Category Russia

Updated calendar for the Republican nomination

The calendar for the Republican Party nomination:

1) Four Republican primary debates have been completed, the field is pretty settled now (Trump, Haley and Desantis). Three more debates are scheduled for 10, 18 and 21 January. Trump has yet to attend one.
2) Donald Trump currently leads the polling for the Republican Party presidential nomination by significant margins.
3) He is currently in a civil trial in New York concerning his businesses. A summary judgment was issued on 26 September that his companies had committed fraud. We expect the final verdicts related to results and penalties to be completed by the end of January.
4) the Iowa caucuses will be on 15 January 2024,
5) the New Hampshire primary will be on 23 January 2024,
6) the Nevada primary will be on 6 February 2024,
7) 24 February is SC primary, then MI,
8.) The date for the DOJ Special Council criminal trial for charges related to the 6 January incidents in now scheduled for 4 March. We gather Trump’s former chief of staff has taken a partial immunity deal with the government and will be providing testimony,
9) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then,
10) 25 March is the trial date for Donald Trump’s New York Stormy Daniel’s related case,
11) 20 May is the trial date for Donald Trump’s classified documents case. This one is kind of a guaranteed conviction.
12) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently three of the five leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.
13) 15-18 July: Republican National Convention held in Milwaukee
14) 5 August is the start date for the Fulton County Georgia case. Four of the defendants have already pleaded guilty under a plea agreement. The other 15 defendants, including Donald Trump, will be going to trial.
15) The U.S. presidential, senate and congressional election is on Tuesday, 5 November, 2024.

So, there seems to be a race between whether Trump can get the Republican nomination before he gets too tangled up in his legal troubles.
 

Total Casualties in Ukraine according to CBC

There was an article on 8 December by CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) that provided a reasonable discussion of casualties in Ukraine. It is here: Hundreds of thousands wounded and dead in Ukraine as war grinds on, intelligence suggests (yahoo.com).

It states for Russia (based upon UK estimates):

50,000 killed + 20,000 Wagner Group = 70,000 killed

240,000 wounded + 40,000 Wagner Group = 280,000 wounded.

 

My comments: Wounded-to-killed ratio: 4.80-to-1 for regular forces and 2-to-1 for Wagner Group. Total of 4-to-1 ratio (precisely, which is odd). I assume LPR and DPR forces are included in these totals.

My comments: The Mediazona by name count of as of 1 December is 38,261. They estimate they are counting only half, making for a total Russian killed of 76,522. This does not include members of LPR and DPR forces who are not Russian.

They give Ukrainian casualties as:

24,500 named + 15,000 missing + 5,500 or more killed who are not named (an estimate based upon the assumption that they are naming 70% of the killed) = 45,000 or more.

My comments: Now, my nagging suspicion is that Ukrainian losses are at least 75% of Russian losses or 70K x .75 = 52,500 or greater.

As they note, a U.S. estimate in August by the U.S. (quoted in NYT) was that Ukraine had close to 70,000 killed and 120,000 wounded (which produces a rather meaningless wounded-to-killed ratio).

My comments: No wounded figures are given for the Ukrainians, but no reason not to assume it is at least four times the number killed.

More than 10,000 civilians have been killed (UN figures).

My comments: The last UN report for 10 September stated 9,614 civilian dead. Not sure why there are not more recent reports.

Total dead is at least 70K + 52.5K + 10K = 132.5K

My comments: In my briefing I give in Norway in early November, I gave the Russian losses aa over 60K killed, Ukrainian losses as over 45K killed and civilian losses as over 10K.

My comments: Note that some people and governments have released much higher figures than this. I do wonder what are the basis for these claims.

 

P.S. My book The Battle for Kyiv is out in the UK. So far I have not heard any feedback.

Current book release schedule

I have four books in process or about to be released. They are:

The Battle for Kyiv:
– UK release date: 28 November
– U.S. release date: 18 January 2024

Aces at Kursk:
– UK release date: 30 January 2024
– U.S. release date: posted as 18 January 2024, but suspect release date will be in March 2024.

Hunting Falcon:
– UK release date: 28 February 2024
– U.S. release date: posted as 29 February 2024, but suspect released date will be in April 2024.

The Siege of Mariupol:
– UK release date: sometime in 2024
– U.S. release date: sometime in 2024

Books under consideration for 2024/2025:
– The Battle for the Donbas
– The Battle of Tolstoye Woods (from the Battle of Kursk)
– More War by Numbers

The Battle for Kyiv will be released on 30 November

The Battle for Kyiv will be released on 30 November in the UK. It is in the Pen & Sword warehouse. It will be released in the U.S. on 18 January 2024.

The book covers the first six or so weeks of the war. It is the first of a series of books on the war in Ukraine. The next book is the series is The Siege of Mariupol, which is currently being completed. It is co-authored with Stefan Korshak. His blog on Medium is here: Stefan Korshak – Medium. The third book in the series will be The Battle for the Donbas, covering the fighting in Spring and Summer of 2022.

Related posts: Ukraine election map (2010) versus U.S. Election Map (2020) | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Battle for Kyiv will be released on 30 November

The Battle for Kyiv will be released on 30 November in the UK. It will be released in the U.S. on 18 January 2024. The book is due to be delivered to the Pen & Sword warehouse on 24 November.

The book covers the first six or so weeks of the war. It is the first of a series of books on the war in Ukraine. The next book is the series is The Siege of Mariupol, which is currently being completed. It is co-authored with Stefan Korshak. His blog on Medium is here: Stefan Korshak – Medium. The third book in the series will be The Battle for the Donbas, covering the fighting in Spring and Summer of 2022.

F-16s for Ukraine: Game Changer or Resource Waster?

Another posting from William (Chip) Sayers, who started his career in the air force:

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F-16s for Ukraine: Game Changer or Resource Waster? 

Now that the Biden Administration has finally decided to allow the Ukrainian Air Force to receive F-16 Falcons (or as they are known by their pilots, “Vipers”), a lot of pushback has shown up in the media claiming this is not a good decision. This pushback mainly comes in the form of two objections: The Ukrainians won’t be able to operate them until it is too late, and that once they do, the F-16 won’t prove to be a game changer.

Let’s discuss how long it will take the UAF to learn how to employ the F-16. Some of the pushback is coming from people with expertise in this field, including Viper instructor pilots, so we can’t just dismiss their opinions out of hand. However, we can evaluate what they have to say against the situation as it stands.

The experts usually claim that it will be years before the UAF can “fully exploit” the F-16, or something along those lines. And they are undoubtedly correct. You show me a really good Viper jock, and I’ll show you an experienced Major, someone with hundreds, or even thousands of hours in the F-16’s cockpit. However, this is undoubtedly irrelevant. If the UAF can exploit even half the capability of the F-16’s potential, they will be way ahead of where they were at the beginning of the war with their Russian-produced fighters. The real question is, how long will it take for the UAF to be able to operate the F-16s in a way that positively contributes to their war effort. And that will take substantially less time. According to a US Air Force report based on the training of two UAF fighter pilots, it should take three to four months.[i] How can this be?

First off, the UAF has a sizable cadre of trained MiG-29 and Su-27 pilots — aircraft comparable to the F-16, if a bit less capable. As it happens, it is significantly easier to fly and fight the F-16 compared to the Russian aircraft. Anyone who can fly the MiG-29 can learn to fly the Viper very rapidly. Two vignettes: In my somewhat abbreviated flying career, I flew the T-37, a sweet little trainer that was well suited to its job. However, having been designed in the 1950’s, its instrument layout was, shall we say, suboptimal. It was often said that if you could fly instruments in the T-37, you could do it in anything. This analogy fits well with the comparison between the MiG-29 and the F-16.

Vignette #2: In the early 1990s I took a class of new analysts to Langley Air Force Base for an orientation with the US Air Force. The highlight of the visit was a chance for everyone to fly the full-motion F-15 weapons simulator. At this point, I had been out of the cockpit for around 10 years and my only updated experience was flying the PC game, Falcon 3.0 — which actually simulated radar and weapons employment quite well. I went last, and did so well, the instructors started playing cat & mouse with me to keep me humble. The point is, I was able to do well on the experience of a $40 commercial flight simulator because US 4th generation jets were purposely designed to be easy to use. So again, UAF MiG-29 pilots should be able to fly the Viper well with a minimum of training, compared to their clunky former mounts. They should be able to fly the jet successfully in air-to-air missions using their MiG tactics in a matter of weeks. 

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions will take longer, and effective air-to-ground missions will come sometime after that. Will this make UAF Viper pilots masters of the air? No, that really does take time, but they will be effective and will rapidly improve with experience. One thing the experts seem to miss is that they were working during peacetime. The UAF is in an existential war, and that is a powerful motivator.

So, if the UAF can get the F-16 into the war relatively rapidly, will it make any difference? At first blush, it seems highly doubtful. Both sides’ air forces have contributed little of consequence to the war thus far. The deadly air defenses fielded by both sides have largely kept airpower away from the front lines and, in the case of the Russians, relegated to launching long-range missiles from the safety of their home airspace. However, things may be quietly changing.

Recently, Ukraine has demonstrated the ability to successfully plan, coordinate and execute SEAD missions against the most advanced Russian SAM systems in existence. Undoubtedly, some credit is due to the incompetence of Russian air defenders and some to the somewhat less than advertised performance of their “best in the world” equipment. However, the great majority of the credit belongs to the Ukrainian planners, particularly given the somewhat low-tech (slow, prop-driven drones, among other things) they used to accomplish the missions. 

The Viper comes in a variety of flavors as do the weapons they carry. The capabilities the UAF will have depends upon the particular combination they field. For example, the F-16CJ Block 50D is specifically designed to hunt and kill air defenses. When teamed with the AGM-88 High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM), the combination is extremely effective. During Operation DESERT STORM, Iraqi troops were so intimidated by the HARM that they refused to use their field radios (which were never targeted, and probably couldn’t be, regardless) and for the next 12 years through Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH and IRAQI FREEDOM, no Iraqi air defense unit turned on its targeting radars — ALL of their shots were fired unguided. Likewise, in Operation ALLIED FORCE over Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, it was rare to see the air defenses turn on their targeting radars. If the UAF can successfully integrate such aircraft and weapons into their SEAD schemes, it could prove as effective with the Russians as it was with the Iraqis and Serbs.

While no amount of SEAD can ever get rid of the threat from air defense guns and IR-guided SAMs, suppression/destruction of the Russian S-300/400, Tor, Pantsir and Buk radar-guided SAMs opens up the UAF’s ability to use altitude to take them out of the range of the short-range threat that will always be present. 

At this point, the F-16’s AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) will move to the fore. The combat histories of the various aircraft and weapons involved would suggest that even a relatively small number of F-16s should be able to secure air superiority over Ukraine. This will be complicated by the fact that the UAF pilots will likely fight using Russian tactics, at least initially. The F-16 was designed to support the use of more dynamic Western tactics, and while it would be difficult for pilots flying MiG-29s to discard their traditional Ground-Controlled Intercept (GCI) doctrine, this will come if the UAF embraces the change. In the mid-1990s, the Kuwaiti Air Force acquired US F-18 Hornets and were trained by the very best the US Navy had to offer. Within three years, they went from being essentially dead in the water to putting the whoop to the Royal Navy’s Harrier pilots and being voted the “Best in the Gulf” by their peer air forces. Changing tactics mid-conflict is far from ideal, but combat can do much to focus the mind. It all depends on the commitment of the UAF leadership and if they buy into the change.

Russian air-to-air missiles are formidable on paper, but have come up short under operational circumstances and their GCI-driven tactics fail to take advantage of what capability they have. However, the superior situational awareness afforded the pilot by the Viper’s easy to use radar and the AMRAAM’s status as a virtual one-shot, one-kill weapon when fired within its parameters make the F-16 capable of high kill:loss ratios. If Ukraine’s F-16s come equipped with the latest models of the AIM-9 Sidewinder Infrared-homing missile, it will be all the more deadly when fighting obsolescent Russian fighters using reliability-challenged weapons and outdated tactics. The sooner UAF Viper pilots can adjust to Western tactics, the more dominant they will be in the skies of their homeland.

Without going into various offshoots, there are two types of air superiority: local air superiority and general air superiority. Local air superiority refers to the seizure of air superiority at a specific time and place in order to conduct a particular operation for a limited time without undue interference by the opponent’s air force. Within the Soviet/Russian doctrinal system, it is gained by strong groupings of long-range SAMs, augmented by Combat Air Patrols (CAP) of fighters to plug gaps and back up the SAM defenses. Obviously, local air superiority cannot be established very far from the front lines on the ground, but this is not a concern since within this scheme, air and air defense forces are used in support of ground forces. While the Russians have always talked a big game, this is essentially the only scheme of air superiority the Russians recognize.  

General, or Persistent air superiority is established over an entire combat zone, region or even country. Of necessity, it must be done utilizing strong fighter forces — often with bomber units as a supplement — and lasts until the enemy can wrest it away by attriting the other side’s fighters to the point that they can no longer present a serious threat. This can best be illustrated by the USAAF’s victory over the Luftwaffe in the European strategic bombing campaign in WWII. 

General air superiority buys the side that has it several advantages. First, it keeps the enemy from meaningfully intervening in the operations of one’s air, ground and naval forces. Secondly, it blinds the enemy to what is going on in one’s own territory, while simultaneously opening up the enemy’s territory to comprehensive reconnaissance. The phenomenon of blinding the enemy while gaining omniscience over him is a war winning, though often overlooked, circumstance. This had as much to do with the victories in Patton’s 1944 operations in France, Operation DESERT STORM and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM as anything else.

Perhaps the biggest benefit of air superiority is the freedom of operations it allows the winner’s forces, including the ability for his air forces to strike when and where they choose. During the summer and fall of 1943, USAAF bombers damaged many targets in Germany while air superiority was being contested, but to nothing like the extent desired. After the USAAF won air superiority over Germany late that winter, their strikes became vastly more effective to the point that, once released from Eisenhower’s direct command in support of the D-Day landings and subsequent ground operations, it took just six months to collapse the German war economy. Clearly, the UAF’s F-16s won’t be collapsing the Russian war economy, but the ability to strike railheads, bridges, fuel and ammunition dumps, Command, Control and Communications (C3) nodes, headquarters and artillery units with such precision can be a decisive factor and force multiplier for Ukrainian ground forces.

The F-16 in every form is an extremely accurate bomber at low altitude, even while using non-guided “dumb” bombs. In a 1980s edition of the USAF’s official publication Fighter Weapons Review, an F-16 pilot detailed a new way to attack runways without specialized munitions. His technique called for aiming 3 feet short of the lip of the runway so that the bombs, burrowing in a predictable manner, go under the concrete to detonate under the center of the runway.  3 feet. That’s some precision bombing.

Typically, putting bombs on target accurately is one of the most challenging tasks a fighter pilot can undertake, particularly in the face of challenging air defenses. However, the Viper makes air-to-ground attacks much easier than with the Russian legacy aircraft. The F-16’s fire control system projects a “Continuously Computed Impact Point (CCIP)” indicator on the heads-up display, which indicates exactly where the bombs will land if punched off at that moment. In earlier jets, the pilot had to fly a precise pre-planned approach to the release point, hitting exact parameters of altitude, airspeed, and dive angle — even the slightest deviation would throw the bombs off target. The first aircraft in a flight might get away with flying a predictable flight path, but the enemy will know with certainty where number four will be at release and can adjust their aim accordingly. The CCIP allows the pilot to take any path to the target, randomly changing airspeed and altitude as necessary for survivability. At the last second, the Viper pilot can pop-up, place the CCIP on the target and deliver his bombs with great precision. It is not for no reason that CCIP’s nickname is the “death dot.” The death dot is featured on most Western fighters today, but Ukraine’s fighter fleet lacks this tool, and therefore the F-16 should give the UAF a major leap forward in effectiveness on ground attack missions.

One thing we shouldn’t expect is a major overnight upgrade in Close Air Support (CAS). The Soviet/Russian Air Force — and by extension, the Ukrainian Air Force — have never really done fixed-wing CAS, at least as we define it. Any air support requiring detailed integration with troops in contact is generally left to attack helicopters, while fixed-wing aircraft do what we used to call Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), which doesn’t require close integration and is less likely to inflict friendly fire casualties. (It’s a dirty little secret that about 95% of air forces world-wide do the same.) Doing CAS according to US doctrine is probably the most difficult mission pilots can undertake, requiring a great deal of training and practice. Even if the UAF decides that they like our CAS concept better, it will take some time for them to be able to do it effectively.

Having determined that the UAF could bring the F-16 on line fairly quickly (albeit, without mastery of all its capabilities), that it represents a significant upgrade in SEAD, air superiority and ground attack capabilities, what will its impact be overall? Game changer or not? Most likely, not. It’s really just a matter of numbers. With a sufficiently sized fleet, the F-16 could dominate the skies to the point that Russian troops that moved would be inviting death by interdiction, while those that hunkered down in defensive positions would starve, be blasted to atoms or surrounded and captured by Ukrainian ground forces. However, that would take closer to 200 aircraft than the few dozen they’re likely to get. And, of course, they’ll need attrition replacements for their inevitable combat losses.

One thing we can do right now to significantly improve the survivability of the F-16 fleet is to put their entire logistics support package on wheels. If the UAF’s Viper fleet proves to be effective, the Russians will undoubtedly put their Main Operating Bases (MOBs) at the top of their priority strike list. While putting MOBs out of action is not nearly as easy as some assume, the loss of a hangar-queen here and an unlucky jet there will add up, and with a fleet as small as they are likely to have, they can ill-afford such losses on the ground. The best way to avoid that is to simply not be home when the cruise missiles arrive. The MiG-29 was specifically designed for such operations with the sturdy landing gear and air intake Foreign Object Damage (FOD) screens necessary to operate from unpaved fields. While the Viper will never be capable of operating from a sod field, it can easily operate from highway strips and better so than larger, heavier and less powerful jets. By making the F-16 fleet’s logistics mobile, they could quickly move from highway strip to highway strip to thwart Russian efforts to find them. Coupled with Ukrainian air superiority over their own territory — thereby making Russian reconnaissance vastly more difficult — UAF F-16 attrition could be kept to manageable levels multiplying their impact on the war.

The F-16 probably won’t be a game changer, but it may very well be a decisive factor.

 

 

[i] https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/basic-f-16-training-for-ukrainian-pilots-could-take-just-four-months  Accessed 26Oct23.

 

The American Political Scene and Aid to Ukraine

My bias on this blog is to stay away from politics, but sometimes it can’t be helped. The U..S. is providing about half the international aid to Ukraine. I have not done the exact math on this comparing U.S. military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine as compared to our NATO allies, plus the EU aid (which is sometimes left out of people’s calculations), plus aid outside of NATO/EU (like Japan, South Korea and Australia). So, haven’t done the exact math in a while, but I gather the U.S, portion is around half. Therefore, what is going on in the House of Representatives and the 2024 U.S. presidential election is worth noting. If Ukraine losses half of its military and humanitarian aid, this does affect its ability to conduct on this war.

First, while the current president supports aid to Ukraine, as do the leaders of both parties in the Senate, the current Republican Speaker of the House does not (although he does support aid for Israel). His latest statement on the subject was that it was not an “urgent need” compared to aid for Israel. Furthermore, three of the top four Republican candidates for President do not support additional aid to Ukraine.

It is uncertain to what extent the Republican controlled House opposes aid to Ukraine. There are currently 212 seats held by Democrats (who mostly support aid to Ukraine) and 221 seats held by the Republicans (and 2 vacant). The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is at least $133 Billion. 

In January the Gallup poll (3-22 January) says that 65% of Americans support the war in Ukraine. 31% clearly do not. This is pretty much the same figures as in August 2022 (66% vs 31%). Among self-identified Democrats the split was 81% to 16%, among independents it was 59% to 38% and among Republicans it was 53% to 41%. So, according to the Gallup poll, the majority of Republicans support Ukraine. On the other hand, 47% of the Republicans polled said that the U.S. is doing too much to help Ukraine. Previous polling from Washington Post shows that 52% of Republicans want to reduce aid to Ukraine or “…want their member of congress to opposed additional funding.” 

The leading two contenders for the Republican presidential nomination are both opposed to extensive aid for Ukraine. Ron Desantis said that it was a not a “vital” U.S. interest. He got immediate pushback from six U.S. Republican senators, but it is clear that there is a very definite split in the Republican Party on this issue. It is a long way until November 2024. We will have to see how this develops.

Eleven Republican members of the House did propose in February a resolution (“Ukraine Fatigue Resolution”) to cut aid to Ukraine. There is a clearly a vocal minority that is opposed to supporting Ukraine, along with both leading Republican presidential candidates. The “Ukraine Fatigue Resolution” is worth a read. It is here: Text – H.Res.113 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Ukraine Fatigue Resolution | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

A letter was issued on 20 April (Hitler’s birthday) calling for an end to unrestrained U.S. aid to Ukraine. It was signed by three senators (out of 100) and 16 members of the house (out of 435). There is a vocal minority opposed to this war, but it is clearly a minority. 

Meanwhile, a Republican House member submitted a resolution in April recognizing the borders of Ukraine as being the 1991 borders. This was supported by 13 Democrats and 5 other Republicans. 

On 13 July, the House took a vote on cutting off aid to Ukraine. The vote was 358-70 rejecting the amendment. All 70 opposed votes were Republican. See: Here are the 70 House Republicans who voted to cut off all US military aid to Ukraine (msn.com).

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” in June with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion. 

In September, a shutdown of U.S. government was delayed for 45 days (until mid-November), then the Republican Speaker of the House was thrown out of office for the first time in the U.S. history and a new speaker has finally been appointed, although house business was shut down for three weeks (did anyone actually miss them?). New additional aid for Ukraine has not been passed.

The second Republican primary debate occurred on 27 September. Four candidates clearly and strongly indicated that they support Ukraine (Christie, Haley, Pence and Scott). The Republican Party seems to split on this issue. Recent polling shows the majority of Americans still support Ukraine.

A few dates to keep in mind for the American political campaigns: 1) the third Republican primary debate is scheduled for 8 November, 2) Donald Trump currently leads the polling for the Republican Party presidential nomination by significant margins. He is currently in a civil trial in New York concerning his businesses. A summary judgment was issued on 26 September that his companies had committed fraud, 3) no start date has been set for the Fulton County Georgia case, but four of the defendants have pleaded guilty under a plea agreement. The other 15 defendants, including Donald Trump, will be going to trial soon, 4) the Iowa caucuses will be on 15 January 2024, 5) the Nevada primary will be on 6 February 2024, 6) the New Hampshire primary is scheduled for 13 February 2024, 7) 24 February is SC primary, then MI, 8) The date for the DOJ Special Council criminal trial for charges related to the 6 January incidents in now scheduled for 4 March. We gather Trump’s former chief of staff has taken a partial immunity deal with the government and will be providing testimony, 9) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then, 10) 25 March is the trial date for Donald Trump’s New York Stormy Daniel’s related case, 11) 20 May is the trial date for Donald Trump’s classified documents case, 12) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently the three of the four leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.

Former VP and Republican presidential candidate Mike Pence was in Ukraine in July. He fully supports the war effort. A couple of days ago, he suspended his campaign. There are for practical purposes, only 6 real contenders are left, and two of them may not yet make the stage in Florida come 8 November.

The False Lessons of Modern War

Hard to ignore an article that name checks Trevor Dupuy and I. Attached is an article by William F. Owen in the British Army Review, Autumn 2023 Issue. I hope I am not breaking some copyright by posting it up: Owen, The False Lessons of Modern War-Why Ignorance is Not Insight (2023). It is available on-line here: The false lessons of modern war: Why ignorance is not insight – Issuu. The full title of the article is “The False Lessons of Modern War: Why Ignorance is not Insight.”

Trevor Dupuy is namechecked in the article: “Much was less than certain, yet paradoxically, a book written in 1978, Trevor N Dupuy’s Elusive Victory, had got far more right than later writers were to get wrong.” That is a pretty strong endorsement. 

He then footnotes the book in his third footnote, referencing losses in 1967.

In the following paragraph he states: “Simply put, no conflict today comes even close to these types of losses, yet the myth persists that war and warfare are becoming ‘more lethal.’ They are not, and a large body of literature proves it.” His footnote to this paragraph then states “See the collected work of Trevor N Dupuy and Christopher Lawrence, Understanding War, War by Numbers and Attrition.”

I like this guy, but I have never met him. He is certainly welcome to present at the third HAAC: The Third HAAC – October 2024? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

A few other quotes from the article worth mentioning:

  1. “Lessons should be a product of analysis, not observation.” (I put this sentence in bold for a reason).
  2. “Observations have often been wrong” (this is his following sentence)
  3. “Warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War is two or three generations behind the standard competent, well-trained armies should aspire to operate.”
  4. “…fires lead manoeuvre in contrast to the opinions of the ‘manouverist approach.” (spell check is complaining about the British spellings).
  5. “Fast forward to today and the war in Ukraine; there is far less to be learned than in 1973.”
  6. “Why should the lessons from Ukraine be removed from the specific context of the participant’s differing training and equipment level and be relevant to the British Army?”
  7. “Is something that is a lesson for the Ukrainians a lesson for everyone else?”
  8. “In sharp contrast, the current war in Ukraine sees much-outdated equipment in ad-hoc combat formations, not seemingly underpinned by NATO equivalent training, doctrine and organisation levels.”

I will let you read the rest, but this is a definitely an article worth reading, even if you find yourself not in agreement with all parts of it. 

I do want to thank Dr. Shawn Woodford for bringing this to my attention.

 

P.S.

Elusive Victory is available here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

Understanding War is here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org)

War by Numbers is here: War by Numbers : Nebraska Press (unl.edu) or here: War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat: Lawrence, Christopher A.: 9781612348865: Amazon.com: Books

Attrition is here: TDI Books For Sale (dupuyinstitute.org). Inventory is getting low for this one.

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 589

No movement to report on the ground. It is looking like this “spring” offensive is over, although the weather is still favorable for operations. To date, neither side has really achieved what they were hoping. The real issue now is whether the support for this war will be maintained by Ukraine’s allies or the Russian populace as it appears this war is heading to a third year.

The Ukrainians are supposedly through the first defensive line in this area south of Orikhiv, but have not been able to exploit this. Ukraine still has another 30 or so days to do something, but right now not much is going on. So, we could be in for an “October surprise” but I doubt it.

The discussions on Prigozhin and Wagner, the grain deal, prisoner exchanges, reinforcements, etc. are in the Day 552 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 552 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. It is dated 5 October. The last dated update on the map was 11 June 2023, although it has clearly been updated to show Klishchiivka in Ukrainian hands.

Russia currently occupies five cities since that start of the invasion: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November 2022.

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 5 PM: It is 62 degrees (17 Celsius) and partly cloudy. Rain forecasted for four of the next ten days. There is 0.05″ expected on Saturday.

Kherson is 68 degrees (20 Celsius) and mostly sunny. Rain forecasted for four of the next ten days. There is 0.20″ expected i the next 24 hours.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: At least 10 M-1s are in Ukraine. They were confirmed to arrive by 25 September. Also, the first 10 of a 100 Leopard Is (older, less armored version of the tank) have arrived in Ukraine.

It is claimed on 18 July that the U.S. and its allies have now trained 63,000 Ukrainian troops. The current Ukrainian armed forces are certainly in excess of 300,000, so over 80% of their troops have been trained by them. It is reported that some of the troops are learning how to use some equipment from YouTube videos.

Since the start of this offensive four months ago, Ukraine has lost at least 5 of its 71 Leopard IIs, with at least 10 out for repairs. They lost their first Challenger II on 5 September. These are not heavy armor losses, which are often lost at a much higher rate than personnel losses during offensive operations (see Dupuy: Attrition).

Russian Army Build-up: Nothing new to report. Russian morale is suspect, with an officer flying a Mi-8 defecting in August. In his interview, he claimed that his family was smuggled out of Russia by Ukrainian operatives before he defected.

The U.S. is now saying in September there are 200,000 Russian troops in Ukraine. The Ukrainian defense intel guys were saying at the same time that it is over 420,000. That is kind of the lower and upper limits of my guesses. So, both figures look good, but obviously at least one is wrong.

Seen some convoluted math on twitter that calculated Russian dead, Russian recruitment and Russian strength. The only way they could get that to work was to use a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.4-to-1. That is lower ratio than what the Soviet Union had in World War II (Battle of Kursk figures, 1943), before they had penicillin. It looks like they had to assume the lower wounded-to-kill figure to make the math work. They probably need rework their estimates. I seriously doubt they have any hard evidence to justify such a low wounded-to-killed ratio.

Opposing forces: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Price of oil (Brent Crude) is back down, now at 84.26 as of 11:44 AM EST. Ruble continues to drop and is now at 100.26 to the dollar.

Casualties: The last extended casualty discussion was in the Day 560 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). This is a reduced posting.

We do have reported U.S. intel reports that claim that Russian casualties are up to 120,000 killed and Ukraine casualties are close to 70,000 killed. For various reasons, I really don’t buy into these higher figures. This is discussed here: The New York Times casualty reports | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 10 September at least 9,614 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Updated chart from the UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month through August.

Don’t have updated figures from the UN for the month of September, but on 5 October, a shop and cafe in the village of Hroza (pop. 330), near Krupiansk, was hit by an Iskander ballistic missile killing 52 civilians. They were gathered for a memorial service.

More than 60,000 people have died in this conflict: 32,656 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 22 September) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – old U.S. DOD estimate) + 9,614 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 62,145. It may be in excess of 120,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect Russian killed is at least 60,000 and Ukrainian military deaths are at least 45,000.

The head of Chechen, Ramzan Kadyrov, age 46, is ill and reported to be in a comma. A recent video shows him in a hospital but conscious and talking: Ramzan Kadyrov Appears in Hospital Video Amid Health Speculation | Watch (msn.com).There were reports six months ago over his health: Top Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov ‘seriously ill from suspected poisoning’ (msn.com). I gather there are no longer any Chechen troops on the front line.

Ammo: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. was reporting in August that it is now producing 24,000 155mm shells a month. This is up from 14,000 before the war. The Pentagon is now saying that they will be producing 100,000 shells per month by 2025 and are currently producing 28,000 shells a month. They expect to be producing 57,000 a month by next spring.

They are reporting that Russia may be able to increase artillery production to 2 million shell a year. I gather they are producing around a million a year now (see: Russia ramps up artillery production but still falling short, Western official says | Reuters). Not sure what percent of Ukrainian shells are “smart” rounds vice what percent of Russian shells are.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see Day 560 post for additional material: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Ukrainians will began training on F-16 this month according to Zelenskyy. I gather this will not be a quick process, as there are a limited number of Ukrainian pilots available with a good command of English. The U.S. did confirm this week (on 18 August) that we will allow third parties to provide Ukraine with F-16s. This includes 42 from Netherlands, their entire inventory. Russian indiscriminate use of SAMs continues to haunt them. It also includes 19 from Denmark. Norway will also be providing some F-16s.

The U.S. will start training Ukrainians on F-16 in Arizona come October. It will probably be a while before Ukraine has the planes. The Dutch are now saying 6 to 8 months. Still, these 61+ F-16s will give Ukraine some capability to contest the air space.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian drone campaign against Russia has continued. On 29 August, drones attack Pskov airport near Estonia. According to Russians 4 IL-76 transport aircraft were damaged. According to photographic evidence, at least two were destroyed.

Naval War: Ukraine launched UK Storm Shadow cruise missiles and sea drones at Sevastopol yesterday (13 September). Some were intercepted but it appears that the Russian 4,012-long-ton (full load) landing ship Minsk and a kilo-class attack submarine B-237 (3,040 tons) were damaged. It appears that Ukraine is trying to make Crimea untenable. This does not regain the peninsula but may have a negotiating advantage.

The Ukrainians also attacked two Project 22160 patrol ship (1300-1700 tons) in the southwestern part of Black Sea on 14 September.

Ukraine also attacked and may have hit the Bora-class guided missile corvette (1,050 tonnes) Samum using one of their “sea baby” drones. This is one of the largest air cushion or surface effect ships (SES) (i.e. a sidewall hovercraft) ships in existence. It is also a catamaran.

The Ukrainians also hit the Russian naval headquarters in Sevastopol on 22 September using at least two British supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles. The Ukrainians claimed 34 Russian officers killed, including the commander of the Black Sea Fleet and 105 soldiers were wounded. The Russians claimed that only 6 were injured and no one killed. Russia did show a video show the commander looking very alive. On 25 September, Russia announced it was demolishing the HQ building.

By its use of missiles and drones, Ukraine has wrestled partial control of the western half of the Black Sea. There have now been over a half-dozen ships that have sailed from Odesa to Bosporus even though no grain deal is in place.

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It was updated in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Complete write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The attempts to clean up corruption and reform the government has gotten serious. The Ukranian defense minister, Reznikov, has finally been replaced as of 3/5 September. This looked like something that had to happen. Two weeks before Zelenskyy removed all the officers in charge of recruiting over corruption issues. He has also conducted a review of the military medical commissions. Zelensky is also pushing a bill in the Rada (their parliament) to define corruption during wartime as treason. They have also detained a prominent Ukrainian oligarch (Forbes estimates that he is worth $1 billion) who owns the TV station that aired Zelenskyy’s old show “Servant of the People.” He is being investigated for fraud and money laundering.

The new defense minister is Rustem Umierov, who is Muslim. He is from a Crimean Tatar family. He was sworn in by the Rada on 6 September.

The Ukrainians are in discussion whether to hold elections next March. I think they absolutely must do so, especially in light of the lack of support for Ukraine by significant elements of the U.S. Republican Party. See: Presidential Elections – 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Other Issues:

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion. The shut of U.S. government was delayed for 45 days (until mid-November), the Speaker of the House was thrown out of office for the first time in the U.S. history, a new speaker will not be appointed until next week so all House business has stopped, and new additional aid for Ukraine has not been passed.

The second Republican primary debate occurred on 27 September. Four candidates clearly and strongly indicated that they support Ukraine (Christie, Haley, Pence and Scott). The Republican Party seems to split on this issue. Recent polling shows the majority of Americans still support Ukraine.

A few dates to keep in mind for the American political campaigns: 1) the third Republican debate is scheduled for 8 November, 2) Donald Trump currently leads the polling for the Republican Party presidential nomination by significant margins. He is currently in a civil trial in New York concerning his businesses. A summary judgment was issued on 26 September that his companies had committed fraud, 3) the tentative start date for the criminal trial in Fulton County Georgia is October 23 at the request of two of the defendants. The other 17 defendants, including Donald Trump, will be tried later, date not yet not declared, 4) the Iowa caucuses will be on 15 January 2024, 5) the Nevada primary will be on 6 February 2024, 6) the New Hampshire primary is scheduled for 13 February 2024, 7) 24 February is SC primary, then MI, 8) The date for the DOJ Special Council criminal trial for charges related to the 6 January incidents in now scheduled for 4 March, 9) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then, 10) 25 March is the trial date for Donald Trump’s New York Stormy Daniel’s related case, 11) 20 May is the trial date for Donald Trump’s classified documents case, 12) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently the three of the four leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.

Former VP and Republican presidential candidate Mike Pence was in Ukraine in July. He fully supports the war effort. On 13 July, the House took a vote on cutting off aid to Ukraine. The vote was 358-70 rejecting the amendment. All 70 opposed votes were Republican. See: Here are the 70 House Republicans who voted to cut off all US military aid to Ukraine (msn.com). There are 222 Republicans in the house, so this is a minority opinion in the party supported maybe a third of Republicans in the house. It is also the opinion that appears to be held by their two presidential nomination front runners.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction.

European Support for Ukraine: A pro-Russian candidate and the Smer party won 42 out of 150 seats in the parliamentary elections for Slovakia on 30 September. Their party leader, Robert Fico (b. 1964), has until 16 October to form a government. Their leader has promised to not send a single bullet to Ukraine. See: Opinion polling for the 2023 Slovak parliamentary election – Wikipedia. He has since moderated his position.

Ukraine is gotten into an argument with some of its eastern European allies over exportation of cheaper grain. Poland was threatening to cut off military aide to Ukraine. They are also threatening to send all the Ukrainian migrants home. It appears that they are now working it out.

Belarus: It has been reported by Ukraine that Russia has completely withdrawn their ground forces from Belarus. Nuclear weapons are discussed in the Day 560 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey.  As of 10 July, it looks like Erdogan of Turkey has finally agreed to let Sweden into NATO. Hungary is not expected to block this. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. See Day 443 for more info. Meanwhile, the head of NATO is supporting renewal of talks about Turkey joining the EU.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan has taken the capital of Karabakh, the town of Khankendi (pop. 75,000 in 2021) and closed down the Lachin Corridor. This was a two-day offensive covering 19 and 20 September that took the rest of the country. This ends the conflict for the moment, with Azerbaijan having completely taken the Nagorno-Karabakh area between its war in 2020 and the events of the last week. The President of Artkakh (Karabakh) issued a decree of 28 September to dissolve all state institutions from 1 January 2024. The state effectively does not exist now, having first come into existence in late 1991, as the Soviet Union was breaking up.

There were Russian peacekeepers, around 2,000 in the area. They were unable to stop Azerbaijan and took casualties. The deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping force has been killed, as were at least four other officers. It kind of shows that Russia is currently not able to control the Caucasus. One wonders what is next.

Protests continue against the Armenian government in Yerevan. They started on 19 September with thousands protesting and are continuing. On 25 September 140 protesters were arrested. It appears both the protestors and the government are western leaning, but there is general dissatisfaction with the government over having lost the war in Karabakh. The protesting appears to have died down after 25 September. The Armenian parliament voted on Tuesday (3 Oct) to join the ICC (International Criminal Court). The ICC currently has arrest warrants out for Vladimir Putin.

As of 28 September Kazakhstan has said it will comply with sanctions against Russia. Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Union. It was Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych’s decision to join the Eurasian Union vice EU that led to the protests in late 2013 that resulted in his overthrow in 2014, the Russian-supported successionist war in Ukraine in 2014, followed by the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014.

Meanwhile, on 27 September, one American and two Russian astronauts/cosmonauts landed in Kazakhstan after their joint space mission. They have been in space 371 days. The record is 437 days.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 576



Some minor advances, but it is mostly clean up, vice any new operations. To date, neither side has really achieved what they were hoping. The real issue now is whether the support for this war will be maintained by Ukraine’s allies or the Russian populace as it appears this war is heading to a third year.

Ukraine did take village Andriivka south of Bakhmut. Ukraine is still advancing towards Verbove, supposedly now through the first defensive line. Ukraine still has another 30 to 60 days to do something, but right now not much is going on. So, we could be in for an “October surprise” but I doubt it. 

Ukraine appears to have penetrated the first line in the area south of Orikhiv and is looking to slowly expand that area under control. While this is progress, it is not much for an offensive that has now gone for more than three months. The Russians have a layered defense consisting of three lines. Some people are claiming that 60 percent labor and resources were spent on the first line and only 20 percent on the next two. I have not checked this. 

Still, there is some sense that the Russian defenses are stretched. As U.S. General Milley described it on 16 August (via WP): “The Russians are in pretty rough shape. So they’ve suffered huge amount of casualties. Their morale is not great. Their leadership is questionable and spotty….Logistics is not great.” This assessment does appear to have some validity.

Discussions on Prigozhin and Wagner, the grain deal, prisoner exchanges, reinforcements, etc. are in the Day 552 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 552 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia map. It is dated 22 September.

Russia currently occupies five cities since that start of the invasion: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November 2022.

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 5 PM: It is 77 degrees (25 Celsius) and sunny. No rain forecasted for the next ten days.

Kherson is 79 degrees (26 Celsius) and partly cloudy. No rain forecasted for the next ten days.

Ukrainian Army Build-up: It is now claimed that the M-1s will be arriving in September and this still appears to be the case. At least 10 have been spotted on trains in Eastern Europe and are expected to arrive in Ukraine in mid-September. Also, the first 10 of a 100 Leopard Is (older, less armored version of the tank) have arrived in Ukraine.

It is claimed that the U.S. and its allies have now trained 63,000 Ukrainian troops. The current Ukrainian armed forces are certainly in excess of 300,000, so over 80% of their troops have been trained by them. It is reported that some of the troops are learning how to use some equipment from YouTube videos.

Since the start of this offensive three months ago, Ukraine has lost at least 5 of its 71 Leopard IIs, with at least 10 out for repairs. They lost their first Challenger II yesterday. These are not heavy armor losses, which are often lost at a much higher rate than personnel losses during offensive operations (see Dupuy: Attrition).

Russian Army Build-up: Nothing new to report. Russian morale is suspect, with an officer flying a Mi-8 defecting last month. In his interview, he claimed that his family was smuggled out of Russia by Ukrainian operatives before he defected.

The U.S. is now saying there are 200,000 Russian troops in Ukraine. The Ukrainian defense intel guys last week said it is over 420,000. That is kind of the lower and upper limits of my guesses. So, both figures look good, but obviously at least one is wrong.

Seen some convoluted math on twitter that calculated Russian dead, Russian recruitment and Russian strength. The only way they could get that to work was to use a wounded-to-killed ratio of 2.4-to-1. That is lower ratio than what the Soviet Union had in World War II (Battle of Kursk figures, 1943), before they had penicillin. It looks like they had to assume the lower wounded-to-kill figure to make the math work. They probably need rework their estimates. I seriously doubt they have any hard evidence to justify such a low wounded-to-killed ratio.

Opposing forces: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Price of oil (Brent Crude) has increased to 93.96 as of 10:26 AM EST. Ruble is still low at 96.15 to the dollar.

Casualties: The last extended casualty discussion was in the Day 560 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). This is a reduced posting.

We do have reported U.S. intel reports that claim that Russian casualties are up to 120,000 killed and Ukraine casualties are close to 70,000 killed. For various reasons, I really don’t buy into these higher figures. This is discussed here: The New York Times casualty reports | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The UN is reporting as of 10 September at least 9,614 civilians confirmed dead in the war. Updated chart from the UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month through August.

More than 60,000 people have died in this conflict: 32,656 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count as of 22 September) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – old U.S. DOD estimate) + 9,614 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR April 2022) = 62,145. It may be in excess of 120,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect Russian killed is at least 60,000 and Ukrainian military deaths are at least 45,000.

The head of Chechen, Ramzan Kadyrov, age 46, is ill and reported to be in a comma. A recent video shows him in a hospital but conscious and talking: Ramzan Kadyrov Appears in Hospital Video Amid Health Speculation | Watch (msn.com).There were reports six months ago over his health: Top Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov ‘seriously ill from suspected poisoning’ (msn.com). I gather there are no longer any Chechen troops on the front line.

Ammo: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The U.S. is reporting that it is now producing 24,000 155mm shells a month. This is up from 14,000 before the war.

Air Power: Previous discussion of air power is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see Day 560 post for additional material: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).  

Ukrainians will began training on F-16 this month according to Zelenskyy. I gather this will not be a quick process, as there are a limited number of Ukrainian pilots available with a good command of English. The U.S. did confirm this week (on 18 August) that we will allow third parties to provide Ukraine with F-16s. This includes 42 from Netherlands, their entire inventory. Russian indiscriminate use of SAMs continues to haunt them. It also includes 19 from Denmark. Norway will also be providing some F-16s.

The U.S. will start training Ukrainians on F-16 in Arizona come October. It will probably be a while before Ukraine has the planes. The Dutch are now saying 6 to 8 months. Still, these 61+ F-16s will give Ukraine some capability to contest the air space.

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian drone campaign against Russia has continued. On 29 August, drones attack Pskov airport near Estonia. According to Russians 4 IL-76 transport aircraft were damaged. According to photographic evidence, at least two were destroyed.

Naval War: Ukraine launched UK Storm Shadow cruise missiles and sea drones at Sevastopol yesterday (13 September). Some were intercepted but it appears that the Russian 4,012-long-ton (full load) landing ship Minsk and a kilo-class attack submarine B-237 (3,040 tons) were damaged. It appears that Ukraine is trying to make Crimea untenable. This does not regain the peninsula but may have a negotiating advantage.

The Ukrainians also attacked two Project 22160 patrol ship (1300-1700 tons) in the southwestern part of Black Sea on 14 September.

Ukraine also attacked and may have hit the Bora-class guided missile corvette (1,050 tonnes) Samum using one of their “sea baby” drones. This is one of the largest air cushion or surface effect ships (SES) (i.e. a sidewall hovercraft) ships in existence. It is also a catamaran.

They also hit the Russian naval headquarters in Sevastopol yesterday (21 September).

Missile Defense: Discussion of previous missiles attack is in the Day 443 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It was updated in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Complete write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Updates are provided in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 471 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The attempts to clean up corruption and reform the government has gotten serious. The Ukranian defense minister, Reznikov, has finally been replaced as of 3 September. This looked like something that had to happen. Two weeks ago Zelenskyy removed all the officers in charge of recruiting over corruption issues. He has also conducted a review of the military medical commissions. Zelensky is also pushing a bill in the Rada (their parliament) to define corruption during wartime as treason. They have also detained a prominent Ukrainian oligarch (Forbes estimates that he is worth $1 billion) who owns the TV station that aired Zelenskyy’s old show “Servant of the People.” He is being investigated for fraud and money laundering.

The new proposed defense minister is Rustem Umierov, who is Muslim. He is from a Crimean Tatar family.

The Ukrainians are in discussion whether to hold elections next March. I think they absolutely must do so, especially in light of the lack of support for Ukraine by significant elements of the U.S. Republican Party. See: Presidential Elections – 2024 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Other Issues:

U.S. Support for Ukraine: Write-up on U.S. support for Ukraine is in the Day 443 post here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 443 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is going to be a long campaign season until November 2024, so certainly we will revisit this issue at some point. The total amount of support committed by the U.S. to Ukraine is $133 Billion.

The U.S. resolved its “debt crisis” with the debt limit being suspended until 2025. Defense spending is capped at $886 billion, or 3.5% increase over the previous year. This matches the current administrations budget request. Spending on defense is limited to a 1% growth in 2025, or up to $895 billion. We will see if things get balled up with a government shut down on 1 October.

A few dates to keep in mind for the American political campaigns: 1) the second Republican primary debate is scheduled for 27 September, 2) the third debate is scheduled sometime in early November, 3) the tentative start date for the trail in Fulton County Georgia is October 23 at the request of two of the defendants. The other 17 defendants, including Donald Trump, will be tried later, date not yet not declared, 4) the Iowa caucuses will be on 15 January 2024, 5) the Nevada primary will be on 6 February 2024, 6) the New Hampshire primary is scheduled for 13 February 2024, 7) 24 February is SC primary, then MI, 8) The date for the DOJ Special Council trail for charges related to the 6 January incidents in now scheduled for 4 March, 9) on 5 March 14 states will hold their primaries and between 9 – 23 March another 15 states/territories will hold their primaries. The Republican nominee could be decided by then, 10) 25 March is the trail date for Donald Trump’s New York Stormy Daniel’s related case, 11) 20 May is the trial date for Donald Trump’s classified documents case, 12) last Republican primary is 4 June 2024. I actually do think this is war related news as the currently the three leading Republican presidential candidates do not support Ukraine.

Former VP and Republican presidential candidate Mike Pence was in Ukraine in July. He fully supports the war effort. On 13 July, the House took a vote on cutting off aid to Ukraine. The vote was 358-70 rejecting the amendment. All 70 opposed votes were Republican. See: Here are the 70 House Republicans who voted to cut off all US military aid to Ukraine (msn.com). There are 222 Republicans in the house, so this is a minority opinion in the party supported maybe a third of Republicans in the house. It is also the opinion that appears to be held by their two presidential nomination front runners.

Also, see the Day 443 posts for previous reports on the EU, NATO, Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh. On 20 May, Lavrov’s daughter (Lavrov is the foreign minister of Russia) attended a wedding in Georgia. There were protests by the Georgians, with her car egged. She was forced to leave because of the public reaction.

European Support for Ukraine: A pro-Russian candidate and the Smer party is leading in the parliamentary elections for Slovakia that are scheduled for 30 September. Their leader has promised to not send a single bullet to Ukraine. See: Opinion polling for the 2023 Slovak parliamentary election – Wikipedia.

Ukraine is gotten into an argument with some of its eastern European allies over exportation of cheaper grain. Poland is now threatening to cut off military aide to Ukraine. They are also threatening to send all the Ukrainian migrants home.

Belarus: It has been reported by Ukraine that Russia has completely withdrawn their ground forces from Belarus. Nuclear weapons are discussed in the Day 560 post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 560 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey.  As of 10 July, it looks like Erdogan of Turkey has finally agreed to let Sweden into NATO. Hungary is not expected to block this. Erdogan, age 69, won the election on 28 May with 52% of the vote. Voter turn-out was 84%. Next election is in five years. See Day 443 for more info. Meanwhile, the head of NATO is supporting renewal of talks about Turkey joining the EU.

Nagorno-Karabakh: This argument has reared its ugly head again. Last we left it, Azerbaijan was threatening Karabakh, but was restrained by Russian peacekeepers (2,000 of them), that were supporting Armenian Karabakh, with some unease by the pro-Western Armenian government. Well, it was now blown up again, with Azerbaijan attacking Armenian Karabakh positions around the “Lachin Corridor.” There were videos yesterday showing Azerbaijan forces just outside of the capital of Karabakh, the town on Khankendi (pop. 75,000). The deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping force has been killed, as were at least four other officers.

Starting on 19 September, large protests (thousands) started in the Armenian capital of Yerevan over the lack of support for Karabakh. This includes shouted obscenities against Putin, just to show where their sympathies lie. Protests were continuing as of the night of 21 September. This is tricky situation, as it appears Azerbaijan has the upper hand militarily, the Russian peacekeeping force is not robust enough to keep the peace, and the western-leaning Armenian government could be overthrown by even more western-leaning (or at least more anti-Putin) protesters. This is probably not going to end well. 

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.