No quantitative analysis here, but a decent and balanced look at Kennedy’s thinking on Vietnam in 1963, when we had more than 16,000 advisors committed but had not yet put in combat troops: Kennedy and Vietnam
A couple of salient points:
His ruminations on a Congo intervention are particularly interesting: “I assume this probably won’t be successful. Nothing ever seems to be….”
Concerning the Congo: “He also reiterated the need for an expert military assessment ‘of the chances of its [US military intervention] success'”
Conclusion: “My view, rooted in the documents and tape recordings at the JFK Library, does not support the conclusions of either Kennedy advocates or critics.”
The U.S. at the end of 1960, under Eisenhower, the U.S had 685 troops in South Vietnam. Under Kennedy, at the end of 1961 it was 3,164, in 1962 it was 11,326 and in 1963 it was 16,263. Under Johnson, it continued to grow to 23,210 in 1964 and 184,314 at the end of 1965. At the end of 1968 it was at 536,040 (source: DISS — Dupuy Insurgency Spread Sheets).
An article just quoted an estimate for the number of Islamic State fighters in and around Mosul: Retaking Mosul
They estimate that “IS fighters in Mosul, meanwhile, vary from a few thousand to “not more than 10,000.” according to the coalition.”
They also note that the current population of Mosul is estimated at between 500,000 and one million. Also: “Al-Hashimi, the analyst, estimated retaking Mosul would require 80,000 men, of whom 15,000 are expected to come from the government-sanctioned Shiite militias.’
Also note: “An official…said there was not yet a detailed plan for retaking Mosul. “for now, the plan is simply that Mosul is next.'”
Anyhow, estimating the size of an insurgency or irregular force is somewhat of a challenge. Part of the challenge is that a significant percent (the majority?) of the force and the support personnel for the force is not “full-time”….so to say. They are people that are activated irregularly and as needed. I ended up with an entire chapter in my book America’s Modern Wars on estimating insurgent force size. In the end, I concluded that you are probably best estimating the force size based upon their levels of activity (incidents occurred and people killed) compared to other insurgencies. This did produce estimates higher than the official U.S. DOD estimates for Iraq and Afghanistan. In retrospect, it appear our estimates were closer to reality.
Of course, all these “part-time” and “casual” insurgents disappear back into the population when you occupy an area and are available to be called upon again.
Now, they do choose the headlines, and sometimes that gives a different feel to the article. So for example, one of my blog posts was titled “Russian Revolutions.” The exact same article on the HNN is titled “Are Russians Really Long-Suffering.” This apparently got a couple of people up in arms because the article did not talk about all the famines and oppression in Russia and the Soviet Union. It did not, because it was about revolutions, and in particular was about revolutions that succeeded. The famines in the 1890s, 1920s and 1930s did not directly lead to a successful revolution (a point that I think is pretty significant).
The article “Did I Just Write…” is actually a shorter version of an article I posted on the Aberdeen Bookstore website: Long version of “Did I Just Write…” Part of the reason that I wrote that article was to see if someone would come out of the woodwork and post that there was a larger book published (usually these postings start with something like “the author is an idiot because….”). I did not get that for this article. This does sort of confirm my suspicion that this is indeed the largest single volume history book ever written (no disrespect intended for the 11-volumes done by the Durants…which were four million words and 10,000 pages). I wonder if this is something I should submit to the Guinness Book of World Records? Will I get free beer for that?
By the way, there is still a war going on in Afghanistan and it is not going that well: Helmand
I have always liked the U.N. Secretary General’s periodic updates on the war. The 7 March 2016 report is here: Report on Afghanistan
Just a few highlights:
12. The security situation deteriorated further in 2015. The United Nations recorded 22,634 security incidents, representing a 3 per cent increase compared with 2014 and the second-highest number since 2001. Since the issuance of my previous report, fighting has intensified in Helmand and Baghlan provinces, and Kunduz Province has remained volatile.
15. Reports indicate a substantial increase in casualties among the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces in 2015, the first year in which the forces confronted anti-government elements with much-reduced international military assistance…Insufficient recruitment and high attrition rates posed particular challenges to the sustainability of the Forces…At the current rate, recruitment cannot compensate for the losses generated by absenteeism and casualties, particularly within the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.
24. On 14 February 2016…The report documented 11,002 civilian casualties (3,545 deaths and 7,457 injured) between 1 January and 31 December.
33. Economic growth…remained slow. In January….its growth projection for 2015 had been revised downward…to 1.5 percent…
As of 15 November 2015, there were 162,694 personnel on the official Afghan National Army roster and 6,907 personnel on the Afghan Air Force roster, for a total of 169,601 personnel, a figure that is 32,306 below the end-state objective for January 2016. Also as of 15 November, there were 144,591 personnel serving on the official Afghan National Police roster, a figure that is 43,409 below the end-state objective.
The U.S.has 9,800 people in Afghanistan, down from a peak of NATO forces at 140,000: NATO Training Mission
According to this article Afghan forces suffered 5,500 killed-in-action and more than 14,000 wounded in 2015.
Just to reinforce Shawn Woodford’s point below, let me quote from Chapter Twenty-Four, pages 294-295, of my book America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam:
Many years ago, I had the pleasure of having a series of meetings with Professor Ivo Feierabend. I was taking a graduate course in Econometrics at San Diego State University (SDSU). I decided that for my class paper, I would do something on the causes of revolution. The two leading efforts on this, both done in the 1960s, were by Ted Gurr and the husband and wife team of Feierabend and Feierabend. I reviewed their work, and for a variety of reasons, got interested in the measurements and analyses done by the Feierabends, vice the more known work by Ted Gurr. This eventually led me to Dr. Feierabend, who still happened to be at San Diego State University much to my surprise. This was some 20 years after he had done what I consider to be ground-breaking work on revolutions. I looked him up and had several useful and productive meetings with him.
In the 1960s, he had an entire team doing this work. Several professors were involved, and he had a large number of graduate students coding events of political violence. In addition, he had access to mainframe computers, offices, etc. The entire effort was shut down in the 1960s, and he had not done anything further on this in almost 20 years. I eventually asked him why he didn’t continue his work. His answer, short and succinct was, “I had no budget.”
This was a difficult answer for a college student to understand. But, it is entirely understood by me now. To do these types of analytical projects requires staff, resources, facilities, etc. They cannot be done by one person, and even if they could, that one person usually needs a paycheck. So, the only way one could conduct one of these large analytical projects is to be funded. In the case of the Feierabends, that funding came from the government, as did ours. Their funding ended after a few years, as has ours. Their work could be described as a good start, but there was so much more that needed to be done. Intellectually, one is mystified why someone would not make sure that this work was continued. Yet, in the cases of Ted Gurr and the Feierabends, it did not.
The problem lies in that the government (or at least the parts that I dealt with) sometimes has the attention span of a two-year-old. Not only that, it also has the need for instant gratification, very much like a two-year-old. Practically, what that means is that projects that can answer an immediate question get funding (like the Bosnia and Iraq casualty estimates). Larger research efforts that will produce an answer or a product in two to three years can also get funding. On the other hand, projects that produce a preliminary answer in two to three years and then need several more years of funding to refine, check, correct and develop that work, tend to die. This has happened repeatedly. The analytical community is littered with many clever, well thought-out reports that look to be good starts. What is missing is a complete body of analysis on a subject.
“The U.S. military estimated earlier this year that the Islamic State had lost 40 percent of the territory it controlled at its peak in 2014.”
“Shadadi was going to be a major six-week operation….Instead, they completely collapsed.”
“We could probably liberate Mosul tomorrow…”
“…troops encountered little resistance, overrunning five mostly empty villages ahead of retreating militant fighters.”
“…it is starting to become possible to foresee the group’s ultimate defeat, said Knights, who thinks that could come by the end of next year.”
Of course, by establishing an “Islamic State,” a guerilla movement has now developed a conventional mission to hold territory. This allows us to develop a more conventional war against them. There may still be a guerilla movement to deal with after the Islamic State has been reduced.
The interesting point is that they give stats as to what they are leaving behind (have no idea how they know this):
The first is that Russia is not pulling out its forces completely. It will retain its naval presence in Tartus; at least a dozen fast jets will continue to fly from its air base near Latakia; about 1,000 military advisers and special forces will stay; and the recently-installed S-400 air defence system covering the north-west of the country will also be kept in place. Should the fragile “cessation of hostilities” that Russia and America brokered last month fall apart, it can re-escalate very quickly. But for now, Russia can cut the $3m a day cost of its military operation, while preserving much of the leverage it has bought.
Not sure how they got the price tag either. Very cheap compared to U.S. deployments (which usually are in the billions). Maybe we can contract them.
It would be nice to have short, quick, sharp interventions. Basically, go into a troubled country, kick tail, and then leave shortly thereafter with everything resolved. Sort of like we did in Libya in 2011; or that peacekeeping mission in Lebanon in 1982-1984 that was effectively ended by the barracks bombing that killed 241 Marines; or the brief humanitarian mission to Somalia 1992-1994 that generated the book and movie Black Hawk Down; or the 1991 Gulf War; or one-year deployment to Bosnia in 1995; or any number of short and sweet interventions that were not always so sweet and short.
Obviously the real “short and sweet” list is pretty short. Panama 1989, Grenada 1984 and….and….and…… Most commitments either take much longer that that (like Bosnia), or the conflict continues rattling on long after we left (pretty much the rest of the cases mentioned in the first paragraph), and sometimes they require us to re-engage or they mutate in ways we did not expect (for example: Libya and Somalia). Getting in, kicking tail, taking names, and getting out sounds like a great idea. Just doesn’t work out that way very often.
Russia is now wrapping up its 5 ½ month commitment in Syria. It was not that big, maybe 3,000 to 6,000 uniformed personnel, plus aircraft. Still, this mission was unique in many ways. It was really the first case of Russia doing an intervention away from its immediate borders (and pretty much one of the few cases of the Soviet Union doing one also). Neither Russia nor the Soviet Union had ever played far from home, if you ignore the communist international, world wide revolutionary movements and a few dozen missiles sent to Cuba. Still, Russia/Soviet Union had rarely actually committed conventional forces into combat in a country that is not connected to it by border. Even their failed war in Afghanistan (1979-1989) was connected by a border. They were part of the Kosovo peacekeeping forces. But besides that, Syria is the only case I can think of in the last 100 years of a Russian or Soviet ground invention in a country not connected by a border.
They are now withdrawing (so they claim). Syria is the location of the only Russian military bases outside their country, so obviously some forces are remaining.
But, Syria remains Syria. It is a country of 18 million people that is only around 13% Shia (primarily Alawite). Up until the civil war started five years ago, the Alawite minority ruled the country under Bashar Assad. It is around 10% Christian (which were sometimes allied with their fellow minority, the Alawites), 3% Druze, 9% Kurds (Sunni) and 60% Sunni Arab (and no…these numbers don’t add up to 100%). Of course, having an Alawite minority over the top of the Sunni majority pretty much guaranteed that there would eventually be a conflict. Now the Russia intervention has bolstered the Alawites. Hard to imagine if Russia actually pulls out, how the bolstered Alawites maintain their current position.
Still, perhaps Russia has given Assad and the Alawites enough breathing space for them to now stand on their own. This has not been the case in a number of past interventions (U.S. in Vietnam, USSR in Afghanistan, U.S. in Iraq).
