Category National Security Policy

Variable 4: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?

Depressions begat revolutions. Now it ain’t so simple as that, but there is a big enough correlation here that every time there is a economic downturn, a nation’s leaders should be looking over their shoulder in concern. If they are a democratic government, it probably means they will now have time to write their memoirs. If they are a dictatorship, they could end up dangling from a meat-hook.

The seminal quantitative work on this subject was two separate studies done in the 1960s by Ted Gurr and the couple Ivo and Rosilind Feierabend. Ted Gurr’s work was summarized in his book Why Men Revolt, while the Feierhabend’s never issued out a book (which is a shame as their work was as significant). There has not been much of significance done since then (which I think is fairly bizarre actually… it is not like revolutions are a dead subject).  We have blogged about this before.

So Variable 3 is “How is the economy of China doing?.” As long as the China economy is growing and thriving over the next 20 years, then this only increases the danger to Taiwan. On the other hand, there are lots of reasons to doubt that their economy will continue to thrive over the next 20 years. If the economy is not growing, then this fourth variable comes into play: Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?  This affects the odds that China will decide the invade Taiwan in five ways:

  1. The reduced economic growth probably reduces their “defense” budget.
  2. If there is unrest or political turmoil, it probably distracts the government to worry about internal issues, vice invading their neighbors (although it some cases, it can actually do the reverse).
  3. It may result in a leadership change:
    1. This leadership could be even more internally absorbed.
    2. This leadership could be even more nationalistic.
    3. This government could be unstable.
  4. It may result in a change of the form of government:
    1. Communism collapses.
      1. It becomes a democracy
      2. It becomes a dictatorship.
      3. The new government could be unstable
      4. Central government may collapse entirely.
    2. Communism is reinforced (sort of another cultural revolution)
    3. Communism is de-stabilized, but returns back in control.
  5. It may result in no government at all (more on this later).

So, what are the odds that China will have a economic slow-down in the next 20 years? Is it 25%, is it 50%, is there no chance at all? 

If there is an economic slowdown, what is the chance of political turmoil, and then what is the extent, nature and virulence of this political turmoil? Is it a bunch children of “princelings” that can be run over with tanks, or is something more broadly based.

The problem with revolutions, is that once they start, they gets pretty hard to predict where they are going to go. For example, when the Shah of Iran abdicated in 1979, much his vocal opposition came from the left, often college students. The country ended up being taken over by Ayatollahs. The Russian revolution started in 1917 with the moderately liberal Cadet Party and Alexander Kerensky running the country in a somewhat democratic manner and ended up with Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin in charge. The Russian revolution of 1991 ended up with Boris Yeltsin in charge of a developing democracy and ended up with Vladimir Putin in charge. The Arab Spring of 2010-2012 resulted in demonstrations and revolts in 17 or so different countries. In four of those countries the governments were overthrown (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen). Only one ended up with a democratic government in its aftermath. 

And then there is always the possibility that China could end up with no central controlling government at all. This is not all that far-fetched. China has spent almost of much of its history broken up into smaller states as it has spend unified as a single state. There is no strong reason to assume that over the next decades that China will remain unified. There is no history that suggests such a pattern.  

Modern countries do break up. Yugoslavia comes to mind. There are significant independence movements in Catalonia (Barcelona) and Scotland. So the image of China as a dominating unified state may not be the image moving forward.

Anyhow, I suspect we are looking at maybe a 50% chance of a major economic slowdown in the next 20 years (this is just a wild guess, I have no idea what the odds of such an event are). If there is an economic slowdown, then I am guessing maybe a 50% change of unrest and turmoil. So….there is no guarantee that China will be in a position or place to even consider invading Taiwan in the next 20 years. Maybe a 50% chance that this is the case.

 

Related blog posts:

Why Men Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Why Are We Still Wondering Why Men (And Women) Rebel? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Quote from America’s Modern Wars | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Ted Gurr Has Passed Away | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Variable 3: How is the economy of China doing?

Now, the Chinese economy has been on a tear for the last three decades. This graph cribbed from Wikipedia nicely shows this trend:

It was doing double-digit growth rates and is still growing 6-7% a year. As I point out in my previous blog posts, the Chinese armed forces are not really ready to invade a defended Taiwan, especially their air force and navy. This is going to take some time and money to build up. 

Such a build up sort of means that the economy needs to keep growing. Hard to justify lots of nice new shiny expensive high-tech airplanes when the economy is in the doldrums. As the economy has been steadily growing at 6% or more a year for 30+ years, their definition of doldrums may be pretty slanted. 

Now, relatively speaking, the Chinese have not been putting as much into defense as either Taiwan or the United States. Their defense budget is between 1.3% to 1.7% of their GDP. In contrast, the U.S. defense budget is between 3.4% to 3.7% of its GDP. Taiwan’s defense budget is around 2.3% of their GDP. As the Chinese economy grows, so to will their defense budget; I suspect we will know they are serious about changing the status of Taiwan if and when their defense budget expands to 2 or 3% of GDP.

But, the big question is whether the Chinese economy is actually going to keep expanding at 6% a year. A lot of people have been questioning that for a while, some people have been predicting that China is heading for an economic crash, some people have been claiming that the economy is artificially boosted, and other people are claiming that their economic statistics are artificially boosted. Regardless, they are facing a changing economic environment with India and other countries taking over the “cheap manufacturer” role. The transition to a more developed and growing economy could be a little fraught. 

There is one big ticking time-bomb the Chinese are facing, which is their demographics. I have blogged about this before (see below). The birth rate of China is below replacement rate, so the population is aging and the number of new young workers is declining. Old people are less productive and because of their health problems, sometimes more expensive. This is an economic drag with all aging populations unless one comes up with a Logan’s Run type solution. But, even a bigger problem will be the declining young work force. This is in part, a problem created by the one-child policy of China, which had good short-term benefits but has now created a long-term problem. Most likely the Chinese population will experience negative population growth by 2030. The population for China for 2021 is estimated at 1.44 billion. The United Nations predicts the Chinese population will be 1.36 billion by 2050. The real shortfall will be in the number of new workers.

Now, China is reacting to that with a new three-child policy. An article on that is below. China abandoned is one-child policy in 2015 (much too late in my opinion), went to a two-child policy and now have upgraded to a three-child policy. What is next: do they all become Mormons? This does look like an exercise in desperation. But, regardless of what the Chinese government does, I don’t think we are going to see a sudden sea-change in Chinese demographics over the next twenty years.

So, if the population starts declining by 2030…then does the economy decline with it? I think it will slow economic growth down. Hard to imagine they can maintain their 6% growth rates in that environment. They appear to have no quick and easy fix.

Now, a slow growth, stagnant or declining economy creates all kind of new problems. First, it is hard to increase or justify defense expenses when the economy is stagnant. If they are serious about creating the modern air forces and navy that they need to invade Taiwan, then they need to go on a spending spree for a decade or so. Chinese is looking at the population starting to decline by 2030. In 2020 they only had 12 million new births. By 2025 they will have over 300 million people over the age of 60. Does this mean that they have already “lost the bubble” for the chance to build up their military so as to take Taiwan?

Second, invading Taiwan is going to have a big negative economic impact. I have discussed this before, with perhaps a loss of 60-80% of their trade, 60% of their oil and a decline in their economy of 30-40% (just a guess). See the post below.

Third, stagnant or declining economies tend to lead to demands for political reform. This leads to either governmental reforms, leadership changes, civil unrest or even overthrow of the government. It was the extended period of economic stagnation that set the stage for the overthrow of Communism in Russia. We did go from a world in 1991 that had 16 Communist governments to a world with only four (China, Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea). Is this the final stage of that movement? One cannot rule it out. Hard to imagine the leadership of China is going to be focused on invading Taiwan if they are facing another Tiananmen Square (1989)

That said, there is a risk here in the danger to the government. Argentine invaded Falklands Island in part due to concerns about unrest in Argentina. In a sense, it was an invasion conducted for the sake of trying to bolster the government. This may not be a good example for China to follow, for not only did Argentina loose the war, but the government was overthrown and the leaders were arrested. The head of the Argentine junta was sentenced to a dozen years in jail. 

There is another example of a booming Asian economy that was going to surpass the United States. This is Japan. I have blogged about this before. To summarize: In 1995 the Japanese economy was 71% of the U.S. economy based upon GDP. In 2017 it was 25%.  I always liked this graph from that blog post:

Does history repeat itself?

 

 

Previous blog posts:

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Proposed Defense Budget for 2022 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Demographics of China | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

“We can’t afford it”: Chinese internet users have rejected Beijing’s new three-child policy

Where Did Japan Go? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

P.S. Chinese economy grew 6.7% in 2018, 6.0% in 2019, 2.3% in 2020 and is projected to grow 8.5% in 2021 (source: World Bank and for 2021 IMF). In contrast, the U.S. economy grew 3.0% in 2018, 2.2% in 2019, -3.5% in 2020 (it shrunk), and is projected to grow 6.39% in 2021 (source IMF).

P.P.S.: A recent article on Chinese demographics that repeats what I have been saying: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-2020-census-shows-slowest-population-growth-since-1-child-policy-2021-05-11/

Variable 2: What is the changing composition of the politburo?

This subject would be best discussed by a proper “China watcher”, vice me. But… let me make a few observations on this. Politburo’s in the Soviet Union and in Red China have traditionally, but not always, been subservient to the leading political figure of the day. This leading figure is usually the Chairman of the communist party, although during the time of Deng Xiaopiing, he was the leading figure even though his official role was the Chairman of the Central Military Commission until 9 November 1989. While he held no official office after that he clearly was still considered the “paramount leader” and was still the senior leader in China up until his death in 1997 at the age of 92. Still, politburo’s sometimes have a significant role. The next leader invariably comes from it, and they are involved to some extent in choosing the next leader. The nature of the politburo does matter as they often reign in leadership and sometimes even try to overthrow leadership. So usually their operations are low-key and behind the scenes, until such time as they are not.

The current politburo of Chinese Communist Party consists of 25 people. But the power of the politburo has been further centralized in the Politburo Standing Committee of seven members. They are Xi Jinping (President of PRC and General Secretary CCP, aged 67), Li Keqiang (Premier, aged 65), Li Zhanshu (Chairman of National People’s Congress, aged 70), Wang Yang (Chairman of Political Consultative Conference, aged 66), Wang Huning (First Secretary CCP, aged 65), Zhao Leji (Chairman Dicipline Inspection, aged 64) and Han Zheng (Vice Premier, aged 67).

This is a pretty homogenous crowd, all aged between 64 and 70. Mostly likely, as Xi Jinping ages and retires, none of these people are going to be his long-term replacement. Over the next decade or two there will a rising generations of new leaders pulled up into the politburo. So the generational replacement for Xi Jinping is not in place yet, or at least he/she is not currently sitting on the Politburo Standing Committee.

This, of course, just reinforces my impression that the Politburo and therefore the leadership of China will be fairly cautious and deliberate for the next decade and perhaps for the next two decades. Potentially adventurous and risk-taking leaders are currently not in place, and they can only rise to the top as positions are opened. This may take a while.

Variable 1: Who is the leader of China?

This is a pretty straightforward discussion. Xi Jinping is 67 years old. It is not unusual for leaders to remain in power in dictatorships until they are well into the 80s. It is also possible that leaders in China can retire (it has happened recently). So, the four options are:

  1. Xi Jinping remains in power for the next 20 years.
  2. Xi Jinping is retired after 10-15 years (or sooner).
  3. Xi Jinping is marginalized or replaced (this does not look likely now, but could happen a decade from now, although still not likely).
  4. Xi Jinping could be gone from power tomorrow due to health reasons.

As outlined in a previous post, there are lots of reasons to believe nothing significant will happen in Taiwan as long as Xi Jinping remains in power. See: Will China take the risk and actually invade Taiwan? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

So, the question is, will he be gone from power anytime soon (probably not likely) and if he is gone from power, then who will replace him. Lets say he is gone from power in the next 10 to 15 years. Then, what we are looking at:

  1. He is replaced by another cautious and deliberate Chinese leader, which means Taiwan will not be on the front burner (i.e. more of the same).
  2. He is replaced by a leader that actually just doesn’t care much that Taiwan is an independent entity (after all this is an issue that now dates back over 70 years).
  3. He is replace by more adventurous, nationalistic, risk-taking or radical leader who is willing to take on such an invasion and the politburo is willing to go along.
  4. He is replaced by a more adventurous, nationalistic, risk-taking or radical leader who is willing to take on such an invasion and the politburo is not willing to go along.
  5. The politburo is packed with people more adventurous, nationalistic, risk-taking or radical and will push the leadership (who may not be able to say no) into such an effort.

It is pretty hard to determine what are the odds of this, but we will probably be staring at a leadership change in the next 15 to 20 years. I am no China expert, but my sense that there is at least a 50/50 chance that Xi Jinping will be replace by someone similar, or option 1 above. There is also at least a 50/50 chance that the politburo will remain cautious. They may serve to reign in a more adventurous leader. I think the odds of getting a risk-taking adventurous leader who has the backing from an acquiescent or supportive politburo is probably less than 25%. Again, I am no China expert and there is really no way to estimate the odds. This is a “guesstimate” shall we say.

On the other hand, a useful survey would be to examine what percent of Sovietologists who predicted that someone like Khrushchev would replace Stalin and heavily reform the Stalinist state? Also what percent of Sovietologists predicted the Brezhnev would replace Khrushchev and the reforms of Khrushchev would be reeled in? What percent of Sovietologists predicted that Gorbachev would rise to power and so radically change the Soviet state that it would collapse? I have never seen such a survey done, but I think I know generally what is the answer to this.

But based upon the patterns we have seen in Chinese leadership and the politburo, most likely nothing will significantly change in the next 20 years. On the other hand, it can…..

This leads us to Variable 2: What is the changing composition of the politburo?

Will China invade Taiwan in the next 20 years?

I did three posts recently looking at the claim by retiring Admiral Phillip Davidson of the Indo-Pacific Command indicating that he thought China might invade Taiwan in the next six years: “I think the threat is manifest…in the next six years…” I ended up concluding (in bold) that “I do find the idea that mainland China will invade Taiwan in the next 6 years to be somewhat loopy.” I was surprised that I did not receive any comments about that characterization.

Now, it is possible that China may invade Taiwan, not in the near future, but over the next decade or two. Let us say in the next 20 years. So what would have to change to make this option viable in the next 20 years when it is really not likely in the next 6 years?

I think the following will influence this:

  1. Who is the leader of China?
  2. What is the changing composition of the politburo?
  3. How is the economy of China doing?
  4. Is there a problem with internal turmoil and unrest in China?
  5. What is the degree of U.S. commitment to Taiwan?
  6. What is the size and capabilities of the Chinese Armed Forces?

 

I will have to address each of these variables one blog post at a time. As I don’t like to do particularly long blog posts (unlike my books), I will address each of these variables in a separate blog post, maybe every other day, if I am so focused.

In this case, I am looking at a conventional amphibious operation, as I think that is the only approach over the next 20 years that will actually bring Taiwan under control of China. There are other options and operations that China can do that may intimidate or coerce Taiwan and modify their behavior, but these do not bring Taiwan under the direct control of China. To control Taiwan without an amphibious invasion is a much longer, complex and more difficult process, and I am not going to discuss that here.

Keep in mind that right now, in a conventional warfare scenario, if Taiwan has military support from the United States, the most likely outcome would be a failed invasion. The political and economic cost of a failed invasion would be very significant, possibly resulting in the collapse of the ruling party of the People’s Republic of China.

 

Past three blog posts on the subject:

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – wherefore and why? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Will China take the risk and actually invade Taiwan? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

 

P.S. Today is the 77th anniversary of the Normandy invasion. Related blog post: The Dupuy Institute on Youtube | Mystics & Statistics

Proposed Defense Budget for 2022

The president has proposed his defense budget for 2022. The budget has not gone down, which may not have been what some people expected. The Department of Defense (DOD) budget is $715 billion. This is an increase in the budget of $10 billion from 2021, or about 1.6 percent. Inflation in 2020 is estimated to be 1.5 percent. The overall budget for “national defense” is $753 billion, with expenditures for the Department of Energy and other federal agencies included.

Don’t have details of the budget. It may be out there, but I have not chased them down yet. So, I don’t know what the Army’s share of the budget is. Budget for 2021 included supplemental spending bills and funding transfers and the expenses for combat operations were separately funded. For this proposed budget, these are included in this budget and are $18.4 billion. This is apparently a drop of 21 percent from last year.

There is a renewed focus on conventional war against near-parity opponents. We are now looking at a 296-ship fleet vice a 355-ship fleet envisioned by the previous administration. The 355-ship fleet was kind of a wasteful pipedream that was not easily achievable. It harkened back to the movement for a 600-ship fleet that was envisioned in the 1980s. This was briefly attained before it was cut back. They are also decommissioning two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which always struck me as a bizarre expenditure of money. Then there is the controversial F-35 program, which has been reduce from 60 new planes this year to 48. They are retiring 42 A-10s, leaving the Air Force with 239. Artillery is back in fashion with $6.6 billion to develop and field long-range fires. Overall, they are spending a lot on R&D, the “largest-ever” R&D spending according to the SecDef (I have not tested statement against inflation). There was $107 billion R&D requested in 2021. For 2022 it is higher (but I did not see an exact figure).

By the way, the budget for the State Department and international programs is proposed as 63.6 billion.  

This is a proposed budget. It is a recommendation sent to congress and congress can choose to do whatever they wish with it. As it is a Democratic controlled House and a bare Democratic majority in the Senate, it may be passed close to as is, but probably will not be unscathed. Most likely, if it is significantly changed it will be to reduce it in general or to maintain or restore hardware (LCS and A-10s) that DOD is trying to reduce. I don’t expect the final figures to be much lower than what is proposed.

The total active and reserve component of the military is planned to be 2,145,900, which is a slight reduction (4,475 less) than last year. Chinese active personnel is 2,185,000 in 2021. Russia’s active personnel is 1,454,000.

In contrast the estimated defense budget for the Chinese armed forces for 2020 or 2021 is given as $193.3 (IISS-2020), $209.4 billion (Wikipedia-2021) or $252.0 (SIPRI-2020). This is between 1.3% to 1.7% of GDP. In contrast the U.S. defense budget is 3.4% to 3.7% of GDP. The Chinese budget in purchase parity (PPP) figures I gather would be some 1.6 times higher.

The defense budget for Russia is given as 61.7 billion in 2020. This is around 3.9% to 4.3% of GDP (as of 2019). The Russian budget in PPP figures is probably around 2.5 times higher.

 

See: https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/a-look-at-what-s-inside-biden-s-6-trillion-budget-request/ar-AAKuAdi?ocid=msedgntp

https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/28/pentagon-asks-for-715-billion-in-2022-defense-budget.html

https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2639101/dod-budget-request-boosts-research-nuclear-modernization-and-includes-27-pay-ra/

https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2021/05/27/pentagon-budget-will-shake-up-legacy-systems-lawmakers-are-shaking-back/

https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/5/28/air-force-proposal-would-shift-funding-to-new-aircraft

https://breakingdefense.com/2021/05/secdef-rd-spending-to-skyrocket-in-22-budget/

Older related blog posts:

GAO: “We’re 26 ships into the contract and we still don’t know if the [Littoral Combat Ship] can do its job.” | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Challenge of Getting to a 350-Ship Fleet | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The Saga of the F-35: Too Big To Fail? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

U.S. Army Invests In Revitalizing Long Range Precision Fires Capabilities | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Status Update On U.S. Long Range Fires Capabilities | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Will China take the risk and actually invade Taiwan?

One of our commenters asked the question “So what if the PRC President for Life takes a gamble?”

Invading Taiwan is a high risk operation as discussed in our previous posts:

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – the fight? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Invading Taiwan in the next six years – wherefore and why? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The potential cost of such an operation is a loss of 60-80% of trade, a loss of 60% of their oil and a temporary decline in their economy of 30-40% (just a guess). It is unknown how long this economic decline would be, but it could last for several years. The resulting economic decline could also result in civil unrest, protests and even the overthrow of the government. The invasion could also fail. We will discuss some of these examples of failed gambles in a later post.

Still, one cannot rule out the leadership of a nation doing something risky, or pushing the limits or simply making a mistake. There is more than enough historical examples of mind-boggling idiocy by senior leadership of nations.

Now, there is not a lot history of military adventurism on the part of China. Their armed forces have operated in country and only on the edge of their borders for most of their history. The current head of the Peoples Republic of China, XI Jinping, has been in charge since 15 November 2012. He came up through the communist party and the communist system, although his parents were suppressed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). He is a “princeling” or a “Party’s Crown Princes” meaning a descendent of prominent and influential senior communist officials who, not surprisingly, often also rise of prominent positions in the Chinese hierarchy. He spent much of his career as a politician. Various descriptions of him tend to reinforce his image as pragmatic, serious and cautious. He is also very much the dictator.

He does report to a politburo. So while the head of any communist party system has significant power, these politburos are not without influence. They have been known to occasionally replace heads of the party that have had repeated problems. For the Soviet Union this includes Khrushchev in 1964 and for China, the list is longer: Chen Duxiu in 1927, Xiang Zhongfa in 1931, Qin Bangxian (or Bo Gu) in 1935, Zhang Wentian in 1943, Hua Guofeng in 1981, Hu Yaobang in 1987, and Zhao Ziyang in 1989, Jiang Zemin in 2002, and Hu Jintao in 2012. So, it is not like Xi Jinping can wake up one morning and decide to invade Taiwan. This almost certainly has to be discussed with and supported by the Politburo. So even if Xi Jinping was a risk taker, which he does not appear to be, then is debatable if the majority of the Politburo will be risk takers. Usually Politburo’s tend to be conservative. For example, the “Khrushchev thaw” from mid-1950s to the mid-1960s was reeled in by Brezhnev and the politburo, as were the economic reforms of Alexei Kosygin that were initiated in 1965. By the same token, the coup that was conducted in the Soviet Union in August 1991 was for the sake of getting Gorbachev to restrict or restrain the degree and extent of reforms. In the case of China they have their own complex history wrapped up around the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. I can’t think of any examples of a politburo forcing the leadership to be more adventurous and less conservative. They traditionally serve as a brake to adventurism.

So, Xi Jinping is 67 years old. He could easily be there for another 20 years. He is not a risk taker and politburo’s tend to not be risk takers. So, my suspicion is that China would not take the risk of invading Taiwan any time in the near future, and probably not at any time when Xi Jinping in charge. I suspect that any scenario that endangers Taiwan will only come about once Xi Jinping has retired or expired.

So should Ukraine join NATO?

I gather that we are on the path for Ukraine to NATO at some point in the future. It is clearly something that the current government of Ukraine wants, although Russia is hostile to the idea and the west is wary. Ukraine was in the Partnership for Peace program and working towards joining NATO until Viktor Yanokovich was elected President of Ukraine in 2010. He shut that effort down but was thrown out of power in 2014. The efforts of Ukraine to join NATO has now been re-activated.

Now, it is clear that Ukraine is back on the path to joining NATO and probably will at some point. Needless to say, Russia is not very happy about this. I gather the real question is whether this will be something that will be done sometime in the next 10-20 years or whether it is something that needs to be accelerated to maybe the next three years.

Russia’s saber rattling last week does sort of make the argument for three years vice 20 years. On the other hand, NATO has become an alliance of 30 western democracies, although a couple are what I call “troubled democracies” (Turkey and Hungary). Gone are the days when dictatorships like Portugal were part of NATO. So, it is now sort of expected that countries that join will have democratic structures and low levels of corruption. Ukraine posses several problems in that it is still a fledgling democracy, there is a lot of corruption, there are two “people’s republics” in an armed warlike state, and part of Ukraine (Crimea) has been occupied by Russia.

If a country joins NATO that is fighting a separatist movement, does NATO have an obligation to help? England was fighting in Northern Ireland for three decades and it was never a NATO problem. On the other hand, if a country joins NATO that has territory occupied by Russia, what is NATO’s responsibility for that? NATO is a defensive alliance. Does Ukraine joining NATO give it a free hand to try to change the status of Donetsk, Lugansk or Crimea? What if Russia responds? What are the requirements of the alliance then? Maybe entry into NATO needs to be delayed until these issues are resolved. As we have seen through, these can sometimes take a while (the Transnistia republic in Moldovia has been independent for 30 years, Taiwan has been independent for over 70 years).

So, should Ukraine join NATO
1. In the near team (3-5 years)?
2. In the long team (10-20 years)?
3. Not until all major outstanding international issues are resolved (which I gather means not in our lifetime)?
4. Never?

 

A few links:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria

Ukraine in NATO?

NATO currently consists of 30 members. This includes three members of the former Soviet Union (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and all former members of the Warsaw Pact except Russia (Poland, East Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania). Ukraine borders Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

Noticed in the news today that President Zelensky of Ukraine has urged NATO to speed up his country’s membership into the alliance: see: https://news.yahoo.com/ukraine-urges-nato-speed-membership-110245606.html

This has been a long drawn out process. Ukraine joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program in February 1994. In 2002 the President of Ukraine Kuchma declared that Ukraine wanted to join NATO and in 2003 sent Ukrainian troop to Iraq. They were also part of the peacekeeping effort in Kosovo. Ukraine applied for the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2008. Viktor Yanukovich was elected president in 2010 (which was a free and fair election) and shelved plans to join NATO shortly thereafter. He nuzzled up to Russia, cancelling the attempts to get Ukraine to the join the European Union and instead decided to join Russia’s Eurasian Union. There were then massive protest against him that cost lives of over a hundred protestors and Yanukovich fled the county in February 1914. There was then multiple secessionist movements in Ukraine (Donets and Lugansk) and a Russian engineered seizure of Crimea and Sevastopol, which Russia has now annexed. So…..

See: Ukraine-NATO Relations

Needless to say, Russia does oppose this.

 

P.S. The previous President of The Dupuy Institute, Major General Nicholas Krawciw (U.S. Army, ret.), also worked as the Secretary of Defense Senior Military Representative to Ukraine. MG Krawciw was born in Lvov in 1935. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_S._H._Krawciw

 

 

U.S. Fleet versus Chinese Fleet

This subject has been addressed in a few cases in our past posts. Let’s dredge up a few:

From January 2020:

The Size of Fleets in the South China Sea, Part 1 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Size of Fleets around the South China Sea, Part 2 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

U.S. Navy Compared to Russian Navy | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

From August 2016:

Chinese Carriers | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Chinese Carriers II | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

To summarize:

………………………….US…China…Size

Aircraft Carriers………..11……………..100,000-106,300 tons

Small Carriers……………0…….2………..54,500-58,600

LHA/LHD (Carriers !)……9 * ……………..41,150-45,693

Cruisers…………………..22………………….9,800

Destroyers……………….69………………….8,315-9,800

Destroyers……………………….36………….3,670-12,000

LCS……………………….20………………….3,104-3,900

Frigates……………………0…….52………….2,000-4,200

Corvettes…………………0…….42…………..1,400

Missile boats……………………109…………..170-520

Submarine chasers…………….94

Gunboats………………………..17

 

LPD…………………………11..,…6……………25,000-25,300

LSD…………………………12…………………..15,939-16,100

LST…………………………..0…..32…………….4,170-4,800

LSM………………………………..31…………….800-2,000

Mobile Landing Platform………….1

Special-purpose……………7……………………895 – 23,000

MCM………………………..11…..20

PC…………………………..13

 

SSBN………………………14………………….18,750

SSBN………………………………..7……………8,000-11,500

SSGN……………………….4…………………..18,750

SSN………………………..48…………………….6,927-12,139

SSN…………………………………12……………5,500-7,000

SSK…………………………………55……………2,110-4,000

 

 

*This excludes the USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6), which is still on the rolls but because of the fire of 12 July 2020 is clearly never returning to duty.