine with four years of service but no combat experience.
  4. Three foreign fighters have been captured in Mariupol by the DPR and sentenced to death.
    1. Aiden Aslin, 28, English
    2. Shaun Pinner, 46, English
    3. Saaudun Brahim, 21, Moroccan (he is not mentioned in the Rolling Stone article).
  5. One American is missing:
    1. Grady Kurpasi, 49, a retired Marine captain from Wilmington, NC. Three tours Iraq.
  6. The Ukrainians claim the International Legion has as many as twenty thousand fighters from over fifty countries.
    1. Russia is claiming 6,956 “foreign mercenaries” from 64 countries (see Day 117 post below).

Oh, and the Kremlin press secretary is saying that the Geneva conventions do not apply to the two captured Americans.

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 117 (ground actions)

There is really nothing new to report on the ground since my last post on Friday. The situation has remained mostly unchanged for the last seven days. I do think that everything stalling out for a week is news.

About 80% of Severodonetsk is under Russian control. All three bridges across the river between Severodonetsk and Lysychansk have been destroyed, leaving Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk a little isolated. Russia seems to be slowly taking Severodonetsk. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. The Ukrainian forces are hanging on at the Azot chemical plant in the western part of the city. It has underground bunkers. It is another sprawling Soviet-era industrial facility similar to what we saw in Mariupol. It does look like Russia is going to take all of Severodonetsk. I am not sure that Lysychansk, in a well defended position, is in any threat of being taken this week or next week.

Other parts of the front have shifted back and forth. Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. Russia continues expanding in control of the area to the north of Kharkov including having taken the village Vesele. In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, towards Slovyansk from Izyum and Lyman, and around Popasna in addition to fighting in Severodonetsk. Russia has taken some territory to the west of Izyum and the fighting continues back and forth in that area. Russians threatens to advance to the north and NW of Slovyansk and threaten to cross the Severskii Donetsk River at Bohorodychne, just north of Slovyansk but nothing has actually happened in the last couple of days. South of Severodonetsk, towards Poposna, the Ukrainians retook part of the village of Toshkhiva. North of Popasna, the Russians took Komyshuvakha two weeks ago, took Vrubivka on 18 June, and threaten Zolote. Around Kherson, fighting continues in two areas, near Kherson and to the NE of Kherson. Last week Ukraine took Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson but Russia took it back this weekend. Ukrainian advanced last week took three villages in the area. There were other claims of advances closer to Kherson, but they do appear to have panned out. The Russians appear to have pushed back against the Ukrainian forces to the NE of Kharkov, indicating that the Ukrainian offensive there is completely stalled out. A worthwhile graphic discussion dated 16 June of where the front line lies is here (14:05 in length): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjC1vSdf-oA.

There is some concern now that Ukraine seems to be on the downside of the casualty exchange, primarily because of overwhelming Russian artillery. Zelenskyy did state last week that Russians have a numerical advantage. It is stated in the Ukranian paper, “New Voice of Ukraine” that they are suffering up to 1,000 casualties a day in Donbas (a casualty includes killed, wounded and missing, so maybe 200 dead a day based upon this estimate). Ukraine is calling for more heavy weapons, in particular artillery and shells. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. I have reduced the number of postings of these updates to three times a week (M, W and F).

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. The expansion around Popasna is greater than what is shown here (see more detailed map in the Donbas discussion below).

Right now, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (the Donbas)
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy. The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are now 106 BTGs.

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Russians are pushing back towards Kharkov, taking over the last couple of days the villages of Mali Prohody, Velkyki Prokhody (to the west of Lyptsi), Vesele, Male Vesele (to the SE of Lyptsi) and Borshchova (south of Lyptsi). They appear to have advanced part of the distance back towards Kharkov and continue to expand their control of the areas to the north of Kharkov

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

Now Russia appears to be reclaiming some of the territory between Lyptsi and Kharkov.

The Russian push to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast, has been stalled out for weeks. It was either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few weeks. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

The latest Russian efforts took the town of Svyatohirsk (pop. 4,309), which is 19 miles (30 kilometers) due north of Slovyansk and on the north bank of the Severskii Donetsk River. Russia is claiming to have “liberated” Svyatohirsk on 7 June. They have advanced to Bohorodychne (north of Slovyansk) and are threatening to cross the Severskii Donetsk there and are advancing some to the NNW of Slovyansk. The Russian have now taken most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May.

The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk. 

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (the Donbas): The Russians currently hold most of Severodonetsk and appear to be on the advance. Next is Lysychansk, which is literally just across the Severskii Donets River from Severodonetsk. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. These two cities are surrounded on three sides. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Severodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk. Lysychansk is on higher ground with a river in front of it and a large open, partly wooded area beyond it and puts Severodonetsk under fire. This could be the point where the Russian advance in this area stalls out because of terrain. All three bridges across the Severskii Donets in this area have been destroyed by Russia. This was probably to reduce reinforcements and resupply from Lysychansk into Severodonetsk, but it also works the other way. It appears that they are not going to assault Lysychansk from Severodonetsk. They may come at it from another direction, perhaps from Popasna.

The Ukrainian forces are hanging on at the Azot chemical plant in the western part of Severodonetsk. It has underground bunkers. It is another sprawling Soviet-era industrial facility similar to what we saw in Mariupol. Do not know what else they hold.

To the south of Severodonetsk, part of the village of Toshkhiva was retaken this weekend by the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that they had achieved partial sucess, entrenching themselves in the northern outskirts. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine were still reporting on houses lost at Toshkivka, so I assume they still held part of it.

Further south, the village of Zolote in still held by Ukraine, even though some reports claimed Russia took it on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 7 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. 

The danger of surrounding Severodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. They have also pushed north taking the village of Vrubivka by 18 June.

The map below is from 13 June by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. 

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Still, it is claimed there are only about 22 – 24,000 people left in Slovyansk. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 9 June that they had 2,048 soldiers killed and 8,459 wounded (4.13-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 53% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. Ukraine is now claiming at least 22,000 civilians have been killed there. We have no evidence supporting a number this high. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while. I do have my doubts about some of the higher claims of civilians dead at Mariupol. 

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Attacks towards Kherson have taken back the villages of Soldatski, Pravdyne, and Oleksandrivka. It is claimed that Ukraine took Kiselivka (pop. 2,494) on 14 June but these claims appear to be questionable, as do several other claims of Ukrainian advances. It appears the Ukrainians have taken Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson last week and the Russians took it back this weekend.

The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. This advance appears to be stalled. The Russians appear to have pushed back against the Ukrainian forces to the NE of Kharkov, indicating that the Ukrainian offensive there is completely stalled out. It may not have been that large of an operation, as I think by default, most of the forces are both sides are concentrated in the Donbas. 

A car bombing occurred two weeks ago in Melitopol. Either the work of a developing Ukrainian insurgency or special operations. On July 9 two tractors and three truck trailers were burned. On July 11, a Russian ministry staffer was stabbed to death. It was reported on 16 June that the locals had feed poisoned cherries to the Russian troops. On Saturday (18 June) an explosion seriously injured a local Russian official in Melitopol, Evgeny Sobolev. Melitopol still has 70,000 residents.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 5 PM: It is a balmy 86 degrees (30 Celsius) and sunny. Low tonight 64 degrees (18 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for Thursday (80%) and the following four days. 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

There is also a group of Russian defectors and dissidents fighting for Ukraine, called the Freedom of Russia Legion. It is reported to be more than 500 people. It has been joined by the ex-vice chairman of Gazprombank, Igor Volobuyev. Among it stated goals is the disposition of Russia president Putin. A few related articles: https://web.archive.org/web/20220408160703/https://time.com/6165422/russians-in-ukraine/ and Former Gazprombank executive Igor Volobuev joins the Freedom to Russia Legion within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (novayagazeta.eu).

A Russian propaganda twitter account (AZ Osint) did provide a detailed listing on 17 June of “Number of Foreign Mercenaries in Ukraine.” Their source is the Russia Ministry of Defense. They claim that there were a total of 6,956 foreign fighters of which 3,221 remain as of June 17. This includes 4,866 from Europe (2,515 remain as of 17 June), 671 from Asia (266 remain), 147 from Africa (29 remain), 5 from Australian and New Zealand (one remains from each country) and 1,267 from “America” (North and South America) (409 remain). They do list the count of fighters by 64 different countries, including 1,831 from Poland, 601 from Canada (162 “eliminated”), 530 from the USA (214 “eliminated”), 504 from Romania and 422 from the United Kingdom (101 “eliminated”) and 355 (145 remain) from Georgia (which seems low). The rest of the countries are listed as 204 fighters or less. Now if some 477 people were eliminated from the U.S., Canada and UK, I think we would have heard about this. They do not list any foreign fighters from Russia, Belarus or Chechnya, although I know they exist (see the paragraphs above). Now, this is a likely Russian propaganda site, and probably the data offered is between 50% to 100% false (certainly the 3rd column is), but it is the first detailed estimate I have seen of the number of foreign fighters provided. If I was doing propaganda, I would not really want to admit that individuals from 64 countries are in Ukraine providing them help. This sort of reinforces that narrative that the whole world condemns Russia. 

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark. Bulgaria has been hesitant to provide Soviet-era heavy weapons to Ukraine due to internal politics. 

The proposed U.S. defense budget has been increased to $847 billion as a result of Senate action. Last year’s budget was $768 billion. This proposed defense budget is around half the GDP of Russia.

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has been confirmed. Two more generals reported killed this weekend, General Roman Kutuzov and Roman Berdnikov. Kutuzov has been confirmed.

So far twelve named generals have been reported killed in this war. Five deaths have been confirmed and three are still alive.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The IIF (Institute of International Finance) is estimating that the Russian economy will shrink by 15% this year and 3% in 2023. This is in line with previously reported estimates of an 8-12% decline in the Russian economy. I have seen and estimated for Ukraine was a 45% decline and IMF has estimated a 35% decline (and 8.5% for Russia). Not sure that is the case anymore with $100 billion in aid coming in (Ukrainian GDP was $181 billion). 

Price of oil is up to 112.82 as of 10:58 AM and the ruble is at 55.31 to the dollar, which is the strongest it has been since April 2015.

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed. Der Spiegel has claimed on 11 June that according to an advisor to Zelenskii, about 10,000 Ukranian soldiers have been killed since the start of this war. This seems entirely reasonable and believable (thanks to commenter Ulenspiegel for this reference).

Zelensky stated in an interview on 1 June that between 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are lost on the battlefield each week, with an additional 500 wounded. This would make for a wounded-to-killed ratio of 5-to-1 or 8.33-to-1.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people. On 2 June, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 160 bodies of killed soldiers and another 50 on 8 June.

The UN is reporting as of 19 June at least 4,569 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,677 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 183 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,569 (Civilians) + 2,048 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,568). It may be in excess of 28,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. We may be looking at 10,000 or more killed in each army. We are probably looking at thousands of civilian deaths in Mariupol.

As of June 7 Ukraine is claiming to have killed 31,250 Russian soldiers, while Russia is claiming to have killed 38,257 Ukrainian soldiers (as calculated by @HelloMrBond). I have questioned the Ukrainian claims: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, I also doubt the Russian claims.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Two Americans have been captured and another is missing. The captured Americans are Andy Tai Ngoc Huynh, 27, of Hartselle Alabama (just north of where my father was born), and Alexander Drueke, 39 of Tuscaloosa, Alabama. They were captured in the fighting in northeastern of Kharkov on 9 June or later. Drueke was a former staff sergeant in the U.S. Army that had done two tours in Iraq. He left the U.S. for Poland in mid-April. Huynh is a former U.S. Marine with four years of service, but no combat service. He flew to Eastern Europe sometime after 7 April. They have been shown on Russian TV and they both spoke in the video. They are believed to be the first two Americans captured in this conflict. The DPR has sentenced to death two captured Brits and a captured Moroccan. These sentences are currently under appeal.

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. It may continue for years: So How Long is this War Going to Last? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, I do think that it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me. The DPR has now convicted and sentenced three captured foreign fighters to death by firing squad. They are two UK citizens and a Moroccan. They have a month to appeal their sentences. So Ukraine has convicted three POWs for war crimes and now DPR has now sentence three people for execution. One wonders if this will be the subject for the next prisoner exchange. As the two sides are still conducting exchanges of prisoners and bodies of killed soldiers, there is some hope for some resolution here. 

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot. Ukraine stated on 8 June that they are investigating nearly 480 people for treason and collaboration.

Other Issues: 

Ukraine and Moldova are now recommended to be become candidate members of the EU. Georgia is still not (and it is not on good terms with Russia). It still means that it will be years before Ukraine becomes part of the EU, but this is a bid first step. The Ukraine government applied for EU membership less than week after Russia first invaded them. It still will be years before they become a member of the EU. For example, Turkey first applied for membership in 1987 and is still not a member (Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952… in 1953 my father briefly served as a liaison officer to their brigade in Korea). The leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania visited Kiev on Thursday and vowed to back their candidacy. Netherland and Denmark, previously hold outs, have said they are backing Ukraine admission to the EU, so this does look like this is going through (at least candidate status is). It is a solid showing of support for Ukraine.

This was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. The process of accepting them has been dragged out, thanks to Turkey. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. There is an alliance summit next week Madrid, but Turkey is saying that the issues may be not be resolved by then. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. Once these issues are resolved, they could be members within a few months. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 20 June. It does show some updates to the west of Izyum on 13 June. They have finally corrected this map so show Zolote in Ukrainian hands, which is something we have been pointing out for a month. They still left the date showing Zolote taken by Russians on 23 May.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 114 (ground actions)

There is really nothing new to report on the ground, the situation has remained mostly unchanged for the last four days. The big news is that Ukraine and Moldova are now recommended to be candidate members in the EU. It took a little bit to get there, but now things are moving in the right direction.

About 80% of Severodonetsk is under Russian control. All three bridges across the river between Severodonetsk and Lysychansk have been destroyed, leaving Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk a little isolated. Russia seems to be slowly taking Severodonetsk. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. The Ukrainian forces are hanging on at the Azot chemical plant in the western part of the city. It has underground bunkers. It is another sprawling Soviet-era industrial facility similar to what we saw in Mariupol. It does look like Russia is going to take all of Severodonetsk. I am not sure that Lysychansk, in a well defended position, is in any threat of being taken this week or next week.

Other parts of the front have shifted back and forth. Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. Russia continues expanding in control of the area to the north of Kharkov including having taken the village Vesele. In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, towards Slovyansk from Izyum and Lyman, and around Popasna in addition to fighting in Severodonetsk. Russia has taken some territory to the west of Izyum and the fighting continues back and forth in that area. Russians threatens to advance to the north and NW of Slovyansk and threaten to cross the Severskii Donetsk River at Bohorodychne, just north of Slovyansk but nothing has actually happened in the last couple of days. South of Severodonetsk, towards Poposna, the Ukrainians retook part of the village of Toshkhiva. North of Popasna, the Russians took Komyshuvakha two weeks ago, and threatens Zolote. Around Kherson, fighting continues in two areas, near Kherson and to the NE of Kherson. Last week Ukraine took Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson but Russia took it back this weekend. Ukraine has apparently again advancing taking three villages in the area. The Russians appear to have pushed back against the Ukrainian forces to the NE of Kharkov, indicating that the Ukrainian offensive there is completely stalled out. A worthwhile graphic discussion dated 16 June of where the front line lies is here (14:05 in length): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TjC1vSdf-oA.

There is some concern now that Ukraine seems to be on the downside of the casualty exchange, primarily because of overwhelming Russian artillery. Zelenskyy did state last week that Russians have a numerical advantage. Ukraine is calling for more heavy weapons, in particular artillery and shells. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. I have reduced the number of postings of these updates to three times a week (M, W and F).

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. The expansion around Popasna is greater than what is shown here (see more detailed map in the Donbas discussion below).

Right now, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (the Donbas)
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy. The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are now 106 BTGs.

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Russians are pushing back towards Kharkov, taking over the last couple of days the villages of Mali Prohody, Velkyki Prokhody (to the west of Lyptsi), Vesele, Male Vesele (to the SE of Lyptsi) and Borshchova (south of Lyptsi). They appear to have advanced part of the distance back towards Kharkov and continue to expand their control of the areas to the north of Kharkov

The Ukrainian general staff is reporting last week that a motor rifle brigade in this area, made up of enlistees from Donetsk or Lugansk has refused to continue operations. Had no idea of the validity of this report at the time, but it appears that the Russians are again advancing near Kharkov. I do not think this is a major offensive, just the back and forth between weakly held areas. I do not think Kharkov is under threat of being taken. 

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

Now Russia appears to be reclaiming some of the territory between Lyptsi and Kharkov.

The Russian push to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast, has been stalled out for weeks. It was either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few weeks. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

The latest Russian efforts took the town of Svyatohirsk (pop. 4,309), which is 19 miles (30 kilometers) due north of Slovyansk and on the north bank of the Severskii Donetsk River. Russia is claiming to have “liberated” Svyatohirsk on 7 June. They have advanced to Bohorodychne (north of Slovyansk) and are threatening to cross the Severskii Donetsk there and are advancing some to the NNW of Slovyansk. The Russian have now taken most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May.

The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk. 

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (the Donbas): The Russians currently hold most of Severodonetsk and appear to be on the advance. Next is Lysychansk, which is literally just across the Severskii Donets River from Severodonetsk. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. These two cities are surrounded on three sides. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Severodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk. Lysychansk is on higher ground with a river in front of it and a large open, partly wooded area beyond it and puts Severodonetsk under fire. This could be the point where the Russian advance in this area stalls out because of terrain. All three bridges across the Severskii Donets in this area have been destroyed by Russia. This was probably to reduce reinforcements and resupply from Lysychansk into Severodonetsk, but it also works the other way. It appears that they are not going to assault Lysychansk from Severodonetsk. They may come at it from another direction, perhaps from Popasna.

The Ukrainian forces are hanging on at the Azot chemical plant in the western part of Severodonetsk. It has underground bunkers. It is another sprawling Soviet-era industrial facility similar to what we saw in Mariupol. Do not know what else they hold.

To the south of Severodonetsk, part of the village of Toshkhiva was retaken this weekend by the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that they had achieved partial sucess, entrenching themselves in the northern outskirts. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine were still reporting on houses lost at Toshkivka, so I assume they still held part of it.

Further south, the village of Zolote in still held by Ukraine, even though some reports claimed Russia took it on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 7 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. 

The danger of surrounding Severodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. 

The map below is from 13 June by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. 

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Still, it is claimed there are only about 22 – 24,000 people left in Slovyansk. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 9 June that they had 2,048 soldiers killed and 8,459 wounded (4.13-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 53% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. Ukraine is now claiming at least 22,000 civilians have been killed there. We have no evidence supporting a number this high. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while. I do have my doubts about some of the higher claims of civilians dead at Mariupol. 

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Attacks towards Kherson have taken back the villages of Soldatski, Pravdyne, and Oleksandrivka. It is claimed that Ukraine took Kiselivka (pop. 2,494) on 14 June but these claims appear to be questionable, as do several other claims of Ukrainian advances. It appears the Ukrainians have taken Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson last week and the Russians took it back this weekend.

The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. This advance appears to be stalled. The Russians appear to have pushed back against the Ukrainian forces to the NE of Kharkov, indicating that the Ukrainian offensive there is completely stalled out. It may not have been that large of an operation, as I think by default, most of the forces are both sides are concentrated in the Donbas. 

A car bombing occurred two weeks ago in Melitopol. Either the work of a developing Ukrainian insurgency or special operations. On July 9 two tractors and three truck trailers were burned. On July 11, a Russian ministry staffer was stabbed to death. It was reported on 16 June that the locals had feed poisoned cherries to the Russian troops. Melitopol still has 70,000 residents.

 

Weather: Kharkov at 6 PM: It is 74 degrees (24 Celsius) and partly cloudy. Low tonight 60 degrees (13 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for today (50%), Saturday (60%) and Wednesday (50%) and the following two days.  

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

There is also a group of Russian defectors and dissidents fighting for Ukraine, called the Freedom of Russia Legion. It is reported to be more than 500 people. It has been joined by the ex-vice chairman of Gazprombank, Igor Volobuyev. Among it stated goals is the disposition of Russia president Putin. A few related articles: https://web.archive.org/web/20220408160703/https://time.com/6165422/russians-in-ukraine/ and Former Gazprombank executive Igor Volobuev joins the Freedom to Russia Legion within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (novayagazeta.eu).

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark. Bulgaria has been hesitant to provide Soviet-era heavy weapons to Ukraine due to internal politics. Major weapon systems from Germany are also still slow to arrive. 

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has been confirmed. Two more generals reported killed this weekend, General Roman Kutuzov and Roman Berdnikov. Kutuzov has been confirmed.

So far twelve named generals have been reported killed in this war. Five deaths have been confirmed and three are still alive.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The IIF (Institute of International Finance) is estimating that the Russian economy will shrink by 15% this year and 3% in 2023. This is in line with previously reported estimates of an 8-12% decline in the Russian economy. I have seen and estimated for Ukraine was a 45% decline and IMF has estimated a 35% decline (and 8.5% for Russia). Not sure that is the case anymore with $100 billion in aid coming in (Ukrainian GDP was $181 billion). 

Price of oil is up to 114.54 as of 11:49 AM and the ruble is at 59.31 to the dollar, which is the strongest I have seen it in a very long time (since early 2018).

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed. Der Spiegel has claimed on 11 June that according to an advisor to Zelenskii, about 10,000 Ukranian soldiers have been killed since the start of this war. This seems entirely reasonable and believable (thanks to commenter Ulenspiegel for this reference).

Zelensky stated in an interview on 1 June that between 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are lost on the battlefield each week, with an additional 500 wounded. This would make for a wounded-to-killed ratio of 5-to-1 or 8.33-to-1.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people. On 2 June, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 160 bodies of killed soldiers and another 50 on 8 June.

The UN is reporting as of 12 June at least 4,395 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,553 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 163 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,395 (Civilians) + 2,048 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,394). It may be in excess of 28,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. We may be looking at 10,000 or more killed in each army. We are probably looking at thousands of civilian deaths in Mariupol.

As of June 7 Ukraine is claiming to have killed 31,250 Russian soldiers, while Russia is claiming to have killed 38,257 Ukrainian soldiers (as calculated by @HelloMrBond). I have questioned the Ukrainian claims: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, I also doubt the Russian claims.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. It may continue for years: So How Long is this War Going to Last? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, I do think that it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me. The DPR has now convicted and sentenced three captured foreign fighters to death by firing squad. They are two UK citizens and a Moroccan. They have a month to appeal their sentences. So Ukraine has convicted three POWs for war crimes and now DPR has now sentence three people for execution. One wonders if this will be the subject for the next prisoner exchange. As the two sides are still conducting exchanges of prisoners and bodies of killed soldiers, there is some hope for some resolution here. 

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot. Ukraine stated on 8 June that they are investigating nearly 480 people for treason and collaboration.

Other Issues: 

Ukraine and Moldova are now recommended to be become candidate members of the EU. Georgia is still not (and it is not on good terms with Russia). It still means that it will be years before Ukraine becomes part of the EU, but this is a bid first step. The Ukraine government applied for EU membership less than week after Russia first invaded them. It still will be years before they become a member of the EU. For example, Turkey first applied for membership in 1987 and is still not a member (Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952… in 1953 my father briefly served as a liaison officer to their brigade in Korea). The leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania visited Kiev on Thursday and vowed to back their candidacy. It was a solid showing of support for Ukraine.

This was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 17 June. It does show some updates to the west of Izyum on 13 June. It is still showing Zolote in Russian hands on 23 May, which appears to be incorrect.

VVS View of Air Superiority

Alright, another William (Chip) Sayers post. This is his fourth post here. He will be presenting at our Historical Analysis conference: Who’s Who at HAAC – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

———————–William (Chip) Sayers——————

VVS View of Air Superiority

From the start of the current war in Ukraine, the TV talking heads have expected the Russian Air Force (VVS) to do business as a Western air force would.  When the VVS failed to achieve the results media reporters have been trained to expect by watching the US Air Force go to war, their question has gone out: “Where is the Russian Air Force?”  However, the news outlets are laboring under some major misconceptions.

Russia is what was once referred to as a “continental power,” i.e., its thinking is all about land forces with little regard for air or naval matters.  As such, the Russian Air Force is and always has been a wholly-owned subsidiary of Russian Army.  Being dominated by the Army, the Russian Air Force has never developed an independent doctrine for doing business that differs from merely being longer ranged artillery.  If they had developed along our lines, they might have a decisive force.  As it is, they don’t have the vision for what it could bring them and consequently don’t expect that much out of their Air Force.

The primary role of the VVS is what we used to call Battlefield Air Interdiction — strikes close behind the front lines that don’t require lots of coordination with their ground troops (~30-70km beyond the line of contact).  The VVS doesn’t really do Close Air Support (CAS) as we define it — they aren’t sufficiently professional for that, and weren’t during the Cold War, either [nor during WWII: C.A.L.].  Since the 1999 battle for Grozny, they have added a mission to their repertoire: doing massive damage to civilian infrastructure in order to crush their enemy’s will to resist.  And we have seen this in action in the Ukraine War.

However, they aren’t really concerned with establishing what we would call Air Superiority.  They view their Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) force as being their primary force to control the airspace over their heads, with fighters used as gap-fillers and support.  The fighter force is definitely the second-string.  If they could achieve Air Superiority in the Western sense, they wouldn’t know what to do with it.  They don’t understand it, and don’t care about it.  That’s why they have so much mobile air defense — to keep the enemy air force off the Army’s back.  And that’s all they want.

During the Cold War, the Soviets faced an entirely different situation than Russia does today.  NATO possessed large numbers of nuclear weapons and the General Staff Academy taught that:

“The air army conducts the following tasks in a Frontal offensive operation:

– participating in the initial nuclear strike

– covering the troops and logistics installations against the enemy’s air attacks

– destroying the enemy’s air forces on their airfields, in the air, and in their base areas

– searching for and destroying the enemy’s nuclear rockets

– supporting the action of combined arms and tank armies

– destroying and suppressing the enemy’s reserves

– conducting air reconnaissance – supporting seaborne assault landing [and air assault operations.]”  

 

Note that this was in the context of a war waged with nuclear weapons and the destruction of the enemy’s air forces was primarily to limit the ability of NATO to deliver nuclear strikes on Soviet forces.  Also note that attacks on NATO air forces is listed as job #3. 

In the 1970s, the Soviet General Staff believed that fully half of NATO’s combat power was resident in their air forces.  As a result, they created the Air Operation designed to negate NATO’s advantage in the air.  While they talked a good game and did come up with innovative means of attacking our bases, they never practiced the skills necessary to defeat us in the air.  For instance, they never developed the doctrine or tactics necessary to escort their bombers to their targets.  Instead, they continued to rely on vulnerable Ground-Controlled Intercept posts to direct their fighter forces — a hopelessly inadequate response to NATO tactics and capabilities.  In the post-Cold War world with the nuclear threat largely off the books, they have returned to a doctrine closer to that of the WWII Red Air Force. 

The news media seems to think “Air Superiority” means that the enemy air force is lying on the ground with their feet in the air like a dead bug.  As thirty years is considered ancient history in this country, all the public has known is Operations DESERT STORM (1991), DELIBERATE FORCE (1995), ALLIED FORCE (1999), ENDURING FREEDOM (2001), IRAQI FREEDOM (2003) and ODESSEY DAWN (2011).  In each of these actions, the US and Allied air forces so overmatched their opponents that they entered the conflicts with Air Dominance (a completely one-sided air situation) already achieved — precisely the condition the media pundits expect.  And indeed, if the General Staff (not the VVS) sees a real and decisive threat from an enemy air force — as they did in the Cold War — the only doctrinal term to describe their goal is “destruction.”  Even this is couched in the language of artillery: “Destruction does not mean total annihilation of enemy air forces…In order to destroy enemy air force capabilities to conduct organized resistance up to 50 – 60 percent destruction of aircraft is required.” This could have come right out of a Russian artillery field manual.  And, in fact, it did.

The Russian Air Force does have capable aircraft and smart bombs and missiles, but they don’t have the tactics, doctrine, or intelligence and targeting apparatus to exploit them properly.  In the Western way of war, smart weapons are used to slip bombs down airshafts or cut the structural supports out from under a high-rise building to cause its collapse, thus disrupting a country’s air defenses, control of their armies, collapse of their economy or governance of the entire nation.  Our bombs are sufficiently accurate that in the late 1990s, guidance kits were attached to “blue bombs” — inert training munitions filled with concrete — in order to destroy individual antiaircraft guns while specifically limiting further destruction.  Since then, several smart weapons have been explicitly designed to destroy the target without undue risk of collateral damage.  To the Russians, smart weapons are just neat toys that are more accurate than conventional bombs.  Mostly, this just means they don’t have to use as much ordnance to do the job — primarily a logistics advantage. 

When I began my career as a Soviet military aviation analyst in the mid-1980s, the VVS was introducing their 4th generation Su-27 and MiG-29 — their equivalents of our F-15 and F-16/F-18.  These were far more capable aircraft than their predecessors and would allow them to advance in their tactics to fly in a way similar to us.  I watched hard for evidence that they were tactically evolving to exploit their new capabilities, but they never did.  They are still flying them the same way, 40 years later. 

More to the point, the Russians simply don’t see things the way we do.  A perfect illustration is what they expect from their aircrew in training.  While the USAF and other Western air forces train to the highest possible standards, Russian standards seem rather lacking.  They simply don’t hold their aircrew to the same high standards we do.  Why?  One possible explanation is that they aren’t capable of reaching those standards, so they settle for what they can get.  There is another possibility, however.  The VVS may not have demanded as much of their aircrew because they knew it was unrealistic to expect so much of them under combat conditions that tend to degrade human performance radically.  Thus, they set the bar to a low, but realistic level that they could depend on their aircrew to achieve, even when being shot at. 

Another example illustrates their natural conservatism.  Many Hollywood treatments of the WWII bombing campaign against Germany include a scene where our intrepid leader is informed by higher headquarters that he must put on a “maximum effort” the next day.  This is General Savage’s cue that he must drive his maintenance crews to Herculean feats to get all 18 of his bombers in the air in order to make the strike effective.  Similarly, during the Cold War, the General Staff wanted their Air Armies to be able to generate a given number of “regimental sorties” at certain times — and particularly early in a war with NATO, when nuclear weapons might be involved.  A regimental sortie was specifically sized to accomplish certain normative tasks.  The typical fighter or fighter-bomber regiment had 36 aircraft, and a regimental sortie consisted of one sortie by each aircraft of the regiment, or 36 sorties.  But what of maintenance problems, operational or even combat losses that might reduce the size of the regiment below 36 aircraft? The Soviets added aircraft to their regiments — 9, in the case of fighters and fighter-bombers — to ensure that they would always be able to generate a 36-aircraft regimental sortie.  An expensive, but expedient way to achieve the goal.

All of this is to say, the Russians don’t think like us, and they often approach problems in ways foreign to our thinking.  They also don’t expect as much from their Air Force.

 

One final thought:  Our forebears fought Soviet pilots and aircraft operating from sanctuary bases in China and the USSR during the Korean War (which the Russians did secretly then, but very proudly admit to, now).  In Vietnam, they faced Soviet-designed and directed tactics and air defenses.  So, it is a rich treat to see Mr. Putin eating his karma today, feathers and all.

 

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 112 (ground actions)

There is really nothing new to report, situation has remained mostly unchanged for the last two days. All three bridges across the river between Severodonetsk and Lysychansk have been destroyed, leaving Ukrainian forces in Severodonetsk a little isolated. Russia seems to be slowly taking Severodonetsk. Russia controls the majority of the city. The mayor said on 12 June that Ukraine still controls a third of the city. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. The Ukrainian forces are hanging on at the Azot chemical plant in the western part of the city. It has underground bunkers. It is another sprawling Soviet-era industrial facility similar to what we saw in Mariupol. Do not know what else they hold. It does look like Russia is going to take all of Severodonetsk. I am not sure that Lysychansk, in a well defended position, is in any threat of being taken this week or next week.

Other parts of the front have shifted back and forth. Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. Russia continues expanding in control of the area to the north of Kharkov including the village Vesele. In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, towards Slovyansk from Izyum and Lyman, and around Popasna in addition to fighting in Severodonetsk. Russia has taken some territory to the west of Izyum. Russians continued advancing to the north and NW of Slovyansk and threaten to cross the Severskii Donetsk River at Bohorodychne, just north of Slovyansk. South of Severodonetsk, towards Poposna, the Ukrainians retook part of the village of Toshkhiva. North of Popasna, the Russians took Komyshuvakha a week ago, and threaten Zolote. Around Kherson, fighting continues in two areas, near Kherson and to the NE of Kherson. Last week Ukraine took Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson but Russia took it back this weekend. Ukraine has apparently again advanced, taking Kiselivka (pop. 2,494) on 14 June. The Russians appear to have pushed back against the Ukrainian forces to the NE of Kharkov, indicating that the Ukrainian offensive there is completely stalled out. A worthwhile graphic discussion of where the front line lies is here (13:17 in length): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-aO2B3-vzAw.

There is some concern now that Ukraine seems to be on the downside of the casualty exchange, primarily because of overwhelming Russian artillery. Zelenskyy did state last week that Russians have a numerical advantage. Ukraine is calling for more heavy weapons, in particular artillery and shells. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. I have reduced the number of postings of these updates to three times a week (M, W and F).

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. The expansion around Popasna is greater than what is shown here (see more detailed map in the Donbas discussion below).

Right now, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (the Donbas)
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy. The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are now 106 BTGs.

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. It did get hit with missile attacks on Sunday.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Russians are pushing back towards Kharkov, taking over the last couple of days the villages of Mali Prohody, Velkyki Prokhody (to the west of Lyptsi), Vesele, Male Vesele (to the SE of Lyptsi) and Borshchova (south of Lyptsi). They appear to have advanced part of the distance back towards Kharkov and continue to expand their control of the areas to the north of Kharkov

The Ukrainian general staff is reporting last week that a motor rifle brigade in this area, made up of enlistees from Donetsk or Lugansk has refused to continue operations. Had no idea of the validity of this report at the time, but it appears that the Russians are again advancing near Kharkov. I do not think this is a major offensive, just the back and forth between weakly held areas. I do not think Kharkov is under threat of being taken. 

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

Now Russia appears to be reclaiming some of the territory between Lyptsi and Kharkov.

The Russian push to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast, has been stalled out for weeks. It was either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few weeks. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

The latest Russian efforts took the town of Svyatohirsk (pop. 4,309), which is 19 miles (30 kilometers) due north of Slovyansk and on the north bank of the Severskii Donetsk River. Russia is claiming to have “liberated” Svyatohirsk on 7 June. They have advanced to Bohorodychne (north of Slovyansk) and are threatening to cross the Severskii Donetsk there and are advancing some to the NNW of Slovyansk. The Russian have now taken most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May.

The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk. 

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (the Donbas): The Russians currently hold most of Severodonetsk and appear to be on the advance. The mayor said on 12 June that Ukraine still controls a third of the cityNext is Lysychansk, which is literally just across the Severskii Donets River from Severodonetsk. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. These two cities are surrounded on three sides. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Severodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk. Lysychansk is on higher ground with a river in front of it and a large open, partly wooded area beyond it and puts Severodonetsk under fire. This could be the point where the Russian advance in this area stalls out because of terrain. All three bridges across the Severskii Donets in this area have been destroyed by Russia. This was probably to reduce reinforcements and resupply from Lysychansk into Severodonetsk, but it also works the other way. It appears that they are not going to assault Lysychansk from Severodonetsk. They may come at it from another direction, perhaps from Popasna.

The Ukrainian forces are hanging on at the Azot chemical plant in the western part of Severodonetsk. It has underground bunkers. It is another sprawling Soviet-era industrial facility similar to what we saw in Mariupol. Do not know what else they hold.

To the south of Severodonetsk, part of the village of Toshkhiva was retaken this weekend by the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian General Staff reported this morning that they had achieved partial sucess, entrenching themselves in the northern outskirts. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine were still reporting on houses lost of Toshkivka also, so I assume they still held part of it.

Further south, the village of Zolote in still held by Ukraine, even though some reports claimed Russia took it on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 7 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. 

The danger of surrounding Severodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. 

The map below is from 13 June by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. 

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Still, it is claimed there are only about 22 – 24,000 people left in Slovyansk. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 9 June that they had 2,048 soldiers killed and 8,459 wounded (4.13-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 53% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. Ukraine is now claiming at least 22,000 civilians have been killed there. We have no evidence supporting a number this high. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while. I do have my doubts about some of the higher claims of civilians dead at Mariupol. 

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? Ukraine has apparently again advanced, taking Kiselivka (pop. 2,494) on 14 June, getting closer to Kherson. It appears the Ukrainians have taken Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson last week and the Russians took it back this weekend.

The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. This advance appears to be stalled. The Russians appear to have pushed back against the Ukrainian forces to the NE of Kharkov, indicating that the Ukrainian offensive there is completely stalled out. It may not have been that large of an operation, as I think by default, most of the forces are both sides are concentrated in the Donbas. 

A car bombing occurred two weeks ago in Melitopol. Either the work of a developing Ukrainian insurgency or special operations. Have not heard of much since then. 

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: It is 75 degrees (24 Celsius) and mostly sunny. Low tonight 55 degrees (13 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for Saturday (80%) and Friday after next (50%). Otherwise, it is clear.  

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

There is also a group of Russian defectors and dissidents fighting for Ukraine, called the Freedom of Russia Legion. It is reported to be more than 500 people. It has been joined by the ex-vice chairman of Gazprombank, Igor Volobuyev. Among it stated goals is the disposition of Russia president Putin. A few related articles: https://web.archive.org/web/20220408160703/https://time.com/6165422/russians-in-ukraine/ and Former Gazprombank executive Igor Volobuev joins the Freedom to Russia Legion within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (novayagazeta.eu).

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark. Bulgaria has been hesitant to provide Soviet-era heavy weapons to Ukraine due to internal politics. Major weapon systems from Germany are also still slow to arrive. 

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has been confirmed. Two more generals reported killed this weekend, General Roman Kutuzov and Roman Berdnikov. Kutuzov has been confirmed.

So far twelve named generals have been reported killed in this war. Five deaths have been confirmed and three are still alive.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The IIF (Institute of International Finance) is estimating that the Russian economy will shrink by 15% this year and 3% in 2023. This is in line with previously reported estimates of an 8-12% decline in the Russian economy. I have seen and estimated for Ukraine was a 45% decline and IMF has estimated a 35% decline (and 8.5% for Russia). Not sure that is the case anymore with $100 billion in aid coming in (Ukrainian GDP was $181 billion). 

Price of oil is up to 120.78 as of 8:24 AM and the ruble is at 57.64 to the dollar, which is the strongest I have seen it in a very long time (since early 2018).

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed. Der Spiegel has claimed on 11 June that according to an advisor to Zelenskii, about 10,000 Ukranian soldiers have been killed since the start of this war. This seems entirely reasonable and believable (thanks to commenter Ulenspiegel for this reference).

Zelensky stated in an interview on 1 June that between 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are lost on the battlefield each week, with an additional 500 wounded. This would make for a wounded-to-killed ratio of 5-to-1 or 8.33-to-1.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people. On 2 June, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 160 bodies of killed soldiers and another 50 on 8 June.

The UN is reporting as of 12 June at least 4,395 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,553 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 163 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,395 (Civilians) + 2,048 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,394). It may be in excess of 28,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. We may be looking at 10,000 or more killed in each army. We are probably looking at thousands of civilian deaths in Mariupol.

As of June 7 Ukraine is claiming to have killed 31,250 Russian soldiers, while Russia is claiming to have killed 38,257 Ukrainian soldiers (as calculated by @HelloMrBond). I have questioned the Ukrainian claims: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, I also doubt the Russian claims.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. It may contiinue for years: So How Long is this War Going to Last? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, I do think that it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me. The DPR has now convicted and sentenced three captured foreign fighters to death by firing squad. They are two UK citizens and a Moroccan. They have a month to appeal their sentences. So Ukraine has convicted three POWs for war crimes and now DPR has now sentence three people for execution. One wonders if this will be the subject for the next prisoner exchange. As the two sides are still conducting exchanges of prisoners and bodies of killed soldiers, there is some hope for some resolution here. 

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot. Ukraine stated on 8 June that they are investigating nearly 480 people for treason and collaboration.

Other Issues: 

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 15 June. It does show some updates to the west of Izyum on 13 June. It is still showing Zolote in Russian hands on 23 May, which appears to be incorrect.

So How Long is this War Going to Last?

I first started drafting this post on 5 March. I then stopped work on it, because, you know, there were a lot of possible outcomes back then and if we waited long enough, some options would come off the table. The options that have disappeared was that this war was going to last only a few weeks, ending with a negotiated settlement and a partial Russian withdrawal. It has now lasted more than three months and looks like it is well on the way to lasting at least another three more months. 

This is a war that first needs to be resolved on the ground. It is about taking or not taking territory.  At this point, it is clear the Russia’s objectives have morphed into taking and holding the better part of four provinces: Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. Ukraine’s objectives are to take back some or all of them, and also Crimea and Sevastopol (annexed by Russia in 2014). So, the fight on the ground needs to be partially won by either Russia or Ukraine or fought into a long bloody draw. Then at some point, there may be a desire on both sides for a peace treaty. But until this is resolved on the ground, this is not going to happen. Therefore, I am pretty certain that the war will continue for the next three months, taking advantage of the summer months of good weather to push the Russian offensive as far as it will go, and to push the Ukrainian counter offensives as far as they will go.

If at the end of the summer nothing has been clearly resolved, then are they will have an opportunity to negotiate a cease-fire. Right now, Ukraine is saying it will not quit fighting until such time as they have reclaimed all the territory that has been taken from them (although what this includes may be negotiable). Russia seems equally determined to hold onto all the territory it has already taken. So, what is basis for a cease-fire?

Right now, each side has probably lost more than 10,000 troops. The total cost of this conflict may be more than 28,0000 dead. Ukraine has clearly lost more than 4,000 civilians and Russia has had one Russian civilian killed in Russia. The Donetsk Peoples Republic (DPR) has lost over 2,000 soldiers and the Lugansk Peoples Republic (LPR) has lost at least 600. 

The real key though is the economic situation. Russia economy is looking to decline between 8.5 to 15% this year and decline a few percent more in 2023. The Ukrainian economy is looking to decline 35-45% this year, and not sure where it will be in 2023. On the other hand, with almost a $100 billion in aid coming into an economy of $181 billion, I do wonder what the real decline will be this year and next year. It is possible that the Ukrainian economy could actually grow because of this war, although this is hardly the way anyone wants to grow their economy.

So, Russia can continue the war as long as there is the will to continue. Its GDP in 2021 was $1,710 billion. Even at 85% of its economy it can continue this war, especially as long as oil prices remain high.

Oil is both a big issue and not that big of an issue. While taxes on oil and gas makes up over 50% of the Russian government budget, oil only makes up 7% of the Russian economy. They can adjust by changing their taxation rates (they currently use a flat income tax). Of course, this may create public discontent (increasing taxes tend to do that, as does inflation, which they are also suffering from).

The real issue here is how long are the Russian civilians willing to tolerate this war. Russia has avoided sending too many conscripts into the fight. They do outnumber Ukraine by more than three-to-one in population, so theoretically with full mobilization they could build up an army three times larger than anything that Ukraine could deploy. This would kind of guarantee victory, but it might take over a year. To date, Russia has not attempted to do this and does not look like it will. They instead are trying to do “war on the cheap,” which is something that the U.S. tried in both Iraq and Afghanistan with poor results. 

The reason that Russian is not doing full mobilization is that it will almost certainly create a significant anti-war movement inside of Russia. An anti–war movement can quickly morph into an anti-government movement. Clearly, they fear their own population. They can produce all the surveys they want showing 80% support, but their actions, like not going to full mobilization during a war, clearly show what the reality it. One can get some sense of that with the 1420 interviews that I have posted here or watching the DDT concerts in Ufa on 18 May 2022 on Youtube. DDT is a deservedly very popular Russian rock band that has been around since the Soviet era. They are clearly not Putin fans. So, it appears that Russia is going to go forward with the forces that it has and the picture on the ground is not going to change rapidly as a result.

The Ukrainian population is mostly in support of this war although they did not have much choice as they were invaded. This is the type of support that takes years to whittle away. So, it does appear that they are willing to fight and willing to fight for a while. The key is the degree of outside aid. As long as “The West” is willing to provide it with $100-$120 billion a year, year after year, Ukraine can and will continue this fight. If the aid drops over time, then Ukraine has a problem, because at the start of this war, the Russian economy was almost ten times the size of the Ukrainian economy. So, it appears the essential element to keeping Ukraine in the war is continued support for Ukraine. About half the aid comes from the U.S. Is the U.S. congress going to pass a $40-$60 billion dollar aid bill every year? Our GDP is $25.35 trillion, so this is maybe 0.2% of our GDP.  Our defense budget was $782 in 2022, or 3.4% of our GDP. Should up to 10% of our defense budget be aid to Ukraine?

So, what is the picture on the ground? Well, it appears that Russia is slowly gaining ground and Ukraine is consistently suffering casualties (and I assume Russian losses are similar). It was become a war of artillery and infantry, with the artillery doing the killing and infantry doing the dying. This a good old fashioned conventional war of attrition. Any campaign that lasts longer than six weeks turns into a war of attrition. How long does a conventional war of attrition last? Well, the Iran-Iraq War lasted eight years (1980-1988). At this point, if both sides are able to maintain the war, then there is no reason to doubt that it could continue for years. 

It is clear that Russia has reduced its objectives to whatever they can seize in the immediate area of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces. They are not really seriously attempting to take anything more at the moment. They look like they will take Severodonetsk. Whether they can take anything further is unknown. It is clear that at some point, their primary objective will be to hold onto the four provinces of Ukraine they have seized and wait for “The West” and Ukraine to tire and then negotiate a cease fire. This plan basically does not indicate any desire to negotiate away any seized territory. I do not currently see any compromise being offered like giving back Kherson and Zaporizhzhia provinces in exchange for peace.  I also do not see right now Ukraine agreeing to a cease-fire in place. 

Ukraine as some point needs to get a counteroffensive going and start reclaiming ground. Most likely this will be in Kherson province as a victory there opens up lots of possibilities (including retaking Crimea). They started offensive operations there a few weeks ago, but so far it has stalled out. Possibly due to a lack of force and lack of forces.

So, the three long-term scenarios are:

  1. Russia continues to advance.
  2. Ukraine starts advancing.
  3. The war stalemates.

As I said, this war is going to be decided on the ground. Looking back at my draft posting on 5 March 2022, I note the second to last paragraph of that post said “So, right now this is beginning to look like a six-month to three-year war.” That was where I was leaning in early March and it is where I still stand today. If anything, I am more leaning towards a three-year war than a six-month war. I do not think by the end of this summer that both sides will be willing to sit down and find a compromise that could end this war.

This is a war that will not be decided by diplomats or international political pressure. It is a war that will be decided by the men fighting on the ground. 

Now, my last paragraph of my draft 5 March post was: “Might be shorter if someone replaces Putin or overthrows him, but the track record on that is un-even (for example, Saddam Hussien was not overthrown by losing the Gulf War in 1991).” That is another long discussion that I may address later. Right now, it does not appear be on the short-term horizon. It may be on the horizon in the long-term.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 110 (ground actions)

Russia seems to be slowly taking Severodonetsk. Russia controls the majority of the city. The mayor said on 12 June that Ukraine still controls a third of the city. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. I am not sure that Lysychansk, in a well defended position, is in any threat of being taken this week.

Other parts of the front have shifted back and forth. Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. It appears that Russia has retaken areas around Kharkov including the village Vesele. In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, towards Slovyansk from Izyum and Lyman, and around Popasna in addition to fighting in Severodonetsk. Russia has taken some territory to the west of Izyum. Russians continued advancing to the north and NW of Slovyansk and threaten to cross the Severskii Donetsk River at Bohorodychne, just north of Slovyansk. South of Severodonetsk, towards Poposna, the Ukrainians retook part of the village of Toshkhiva. North of Popasna, the Russians took Komyshuvakha a week ago, and threaten Zolote. Around Kherson, fighting continues in two areas, near Kherson and to the NE of Kherson. Last week Ukraine took Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson but Russia took it back this weekend. A worthwhile graphic discussion of where the front line lies is here (9:51 in length): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzMmQocjO8Q&t=488s.

There is some concern now that Ukraine seems to be on the downside of the casualty exchange, primarily because of overwhelming Russian artillery. Zelenskyy did state last week that Russians have a numerical advantage. Ukraine is calling for more heavy weapons, in particular artillery and shells. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map.I have reduced the number of postings of these updates to three times a week (M, W and F). I was updating them daily, seven days a week.

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

Right now, Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy. The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are now 106 BTGs.

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. It did get hit with missile attacks on Sunday.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. Russians are pushing back towards Kharkov, taking over the last couple of days the villages of Mali Prohody, Velkyki Prokhody (to the west of Lyptsi), Vesele, Male Vesele (to the SE of Lyptsi) and Borshchova (south of Lyptsi). They appear to have advanced part of the distance back towards Kharkov. 

The Ukrainian general staff is reporting last week that a motor rifle brigade in this area, made up of enlistees from Donetsk or Lugansk has refused to continue operations. Had no idea of the validity of this report at the time, but it appears that the Russians are again advancing near Kharkov. I do not think this is a major offensive, just the back and forth between weakly held areas. I do not think Kharkov is under threat of being taken. 

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

Now Russia appears to be reclaiming some of the territory between Lyptsi and Kharkov.

The Russian push to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast, has been stalled out for weeks. It was either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few weeks. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

The latest Russian efforts took the town of Svyatohirsk (pop. 4,309), which is 19 miles (30 kilometers) due north of Slovyansk and on the north bank of the Severskii Donetsk River. Russia is claiming to have “liberated” Svyatohirsk on 7 June. They have advanced to Bohorodychne (north of Slovyansk) and are threatening to cross the Severskii Donetsk there and are advancing some to the NNW of Slovyansk. The Russian have now taken most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May.

The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk. 

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provincesThe Russians currently hold most of Severodonetsk and appear to be on the advance. The mayor said on 12 June that Ukraine still controls a third of the city. Next is Lysychansk, which is literally just across the Severskii Donets River from Severodonetsk. As of 12 June Ukraine still controlled the eastern suburb of Metolkine. These two cities are surrounded on three sides. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Severodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk. Lysychansk is on higher ground with a river in front of it and a large open, partly wooded area beyond it and puts Severodonetsk under fire. This could be the point where the Russian advance in this area stalls out because of terrain. Two of three bridges across the Severskii Donets in this area have been destroyed by Russia. This was probably to reduce reinforcements and resupply from Lysychansk into Severodonetsk, but it also works the other way.

To the south of Severodonetsk, part of the village of Toshkhiva was retaken this weekend by the Ukrainians. The Ukrainian General Staff reported this morning that they had achieved partial sucess, entrenching themselves in the northern outskirts. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine were still reporting on houses lost of Toshkivka also, so I assume they still held part of it.

Further south, the village of Zolote in still held by Ukraine, even though some reports claimed Russia took it on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 7 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. 

The danger of surrounding Severodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. 

The map below is from 13 June by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. 

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Still, it is claimed there are only about 22 – 24,000 people left in Slovyansk. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 9 June that they had 2,048 soldiers killed and 8,459 wounded (4.13-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 53% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. Ukraine is now claiming at least 22,000 civilians have been killed there. We have no evidence supporting a number this high. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while. I do have my doubts about some of the higher claims of civilians dead at Mariupol. 

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? The Ukrainians are conducting offensive operations around Kherson, but no major territory has exchanged hands. They are 10 miles (15 kilometers) outside of Kherson. It appears the Ukrainians have taken Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson last wek and the Russians took it back this weekend. The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. We shall see if this advance continues. It does not seem to have gained much ground in the two weeks and Russia still holds Kostromka. So, it appears to be stalled. It may not have been that large of an operation, as I think by default, most of the forces are both sides are concentrated in the Donbas.

A car bombing occurred two weeks ago in Melitopol. Either the work of a developing Ukrainian insurgency or special operations. Have not heard of much since then. 

 

Weather: Kharkov at 5 PM: It is 82 degrees (28 Celsius) and mostly sunny. Low tonight 63 degrees (17 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for today (50%) and tomorrow (60%) and them it is clear for the next three days. 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

There is also a group of Russian defectors and dissidents fighting for Ukraine, called the Freedom of Russia Legion. It is reported to be more than 500 people. It has been joined by the ex-vice chairman of Gazprombank, Igor Volobuyev. Among it stated goals is the disposition of Russia president Putin. A few related articles: https://web.archive.org/web/20220408160703/https://time.com/6165422/russians-in-ukraine/ and Former Gazprombank executive Igor Volobuev joins the Freedom to Russia Legion within the Ukrainian Armed Forces (novayagazeta.eu).

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark. Bulgaria has been hesitant to provide Soviet-era heavy weapons to Ukraine due to internal politics. Major weapon systems from Germany are also still slow to arrive. 

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has been confirmed. Two more generals reported killed this weekend, General Roman Kutuzov and Roman Berdnikov. Kutuzov has been confirmed.

So far twelve named generals have been reported killed in this war. Five deaths have been confirmed and three are still alive.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)The IIF (Institute of International Finance) is estimating that the Russian economy will shrink by 15% this year and 3% in 2023. This is in line with previously reported estimates of an 8-12% decline in the Russian economy. I have seen and estimated for Ukraine was a 45% decline and IMF has estimated a 35% decline (and 8.5% for Russia). Not sure that is the case anymore with $100 billion in aid coming in (Ukrainian GDP was $181 billion). 

Price of oil is up to 118.94 as of 11:09 AM and the ruble is at 57.90 to the dollar, which is the strongest I have seen it in a very long time (since early 2018).

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed. Der Spiegel has claimed on 11 June that according to an advisor to Zelenskii, about 10,000 Ukranian soldiers have been killed since the start of this war. This seems entirely reasonable and believable (thanks to commenter Ulenspiegel for this reference).

Zelensky stated in an interview on 1 June that between 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are lost on the battlefield each week, with an additional 500 wounded. This would make for a wounded-to-killed ratio of 5-to-1 or 8.33-to-1.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people. On 2 June, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 160 bodies of killed soldiers and another 50 on 8 June.

The UN is reporting as of 12 June at least 4,395 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,553 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 163 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,395 (Civilians) + 2,048 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,394). It may be in excess of 28,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. We may be looking at 10,000 or more killed in each army. We are probably looking at thousands of civilian deaths in Mariupol.

As of June 7 Ukraine is claiming to have killed 31,250 Russian soldiers, while Russia is claiming to have killed 38,257 Ukrainian soldiers (as calculated by @HelloMrBond). I have questioned the Ukrainian claims: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, I also doubt the Russian claims.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me. The DPR has now convicted and sentenced three captured foreign fighters to death by firing squad. They are two UK citizens and a Moroccan. They have a month to appeal their sentences. So Ukraine has convicted three POWs for war crimes and now DPR has now sentence three people for execution. One wonders if this will be the subject for the next prisoner exchange. As the two sides are still conducting exchanges of prisoners and bodies of killed soldiers, there is some hope for some resolution here. 

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot. Ukraine stated on 8 June that they are investigating nearly 480 people for treason and collaboration.

Other Issues: 

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 13 June. It does show some updates around Kherson on 8 June. It is still showing Zolote in Russian hands on 23 May, which appears to be incorrect.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 107 (ground actions)

The fight for Severodonetsk continues. Russia controls the majority of the city. Don’t know if that means 60% or 90%, but I gather it is closer to the later. I assume they also control the eastern suburb of Metolkine. Over the last two days, that is really the only story. Not much else has changed. Zelenskyy did state a couple of days ago that Russians have a numerical advantage.

There are really no other significant operations in the last two days out of Izyum or towards Slovyansk or out of Poposna. The rest of the front seems quiet. Even the Ukrainian General Staff report of 10 June 06:53 note this with phrases like “Slovansk front, Russia did not undertake any active combat operations…” and “Lyman front, Russian occupation forces did not engage in active hostilities…:”

This fight for Severodonetsk is significant politically, as this is one of the four cities that Russia needs to take to claim all of Donetsk and Lugansk and Lysychansk is right next door to it. Furthermore, they were in a position to surround both Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and had effectively enveloped them from three sides. The Ukrainians are fighting around Severodonetsk and Lysychansk with their head in a noose. But those surrounding efforts had not made any progress for days. The next few days will be telling. It is claimed that the Russian army has been ordered to take or encircle Severodonetsk by 10 June. 

Fighting is still going on in around seven locales along the front. It appears that the Kharkov front has stabilized on their current lines and are mostly limited to shelling each other.  In Lugansk/Donetsk area Russia threatens operations towards Barvenkove, from Lyman towards Slovyansk, and around Poposna in addition to fighting in Severodonetsk. A week ago Russia took Komyshuvakha, to the north of Popasna. No villages in these areas have changed hands since last week except for Svyatohirsk (north bank of the Severskii Donetsk River). It appears all these areas are all active fronts though. Around Kherson, Ukraine is conducting two offensives, one towards Kherson and one to the NE of Kherson looking to drive behind it. They don’t seem to be gaining much ground. No villages changed hands since last week except possibly Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. I have reduced the number of postings of these updates to three times a week (M, W and F). I was updating them daily, seven days a week.

The map below from 20 May is borrowed from Dr. Michael Mackay @mhmck. The area threatened with encirclement contain the cities of Sievierdonetsk and Lysychansk and surrounding areas which had a population in excess of 350,000. One can see the expansion around Popasna.

The Russians have made some progress on their larger objective of taking all of the Lugansk/Donetsk provinces. Not sure how much more they can do. The objectives are clearly Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. Sloviansk and Kramatorsk appear to be secure. The four main cities in this area are Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Sloviansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084). It appears that the war has been reduced to 1) a fight over Severodonetsk and Lysychansk and 2) maybe a fight over Kherson. We shall see if any other major operations develop.

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only two appear to be active right now. Russia now occupies four cities, Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928), Melitopol (pop. 150,768) and Kherson (pop. 283,649). 

1. Kiev – secure

2. Odessa – secure

3. Kharkov – secure

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces
5. Mariupol – operations completed
6. Crimean border/Kherson

It appears that Kiev, Chernigov, Sumy and the northeast part of Ukraine are secure. Of course, Russia can always reintroduce troops later from Russia or Belarus. They are supposed to have around 20 BTGs in Russia. A Ukranian border guard was killed on 16 May near Sumy. The U.S. DOD is reporting that the Russian forces in Ukraine are now 106 BTGs.

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kiev is secure. It did get hit with missile attacks on Sunday.

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkov looks to be securely held but is still being hit by both missiles and artillery. The areas held here have not changed much since 17 May (see maps below). Last week, the village of Vesele was taken by the Ukrainians and since then it appears that the Kharkov front has stabilized on their current lines and are mostly limited to shelling each other. The Ukrainian general staff is reporting that a motor rifle brigade in this area, made up of enlistees from Donetsk or Lugansk has refused to continue operations. Have no idea of the validity of this report. 

Map showing front lines near Kharkov on 27 April and 17 May (cribbed from @War_Mapper), with the 17 May map showing the taking of Dementiivka.

The Russians do appear to have been pushing to the southwest towards Barvinkove (pop. 8,110), vice the south or southeast. So it is either a broader encirclement of Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, or the rumored drive on Dnipro (which I really don’t believe they are going to try). Still, no villages have been reported taken in this area for the last few weeks. A video from Sky News from Barvinkove (3:58): Ukraine War: Ukrainian soldiers stand firm in Barvinkove. Trench warfare (2:14)?

Russia did take the village of Lyman (pop. 20,469) on 27 May (although they claimed they took it on 25 May). On 23 May, the mayor there said the town was down to 7,000-8,000 residents. The Russians also took Yarova (pop. 2,079 in 2011) on 1 June, to the NW of Lyman. The latest Russian efforts took the town of Svyatohirsk (pop. 4,309), which is 19 miles (30 kilometers) due north of Slovyansk and on the north bank of the Severskii Donetsk River. Russia is claiming to have “liberated” Svyatohirsk on 7 June. The Russian have now taken most of the areas north of the Severskii Donets River. Another map cribbed from @War_Mapper dated 9 May.

The Ukrainians still have the river between them and Slovyansk. On the other hand, the river has been flooded for a while due to the rain. It is dropping. Don’t know how much easier that makes it for the Russians to cross. No activity is being reported in this area in the last couple of days.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provincesThe Russians currently hold probably most of Severodonetsk and appear to be on the advance. Next is Lysychansk, which is literally just across the Severskii Donets river from Severodonetsk. I assume Russia also controls the eastern suburb of Metolkine. These two cities are surrounded on three sides. According to Ukraine only 15,000 civilians remained in Severodonetsk and only 20,000 reman in Lysychansk. Lysychansk is on higher ground with a river in front of it and a large open, partly wooded area beyond it and puts Severodonetsk under fire. This could be the point where the Russian advance in this area stalls out because of terrain. 

To the south, the village of Zolote in still held by Ukraine, even though some reports claimed Russia took it on 23 May. The Ukrainian government is still reporting on 7 June that houses were destroyed in Zolote from shelling, which indicates that Ukraine holds it. The Ukrainians retook Toshkivka on 29 May but lost at least part of it the following day. Ukraine is still reporting on houses lost of Toshkivka also, so I assume they still hold part of it. Both of these locales are just south of Severodonetsk and this is helping secure the city from envelopment from the south.

The danger of surrounding Severodonetsk and Lysychansk is coming from the Russian operations around Popasna (pop. 19,672), which has been in Russian hands since 7 May. They are threatening Bakhmut (pop. 72,310) and Soledar (pop.10,692). The Russian forces have advanced to within 10 miles (16 kilometers) of Bakhmut. The Russians have taken Komyshuvakha (pop. 2,058) to the north of Popasna. 

The map below is from 4 June by @War_Mapper.

Further south Avdiyivka (31,940) is still in Ukranian hands but is being shelled. Ukraine claimed on 27 April that Avdiyivka was hit twice by phosphorus munitions. They are reported pushing towards Kamyanka and Novoselivka, to its north.

Slovyansk (pop. 106,972) and Kramatorsk (pop. 150,084) appear safe for now. Still, it is claimed there are only about 22 – 24,000 people left in Slovyansk. Kramatorsk had its rail station hit on 9 April with over 50 civilians killed.

To the southwest of this fight, the Ukrainians have retaken Maryinka (pop. 9,256) on 19 April, which had been taken by the DPR on 17 March. 

The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 26 May that they had 1,986 soldiers killed and 8,199 wounded (4.13-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio) out of a supposed strength of 20,000. This is 51% casualties out of an estimated force of 20,000, which is pretty serious. They have been surprisingly diligent about regularly reporting their casualty figures. One wonders if some Russian losses or contractors are being included in these figures. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio. Don’t know how many of DPR and LPR forces are Russians from Russia as opposed to locals.

Zelensky in an interview on CNN on 17 April said they had 44,000 professional military men in the Donbas.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): The siege lasted seventy-seven days. As of 17 May, Mariupol is under control of Russia although they declared on 20 May that they had “completely liberated” the steel works. It apparently took a couple of days for everyone to surrender, including the final 531 Ukranian troops. The Alamo held out for 13 days. The Germans surrounded in Stalingrad held out for 72 days. The Russian defense minister said 1,908 at that same time, and they have now upped their claimed prisoners to 2,439 (note that 1908 + 531 = 2,439). This is more prisoners that some of the previous Russian claims of defender strength. So far, none have been exchanged. Denys Prokopenkop, the senior commander in the Azovstal steel mill, is being held in Russian controlled territory and was able to have brief conversation with his wife. 

The population of the city is down to 100,000 or less. I assume the civilians are not planning to return. The mayor, who is no longer in the city, claimed that more than 10,000 people have been killed. The head of DPR (Donets People’s Republic) has said over 5,000 people have been killed. The city has been decimated, lots of buildings and houses destroyed. Mariupol has no power, gas or water. 

There is a mass grave being reported outside of Mariupol near the town of Manhush. It looks like around 200 graves have been dug. Another mass grave is also being reported on 23 April. So far, they appear to be graves for hundreds of people, vice thousands. A third mass grave has been reported. There has been no new reports on this for a while.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is under Russian control. Are the Ukrainians going to make a push to take back Kherson? The Ukrainians are conducting offensive operations around Kherson, but no major territory has exchanged hands. They are 10 miles (15 kilometers) outside of Kherson. It appears the Ukrainians have taken Blahodatne to the NW of Kherson.  The more interesting operation is the one to the NE of Kherson, where Ukraine has driven down a road that goes behind the city. towards the Dnipro River. This advance towards Kostromka threatens to cut off the Russian forces to the NE of there. This could result is a significant gain of ground by Ukraine. It also could start the process of isolating Kherson. We shall see if this advance continues. It does not seem to have gained much ground in the last week and Russia still holds Kostromka. 

A car bombing occurred last week in Melitopol. Either the work of a developing Ukrainian insurgency or special operations. 

 

Weather: Kharkov at 3 PM: It is a balmy 86 degrees (30 Celsius) and sunny. Low tonight 61 degrees (16 Celsius). Rain is forecasted for this Sunday (70%) and the next two days. That will probably help the Ukrainian defenders behind the Severskii Donets. 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: 

The big news is what is occurring off the battlefield, where U.S. and other international aid is now providing more than $90 billion in aid to Ukraine. Over the long run this will change the military balance between Ukraine and Russia, unless Russia fully mobilizes for war. They seem hesitant to do this. The U.S. has just added another 0.7 billion in military aid to this total. Germany is slowly getting around to providing more weapons.

Not sure how large the army now is (assume over 200,000). There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They are now reporting their armed forces at 196,600. President Zelensky said on 21 May that 700,000 soldiers are defending Ukraine. Most of those are militia. The Ukrainian army is around 200,000 and I gather is going to grow to 300,000. It does take a while to build up an army. The upper limited of mobilization is around 5% of the population (there have been cases where it has been higher). So Ukraine with a population of 40 million can build up an army of 2 million, especially if it continues to receive significant outside help. The Russia commentor Col. Kodaryonok stated in his outburst on Russian TV a couple of days ago that “But the situation from the overall strategic position is that the Ukrainian armed forces are able to arm a million people. They’re saying it themselves, that for us, there’s no difficulty in mobilizing a million people. The whole issue is to what extent they’re able to supply this army of modern weapons and military hardware… so a million armed Ukrainian soldiers needs to be viewed as a reality of the very near future.” I would also add that they need to be trained, which takes a while.

The Azov Regiment that was holding in Mariupol was actually a militia unit. That is the case with some of the foreign volunteer battalions also. There are some foreign volunteer units that have been there a while, including two Chechen battalions and a Georgian unit. I have yet to any statistics as to how many other foreign volunteers have been deployed, just individual stories.

There also the independent Belarussian Kastus Kalinouski Battalion, which as of 5 March is reported to have 200 members. They were serving in Irpin (near Kiev). It is reported that they have had thousands of volunteers. The deputy commander of the battalion (age 31) was killed on action on 13 March and another member was lost on 24 March in Irpin. On 16 May it was reported that a company commander had been killed. They state that a total of six Belarussians had died in this battalion since February. This, of course, threatens to bring the war into Belarus at some point.

Outside support for Ukraine is considerable and reported in a separate blog post: Outside Support for Ukraine | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Not sure I am going to update this. Additional material is being sent, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles from Denmark. Bulgaria has been hesitant to provide Soviet-era heavy weapons to Ukraine due to internal politics. Major weapon systems from Germany are also slow to arrive. 

The U.S. is now admitting that it helped target Russian generals. See: American intel used to kill Russian generals in Ukraine: US officials. This is something we had assumed for a while. See:  How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). And then yesterday they admitted that U.S. intel helped with tracking the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva, some we also assumed: Official: US gave intel before Ukraine sank Russian warship. Apparently, they did not provide specific targeting information. A group of Russian officers were hit 17 May in the Russian occupied city of Melitopol. Ukraine claims it was done by “partisans.” They are also reporting attacking an armored train. If true, this opens a whole new dimension to this war, although other reports indicate that this was a “special operation” as opposed to partisans. Major General Kanamat Botashev was reported killed while flying an Su-25. This has been confirmed. Two more generals reported killed this weekend, General Roman Kutuzov and Roman Berdnikov. Kutuzov has been confirmed.

So far twelve named generals have been reported killed in this war. Five deaths have been confirmed and three are still alive.

Russian Army Build-up:  I have yet to see many reports of Russia expanding its army or calling up more reserves and conscripts. Their biannual call-up starts on 1 April, and Putin just signed a decree ordering up 134,500 new conscripts into the army. See the comments in the Day 35 for a discussion on the significance of this. We are now in the tenth week of the war. Are they going to expand their army as Ukraine is clearly expanding theirs, or are they expecting that this war will end shortly? It looks like the Russian Army is adding a couple of thousand volunteers. The U.S. DOD told reporters on 8 April that the Russia could be looking to recruit as many as 60,000 soldiers to join the fight. Still have not seen any indications of major build-up, although they are rebuilding and refitting their units.

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia may be able to add more forces from their own resources, but not much more. If they want to add more, they are going to have to mobilize. Russia appears to be hesitant to do so. I suspect with full mobilization; we could be looking at a Ukrainian army larger than 300,000. People are now even talking about a Ukrainian armed force of 700,000 to 1,000,000. At some point, Russia will have to mobilize to continue this war. I do not think Russia can win this war without further mobilization. If fact, with the increased aid flowing into Ukraine, Russia may very well end up losing territory it currently holds without additional mobilization. The failure to mobilize is hard to explain from a military point of view. It is clearly a result of domestic political concerns.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The U.S. congress has approved a $40 billion aid bill for Ukraine. That along with previous aid from dozens of other countries ($20-$25 billion), new economic aid from the G-7 (now reported at $19.8 billion), the previous U.S. aid bill in March ($13 billion), and so forth, is pushing the amount of aid this year towards $100 billion (40.1 + 25 + 19.8 + 13 + 0.7 = 99). This is enough to match the entire Russian 2021 defense budget of 61.7 billion and keep the Ukrainian economy afloat. It means that Ukraine can stay in this war for an extended fight. It changes the strategic balance and strategic considerations.

The discussion of the economic situation and the home fronts has been updated in a separate rambling blog post: The Home Fronts during the Russo-Ukrainian War – update 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The IIF (Institute of International Finance) is estimating that the Russian economy will shrink by 15% this year and 3% in 2023. This is in line with previously reported estimates of an 8-12% decline in the Russian economy. The only estimate I have seen for Ukraine was a 45% decline. Not sure that is the case anymore with $100 billion in aid coming in (Ukrainian GDP was $181 billion). 

Price of oil is up to 120.99 as of 11:15 AM and the ruble is at 58.24 to the dollar, which is the strongest I have seen it in a very long time (since 2018).

Casualties: Ukraine admitted on 29 April that they have suffered “serious losses” in battles. Zelensky is now saying that between “50 to 100 Ukrainians could be killed”  each day in the Battle for Donbas. We take these claims at face value. They also claim that Russian losses are “colossal.” That claim has not been confirmed. Zelensky told CNN on 15 April that Ukrainian Army had lost between 2,500-3,000 troops since the fighting has begun and about 10,000 have been wounded (wounded-to-killed ratio of 4.00- or 3.33-to-1). According to NYT the U.S. intelligence estimates as of 19 April are between 5,500 to 11,000 Ukrainians killed and between 7,000 to 10,000 Russians killed.

Zelensky stated in an interview on 1 June that between 60 to 100 Ukrainian soldiers are lost on the battlefield each week, with an additional 500 wounded. This would make for a wounded-to-killed ratio of 5-to-1 or 8.33-to-1.

Ukraine is claiming as of 19 April that 20,800 Russian and DPR soldiers have been killed, Russians are claiming as of 16 April that 23,367 Ukrainian soldiers have been killed. Are both sets of figures similarly inflated? It does argue that losses on both sides are similar in size.

Prisoner swap of wounded Ukrainians trapped in Mariupol appeared to have been negotiated, but so far nothing has been reported. I gather that the 53 seriously wounded prisoners are being swapped. Don’t know about the rest of the people. On 2 June, Ukraine and Russia exchanged 160 bodies of killed soldiers and another 50 on 8 June.

The UN is reporting as of 8 June at least 4,302 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Of those 2,472 of the deaths are in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 154 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. Ukraine is reporting that as of 25 April, 3,818 civilians were killed in Ukraine. This is not that far from the UN figure. One wonders if the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures. The rate of accrual of reported civilian casualties has gone down. 

It is clear that more than 13,000 people have died in this conflict (1,351 (Russian Army) + at least 2,000 more (Russian Army) + 3,000 (Ukrainian Army) + 4,302 (Civilians) + 1,986 (DPR) + 600 (LPR) = 13,249). It is probably in excess of 20,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. The number of deaths of Mariupol are unverified and unknown and could add thousands to these totals.

As of June 7 Ukraine is claiming to have killed 31,250 Russian soldiers, while Russia is claiming to have killed 38,257 Ukrainian soldiers (as calculated by @HelloMrBond). I have questioned the Ukrainian claims: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, I also doubt the Russian claims.

A more detailed discussion is provided here: Losses during the Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now.

Missile Defense: According to Zelenskyy the missile barrage near Lvov on 12 March consisted of 30 missiles, 8 missiles that landed and 22 missiles that were intercepted and shot down. On the morning of 16 April in the Lvov region, Ukraine claimed it downed four cruise missiles fired by Su-35s operating from Belarus. Zelensky claimed on 26 April that Russians have fired more than 1,100 missiles at Ukraine. The U.S. DOD claimed on 29 April that more than 1,950 missiles have been fired at Ukraine since the start of the war and they are currently firing about 50 a day.

End of the War: It does look like Russia intends to take and hold onto all of Donetsk and Lugansk provinces, and possibly all of Kherson province and four-fifths of Zaporizhzhia province. The capital Zaporizhzhia (pop. 722,713) may not be on their list of areas to take. So, four out of Ukraine’s 24 provinces and Crimea.

Populations of partly or completely occupied areas (2019 estimates):

Donetsk: 4,165,901

Lugansk: 2,151,833

Crimea: 2,033,700 (2001 census)

Zaporizhzhia: 1,705,836

Kherson: 1,037,640

Sevastopol: 509,992 (2021 estimate)

 

Population of Ukraine (excluding Crimea), 2022 estimate: 41,167,336

What they are willing to later negotiate away to achieve peace or a ceasefire is unknown. What Ukraine is willing to negotiate away is also unknown, although they are now saying the war will continue until all areas are freed. Does that include the LPR, DPR and Crimea? When they are ready to return to talks is unknown. This looks like an extended war and I don’t think will be over before the end of summer. At this point, unless Russia mobilizes, it will slowly turn to Ukraine’s advantage.

Atrocities:  Reports from Ukraine have put the body count of civilians found in the towns and villages surround Kiev at 1,222. Not sure if this has been independently confirmed, but I assume the UN counting efforts have now picked up most of these civilian deaths. Ukraine has identified ten Russian soldiers wanted for “pre-mediated murder” in Bucha. They are all enlisted from the 64th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade. These are the first charges unveiled of over 8,000 criminal investigations. The U.S. is claiming it has “credible information” of Russians killing Ukrainians in the vicinity of Donetsk who were trying to surrender.

There are also various accusations against the Russian Army Chechen unit operating around Bucha: Brutal Sect of Putin’s Army Accused of Murdering Their Own Comrades.

More claims of atrocities coming out with videos of Russian troops shooting two civilians outside of Kiev in March. Ukraine has sentenced a 21-year old POW to life in prison for shooting a civilian who was talking on his phone. Ukraine is now charging 48 more Russian soldiers (currently POWs) and investigating around 13,000 alleged offenses. The Ukrainian officials have a list of about 6000 suspects. Two POWs pleaded guilty on 26 May of firing Grad rockets from Russia’s Belgorod region towards Kharkov on 24 Feb.

Meanwhile, the head of the DPR is saying that the fighters who surrendered at the Azovstal steel mill are to be put on trail. Somehow, this response does not surprise me. The DPR has now convicted and sentenced three captured foreign fighters to death by firing squad. They are two UK citizens and a Moroccan. They have a month to appeal their sentences. So Ukraine has convicted three POWs for war crimes and now DPR has now sentence three people for execution. One wonders if this will be the subject for the next prisoner exchange. As the two sides are still conducting exchanges of prisoners and bodies of killed soldiers, there is some hope for some resolution here. 

There is also a video out there of Ukrainian soldiers shooting several Russian prisoners in their legs. There is a second video showing Ukrainian troops executing what appears to be four Russian prisoners seven miles SW of Bucha. See: https://news.yahoo.com/video-appears-show-ukrainian-soldiers-192219323.html. More detailed description from BBC: https://www.bbc.com/news/61025388. It is on Youtube, if you want to look it up. I believe they are members of the Georgian Legion, a group of Georgian volunteers fighting for Ukraine.

There are also some retribution killings going on: Ukrainian Chief Intelligence Directorate: another traitor of Ukraine found shot. Ukraine stated on 8 June that they are investigating nearly 480 people for treason and collaboration.

Other Issues: 

NATO has confirmed 18 May that both Finland and Sweden have officially applied to join NATO. NATO has said it will welcome them with open armsThe process of accepting them is expected to take about two weeks and they could be members within a few months. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. Turkey is withholding consent until there is some resolution concerning some weapons embargoes against Turkey and the presence in Sweden of Kurdish refugees wanted by Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states. 

Ukraine was supposed to be on the fast track to join the European Union (EU), which was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. But EU member Austria has objected, and now France is saying that it may take years. All EU members must unanimously agree for a country’s membership negotiations to begin. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

A Ukrainian court on 23 May order the arrest of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich. He is accused of treason over the agreement he signed in 2010 (The Kharkiv Pact) to extend Russian leave on naval facilities in Crimea. In 2014 Russian forces in Sevastopol seized all of Crimea and Victor Yanukovich left Ukraine for Russia and was in Moscow by 25 February 2014. He has remained in Russia ever since. He had already received a 13-year jail sentence over a letter he sent to Vladimir Putin on 1 March 2014 asking for Russia to use Russian army and police forces to restore order in Ukraine. 

The Map: The attached map is from Wikipedia. It is dated 10 June. It does show some updates around Kherson on 8 June. It is still showing Zolote in Russian hands on 23 May, which appears to be incorrect.

The Severskii Donets River Crossing Operation

This is another piece of TNDM analysis from William (Chip) Sayers. He will be doing a presentation at our Historical Analysis conference: Who’s Who at HAAC – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Now, I have questioned the Ukrainian estimates of overall casualties: The Ukrainian casualty claims are inflated – part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). This post by Chip Sayers makes the point that the estimates of 400+ Russian casualties in this river crossing operation is believable. 

The William (Chip) Sayers piece:


The objective of this set of model runs was to explore the failed Russian river crossing operation of the Siverskiy Donets.  Ukrainian photos of the battlefield aftermath showed vividly the carnage wrought by modern defenses when properly warned and deployed. 

Ukrainian reconnaissance detected the Russian preparations to cross the Siverskiy Donets at least 3 days prior to the river crossing operation, which gave them time to bring up reinforcements and prepare a defense.  According to uawardata.com, The 79th Ukrainian Air Assault Brigade was defending the sector, while one or two Battalion Tactical Groups from the 35th and 74th Mechanized Brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army were in the area of the attack.  The Institute for the Study of War reports that it was a BTG from the 74th Mech Brigade that conducted the attack.

The vulnerability of attacking forces in a river crossing operation is such that surprise and support are necessary to preclude catastrophic losses.  Clearly, the Russian BTG failed to achieve surprise — it is unknown how well supported they were, but the scale of their losses indicates that whatever support they had was probably inadequate.

I set up the battle with the following forces:

Russian: one mechanized BTG from the 74th Mech Brigade with support from half the guns of the 120th Artillery Brigade (the 41st CAA’s sole artillery brigade) and 30 Mi-24 attack helicopter sorties.

Ukrainian: one battalion from the 79th Air Assault Brigade plus a battalion slice of brigade assets (the brigade apparently was covering a large frontage and probably couldn’t afford to devote more to the battle).  Assuming the Ukrainian Army productively used the warning time they had to bring up supporting fires, I gave the defenders an Urgan MRL battalion from the 27th Rocket Artillery Brigade.  Just for fun, I also gave them ~10% of the Switchblade “kamikaze” UAS that the United States has sent (100 x Switchblade 300 anti-personnel drones and 20 x Switchblade 600 anti-tank drones). 

The Siverskiy Donets is only about 50m wide at the crossing point, and the ground is heavily forested, though relatively flat.  As best as can be determined from aerial video imagery, the battlefield is actually too small to support an attacking battalion.  Soviet motorized rifle battalions attacked on a minimum frontage of 1 kilometer, while a Russian BTG is somewhat beefier organization.  The Siverskiy Donets makes a partial loop at the point of attack and a kilometer attack zone would have taken the entire frontage of the loop such that Russian troops on one side might have been firing into the faces of their compatriots attacking at the other end of the line.  This suggests that they probably attacked on no more than a single company frontage (400m), with four companies in echelon.  This is not a formula for success in an opposed river crossing.

For the base case, I did not give the Ukrainian side a CEV advantage, nor surprise to either side.

Results:

After a full day of battle on 11 May, the Russians were decisively repulsed, having lost 27% of their personnel, 80% of their armored fighting vehicles, 50% of their attack helicopters and 38% of their overall combat power.  This compares favorably to the ISW’s estimate of 458 casualties (the TNDM predicted 521) and 80 pieces of equipment, compared to the TNDM report of 89.  50% losses to the attack helicopter force is probably a bit overstated and could bear closer examination.

In contrast, the Ukrainians lost 6% of personnel (85 men), 2 AFVs and 6% of their combat power. 

This disparity in the loss of combat power to the two sides would have undoubtedly made another attempt to cross the river on the 12th a non-starter, even though some sources have reported it as a two-day battle.  If these losses are indeed indicative of what really happened, the second day’s attack could only have been carried out by the 35th Brigade’s BTG.  This would imply that not one, but two BTGs may have been wrecked in the Siverskiy Donets operation.

Run #2: While the force-to-space ratios don’t really support at two-BTG attack, it is possible that when the 74th Mech’s BTG was rendered combat-ineffective, the 35th’s BTG was passed through the 74th to renew the attack.  By including both BTG’s in the Russian Order of Battle and throwing in the balance of the 120th Artillery Brigade, we can see the impact of a rough 2:1 numerical advantage for the attacker’s side.

As it happens, even this reinforcement only yielded a combat power ratio of 1:1, which did not allow for a successful crossing of the river.  Russian casualties were somewhat lower, but still higher than the defender’s losses.  Both sides took about 7% personnel losses, but the Russian units had roughly double the personnel, so took 271 casualties as opposed to only 110 by the Ukrainians.  The Russians lost 29 AFVs to the Ukrainians’ 3, but this is deceptive as the defenders had only a small number of tanks to lose — their 3 AFV losses represented 45% of their starting force.  The bigger story is that the Russian’s lost 15% of their combat power, while the Ukrainians lost just 8%, thus ensuring the attackers would never make it across the river without significant reinforcement.

Run #3: Some sites have reported that the operation continued into a second day, so the third run was essentially the first run with a second day’s extension where the 35th Brigade’s BTG took over the fight.  I also postulated that it would be too expensive for the Ukrainians to devote a second package of Switchblade drones to battle.  Therefore, the defenders’ combat power was weakened in comparison to the first day’s battle, despite their low losses.

After extracting the losses to the defenders and not adding the Switchblade package back in, the fresh 35th Bde BTG replaced the broken 74th’s BTG with exactly the same combat power.  Thus, we have a fresh second echelon committed to battle against a moderately depleted defender. 

Results:

Without their Switchblade drones, the 79th Air Assault Brigade defenders were unable to repulse the second echelon, though the attack was only able to make 350 meters beyond the river’s edge.  In doing so, the Russians lost another 323 men, a third of their AFVs and 14% of their combat power.  The defenders lost 130 men, 2 AFVs and 1% of their combat power.  All told, in the two-day battle the Russians lost nearly 850 men, 45 AFVs, had one BTG rendered combat ineffective and barely gained a toehold on the south side of the Siverskiy Donets. 

Run #4: Clearly, a CEV advantage to the Ukrainian side would merely make the Russian defeats in Runs #1 and #2 worse, so they needn’t be explored further.  Run number 4 was run as run #3, but with a Ukrainian CEV of 1.2.

Results:

On day 1, the Russians lost 57% of their combat power and 124% of their AFVs, indicating they their armored vehicles wouldn’t have survived to the end of the day, thus the battle would have likely ceased less than 16 hours in.  After such a slaughter, it is questionable if the Russians would have tried it again the next day with the second BTG.

On day 2, the Russian second echelon managed to take the crossing site to the same depth as run #3, but lost 50% of their AFVs and 20% of their combat power in doing so.  The casualty list after two days would have totaled over a thousand Russian soldiers.  Technically, this might be called a Russian “victory,” but without a substantial exploitation force behind them, it would surely be a pyrrhic one.

Run #5: The next few runs explored the idea that the Russians not only failed to achieve the needed surprise, but were, in fact, surprised by the resistance they ran into.  Again, runs #1 & #2 were sufficiently adverse to the attacker that they needn’t be explored further.  This is a re-run of run #3 with minor surprise by the defenders.

Results:

While the 74th’s BTG was thoroughly destroyed (41% personnel losses, 161% of AFVs and 71% of its combat power lost), interestingly, the 35th’s BTG made the same gains and losses were almost exactly what they were in run #4.  This surprising result is because surprise degrades over time, and the second day of minor surprise essentially equates to the Ukrainian CEV of 1.2 from run #4.

Run #6: Given this, run #6 was done with substantial surprise.  Not surprisingly, the 74th BTG was obliterated in short order, losing over 54% of its personnel, 271% of its AFVs and 115% of its combat power.  It could be scratched out of the Russian OOB after half a day’s fight.  The 35th BTG, however, still made it across the river, albeit at some cost.

Run #7: Run 7 was done with complete surprise — not a likely situation, but one explored for completeness.  The results were much the same, with the 74th annihilated after just a few hours, while the 35th persisted in gaining the far bank of the Siverskiy Donets.  However, at a cost of 1/3rd of its personnel, all of its AFVs and 35% of its combat power, the BTG would have been hors de combat until a rest and refit period were accomplished.

At this point, I ran several sensitivity exercises without using the Switchblade package from the first day of the battle, but including variations of surprise and CEV.  No amount of surprise was capable of repulsing the attack and only a Ukrainian CEV of 1.5 proved sufficient to keep the Russians on their side of the river without the use of the kamikaze UAVs.  As a large influx of combat power in some form was needed to rebuff the attack, I made a final run with the entire 79th Air Assault Brigade in place of the Switchblades.  This did, indeed, defeat the single BTG on day 1 of the battle with losses comparable to those estimated to have actually been incurred by the Russian force.  In other words, it took a force three times the size of our estimate to successfully defeat the river crossing without extraordinary support.  This would, of course, have been advantageous for defending a day 2 attack by the 35th BTG had it occurred, since the entire brigade would remain in place, as opposed to the Switchblade package that we posited would be too expensive to recreate for the second day’s battle.

Conclusions:

Once again, the TNDM has demonstrated that the reported results of this battle are entirely consistent with historical outcomes — nothing too unusual or particularly remarkable happened here.

Also, Russian tactical incompetence is once again the key to interpreting the results of this battle.  Had the Russians achieved the prerequisite surprise, things would have gone very differently.  A final model run with the shoe on the other foot confirms this.

Finally, the impact of a single weapon system — in this case the Switchblade kamikaze UAS — proved pivotal.  Essentially a round of ammunition, these killer drones significantly boosted the combat power of the defenders.  However, once expended, the defending units went back to their organic firepower, which was insufficient to hold the line.  This underscores the importance of a steady, sustainable supply of weapons and logistical support from NATO and other countries sympathetic to the Ukrainian cause.