Category Kursk

Aces at Kursk

Oh, and by the way, I have a new book coming out next month: Aces at Kursk: The Battle of Aerial Supremacy on the Eastern Front 1943. It is with Pen & Sword in the UK. The release date in the UK is 30 August. We have the UK Amazon link here: Buy from Amazon (UK). The release date for the U.S. is 30 October. The U.S. Amazon link is here: Buy from Amazon. Both of these links are on the right side of the blog. If you click on the image, it goes to the Pen & Sword site. You can pre-order the book direct from the publisher or Amazon or other sites. I have not yet seen a final copy. Not sure if I will have copies available at our conference: Schedule for the Historical Analysis Annual Conference (HAAC), 27-29 September 2022 – update 8 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). It is discounted if pre-ordered. It is cheapest if pre-ordered directly from Pen & Sword. They have a nice pre-order discount.

It is not a small book, 392 pages. This book took a while to publish. I could not find an American publisher that wanted to publish it. Oddly enough, when I contacted Pen & Sword, they mentioned that they had been publishing a lot of American authors recently.

I did have three chapters on the air war in my big Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka book. This book was built from those three chapters, the associated air war appendix, and a lot of other material that has been assembled since I first wrote this around 2002. I also added some chapters on air war on the north side of Kursk (this was at the request of the publisher) and I did have some Soviet air regiment records that I had collected that was not part of the original big book. I also spend more time than I would like disputing accounts and figures from other books. There have been other works published since 2002 when I first wrote the manuscript for my big Kursk book. Unfortunately, some of these added to the confusion over the history. Maybe the best thing is to ignore other works and just tell your account, but in this case, I did roll up my sleeves and debate the details of what they said. Mostly this was done in footnotes, but I did also put in a few “sidebars” in the text. Kind of hated to do that as some of these people I know virtually, and they have always been decent supportive people. But facts are facts, and I really do think the story needs to be told correctly.

I will probably be working on another Kursk related book this fall called The Battle of Tolstoye Woods. This time with an American publisher. I do have a master plan to do up to a dozen books covering all the fighting in the south of Russia and Ukraine in 1943. May yet get around to covering the entire Battle of Kursk and the three battles of Kharkov in 1943.

A couple of related posts:

Aces at Kursk – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Is this my last Kursk book? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Density of Deployment in Ukraine

One thing that stands out on this battlefield is that there is not a lot of troops covering a lot of area. As far as I can tell, for this war in Ukraine, each side has about 200,000 or so regular troops, after all new recruits and old losses are counted for. I actually have never seen any strength figures since the war has started. On the other hand, the Ukrainian Army has said that they have a front width of 2,450 kilometers (1,522 miles) of which 1,105 (687 miles) are active fighting. By active fighting, I assume that means the area from Kharkov to Severodonetsk to Kherson. The border with Belarus is 891 kilometers (554 miles), which I assume is part of the “inactive area.” The Ukrainian border with Russia is 1,974 kilometers (1,227 miles). Anyhow, not sure exactly how this active front is calculated, but I will use the Ukrainian Army figures for now (until I get the energy to pull out a ruler and painstakingly measure it myself).

So, 200,000 troops divided by 1,105 kilometers is 181 men per kilometer, except: I suspect that some of those people are protecting Kiev and other such places away from the active front, and some are in reserve and rear positions. So, it might be two-thirds of that figure (121 men per kilometer). This is less than a tenth of World War II standards for this area.

During the Battle of Kursk before 5 July 1943, in the south around Belgorod, the frontage from the German 332nd Infantry Division through Totenkopf (the main two-corps German attack) covered 54 kilometers. This was covered by 146,443 troops, for a density of 2,712 troops per kilometer. In contrast, the part of the Soviet Sixth Guards Army’s first echelon that was facing them consisted of only 46,412 troops or 859 troops per kilometer (see page 148 of my big Kursk book). This Sixth Guards Army defense, considering both echelons, came in at 1,301 men per kilometer covering 66 kilometers of front, while the neighboring Seventh Guards Army had 1,568 men per kilometer of front covering 55 kilometers (see page 210).

Just do a spot check of several division-level engagements (yes, I do have all this data for the southern Kursk and the Kharkov battles in 1943 in our database, the Division-Level Engagement Data Base or DLEDB): 1) the linear density of the LSSAH Panzer Grenadier Division on 12 July 1943 at the tank fields of Prokhorovka was 1,922.64 men per kilometer of front. The attacking Soviet 18th and 29th Tank Corps came in at 3,151.27 men per kilometer of front, 2) The linear density of men for the GD Panzer Division, 332nd ID and 3rd PzD attack on 5 July 1943 was 2,204.88 men per kilometer of front. It was 612.89 for the defending Soviet 71st Guards Rifle Division. Going to the battles around Kharkov, 3) the linear density of the Soviet 40th Army at Prudyanka-Dergachi on 12 February 1943 was 203.65 while the defending German GD ID was 510.38. 4) The linear density of the LSSAH assault on Kharkov on 12 March 1943 was 753.04 while the defending Soviet 19th Rifle Division, 17th NKVD Brigade and 86th Tank Brigade was 472.65. By the 14th, this had increased to 2,436.43 for the Germans and 1,739.29 for the defending Soviets, 5) The most sparsely deployed unit I have in my database for the fighting in and around Kharkov in February to August 1943 was 280.00 men per kilometer for the attacker and 169.75 for the defender at Merafa III engagement on 13 March 1943. 6) the densest is the 106th ID Defense III on 20 August 1943 with the attacking Soviet 48th Guards Rifle Corps and 375th RD deployed at 3,457.80 men per kilometer of front while the defending 106th ID was at 1,766.00 men per kilometer of front (I do have 3,649.13 for the attacker South of Kharkov on 15 March, but the defender only has 424.38). 7) The most sparsely deployed engagement I have for the Kursk fighting is nominally Soldatskoye VIII on 18 July 1943, where the attacking Soviet elements held a front of 392.25 men per kilometer and the defending German 255th ID held the front at 319.33 men per kilometer (there are a number of other engagements where one side had less density than these) 8) the densest engagement is LSSAH Division’s clash with the 31st Tank Corps on 7 July 1943, where the Germans had a density of 8.,475.00 men per kilometer and the Soviets were at 4,328.85 men per kilometer. This is mostly driven by the LSSAH frontage being temporarily reduced to 2.6 kilometers. This is all drawn from 256 division-level battles on the Eastern Front in February-August 1943 (192 from Kursk and 64 from Kharkov), with all the data drawn from the unit records of both sides. The average for the front now in Ukraine may be 121 men per kilometer, and they are not evenly distributed.

So, what does this all mean?

Well, from a theoretical point of view, it is showing the changes in linear density over time. As firepower increases, density of troop deployments decrease. This has been occurring for hundreds of years. See Dispersion versus Lethality | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and TDI Friday Read: Lethality, Dispersion, And Mass On Future Battlefields | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The Effects Of Dispersion On Combat | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Also see my book War by Numbers.

From a more practical point of view, that means that there are many places that are holding their lines with less than 121 men per kilometer. Does this mean that any concentrated offensive force can push through these areas “if they achieve surprise.” So, should we be seeing more fluid lines?

But, in fact, we are not seeing more fluid lines. This looks less fluid than I expected. So why? Is it because U.S. intel assistance is so good that any concentration of force is immediately fired upon? Is it because any concentration of force is immediately spotted and responded to, by either firepower or movement of reserves?

I don’t really know for sure, just looking at linear densities.

Russian casualties?

This is a follow-up post to my post from Tuesday morning: So, have 9,861 Russians really been killed in Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

We currently have four casualty reports coming out claiming extremely high casualties for the Russian Army in Ukraine. They are:

The briefing posting on 22 March in Komsomolskaya Pravda that stated: “According to the Russian Defense Ministry, during the special operation in Ukraine, the Russian Armed Forces lost 9,861 people killed and 16,153 wounded.”
1. This is a 1.64-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio, which is at least half of what you would expect to see.
2. I do have a book, War by Numbers, that discusses wounded-to-killed ratios in Chapter 15.
Then there is the U.S. estimate from 18 March which reported 3,000 to 10,000 soldiers killed.
Then there was a NATO report from yesterday that reports 7,000 to 15,000 soldiers killed, up to 40,000 casualties total.
Then there is the Ukrainian army claim of 15,800 Russians killed as of 24 March.
1. They also claim 530 tanks and 108 planes, which also seems high.

What also gets my attention is that Ukrainian Army losses are reported to be:

1,300 killed on 12 March as reported by Ukraine.
2,000 – 4,000 killed as of 9 March as estimated by U.S. DOD.

Now, it is not unheard of for an army to achieve a three-to-one kill ratio during a campaign. This happened at lot on the Russian Front in World War II (1941-1945) between Germany and Russia, with Germany usually getting the better of this exchange. It happened at the Battle of Kursk in July 1943, with Germany getting the better of this exchange, even though the Russians were on the defensive, well rested, and in prepared positions (I have a couple of books on this). Even higher exchange ratios happened in the two Arab-Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973, with the Israeli’s getting the better of this exchange. So, it is possible.

On the other hand, the Russians, with superior firepower and air superiority, are losing at potentially an exchange of over seven-to-one if we use the higher estimates of Russian losses. This is a hard sale.

Added to that, these estimates are indicating total losses of 40,000 or greater out of a force of 150,000 (more than 25% losses). Assuming a more reasonable three-to-one wounded to killed ratio (and maybe five-to-one might be even more reasonable), then the figure of 9,861 points to 40,000 losses. The NATO figure estimates 15,000 killed and up to 40,000 casualties. This is a 1.67-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio. If we go with a more reasonable estimate of 3-to-1 wounded-to-killed, this would mean 60,000 casualties, or 40% of the invading Russian Army. This is hard to believe.

I do not know what Russian losses are. On the other hand, I am having a hard time accepting some of these higher estimates. If Ukrainian losses were closer to 10,000 soldiers, then I could believe the higher Russian estimates, but I gather Ukrainian losses are nowhere near 10,000 soldiers.

Mapping Russia’s Tank Losses

Christopher A. Lawrence
March 6, 2022

This youtube video has just been released called “Mapping Russia’s Mostly Costly Tank Losses Ukraine War.” I found it interesting. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adE5GlQ2Ly4

It references our old friend from the Battle of Kursk, Katukov’s First Guards Tank Army. See: First Guards Tank Army and new exercises | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

and: First Guards Tank Army | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

and: Next Stop Berlin? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Eastern Europe Kursk Russia

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – Day 2 (ground actions)

I changed the title of my previous post to “Day 1.” Again, my focus here is on the ground actions. What I am interested in is what ground are they going to take and what ground are they going to hold. Right now, this attack looks pretty unrestrained, but who knows what are Putin actual objectives or at what point he will decide he has done enough. I gather the degree of resistance by the Ukrainian Army may influence these decisions.

We are looking six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

Here is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180): The Russian Army is reported to have reached the northern outskirts of Kiev (the Obolon district). They have also occupied the defunct nuclear power plant at Chernobyl (I wouldn’t want to be those troops). Vladimir Zelensky vowed last night to stay in Kiev. So, it does look like they intend to hold and fight for the city (see picture above). Very different than what we saw in Afghanistan.

The Antonov/Hostomel airport has become a real right. Apparently, Russia did an airmobile operation to put troops within 15 miles of the capitol. This is the group of Matthew Chance ran across, and they were so nice as to let him film them. Ukraine counterattacked against what would have been an isolated “forward detachment” (the head of our Kursk research team, Col. Sverdlov, wrote the influential book “Forward Detachments in Battle”). They have retaken it according to some accounts. By the end of today, I gather it was back under Russian control.

There are lots of twitter feeds on this fight. Recommend you check @RALee85 and @TrentTelenko.

This is a decent news report from AP: https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sorting-fact-disinformation-russian-attack-ukraine-83106752

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826): There were reports of a landing there yesterday. I still have no idea of the size or location of the landing. I see not yet seen any clear reports on the subject for today. Was this a raid or a permanent landing?

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): How serious are Russian ground operations? Are they trying to surround and isolate Kharkov? It appears the Ukraine army in this area are putting up a fight. It does appear that most of the videos of captured Russians and destroyed Russian vehicles are coming from there.

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces: Of course, Russia has recognized these “people’s republics.” They only control half of their provinces. The rest of the provinces under control of Ukraine and defended by the Ukrainian army. I gather their desire is to expand their control and take the rest of both provinces, but these are well defended. Not sure how serious will be their attempts here. So far, we have not heard much from this area.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. The mayor is reporting fighting in the area, but I gather none at or near Mariupol.

Afternoon update: There are reports of an amphibious landing of several thousand troops in or near Mariupol.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): It appears that they are fairly serious about their operations in the area north of Crimea. It looks like they entered Kherson yesterday and raised the Russian flag over the administrative building in the middle of the city. So it does appear that Russia controls the area from the Crimea to Kherson. Such an operation complicates the defense of Mariupol.

Afternoon Update: Twitter accounts report over 100 Ukranian vehicles in convoys in this area were destroyed, but that Ukraine has re-occupied the area between Crimea and Kherson. I assume this is because Russia does not have manpower deployed to hold all the areas they have moved through.

Later Update: It looks like Kherson is back under control of Ukraine. This video is worth watching in its entirety: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSCYjnwJtfk

In general, the news is lagging, as it is in the middle of the afternoon there. Will update this post as I find more information.

The Home Front: There were a number of decent sized protests against the war in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Ekaterinburg that I saw videos off. According to reports, Russia arrested more than 1,700 protesters. There are videos on-line of protesters and protesters being arrested.

Casualties:

Russian Losses include:

4 soldiers captured in three separate incidences (video evidence)

1 Su-25 (attack jet) crashed (Russian claim)

1 An-26 (transport plane) crashed, crew killed (Russan claim)

1 Ka-52 (assault helicopter) destroyed (video evidence)

1 T-80 (tank) destroyed (video evidence)

1 BMP destroyed (video evidence)

450+ casualties (UK estimate) – note probably 25% or less of casualties are killed, so maybe less than 113 killed.

Ukrainian Losses include:

137 soldiers killed, including 10 officers (Zelensky)

14 Soldiers surrendered (Russian claim)

25 Civilians killed (U.N. High Commisiooner)

Updates: Ukrainian Su-27 shot down over Kiev (video evidence)

Also, there is one video on youtube called “fight between Russian Sukhoi Su35 v Ukrainian Mig29 over Kyiv.” If true, it shows that at least some of Ukrainian air force has survived the initial attack. AhirTech has posted many other interesting videos.

There are people doing a better job of this on Twitter, including @RALee85 and @Oryxspioenkop, neither who are known to me. I have not taken the time to exhaustively search their material. I am still working on my first cup of coffee this morning. Maybe later.

The Russo-Ukrainian War of 2022 – day 1 (ground actions)

Well, I did not think that Russia would actually take a step this far, but they did. I may discuss all the implications of that later. Right now my focus is on what ground actions they are taking. Is this a limited and defined operation or are they looking for large scale occupation of Ukrainian territory? As I see it there are six major areas of operations right now.

1. Kiev

2. Odessa

3. Kharkov

4. The Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.
5. Mariupol.
6. Crimean border

Here Is what I have heard/seen from open sources:

1. Kiev (pop: 2,962,180) There is a column driving down the road from Belarus. Don’t know the size or whether it is Russian or mixed Russian-Belarussian. Needless to say, it is a big step from crossing a border to driving all the way down to the capital city. Taking Kiev is even a bigger challenge. I assume that Ukraine has some forces covering that route. I am ~~guessing~~ ~~any column will get stopped~~ ~~or delayed. Not sure if this is anything more than a~~ ~~feint. I~~ ~~kind of doubt that they are looking at taking Kiev (especially as I~~ ~~gather they only have around 30,000 troops in Belarus).~~

2. Odessa (pop: 1,015,826) : I have heard reports that there is a landing there. Have no idea of the size or location of the landing., Again, I wonder if this is anything more than a distraction. Are they really looking at occupying Odessa? Cannot rule out that this is a special operations head-hunting expedition to try to capture/kill some of the people involved in the violence in Odessa in 2013, something that Putin has talked about.

3. Kharkov (pop: 1,433,886): This may be the real objective/prize of this war. It is the second largest city in Ukraine and the largest Russian speaking city in Ukraine. It is part of the former Soviet rust-belt cities (which include Lugansk and Donetsk). It has had a declining population since 1989, although I gather this has now stabilized. I gather it has developed a big IT business though, and almost all of its business is with overseas customers. A Russian occupation would probably destroy a lot of that business.

Geographically, it is a city in the middle of a large open plain. It changed hands three times in 1943. It was larger (population wise) than Stalingrad, which is why we examined the operations there for our urban warfare studies. I have never been there, but drove by it on the way to Belgorod. I do see lots of pictures of Russian forces near Belgorod and at the border between Belgorod and Kharkov. I have been to Belgorod a couple of times, which is part of the Kursk battlefield.

So my question is, is Russia going to conduct serious ground operations for the sake of surrounding and isolating Kharkov?

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): This city of part of the Donetsk Oblast (province/county) and is on the route to Crimea. Are Russian going to try to drive through there to create a land connection to Crimea? Maybe, but it is well defended. Not sure this will be a high priority. In the next reports I saw last night, while there was lots of stuff exploding around Kiev and Kharkov, there was not much happening around Mariupol.

6. Crimea: One of the problems with Crimea is that they get their water from Ukraine. Is Russia going to try to expand their control of the area north of Crimea so as to secure water resources? Maybe. Such an operation also complicates the defense of Mariupol. I have heard that they have crossed the borders there, but I do wonder how serious of an effort they will make.

It is hard to say what Russian final objectives are, but obviously they are going to bomb all major military facilities and airfields. As cities are where many reporters are located this is what is first reported on. But the question for me, it what do they intended to occupy? Are they going to conquer all of Ukraine (I doubt it, it is a very big piece to swallow)? Are they going to just occupy all of Lugansk and Donetsk oblasts? Maybe, but this is a hard fight over terrain of limited economic value? All they going to isolate and then try to take Kharkov? This I think is a distinct possibility and I am looking for any reports of ground operations there with great interest.

While I assume the Ukrainian Army has some defensive capabilities, their biggest problem is that Russia has complete air superiority.

P.S.: Captured around Kharkov: First Prisoners of War as Ukraine Captures Russian Soldiers

P.P.S.: Useful map: Map shows locations of explosions and potential attacks in Ukraine

P.P.P.S: More fighting around Kharkov. This one includes a video of a destroyed Russian tank: Russian Tank Convoy Blown Up in Videos as Ukraine Fights Back Invasion

P.P.P.P.S: Matthew Chance from CNN is at Antonov airbase 15 miles north of Kiev. It looks like Russian airborne and airmobile troops have already taken it. See: Cnn reporter: This shows just how close Russian forces are to Ukraine capital

P.P.P.P.P.S. It does appear that Russia is making a play for Kherson:

https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/801461.html

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/02/24/7325476/

Appendix II: The 39th Panzer Regiment at Kursk

Christopher A. Lawrence
August 19, 2021

Appendix II had a brief discussion of the tank losses in the 39th Panzer Regiment due to mines in our report on “The Military Consequences of a Complete Landmine Ban.” This is from http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/m-6mineban.pdf. It reads as follows:

APPENDIX II: THE 39th PANZER REGIMENT AT KURSK

Losses in the 39th Panzer Regiment at Kursk are confusing. On 4 July 1943 it had 200, and on 6 July 40 tanks, ready for action. But, a significant percentage of the tanks were broken down rather than combat losses. The regiment was attached to the Gross Deutschland Division during the battle. But it is uncertain whether the 20 tanks reported as lost to mines on 5 July were only from Gross Deutschland or included tanks of the 39th Panzer Regiment. We assume that it does not. The 39th Panzer Regiment was equipped with brand new Panther tanks that suffered from various teething problems which resulted in poor reliability. The number of Panthers available on the morning of 4 July is known (200), and the number that broke down during the march up on 4 July is
also known (two or, possibly, six). The next reliable strength report available is for the evening 6 July, when 40 tanks were reported operational. Some of the 158-tank shortfall was due to combat losses (including mines), but many were due to mechanical failure.

There are two reports of mine losses for the Panthers. One was a Quartermaster report of 76 tanks lost to date on 10 July. Four were total losses, 54 were mechanical losses, and 18 were “minor failures (with most caused by mines).” The other was an after action report submitted to the Office of the Inspector General of Armor Troops in August 1943 from the regiment. It reported that on the evening of 10 July there were 10 Panthers left “facing the enemy”, 25 total losses (including 23 hit and burned and 2 burned in the march to the front), 100 in the workshops (including 56 from gun damage and mines and 44 with technical problems). There were also 65 others being released or soon to be released from the repair facilities (cause of failure was not recorded in this report) for
return to the front. This report also stated that “about 40 Panthers were lost to mines in the first days…In one example a total loss resulted when flames penetrated the turret basket and ignited the stored ammunition…”

Since the quartermaster report for 10 July understates Panther losses at that time, and tended to lag behind the tank loss reports, it is assumed to be a partial report. The IG report giving 40 tanks lost to mines is probably closer to the truth.

For 5 July there are no actual reports of Panthers being lost to mines or being in minefields. Of the two battalions of the regiment, one put at least 30 Panthers across the Berezovyii ravine, and as a result, almost certainly took mine losses. Whether these were picked up in the Gross Deutschland report of 20 tanks lost is more difficult to determine. The other battalion did not get across the creek and probably suffered no losses to mines on 5 July.

The following day, they did encounter some mines, and also on 7 July and thereafter. If it is assumed that 18 of the 76 tanks reported as lost were all lost to mines, and that figure is used to account for all of the 158 estimated lost on 5 and 6 July (two them were accounted for on 4 July), then a total of 38 tanks were lost to mines. This is certainly the highest number that can be supported by the historical record. However, the actual number lost to mines may have been 10 or 20 tanks fewer.

_____

There is a more extended discussion on tank losses due to mines at Kursk on pages 16-25. It covers the nine attacking German panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. Some of this made it into my first Kursk book.

Kursk Mine Warfare

The Prokhorovka! game maps – comments?

I have done four posts on the game maps for the upcoming Advanced Squad Leader (ASL) module Prokhorovka!. I have not been involved in the developing the game, but found the effort worthwhile and interesting. What I was hoping to get back from those posts were comments on the game maps themselves, what was done right and well, and more importantly, what was not done right or needed to be corrected. So far, I have not gotten any comments on the game maps. I have provided some of my own to the designers, and in the case of the Storozhevoye map, it was re-worked before I posted it.

So anyhow, for the sake of our game designers, could we get some comments please.

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Stalinskii Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Oktyabrskii Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Storozhevoye Map for the game Prokhorovka! | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Andreyevka Map for the game Prokhorovka!

As I have mentioned before, I am preparing a little write-up for the Italian wargame company Advancing Fire for their game Prokhorovka! (PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com). They are designing a set of scenarios for use in the game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL). They have been providing me with some of their advance material, although I am not involved in the design of the game. This is the fourth game map they have provided me.

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. This game map covers the area around Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. I do use different transliteration conventions than them (and many other people). For example, they spell Andreevka with an ee in the middle. An American, seeing the ee will invariably pronounce it like geek as opposed to ge-yek with two syllables. The two e’s are separately pronounced in Russian. Some transliteration conventions use an apostrophe instead of a y. I don’t think most Americans know what to do with a word spelled ge’ek or Andre’evka. The apostrophe is part of the Library of Congress transliteration system (which I think sucks). Some people use that system but take out the apostrophes, which gets us back to geek or Andreevka. I think it should be Andreyevka, which is closer to the Russian pronunciation.

Andreyevka and Vasilyevka is where the XVIII Tank Corps attacks into and through, getting as far as 200 meters east of the Bogoroditskoye church. Bogoroditskoye is often not marked on maps, but it is south of the Psel just west of Vasliyevka. Bogoroditskoye was defended by German armor (tanks or assault guns or Marders) and the Soviets claim at one point that they repulsed German counterattacks by 50 tanks from the Bogoroditskoye area (see page 318 of my Prokhorovka book or page 931 of my Kursk book). We have never clearly identified who that German armor unit was. I believe the Bogoroditskoye church is the church marked on Map M37-26C just west of the ravine west of Vasileyevka and is between Kozlovka and Vasilyeka. The Totenkopf SS two bridges were just west of Bogodoritskoye.

At 1600 (Moscow time) the XVIII Tank Corps’ II Battalion, 32nd Motorized Rifle Brigade is claimed to be deployed from the Psel River to the center of Bogoroditskoye.

The eastern edge of the Andreyevka (assuming the gully marks the eastern edge) is some five kilometers almost due west of height 252.2. See 1:50000 scale Map M37-26C (there are copies of this map in both of my Kursk books). The village of Mikhailovka is just to the northeast of Andreyevka, along the Psel River (see story below). The XVIII Tank Corps moved through it during their attack.

Below is an aerial photograph of Andreyevka and Vasilyevka. The picture should be rotated 90 degree clockwise.:

The link to their game board is below. Just click on it and the game board should appear.

Andreevka

Now, I have looked their work, but I am hardly the right person to conduct photo analysis. Still, it looked pretty good to me. If anyone has any comments, criticisms, recommendations, corrections, edits, and so forth for this map, please let me know. I will forward the comments to them.

Thanks

Other references:

Advancing Fire

PROKHOROVKA! (advancingfire.com)

Did the LSSAH have 3 panzer panzer companies, 4 panzer companies or two panzer battalions in July 1943? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

P.S. In an email dated 12 April 2021, sent after this initial post, the game map designer informed me that “In the scenario, every hex North of the road A12-CCC10, on level 1 (the lower level), is Mud, so the vehicles and manhandled Guns may bog, the infantry goes slower and HE rounds effect is a bit “cushioned” (look at D8.23 and E3.6 in ASL Rulebook).”

P. P.S. My Mikhailovka story: In 1996, while leading a tour of mostly former German and American officers of the battlefield, we arrived at Mikhailovka while they were doing their presidential elections (back when Yelstin was running for re-election). Our American officers, led by a retired general, decided that this was a unique opportunity to see this new Russian democracy in action. So they decided to go into the town hall and watch the election unfolding. Needless to say, the local election officials were a little overwhelmed with the sudden arrival of rather large contingent of foreigners at their site. They initially said that we would have to leave, and then after conferring for a bit, they decided we could come in and observe the election in pairs. So we did. A rather informal observation of the 1996 Russian elections as conducted in the village of Mikhailovka by former German and American officers.

This trip is also discussed in a chapter in the book Becton: Autobiography of a Solider and Public Servant.

Stalinskii Map for the game Prokhorovka!

Christopher A. Lawrence
April 1, 2021

They are drawing their ASL maps from German aerial photographs of the battlefield. The game map covers the area around Stalinskii Sovkhoz (State Farm). Elements of the 25th Tank Brigade and 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade had pushed through to this small village. It was retaken by the Germans in the early afternoon., The village is in between Storozhevoye and height 252.2 (the previous two maps). It is some two kilometers north of Storozhevoye and a little over 1 and 1/2 kilometers south of height 252.2. See Map M37-26C.

Below are two aerial photographs of the Stalinskii State Farm.