Category Insurgency & Counterinsurgency

TDI and the TNDM

The Dupuy Institute does occasionally make use of a combat model developed by Trevor Dupuy called the Tactical Numerical Deterministic Model (TNDM). That model is a development of his older model the Quantified Judgment Model (QJM). 
 
There is an impression, because the QJM is widely known, that the TNDM is heavily involved in our work. In fact, over 90% of our work has not involved the TNDM. Here a list of major projects/publications that we done since 1993.
 
Based upon TNDM:
Artillery Suppression Study – study never completed (1993-1995)
Air Model Historical Data feasibility study (1995)
Support contract for South African TNDM (1996?)
International TNDM Newsletter (1996-1998, 2009-2010)
TNDM sale to Finland (2002?)
FCS Study – 2 studies (2006)
TNDM sale to Singapore (2009)
Small-Unit Engagement Database (2011)
 
Addressed the TNDM:
Bosnia Casualty Estimate (1995) – used the TNDM to evaluate one possible scenario
Casualty Estimation Methodologies Study (2005) – was two of the six methodologies tested
Data for Wargames training course (2016)
War by Numbers (2017) – addressed in two chapters out of 20
 
Did not use the TNDM: 
Kursk Data Base (1993-1996)
Landmine Study for JCS (1996)
Combat Mortality Study (1998)
Record Keeping Survey (1998-2000)
Capture Rate Studies – 3 studies (1998-2001)
Other Landmine Studies – 6 studies (2000-2001)
Lighter Weight Armor Study (2001)
Urban Warfare – 3 studies (2002-2004)
Base Realignment studies for PA – 3 studies (2003-2005)
Chinese Doctrine Study (2003)
Situational Awareness Study (2004)
Iraq Casualty Estimate (2004-2005)
The use of chemical warfare in WWI – feasibility study (2005?)
Battle of Britain Data Base (2005)
1969 Sino-Soviet Conflict (2006)
MISS – Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets (2006-2009)
Insurgency Studies – 11 studies/reports (2007-2009)
America’s Modern Wars (2015)
Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (2015)
The Battle of Prokhorovka (2019)
Aces at Kursk (2021)
More War by Numbers (2022?)
 
 
Our bread and butter was all the studies that “did not use the TNDM.” Basically the capture rate studies, the urban warfare studies and the insurgencies studies kept us steadily funded for year after year. We would have not been able to maintain TDI on the TNDM. We had one contract in excess of $100K in 1994-95 (the Artillery Suppression study) and our next TNDM related contract that was over $100K was in 2005.
 
  

Some Statistics on Afghanistan (April 2020)

It has been a while since I have posted on the situation in Afghanistan. This post is not about the coronavirus (Afghanistan reported as of Sunday 337 cases with 7 deaths and 15 recovered), but about the never ending war there. The country has been in open warfare much of the time since 1979. The latest quarterly report on Afghanistan from the United Nations Secretary General is now available. These are always worth looking at as they appear to have less “spin” then many other reports:

https://unama.unmissions.org/secretary-general-reports

The report was posted 23 March, although I did not see it on their site at that time (I was looking). It is dated 17 March, which is later then they usually file these reports. Probably because a lot was going on with the attempted peace agreements.

  1. For 2019, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 10,392 civilian casualties (3,403 killed and 6,989 injured), a 5 per decrease compared with 2018, but the sixth year in a row with more than 10,000 documented civilian casualties.
    1. In 2018 the United Nations documented 10,993 civilian casualties (3,804 people killed and 7,189 injured). This was the highest number of civilian deaths recorded in a single year since UNAMA began systematic documentation in 2009, and an increased of 5% compared to 2017.
    2. “Since systematic documentation began in 2009, UNAMA has documented more than 100,000 civilian casualties, with more than 35,000 killed and 65,000 injured.”
    3. Woman and children represented 42 per cent of the civilian casualties in 2019.
    4. “In January, UNAMA documented a significant decrease in civilian casualties in comparison with the same period in 2019.”
    5. “Most civilian casualties (62 per cent) continued to be caused by anti-government elements, 47 per cent attributed to the Taliban, 12 per cent to ISIL-KP and the remainder to undetermined and other anti-government elements.”
    6. “Pro-government forces caused 28 per cent of civilian casualties (including 8 per cent by international military forces).”
      1. “UNAMA documented an 18 per cent increase in civilian casualties attributed to international military forces.”
      2. “Civilian casualties caused by the Afghan National Security and Defence Forces increased by 3 per cent.”
    7. Suicide and non-suicide improvised explosive devices remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, representing 42 per cent of the total, followed by ground engagements (29 percent) and aerial operations (10 per cent).
      1. “In 2019, UNAMA documented a 24 per cent increase in civilian casualties from non-suicide improvised explosive devices by anti-government elements in comparison with 2018.”
      2. “Civilian casualties from pro-government aerial and search operations reached record high levels, with a 3 and a 2 per cent increase, respectively, in comparison with 2018.”
      3. “UNAMA also documented the continued elements, including electoral officials and election-related facilities, judges, prosecutors, health-care workers, and aid workers, as well as continued attacks against the Shi’a Muslim population” (bolding is mine).
      4. “The task force verified 10 attacks against hospitals and protected personnel, a decrease compared with the previous reporting period (26 attacks). Attacks were attributed to the Taliban (eight), and ISIL-KP and the Afghan National Army (one each)…”
      5. “A total of 29 confirmed cases of polio had been reported in 2019….Of these, 25 cases originated inaccessible areas where house-to-house immunization campaigns have been banned by the Taliban since May 2019.”
      6. Explosive remnants of war and anti-personnel mines causes 134 child casualties from November to anuary, killing 49 children and injuring 85.”
  2. “Between 8 November and 6 February, UNAMA recorded 4,907 security-related incidents, a similar number as during the same period in the previous year.”
    1. This includes 2,811 armed clashes.
    2. Use of improvise explosive devices was the second highest type of incident.
    3. 8 Suicide attacks this period, compared to 31 in the previous three-month period and 12 in the same period in 2019.
    4. 330 air strikes were conducted by Afghan and international air forces, an 19% decrease compared with the same period in 2019.
    5. “A nationwide reduction in violence commenced on 22 February…”
    6. “In 2018, the United Nations recorded 22,478 security-related incidents, a 5 per cent reduction as compared with the historically high 23,744 security-related incidents recorded in 2017.”
  3. Territory was changing hands:
    1. “On 31 December the Taliban reportedly took control of Darzab district in Jawzjan Province following the withdrawal of the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces.”
    2. “The Taliban also temporarily captures Arghandad district in Zabul Province…”
    3. “…while the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces recaptured Guzargahi Nur district in Baghlan Province, which had been under Taliban control since September 2019.”

              Security           Incidences      Civilian

Year      Incidences       Per Month       Deaths

2008        8,893                  741

2009      11,524                  960

2010      19,403               1,617

2011      22,903               1,909

2012      18,441?             1,537?                             *

2013      20,093               1,674               2,959

2014      22,051               1,838               3,699

2015      22,634               1,886               3,545

2016      23,712               1,976               3,498

2017      23,744               1,979               3,438

2018      22,478               1,873               3,804

 

As I noted in my post last year: “This war does appear to be flat-lined, with no end in sight.”

Now, on 29 February in Doha the United States and the Taliban signed an agreement to reduce the number of U.S. forces to 8,600 troops in 135 days with a proportional reduction in the number of coalition forces. It is to be followed by the drawdown of all international forces within another nine and half months. This is subject to the Taliban fulfilling their commitments under the agreement. I have blogged about this before. There is still no agreement between the current government of Afghanistan and the Taliban.

Withdrawal and War Termination – 2

Expected first follow-up post to my previous post. I do have a chapter in my book America’s Modern Wars (2015) on Afghanistan. Most of our work on insurgencies was focused on Iraq. Several years after we did our Iraq casualty estimate (presented on pages 15-31 and 302-307) we were asked to do a briefing or two about Afghanistan. This was a little odd, as it was not something we had studied in depth and we never have. All of our work was on Iraq or on insurgencies in general. We never specifically analyzed on Afghanistan or had a contract to do so. Still, hard to ignore Afghanistan so I ended up with the chapter on it in my book (Chapter 21, pages 253-272).

The final paragraph in that chapter reads (pages 269-270):

Given our unwillingness to step up our commitment, then the only question is whether a slower withdrawal will provide more tangible benefits than a fast withdrawal. This we have not examined. Still, this is not “winning” the war in any sense of the word winning. It is withdrawing with the situation on the ground unresolved and a government that far from democratic or stable. We will be leaving behind trainers and other support people, but limited combat troops. If history is a guide, then this government will be replaced one way or the other several years after we withdraw. What will replace it is hard to determine, but will probably include a return to some extent of the Taliban, or perhaps with them leading the new government. It is also distinctly possible that the country will return back into civil war. None of this fulfills our objectives.

What more do I need to say? I wrote that in 2014 or so…..right now the current Afghan government consist of two people claiming to be the president and the U.S. had just negotiated a complete withdrawal over the next 14 months. The negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government start on 10 March 2020.

Previous post:

Withdrawal and War Termination – 1

Withdrawal and War Termination – 1

I have got a hunch that there will be multiple posts on this subject, so have already labeled this post such. The United States just signed a peace agreement today with the Taliban. The United States had agreed to reduce the presence of U.S. troops to 8,600 within 135 days (around 13 July 2020). It is currently around 13,000. The U.S. also agreed to completely withdraw all troops in 14 months (by April 2021?). In exchange, “the Taliban promise to not let extremists use the country as a staging ground for attacking the U.S. or its allies” (to quote from Yahoo news). The withdrawal is “conditions-based” to quote Secretary of Defense Mark Esper. This is more to this 4-page agreement, which I have yet to see. I may get into later.

There will be a separate peace deal between the Afghan Government and the Taliban will begin on 10 March 2020 which will included a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire” (to quote from the U.S. State Department). We shall see how that goes. On 10 March the U.S. will review its sanctions against the Taliban with the goal of ending them by August 27.

In my book America’s Modern Wars (2015) I have a chapter called “Withdrawal and War Termination.” It is Chapter 19 and covers pages 237-242. It is a short chapter because we never really did any work on the subject. Not that we didn’t want to, but we could never get anyone to fund such work. Most of our customers were U.S. Army or Department of Defense (DOD). They were not particularly interested a decade ago in work on “withdrawal and war termination.” Now I think they should have been, but I don’t get to make those decisions.

My chapter starts:

The missing piece of analysis in both our work and in that of many of the various counterinsurgent theorists is how does one terminate or end these wars, and what is the best way to do so? This is not an insignificant point. We did propose doing exactly such a study in several of our reports, briefings and conversations, but no one expressed a strong interest in examining war termination.

Obviously, if the insurgents are driving tanks through the streets of the capital city, the war had ended, and not favorably for the counterinsurgents. But many insurgencies end with some form of negotiated settlement. Many insurgences end with the slow collapse and disintegration of the insurgency. Many of these end with some form of political compromise. Most of them end with some form of negotiation and political agreement, regardless of victor.

And then there is a multiple page discussion on 1) determining winners and losers (easy to determine insurgent victories, but “around one-third of counterinsurgent wins are clouded, or somewhat less than clear victories“), 2) force draw downs during an insurgency (there are only three cases: Malaysia, Northern Ireland and Vietnam, not counting Iraq and Afghanistan) and 3) then we go to these concluding statements:

A basic examination needs to be done concerning how insurgencies end, how withdrawals are conducted, and what the impact of various approaches towards war termination is. This also needs to address long-term outcome, that is, what happened following war termination.

We have nothing particularly unique and insightful to offer in this regard. Therefore, we will avoid the tendency to pontificate generally and leave this discussion for later. Still, we are currently observing with Afghanistan and Iraq two wars where the intervening power is withdrawing or has withdrawn. These are both interesting cases of war termination strategies, although we do not yet know the outcome in either case.

Anyhow, more to come on this.

 

Congressional Research Report on Uses of Armed Forces

I have recently been perusing the Congressional Research Report on Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2019, updated July 17, 2019. It is here: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf

I do have some real heartburn with this report. For example, for the period from 1950-1959 they report six incidents of the use of U.S. armed forces. They are Korean War (1950-53), Formosa (1950-55), China (1954-55), Egypt (1956), Lebanon (1958) and The Caribbean (1959-1960). No Vietnam.

On 23 October 1954 President Eisenhower offered military aid to Vietnamese tin-pot dictator Prime Minister Diem. From 1957 through 1959 the United States had around 700 troops deployed to Vietnam. In 1957 we suffered our first casualties in 1959 lost our first two soldiers in Vietnam. Yet their first listing for Vietnam starts in 1964.

It does appears that the report uses very different standards over reporting for instances from decade to decade. For example, from 1950-1959 they report six uses of U.S. armed forces abroad, while in 2000-2019 they report 108. Many of the type of instances they report later in their list do not appear to be reported in the previous decades.

For example, the last instance listed on page 45 is the signature of a “defense-cooperation agreement” with Lithuania for 2019. Yet, the list does not record the United States joining NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), which eventually grew to 29 members (including Lithuania). It is clear that we have signed dozens of these types of agreements from 1945-1979, and yet they are not listed back then, but are now being listed in 2019.

In another extreme example, they only have three instance reports for Vietnam, one covering 1964-1973 and two reports for 1975. Yet they have 32 instances for Bosnia from 1993-2006.

It is clear that different standards and levels of research are being used for events in the last few decades on that list than are used for events in the first few decades.

It appears that the list over time has been updated with considerable detail over the last couple of decades without a corresponding backdating to make sure that the listing is reporting the same type of events in the same detail from 1945-1979. Therefore, one cannot directly compare the number of instances from previous decades to the more recent decades because they are based upon a different standard and detail of reporting.

Around 2000, the report also appears to start listing the instances in more detail, and in 2014, they start footnoting the source for each of their listings. So the report is clearly expanding in scope and improving in detail, but this means that it cannot and should not be used for comparisons over time. Still, the absence of major events like the involvement of the United States armed forces in Vietnam before 1964 is a major shortfall. It is clear that this report needs to be properly updated for past events.

As this is the tax payer funded, government supervised Congressional Research Service report, I really do expect better from them.

Deja Vu all over again

Afghan police in training, 5 October 2010 (taken by William A. Lawrence II)

Recent article on Afghan troop size: https://news.yahoo.com/afghan-troop-numbers-drop-sharply-040851162.html

A few points from the article:

  1. There are now 42,000 less troops reported for the Afghan security forces.
  2. U.S. has 14,000 troops there
    1. Of those, 9,000 involved in training, advising and assisting Afghan security forces.
  3. “The change was part of an effort by the United States and its partners to reduce opportunities for corrupt ANDSF officials to report ‘ghost’ (nonexistent) soldiers and police on personnel rolls in orders to pocket the salaries.”

A few observations:

  1. Didn’t we have the same issue in Vietnam (1965-1973) with the South Vietnamese Army?
  2. Our analysis of counterinsurgency efforts focused on force ratios and the political concept behind the insurgency. This does affect the force ratios (see America’s Modern Wars).
  3. It is good that we are correcting this, but we are in our 18th year of this war. What were we doing the previous 17?
  4. Does this again establish that: “The real lesson from history is that no one learns any lessons from history.”

Ten Million in Ten Days?

Hard to ignore the news when the President of the United States is talking about how he could kill ten million people. And here I was planning on spending this week blogging about Prokhorovka. Anyhow, an article with a video of his comments is here: https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-boasts-afghanistan-would-be-easy-to-fix-i-just-dont-want-to-kill-10-million-people-190412501.html

His two main comments were:

We’re like policemen. We’re not fighting a war. If we wanted to fight a war in Afghanistan and win it, I could win that war in the week. I just don’t want to kill 10 million people.

I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win that war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth. It would be gone, it would be over literally in 10 days.

Well, to start with it is pretty hard to kill 10 million people.  We won’t discuss the six or so cases where people actually succeeded in doing this, they are pretty well known. None of them were done in 10 days. It would appear that the only way you could cause such havoc in 10 days would be through a massive nuclear attack. It would have to be fairly extensive attack to kill 10 million of the 35 million people in Afghanistan, especially as they are somewhat dispersed.

Is someone actually discussing this possibility inside the White House or Pentagon? I seriously doubt it.

Now, I have never been involved in estimating losses from a nuclear attack. It can be done. Each bomb or missile has a lethal radius, a less-than-lethal radius, and of course, there is radiation poisoning, nuclear fallout, and a rather extended long-term series of illnesses, as the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki could recount in painful detail. It would certainly require dozens of nuclear bombs. The U.S. has around 1,800 deployed nuclear warheads.

He also said:

If we wanted to, we could win that war. I have a plan that would win that war in the very short period of time.

I do find that hard to believe, as large insurgencies have been particularly intractable. See page 47 of my book America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam.

 

The Venezuelan Military

Caracas (Venezuela), 05 de Marzo del 2014. El Canciller del Ecuador, Ricardo Patiño, participó en los actos de conmemoración de la muerte del Comandante Hugo Chávez Frías. Foto: Xavier Granja Cedeño / Cancilleria Ecuador

Our government claims that all options are on the table in response to the situation developing in Venezuela. I gather this includes military options, which according to news reports, the U.S. had yet to actually mobilize for. So, if military options are a possibility, what does the Venezuelan military actually look like?

First, Venezuela is not a small country. It is over 32 million people and almost a million square kilometers in area. Population wise, this is more people than were in Vietnam in 1965, Afghanistan in 2001 or Iraq in 2003. Area wise, it is several hundred thousand square kilometers bigger than Afghanistan, Iraq or Vietnam.

The Venezuelan Army has 128,000 troops of six divisions. They have 192 T-72s, 84 AMX-30s, 78 Scorpion light tanks, and 111+ AMX-13s, several hundred armored personnel carriers and over 100 armored cars. They also have 48 Hind Mi-35 attack helicopters. The Venezuelan Air Force has 10+ F-16s and 23 Sukhoi Su-30s. The Venezuelan Navy is 60,000 personnel including 12,000 marines. It has 2 submarines, 3 missile frigates, 3 corvettes, 10 large patrol boats and gunboats, 19 smaller patrol boats and 4 LSTs (landing ship tank). Added to that is a National Guard with police functions of around 70,000 troops. They have up to at least 191 (and eventually up to 656) of the white Chinese-built APCs that were running over people a couple of days ago (see picture). There is also a National Militia and a Presidential Honor Guard brigade. So we are looking at 258,000+ people under arms. All data is from Wikipedia.

Added to that, the source of Chavez (Maduro’s predecessor) power and popular support was the military. He was a career military officer for 17 years, He was a captain when he attempted two violent coups in 1992. To date, the government of Maduro has maintained the support of the military. This is probably the key to his ability to hold onto power.

Now, retired General Jack Keene recently did discuss three military options 1) move forces to Colombia and threaten, 2) move a coalition of forces (Colombia and Brazil) into Venezuela to provide humanitarian aid and 3) invade with the purpose of conducting regime change. See: Keene Interview

I suspect that any form of direct intervention, like we did in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq is not being seriously considered. So, one wonders what other military options is the United States considering, if any.