Category Iraq

Current Deployment of Patriot Missile Battalions

Our air defense artillery assets consists of Patriot, THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) and the SHORAD (Short Range Air Defense) battalions and batteries, among other elements.

A Patriot Missile Battalion consists of four or five Patriot Missile Batteries. A Patriot Missile Battery consists of four or six launchers, each with four missiles. The United States has 16 Patriot battalions. There is one battalion in Germany and three battalions in South Korea and I gather at least one battery in the Gulf (not sure which). I gather the most elements of the other 11 battalions are in the U.S. As of 2010 it was reported that the U.S. Army operates a total of 1,106 Patriot launchers (1,106/16 = 60 launchers per battalion). According to a count developed from multiple open sources, our air defense battalions and batteries are located at:

Baumholder, Germany

5th Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriots)

5th Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (equipped with 36 Avenger SHORAD systems, with 36 in prepositioned storage).

 

Fort Bliss, Texas:

1st Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

3rd Battalion/43rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion/52rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

Battery A, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery B, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery E, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

Battery A, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Guam:

Battery A, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD)

 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma

3rd Battalion, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

4th Battalion, 3rd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

5th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

2nd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (C-RAM, Sentinal, Stinger/Avenger)

3rd Battalion, 6th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Hood, Texas

4th Battalion, 5th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

1st Battalion, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

3rd Battalion, 4th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot/Avenger?)

1st Battalion, 7th Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Fort Campbell, Kentucky

2nd Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery Rgt  (Counter Rocket Artillery and Mortar)

 

Suwon Air Base, South Korea

6th Battalion, 52nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

2nd Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

D Battery, 2nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THADD)

1st Battalion, 1st Air Defense Artillery Rgt (Patriot)

 

Location unknown:

B Battery, 62nd Air Defense Artillery Rgt (THAAD) – activated 2016

 

This listing does not include National Guard units. It is also not definitive.

So Where are the Patriots?

We just got “shelled” by a dozen ballistic missiles fired from Iran to Iraq. These are the type of things that could be stopped by Patriot surface-to-air (SAM) missiles. Apparently we were given a heads up that the missiles were coming.

Not sure if we have any Patriot missile batteries deployed in Iraq. During the build up in May and June, we did deploy at least one Patriot battery to the Gulf. I assume they are still there defending facilities in the Gulf States. Do we have any Patriot missile batteries in Iraq?

Current U.S. and Allied Forces in the Gulf (mid-June 2019)

And:

Did The Patriot BMD Miss Again In Saudi Arabia?

One notes that the recent Iranian attack on the Saudi oil facilities on 14 September 2019 was not intercepted even though Saudi Arabia has six battalions of Patriot missiles and we also have at least one battery in the Gulf.

So did we have Patriots deployed in Iraq? If we did have them available, then did we decide not to use them?

 

 

P.S. (added at 1:40 9 Jan 2020): 3 Hours from Alert to Attacks

  1. We had a three hour alert
  2. There were no Patriot batteries deployed to protect the Ain Al-Asad base
  3. 16 missiles were fired at Ain Al-Asad base.

Size of Theater

Seeing how Iran and Iraq are back in the news (as I suspect so will be the Persian Gulf), let me just remind everyone the size of these “theaters.”

………………….Iraq………….Iran…………Persian Gulf……Texas……Lake Superior
Area (sq. km)…437,072……..1,648,195……251,000…………..696,241…….82,000

Population…….38,433,600…82,531,700……N/A……………..28,995,881…….N/A

GDP …………..$250 Billion…$458 Billion……N/A……………..$1,819 Billion….N/A

Texas is the second largest state in the U.S. (behind Alaska) and the second most populous state in the U.S. (behind California). Lake Superior is the largest fresh water lake in the world. Or to put it relative to Europe:

………………….Iraq……………Iran………..Persian Gulf…….France……..Baltic Sea
Area (sq. km)…437,072……….1,648,195…251,000……………551,695……..1,641,650

Population…….38,433,600……82,531,700….N/A………………64,834,000…….N/A

GDP ……………$250 Billion…$458 Billion….N/A………………$2,707 Billion….N/A

The area and population given is for “Metropolitan France,” meaning those parts of France that are in Europe.

Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran

I noted today, via tweet from President Trump, that “..when I asked, how many will die. 150 people, sir, was the answer from a General.”

Now, we have done a few casualty estimates for conflicts: 1) The 1991 Gulf War estimate done by Trevor Dupuy that was briefed to the House Armed Services committee in 1990 and was the source of his book If War Comes, 2)  the Bosnia casualty estimate that The Dupuy Institute did for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC) in 1995. This is discussed in depth in Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars, and 3) The Iraq casualty estimate that we did in 2004 for Center of Army Analysis (CAA) and OSD Net Assessment. This is discussed in depth in the first Chapter of America’s Modern Wars. So, we know something about casualty estimation and actually have a documented, provable track record.

We have no idea what casualty estimation was done for a strike or conflict with Iran. We have not been involved in that. Most likely, if a properly developed casualty estimation was done, it was done with a range of results. For example, our Bosnia estimate was that in the case of an extended deployment (which is what was done) it was estimated that there was a 50% chance that U.S. killed from all causes in Bosnia in the first year would be below 17 (12 combat deaths and 5 non-combat fatalities) and a 90% chance U.S. killed would be below 25 (see page 308 in America’s Modern Wars).

So, I am guessing that President Trump was not told that there would be 150 killed, he was probably given a range of estimates, of which that was probably the upper boundary of that range. Still, these numbers get people’s attention. I gave a briefing one morning on our Iraq estimate after a three-day weekend…and as one colonel commented during the briefing “This is a hell of a briefing to wake up to after a long weekend.” (see page 18, America’s Modern Wars).

Combat Adjudication

As I stated in a previous post, I am not aware of any other major validation efforts done in the last 25 years other than what we have done. Still, there is one other effort that needs to be mentioned. This is described in a 2017 report: Using Combat Adjudication to Aid in Training for Campaign Planning.pdf

I gather this was work by J-7 of the Joint Staff to develop Joint Training Tools (JTT) using the Combat Adjudication Service (CAS) model. There are a few lines in the report that warm my heart:

  1. “It [JTT] is based on and expanded from Dupuy’s Quantified Judgement Method of Analysis (QJMA) and Tactical Deterministic Model.”
  2. “The CAS design used Dupuy’s data tables in whole or in part (e.g. terrain, weather, water obstacles, and advance rates).”
  3. “Non-combat power variables describing the combat environment and other situational information are listed in Table 1, and are a subset of variables (Dupuy, 1985).”
  4. “The authors would like to acknowledge COL Trevor N. Dupuy for getting Michael Robel interested in combat modeling in 1979.”

Now, there is a section labeled verification and validation. Let me quote from that:

CAS results have been “Face validated” against the following use cases:

    1. The 3:1 rules. The rule of thumb postulating an attacking force must have at least three times the combat power of the defending force to be successful.
    2. 1st (US) Infantry Divison vers 26th (IQ) Infantry Division during Desert Storm
    3. The Battle of 73 Easting: 2nd ACR versus elements of the Iraqi Republican Guards
    4. 3rd (US) Infantry Division’s first five days of combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)

Each engagement is conducted with several different terrain and weather conditions, varying strength percentages and progresses from a ground only engagement to multi-service engagements to test the effect of CASP [Close Air Support] and interdiction on the ground campaign. Several shortcomings have been detected, but thus far ground and CASP match historical results. However, modeling of air interdiction could not be validated.

So, this is a face validation based upon three cases. This is more than what I have seen anyone else do in the last 25 years.

Other Validation Data Bases

There have been (only) three other major historical validations done that I am aware of that we were not involved in. They are 1) the validation of the Atlas model to the France 1940 campaign done in the 1970s, 2) the validation of the Vector model using the Golan Heights campaign of 1973, and 3) the validation of SIMNET/JANUS using 73 Easting Data from the 1991 Gulf War. I am not aware of any other major validation efforts done in the last 25 years other than what we have done (there is one face validation done in 2017 that I will discuss in a later post).

I have never seen a validation report for the ATLAS model and never seen a reference to any of its research or data from the France 1940 campaign. I suspect it does not exist. The validation of Vector was only done for unit movement. They did not validate the attrition or combat functions. These were inserted from the actual battle. The validation was done in-house by Vector, Inc. I have seen the reports from that effort but am not aware of any databases or special research used. See Chapter 18 of War by Numbers for more details and also our newsletter in 1996 on the subject: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/v1n4.pdf

So, I know of only one useful validation database out there that is not created by us. This is the Battle of 73 Easting. It was created under contract and used for validation of the JTLS (Joint Theater-Level Simulation).

But, the Battle of 73 Easting is a strange one-sided affair. First, it was fought in a sandstorm. Visibility was severely limited. Our modern systems allowed us to see the Iraqis. The Iraqis could not see us. Therefore, it is a very one-sided affair where the U.S. had maybe 6 soldiers killed, 19 wounded ant lost one Bradley fighting vehicle. The Iraqi had been 600-1,000 casualties and dozens of tanks lost to combat (and dozens more lost to aerial bombardment in the days and weeks before the battle). According to Wikipedia they lost 160 tanks and 180 armored personnel carriers. It was a shooting gallery. I did have a phone conversation with some of the people who did the veteran interviews for this effort. They said that this fight devolved to the point that the U.S. troops were trying to fire in front of the Iraqi soldiers to encourage them to surrender. Over 1,300 Iraqis were taken prisoner.

This battle is discussed in the Wikipedia article here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_73_Easting

I did get the validation report on this and it is somewhere in our files (although I have not seen it for years). I do remember one significant aspect of the validation effort, which is that while it indeed got the correct result (all the Iraqi’s were destroyed), it did so having the Americans use four times as much ammunition as they did historically. Does this mean that the models attrition calculation was off by a factor of four?

Anyhow, I gather the database and the validation report are available from the U.S. government. Of course, it is a very odd battle and doing a validation to just one odd one-sided battle runs the danger of the “N=1” problem. Probably best to do validations to multiple battles.

A more recent effort (2017) that included some validation effort is discussed in a report called “Using Combat Adjudication to Aid in Training for Campaign Planning.” I will discuss this in a later blog post.

Now, there are a number of other database out there addressing warfare. For example the Correlates of War (COW) databases (see: COW), databases maintained by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (see: SIPRI) and other such efforts. We have never used these but do not think by their nature that they are useful for validating combat models at division, battalion or company level.

Other TDI Data Bases

What we have listed in the previous articles is what we consider the six best databases to use for validation. The Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base (ACSDB) was used for a validation effort by CAA (Center for Army Analysis). The Kursk Data Base (KDB) was never used for a validation effort but was used, along with Ardennes, to test Lanchester equations (they failed).

The Use of the Two Campaign Data Bases

The Battle of Britain Data Base to date has not been used for anything that we are aware of. As the program we were supporting was classified, then they may have done some work with it that we are not aware of, but I do not think that is the case.

The Battle of Britain Data Base

Our three battles databases, the division-level data base, the battalion-level data base and the company-level data base, have all be used for validating our own TNDM (Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model). These efforts have been written up in our newsletters (here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub4.htm) and briefly discussed in Chapter 19 of War by Numbers. These are very good databases to use for validation of a combat model or testing a casualty estimation methodology. We have also used them for a number of other studies (Capture Rate, Urban Warfare, Lighter-Weight Armor, Situational Awareness, Casualty Estimation Methodologies, etc.). They are extremely useful tools analyzing the nature of conflict and how it impacts certain aspects. They are, of course, unique to The Dupuy Institute and for obvious business reasons, we do keep them close hold.

The Division Level Engagement Data Base (DLEDB)

Battalion and Company Level Data Bases

We do have a number of other database that have not been used as much. There is a list of 793 conflicts from 1898-1998 that we have yet to use for anything (the WACCO – Warfare, Armed Conflict and Contingency Operations database). There is the Campaign Data Base (CaDB) of 196 cases from 1904 to 1991, which was used for the Lighter Weight Armor study. There are three databases that are mostly made of cases from the original Land Warfare Data Base (LWDB) that did not fit into our division-level, battalion-level, and company-level data bases. They are the Large Action Data Base (LADB) of 55 cases from 1912-1973, the Small Action Data Base (SADB) of 5 cases and the Battles Data Base (BaDB) of 243 cases from 1600-1900. We have not used these three database for any studies, although the BaDB is used for analysis in War by Numbers.

Finally, there are three databases on insurgencies, interventions and peacekeeping operations that we have developed. This first was the Modern Contingency Operations Data Base (MCODB) that we developed to use for Bosnia estimate that we did for the Joint Staff in 1995. This is discussed in Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars. It then morphed into the Small Scale Contingency Operations (SSCO) database which we used for the Lighter Weight Army study. We then did the Iraq Casualty Estimate in 2004 and significant part of the SSCO database was then used to create the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets (MISS). This is all discussed in some depth in my book America’s Modern Wars.

None of these, except the Campaign Data Base and the Battles Data Base (1600-1900), are good for use in a model validation effort. The use of the Campaign Data Base should be supplementary to validation by another database, much like we used it in the Lighter Weight Armor study.

Now, there have been three other major historical validation efforts done that we were not involved in. I will discuss their supporting data on my next post on this subject.

Battalion and Company Level Data Bases

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the need and desire to model combat at the division-level has declined. The focus has shifted to lower levels of combat. As such, we have created the Battalion-Level Operations Data Base (BLODB) and the Company-Level Actions Data Base (CLADB).

The challenge for both of these databases is to find actions that have good data for both sides. It is the nature of military organizations that divisions have the staff and record keeping that allows one to model them. These records are often (but not always !!!) preserved. So, it is possible to assemble the data for both sides for an engagement at division level. This is true through at least World War II (up through 1945). After that, getting unit records from both sides is difficult. Usually one or both of the opponents are still keeping their records classified or close hold. This is why we ended up posting on this subject:

The Sad Story Of The Captured Iraqi DESERT STORM Documents

And:

So Why Are Iraqi Records Important?

 

Just to give an example of the difficulty of creating battalion-level engagements, for the southern offensive around Belgorod (Battle of Kursk) from 4-18 July 1943 I was able to created 192 engagements using the unit records for both sides. I have yet to create a single battalion-level engagement from those records. The only detailed description of a battalion-level action offered in the German records are of a mop-up operation done by the 74th Engineer Battalion. We have no idea of who they were facing or what their strength was. We do have strengths at times of various German battalions and we sometimes have strength and losses for some of the Soviet infantry and tank regiments, so it might be possible to work something up with a little estimation, but it certainly can not be done systematically like we have for division-level engagements. As U.S. and British armies (and USMC) tend to have better battalion-level record keeping than most other armies, it is possible to work something up from their records, if you can put together anything on their opponents. So far, our work on battalion-level and company-level combat has been more of a grab-bag and catch-and-catch-can effort that we had done over time.

Our battalion-level data base consists of 127 cases. They cover from 1918 to 1991. It is described here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/data/blodb.htm The blurry photo at the start of this blog if from that database.

Our company-level data base is more recent. It has not been set up yet as an Access data base. It consists of 98 cases from 1914 to 2000.

The BLODB was used for the battalion-level validation of the TNDM. This is discussed briefly in Chapter 19 of War by Numbers. These engagements are discussed in depth in four issues of  our International TNDM Newsletter (see Vol. 1, Numbers 2, 4, 5, 6 here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/tdipub4.htm )

The CLADB was used for a study done for Boeing on casualty rates compared to unit sizes in combat. This is discussed in depth in Chapter 12: The Nature of Lower Levels of Combat in War by Numbers.

Both databases are in need to expansion. To date, we have not found anyone willing to fund such an effort.

An Administrative Weakness

Another post is response the comments to this blog post:

The Afghan Insurgents

The comment was “…the insurgents are one side of the coin and the other is the credibility of the government we are trying to create in Afghanistan…If the central government is seen as corrupt and self serving then this also inspires the insurgents and may in fact be the decisive factor….”

This immediately brought to mind David Galula’s construct, which was based upon four major points (see pages 210-211 of America’s Modern Wars):

  1. Insurgents need a cause
  2. A police and administrative weakness
  3. A non-hostile geographic environment
  4. Outside support in the middle to late states.

He specifically state that: “the first two are musts. The last is a help that may become a necessity.”

Now, the problem is that we never took the time to measure an “administrative weakness” or even define what it was. Nor did David Galula. Furthermore, there is also probably an “administrative weakness” or two on the guerilla side. If the culture of Iraq/Afghanistan/Vietnam make it difficult to create government structures and armed forces that are highly motivated, unified and not corrupted, well I suspect some of those same problems exist among the guerillas drawn from that same culture. Therefore, to measure this requires some way of defining what these “administrative weaknesses” are, but also quantifying them, and then determining how they affected both (or more) sides. Needless to say, this was not going to be done in the initial phase of our analysis. We were never funded to conduct follow-up analysis.

This is the problem with David Galula’s construct. There is no easy way to measure it or analyze it. Galula offers no definition of what an “administrative weakness” is. If he does not define it, then how do I define it for his “theory?”

One does note that Galula in his description of the Viet Cong in 1963 states that:

The insurgent has really no cause at all: he is exploiting the counterinsurgent’s weaknesses and mistakes….The insurgent’s program is simply: “Throw the rascals out.: If the “rascals” (whoever is in power in Saigon) amend their ways, the insurgents would lose his cause.

As I note on page 48 of my book:

This was a war that eventually resulted in over 2 million deaths and insurgent force in excess of 300,000. As it is, one could infer from Galula’s statement that he felt that the insurgency could be easily defeated since it was based upon “no real cause.”  We believe that this view has been proven incorrect by historical events.

Clearly identifying insurgent cause and administrative weakness was also a challenge for David Galula.

Forecasting the Iraqi Insurgency

[This piece was originally posted on 27 June 2016.]

Previous posts have detailed casualty estimates by Trevor Dupuy or The Dupuy Institute (TDI) for the 1990-91 Gulf War and the 1995 intervention in Bosnia. Today I will detail TDI’s 2004 forecast for U.S. casualties in the Iraqi insurgency that began in 2003.

In April 2004, as simultaneous Sunni and Shi’a uprisings dramatically expanded the nascent insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA) accepted an unsolicited proposal from TDI President and Executive Director Christopher Lawrence to estimate likely American casualties in the conflict. A four-month contract was finalized in August.

The methodology TDI adopted for the estimate was a comparative case study analysis based on a major data collection effort on insurgencies. 28 cases were selected for analysis based on five criteria:

  1. The conflict had to be post-World War II to facilitate data collection;
  2. It had to have lasted more than a year (as was already the case in Iraq);
  3. It had to be a developed nation intervening in a developing nation;
  4. The intervening nation had to have provided military forces to support or establish an indigenous government; and
  5. There had to be an indigenous guerilla movement (although it could have received outside help).

Extensive data was collected from these 28 cases, including the following ten factors used in the estimate:

  • Country Area
  • Orderliness
  • Population
  • Intervening force size
  • Border Length
  • Insurgency force size
  • Outside support
  • Casualty rate
  • Political concept
  • Force ratios

Initial analysis compared this data to insurgency outcomes, which revealed some startlingly clear patterns suggesting cause and effect relationships. From this analysis, TDI drew the following conclusions:

  • It is difficult to control large countries.
  • It is difficult to control large populations.
  • It is difficult to control an extended land border.
  • Limited outside support does not doom an insurgency.
  • “Disorderly” insurgencies are very intractable and often successful insurgencies.
  • Insurgencies with large intervening third-party counterinsurgent forces (above 95,000) often succeed.
  • Higher combat intensities do not doom an insurgency.

In all, TDI assessed that the Iraqi insurgency fell into the worst category in nine of the ten factors analyzed. The outcome would hinge on one fundamental question: was the U.S. facing a regional, factional insurgency in Iraq or a widespread anti-intervention insurgency? Based on the data, if the insurgency was factional or regional, it would fail. If it became a nationalist revolt against a foreign power, it would succeed.

Based on the data and its analytical conclusions, TDI provided CAA with an initial estimate in December 2004, and a final version in January 2005:

  • Insurgent force strength is probably between 20,000–60,000.
  • This is a major insurgency.
    • It is of medium intensity.
  • It is a regional or factionalized insurgency and must remain that way.
  • U.S. commitment can be expected to be relatively steady throughout this insurgency and will not be quickly replaced by indigenous forces.
  • It will last around 10 or so years.
  • It may cost the U.S. 5,000 to 10,000 killed.
    • It may be higher.
    • This assumes no major new problems in the Shiite majority areas.

When TDI made its estimate in December 2004, the conflict had already lasted 21 months, and U.S. casualties were 1,335 killed, 1,038 of them in combat.

When U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in December 2011, the war had gone on for 105 months (8.7 years), and U.S. casualties had risen to 4,485 fatalities—3,436 in combat. The United Kingdom lost 180 troops killed and Coalition allies lost 139. There were at least 468 contractor deaths from a mix of nationalities. The Iraqi Army and police suffered at least 10,125 deaths. Total counterinsurgent fatalities numbered at least 15,397.

As of this date, the conflict in Iraq that began in 2003 remains ongoing.

NOTES

Christopher A. Lawrence, America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Philadelphia, PA: Casemate, 2015) pp. 11-31; Appendix I.