Category National Security Policy

Vincent Viola

We have a new nominated Secretary of the Army and I will try to avoid any obviously way too cute headlines or puns.

He is another New York billionaire from outside of the DC establishment: Vincent Viola and vincent-viola

Not much on him. Military experience is:

  1. Graduated from West Point 1977.
  2. I gather he served a full five years in the Army (bio doesn’t state, but that was the standard at the time).
  3. Is a reserve major.
  4. Has been involved in founding and funding the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point and several other projects.

Anyhow, I gather the real challenge with the Army over the last few years has been the budget. With DOD taking 50% of the sequestration cuts (which were really a big deal), it does appear that the Army took about half of those defense cuts. The nature of things is that the Army does not have a lot of big ticket production items, like F-35s and Littoral Combat Ships, that are difficult to cancel and hard to cut. Instead their costs are in personnel, which are easier to cut (except for the people who get cut). In the last 5-6 years the Army has dropped from around 570,000 to around 480,000 people and was slated to drop to 450,000. Trump has said he is bringing the Army back up to 540,000. Not sure where that figure comes from and have my doubts that it will actually occur.

See: us-military-personnel-1954-2014 and end-strength

Anyhow, the budget for the Army is not going to be determined by Mr. Viola, although it may be influenced by him. There are lots of players involved in determining the budget and balancing the budget. The Trump’s administration’s first real budget will be next year, FY2018.

Pivot to Russia?

This is an interesting article on the U.S. deliberately pivoting from China to Russia: 45-years-ago-kissinger-envisioned-a-pivot-to-russia-will-trump-make-it-happen?

I am not sure I buy into any of it !!!…..but it got my attention.

The argument:
  1. 45 years ago Kissinger told Nixon that the next president would have to pivot towards Russia in 20 years.
  2. In effect, he envisioned the United States playing a balance of power role between China and Russia, moving back and forth between the two.
  3. Is this what Trump is doing with his recent negative comments on China and positive comments on Russia?
Factiods that got my attention:
  1. “As a means to block the spread of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia, Carter administration officials approved of the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, which occurred shortly after Deng Xiaoping concluded the first trip of a Chinese leader to the United States in January 1979.” …..Really?
  2. “China’s economy was once a fraction of the Soviet economy; now it’s about five times larger.” …….it is always useful to look at GDP.

What is missing?

What is missing from the list of Trump’s foreign and national security policy team is an established foreign policy expert or established foreign policy professional. There is no one like a Kissinger or Brzezinski. Of the seven people nominated (the list is below) two are businessmen with no prior government or foreign policy experience, three are retired generals, one has no real experience, and there is only one who has spent a significant part her career in foreign policy (McFarland). McFarland is not a major name, although she was on the board of Jamestown Foundation, effectively headed by Brzezinski. She does not report directly to the president.

Their degrees are interesting:
Haley = BS in Accounting,
Tillerson = BS in Civil Engineering,
Ross = MBA.

 

The three generals are better educated:
Mattis = BA in History. Graduate of National War College…does he have an MA or MS or only a BA?
Flynn = An MBA Telecommunications, MA in National Security and Strategic Studies.
Kelly = MS from National Defense University.

 

McFarland has a MA in Politics, Philosophy and Economics and studied for a PhD but never completed her dissertation.

The real senior foreign policy experts appear to be the retired generals. Keep in mind, that many retired generals are not foreign policy experts. They often spend the first 15-20 years in service with their branch, then as a general in various commands. Depending on how this adds up, some may have considerable foreign policy experience, but many do not.

Flynn during his career deployed in Grenada and Haiti, and starting around 2001 has been involved in intelligence commands, often deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Certainly no broad foreign policy experience but around two decades of very real experience in our last two wars.

Mattis’s international career also appears to have started around 2003 with the invasion of Iraq as the 1st Marine Division commander. He then went to the Combat Development Command and in 2006 to the Joint Forces Command and then U.S. Central Command. So, more than a decade of foreign policy experience.

Kelly is similar as he with the 1st Marine Division in Iraq. Again, maybe a decade.

On the other hand, McFarland is an old hand, having first worked on the National Security Council in the 1970s (when Kissinger was there).

Anyhow, degrees and experience does not produce a successful foreign policy and a lack of degrees and lack of experience does not mean they will not produce a successful foreign policy. But, with three defense experts, three business people (including Haley) and only one foreign policy expert (who does not directly report to the president), the foreign policy expertise is a little thin. The real concern is that among the six people that report directly to the president, there really is not an expert on foreign policy. Added to that, the president-elect is not considered a foreign policy expert either (BS in Economics).

It does raise the issue as to who is doing the bigger picture long-term strategic thinking for our foreign and national security policy or is this going to one of these administrations that jump from issue to issue with no real plan or overall strategy (like most administrations have…to be honest).

List of nominees:
Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson (head of Exxon)
Secretary of Defense: James Mattis (retired Marine Corps general)
National Security Advisor: Michael T. Flynn (retired Army Lt. General)
    Deputy National Security Advisor: K.T. McFarland (Fox News commentator)
Ambassador to the United Nations: Nikki Haley (Governor of South Carolina).
    This is apparently a cabinet-level position.
Secretary of Commerce: Wilbur Ross (businessman)
Homeland Security: John F. Kelly (retired Marine Corps General)

 

Questions II

Back on November 9 I made a long post about what our foreign and defense policies might be in the new administration. At the time, I really did not know, so I threw out a range of options on 14 different issues. That post is here: Questions

We now have a team nominated, although there are more positions to fill. It consists of:

Secretary of State: Rex Tillerson (head of Exxon)
Secretary of Defense: James Mattis (retired Marine Corps general)
National Security Advisor: Michael T. Flynn (retired Army Lt. General)
    Deputy National Security Advisor: K.T. McFarland (Fox News commentator)
Ambassador to the United Nations: Nikki Haley (Governor of South Carolina).
    This is apparently a cabinet-level position.
Secretary of Commerce: Wilbur Ross (businessman)
Homeland Security: John F. Kelly (retired Marine Corps General)

 

All these require confirmation by the senate except for the National Security Advisor (Flynn) and his Deputy (McFarland).

Anyhow, I am not sure I have answers to any of the 14 questions I posed. In fact, the only one that has been publicly discussed (#12) I whiffed on and provided no options. It simply read: “12. And then there is East Asia (China, the two Koreas, Taiwan, Japan, Philippines, etc.).”

I gather China is going to be a central issue in the Trump administration from the start. Not sure how much impact this will have on national security. Will it primarily be an argument over trade?

Tillerson is the one

More rhyming headlines…sorry. Anyhow, looks like  Rex Tillerson, President of Exxon Mobil Corporation has been selected to be our next Secretary of State. Here is his Wikipedia bio: Rex Tillerson

Not much in the bio….he has been with Exxon for 41 years. It appears that this will be his first job since college that is not with Exxon. The most telling things are:

  1. Close ties to Russia and Putin.
  2. Doesn’t like sanctions (not surprising)
  3. Likes free trade (and the TPP)
  4. Suspicious of global warning (not surprising…considering his company)
  5. According to Wikipedia was recommended to Trump by Condoleezza Rice.

Anyhow, nothing really surprising or earthshaking here considering his business. The ties to Russia pose a problem and the hearings should be interesting. This is worth noting: John McCain: Rex Tillerson and Putin

To quote a couple of lines from McCain:

“But Vladimir Putin is a thug, a bully and a murderer, and anybody else who describes him an anything else is lying.”

and

“What about all the other things–right now, the targeting of hospitals by Russian aircraft with precision weapons in Syria, in Aleppo? Those are the kind of questions that we need to ask [Tillerson] about the relationship with Vladimir Putin.”

Senators McCain and Graham have been supportive of Ukraine and hostile to Russia. The Democrats have 48 seats in the Senate. If McCain and Graham were willing to break with the party and break with Trump, and could bring one more Republican senator with them, then they could actually reject Trump’s Secretary of State appointment. I don’t recall that ever happening for a Secretary of State appointment so suspect it is not very likely.

World War IV

One of Roger Mickelson’s TMCI briefings is on-line at the Xenophon Group site: World War IV

Don’t know the date of this briefing, but it was fairly recent. I never quite bought into Roger’s construct that World War III was the Cold War….and now we are in World War IV. But I do find it to be an interesting categorization.

The Fatwa on “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders” dated 23 February 1998 is worth reading. It is on slides 16 and 17.

The Xenophon Group is run by John Sloan, a retired Sovietologist and historian. He used to work with Trevor Dupuy’s HERO (Historical Evaluation Research Organization) and played a major role in getting the Kursk project started (which turned into my book Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka). His site is here: http://www.xenophon-mil.org/xenophon.htm

The index to his site is here: http://www.xenophon-mil.org/xenindex.htm

This is worth trolling through. There are all kinds of interesting bits and pieces here. There is a review of my book America’ Modern Wars here: http://www.xenophon-mil.org/politicaleconomy/lawrencemodernwars.htm

Mattis’ Reading List (2007)

Here is a 2007 copy of James Mattis reading list, courtesy of the Small War Journal: ltgen-james-mattis-reading-list

Nothing really earthshaking here, except I have not read most of the books on this list. Hard for me to evaluate it.

No Trevor Dupuy books, but Ali Jalali is on the list. He used to be a consultant to Trevor Dupuy’s old company HERO (Historical Evaluation and Research Organization). He was doing Sovietology work for us in the early 1980s along with John Sloan and others. He later became the Interior Minister of Afghanistan: Ali_Ahmad_Jalali

The Warrior Monk

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“Warrior Monk” is a cool nickname. Like it better than “Mad Dog”….which brings up another image:

md20-20

Anyhow, don’t want to be pre-mature, but the rumor has it from a very good source (Donald Trump) that retired General James Mattis is going to be our next Secretary of Defense.

Wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Mattis

My last post on the subject:

Too busy to read

Andrew Bacevich comments on the subject (the link to the long article is in my previous post):

Yet Pres. Trump is also likely to double down on the use of conventional military force. In that regard, his promise to “quickly and decisively bomb the hell out of [Islamic State]” offers a hint of what is to come.

Trump’s appointment of the uber-hawkish retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as his national security adviser and his rumored selection of retired U.S. Marine Corps Gen. James “Mad Dog” Mattis as defense secretary suggest that he means what he says. In sum, a Trump administration seems unlikely to reexamine the conviction that the problems roiling the Greater Middle East will someday, somehow yield to a U.S.-imposed military solution.

Having retired generals as the National Security Advisor and as Secretary of Defense does not necessarily indicate only a kinetic solution to all problems, but there is always a concern with “groupthink,” to use a still valid term from the 60s. One only has to look at the early recommendations made to President Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis to appreciate the dangers of this.

The interesting thing is that Trump himself on multiple occasions has expressed a desire to disengage from various areas of the world. I for one, still have no idea what our National Security Policies are going to be, and am not sure we can determine anything from these cabinet picks. I wonder if the incoming administration has decided what our National Security Policies are going to be.

All we need is generals who know how to win?

There was an article just published in the blog War is Boring by Andrew Bacevich called “American Generals Have Forgotten How to Win Wars”: american-generals-have-forgotten-how-to-win-wars

It is a long article with three completely different sections. The first section is that somehow or the other, all we have in Iraq and Afghanistan is generals who don’t know how to win. Really? Was that the problem in Korea when General MacArthur was in command and got driven out back from the Yalu and out of North Korea by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)? His replacement was Matthew Ridgeway, who in World War II was commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps. He did not win in Korea either. Same for the next commander in Korea: Mark Wayne Clark.

Was that the problem with Vietnam, where a succession of generals, Harkins, Westmoreland, Abrams and finally Weyand, commanded? Was Abrams, who relieved Bastogne in World War II and had a tank named after him, one of these generals that did not know how to win? We did win the Gulf War in 1991, we were able to conquer Afghanistan in 2002 with few forces, and we were able to conquer Iraq in 2003. So, since World War II, we have been able to win under the right situation. I don’t think the issue is a “winning” versus a “non-winning” general. Bacevich gives a listing of the 17 commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan since they started. Of the 17 commanders listed, not a single one is a “winning general”? What are the odds of that being the case?

The second part of the article, starting with “Draining which swamp?”, actually makes a lot more sense and it would have been a better article without the first part. It is the nature of the war that is the problem. Napoleon, probably the winning-est general in history (over 60 battles fought), could never figure out how to solve the Spanish ulcer. That ulcer generated a new word: guerilla. It is the nature of guerilla wars and insurgencies that they generate a lack of clear wins.

The British seem to have a reputation as being counterinsurgency experts. They won in Malaya and Kenya in the 1950s. Yet, when it came to Northern Ireland, the conflict went on for over 30 years and was resolved by a settlement that included the political arm of the provisional IRA as a legitimate political party. Would we consider an arrangement in Afghanistan that included the Taliban as part of the government as a victory? Would we consider including ISIL or Al-Qaeda in a future Iraqi or Syrian government? It is kind of the same thing.

Anyhow, a clear win is sometimes elusive in guerilla wars, even for the British. Not only did they fight for over 30 years in Northern Ireland, but their victory in Malaya included giving the country independence. Seven years after they defeated the Mau Mau in Kenya, they also gave that country independence.  Their results in Palestine in the late 1940s, Cyprus in the 1950s and Aden in the 1960s were even less successful. In the case of Cyprus, the guerilla force leader also became the head of a Cypriot political party. So, the British appear to have a winning problem also.

In our original work on insurgencies, part of what the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) wanted us to do was analyze different tactics and approaches and see what worked and what did not. This become difficult to do analytically, for eventually in almost every single extended guerilla war, most of the counterinsurgents ended up developing over the course of years of fighting many of the same answers, whether they were British, American, French, Portuguese, Soviets, Rhodesians, etc. We could not connect the tactics to the outcomes. The end result we ended up looking at the bigger issue questions, like grand strategies and size of forces involved. This was where we could get an analytical result (marketing alert: See my book America Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam).

Bacevich picks up some of these questions in the second part of his article, where he states “The truth is that some wars aren’t winnable and no one should fight them in the first place.” He then concludes “In sum, a Trump administration seems unlikely to reexamine the conviction that the problems roiling the Greater Middle East will someday, somehow yield to a U.S.-imposed military solution.”

Not sure I agree with that conclusion, but I would strongly argue that understanding and defeating an insurgency is much more complicated than just changing a general. We have certainly changed enough generals in Iraq and Afghanistan that by happenstance one should have won, if it was possible. Some argue that Patreaus did win in Iraq (but he clearly did not in Afghanistan). Did Patreaus forget how to win when he went from one war to the next?

Anyhow, to win these wars requires a combination of proper professional approaches, proper resources, and proper engagement times. Our continued attempts to win these wars on the cheap, or shorten the commitment to them, or to find some magic trick (like a surge) that will win it…..have not really worked out. It is time to get serious.

Too busy to read

A reposted email by retired General Mattis, who is being considered for Secretary of Defense. This is worth reading: general-james-mattis-email

Opening sentence:

“….The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience (or by your men’s experience), i.e. the hard way. By reading, you learn through other’s experiences, generally a better way to do business, especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final for young men.”

and

“Ultimately, a real understanding of history means that we face NOTHING new under the sun. For all the ‘4th Generation of War’ intellectuals running around today saying that the nature of war has fundamentally changed, the tactics are wholly new, etc, I must respectfully say….’Not really’…”

and

“‘Winging it’ and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost of incompetence in our profession.”