Category Kursk Data Bases

Soviet Artillery in Proportion

A miniature wargaming website in the UK came to my attention because he quoted from my Kursk book (actually probably from my blog). The link is here:

https://notquitemechanised.wordpress.com/

Now, this was one of the many asides that I developed during the writing of the book and I felt one of the more significant discussions in the book. I am always concerned that a number of major points in that book were drowned in the 1,662 pages. I am glad he was able to identify and pull that one out.

The quote is in his blog post, but for the battle we estimated that the Germans fired 51,083 tons of ammunition while the Soviets fired 21,867 tons. I don’t think anyone else have made such a calculation.

For the Soviet rocket launchers (Katyushas) they fired an estimated 2,422 tons of ammo, while for the German rocket launchers (Nebelwerfers) they fired 5,916 tons of ammo.

This is subject that probably could be the basis of a complete stand-alone study or book. I suspect if this was the case at Kursk, where the Soviet army had three months to prepare and stockpile, then it is very much an issue for other, especially more mobile, operations.

 

P.S. The complete quote is also in this earlier blog post:

German versus Soviet Artillery at Kursk

My articles on other blogs

Col. General Wolfram Baron von Richthofen, 1942 (Bundesarchive Bild 101I-452-0985-36)

While there are 783 blog posts that I have made to the Mystics and Statistics blog, I do have seven other articles written on other sites, all in 2015 and 2016.

History News Network

  1. How Military Historians Are Using Quantitative Analysis — And You Can Too
  2. Did the Pentagon Learn from Vietnam?
  3. Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever?
  4. Are Russians Really Long-Suffering?
  5. What Are Historians Supposed to Make of Quotes Reported by the Discredited Historian and Holocaust Denier David Irving?

While I was writing this blog post a week ago, I noticed a message from nine months ago on the History New Network to this last article. It was from Dr. Andrew Arthy of Australia. Turns out he has a copy of the Wolfram von Richthofen’s notes from a discussion he had with Generaloberst Jeschonnek on 25 May 1943. So finally got confirmation that this was indeed a valid quote from David Iriving.

Small Wars Journal

  1. Airpower: Just Part of the Counterinsurgency Equation

Aberdeen Book Store

  1. Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever?

This is the complete article. The article with the History News Network was abbreviated.

Force Ratios at Kharkov and Kursk, 1943

T-34 Tanks near the Derzhprom building during brief Soviet re-occupation of Kharkov, February 1943. Source: https://thecharnelhouse.org/

Now, some of the data provided in the previous posts were muddied by the fact that there were serious differences in the performances of the opposing armies. This is true for the German Army versus the Soviet Army in 1943, the Israeli Army versus the Arab armies in 1956-1973, and for the U.S. Army, USMC and allied armies versus the Iraqi Army in 1991. To a much lesser extent, it is also true for the German Army versus the U.S and UK armies up through the middle of 1944. This is discussed in some depth in my book War by Numbers.

As such, this seems like also a good time to again briefly address this issue. We need to break down the force ratio tables by which nationality is attacking. First let us look at the Eastern Front World War II data:

World War II, Kharkov and Kursk 1943 (180 cases)

German Army attacking the Soviet Army – culled data set (100 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins……………..Number of Cases

0.49………………………………..0%…………………………………………….1

0.58 to 0.95………………………90……………………………………………..10

1.01 to 1.49……………………..100……………………………………………..30

1.52 to 1.96………………………95……………………………………………..19

2.09 to 2.42…………………….100……………………………………………….6

2.57 to 2.87…………………….100……………………………………………….7

3.00 to 3.45…………………….100……………………………………………….8

3.60 to 3.79…………………….100……………………………………………….2

4.31 to 5.85………………………92……………………………………………..13

6.48 to 6.63…………………….100……………………………………………….2

8.60 to 11.41…………………..100……………………………………………….2

 

In these hundred battles, when the Germans are on the offensive, they win 96% of the time. That is a pretty impressive result. The full data set with another 28 cases that include “limited action” and “limited attack” are listed below.

German Army attacking the Soviet Army – complete data set (128 cases)

Force Ratio………………….Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.49…………………………………….0%…………………………………………….1

0.58 to 0.95…………………………..47…………………………………………….19

1.01 to 1.49…………………………..88…………………………………………….34

1.52 to 1.96…………………………..77…………………………………………….26

2.09 to 2.42…………………………..86………………………………………………7

2.57 to 2.98…………………………100………………………………………………9

3.00 to 3.45…………………………100………………………………………………8

3.60 to 3.79…………………………100………………………………………………3

4.31 to 5.85…………………………..71…………………………………………….17

6.48 to 6.63…………………………100………………………………………………2

8.60 to 11.41……………………….100………………………………………………2

 

Out of these 128 battles, when the Germans attack they win 79% of the time. This is still impressive by any standard. Because of the additional cases being “limited action” and “limited attack” there are a lot of drawn engagements in this data set. The “culled” data set has three defender victories and one draw (and 96 attacker wins). This one has five defender victories and 22 drawn engagements. Now, let us look at how the Soviets do in response. These are the opposing forces on the same battlefield, similar terrain, similar weather, and often on the same day

Soviet Army attacking the German Army – culled data set (41 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases

0.40 to 0.43……………………..67%………………………………………………..3

0.51 to 0.99……………………..18…………………………………………………11

1.02 to 1.46……………………..25…………………………………………………16

1.53 to 1.96……………………..50…………………………………………………..4

2.08 to 2.31……………………..50…………………………………………………..4

2.79 to 2.89……………………..33…………………………………………………..3

 

This is a very different result than what we see for the Germans. Out of the 41 attacks, the Soviets win 13 times or 32%. If I compare the German results of their attacks at odds below three-to-one, I have the Soviets succeeding 32% of the time while the Germans are succeeding 96% of the time (70 out of 73 attacks). Hard to argue that there is not a performance difference as the two armies in 1943 were roughly equivalent in armament and the mix of armaments. Each of the engagements from Kursk are presented in considerable detail in my books on the battle.[1]

The same data, but including “limited action” and “limited attack” is shown below:

Soviet Army attacking the German Army – complete data set (52 cases)

Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins………………….Number of Cases

0.40 to 0.49……………………..50%…………………………………………………4

0.51 to 0.99……………………..14………………………………………………….14

1.01 to 1.46……………………..19………………………………………………….21

1.53 to 1.96……………………..40……………………………………………………5

2.08 to 2.31……………………..50……………………………………………………4

2.66 to 2.89……………………..25……………………………………………………4

 

With this data set, out of 52 engagements the attacker still only won 13 times, or 25%.

 

 

[1] See Lawrence. Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (2015) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (2019). The first book lays out all 192 engagements from the offensive in the south while the second book provided the detailed data for 76 of the engagements. Each engagement has a separate engagement sheet that lays out the forces involved, their strength and their losses. There is a detail narrative of their operations in the text of the books. If anyone has any questions over the accuracy or interpretation of this data, it is presented in these books, developed primarily from the unit records of both sides (primary sources).

The U.S. Army Three-to-One Rule

Various Three-to-one rules of thumbs have existed in the U.S. Army and in writings possibly as early as the American Civil War (1861-1865). These are fine as “rules of thumb” as long as one does not take them seriously and understands what they really mean. But, unfortunately, we have now seen something that is a loose rule of thumb turned into a codified and quantified rule. This is annoyingly overstating its importance and as given in U.S. Army manuals, is patently false.

The U.S. Army has apparently codified the “three-to-one rule” in its documentation and has given it a value. In the 2014 edition of FM 6-0, paragraph 9-103, it states that “For example, historically, defenders have over a 50 percent probability of defeating an attacking force approximately three times their equivalent strength.” This statement, on the surface, simply is incorrect. For example, the following table from my book War by Numbers is drawn from a series of 116 division-level engagements in France in 1944 against the Germans (see War by Numbers, page 10) They show the following relationship between force ratio and outcome:

European Theater of Operations (ETO) Data, 1944

 

Force Ratio………………..Result…………………Percent Failure…Number of cases

0.55 to 1.01-to-1.00………Attack Fails…………………..100%……………….5

1.15 to 1.88-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……21%………………..48

1.95 to 2.56-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……10%………………..21

2.71-to-1.00 and higher…Attacker Advances…………….0%……………….. 42

 

Now these engagements are from fighting between the U.S., UK and Germany in France and Germany in 1944. These are engagements between forces of roughly equal competence. As can be seen, based upon 42 division-level engagements, in all cases of attacks at three-to-one (more specifically 2.71-to-1 and greater), the attacker advanced. Meaning in all cases of attacks at three-to-one, the attacker won. This directly contradicts the statement in FM 6-0, and contradicts it based upon historical data.

This is supplemented by the following two tables on the next page of War by Numbers. The first table shows the German performance when attacking Soviet units in 1943.

Germans attacking Soviets (Battles of Kharkov and Kursk), 1943

 

Force Ratio………………..Result………………….Percent Failure…Number of cases

0.63 to 1.06-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……..20%……………………..5

1.18 to 1.87-to-1.00………Attack usually succeeds……….6%……………………17

1.91-to-1.00 and higher…Attacker Advances……………….0%……………………21

 

The next table shows the Soviet performance when attacking German units in 1943:

Soviets attacking Germans (Battles of Kharkov and Kursk), 1943

 

Force Ratio………………Result…………………..Percent Failure…Number of cases

0.40 to 1.05-to-1…………Attack usually fails…………70%……………………10

1.20 to 1.65-to-1.00…….Attack often fails…………….50%……………………11

1.91 to 2.89-to-1.00…….Attack sometimes fails…….44%……………………..9

 

These charts are from the fighting around Kharkov in February, March and August of 1943 and the fighting during the Battle of Kursk in July 1943. It is 73 engagements between the German and Soviet armies.

Now, there is a clear performance difference between the German and the Soviet armies at this time. This is discussed in considerable depth in War by Numbers and will not be addressed here. But, what it amounts to is that the German Army has an advantage in the casualty exchange and that advantage also shows up in the outcomes of the battles, as show above. If they attacked at two-to-one odds are greater, they would win. The Soviets attacking at the same odds would win only 56 percent of the time. Clearly, at the division-level, in a unit to unit comparison, the Germans were two or three times better than their Soviet opponents.

Still, even in the worse case, which is the Soviets attacking the Germans, we do not get to the claim made in FM 6-0, which is the defender won 50% of the time when attacked at three-to-one. In fact, the Soviets managed to win 50% of the time when attacking at 1.20 to 1.65-to-1. Something is clearly wrong with the statement in FM 6-0.

Now, at the time I wrote War by Numbers, I was not aware of this sentence planted in FM 6-0 and so therefore did not feel a need to respond to the “three-to-one rule.” It is a rule of thumb, not completely without value, that had been discussed before (see Dupuy, Understanding War, pages 31-37). I thought this issue was properly understood in the U.S. analytical and defense community, therefore I did not feel a need to address it further. It turns out that I do. So, I will take a moment to tap into our databases and properly address this using all the resources at my disposal. This will be in subsequent blog posts.

So What Were the Assault Guns Doing at Prokhorovka?

There were three assault gun battalions in the SS Panzer Corps at Prokhorovka, one in each of the three SS Panzer Grenadier Divisions (Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf). They all started the offensive (on 4 July) with 34, 33 and 28 Sturmgeschuetz IIIs (in that order). These “tanks” were armed with the 75mm L48 guns (the same as the Panzer IVs) and has 80mm of frontal armor (which is more than the Panzer IVs, which had 80mm for the glacis but only 50mm for the turret).

As of the evening of 11 July I have them with 10 operational in the Leibstandarte (with one destroyed and 9 damaged that day), 27 operational in Das Reich (with one destroyed that day), and 21 operational in Totenkopf. So where were they and what did they do this day?

Well, according to multiple Russian accounts, there were some assault guns opposite the XVIIII Tank Corps. This is specifically stated as follows:

From: Combat Report #38, 0330, July 13, 1943

In attempting to reach the Belgorod highway, XVIII Tank Corps unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s well-organized resistance, which featured buried tanks and assault guns along the line ht. 217.9-ht. 241.6

From: Account of 18th TC’s Combat Activities, July 12-24 1943:

By the end of the day the enemy attempts a frontal tank attack from the Kozlovka-Greznoye area, with the simultaneous attempt bypass the corps; units from the Kozlovka-Polezheyva direction, using Tiger tanks and self-propelled guns and intensively bombarding our lines from the air.

XVIII Tank Corps encountered the enemy’s well-organized and powerful anti-tank defense, consisting of tanks and assault guns along the line of ht. 217.9-ht. 241.6.

From: Operational Report #1, 1900, July 12, 1943, 5th GTA

At 1400 the corps repulsed an enemy counterattack by 50 tanks from the Bororoditskiye area, and by 13 “Tigers” from the area of ht. 226.6

The Corps’ further advance was contained by the enemy’s powerful artillery and mortar fire from the Greznoye area, and by tank fire from the Bogoroditskoye area.

From: Operational Report #2, 0700, July 13, 1943, 5th GTA

18th TC, with 80th Gds Mortar Rgt, by the end of July 12 had taken the eastern outskirts of Vasilyevka, but its further advance was halted by the enemy’s artillery and tank from the area of the western outskirts of Vasilyevka. The corps is on the line Petrovka-Mikhalovka and has consolodated and is regrouping.

From: 5th Guards Tank Army’s Combat Activities from July 7-24, 1943 (compiled September 30, 1943)

In Andreyevka 181st TBde met a large column of enemy tanks. As a result of the battle that followed, the Germans suffered heavy casualties and were thrown back on Kozlovka.

The corps, on the line ht. 279.9-3 km southwest of Kozlovka-ht. 241.6, encountered heavy enemy fire resistance from assault guns, tanks buried in the ground, and fierce aerial bombardment, which made any further advance impossible.

This is all discussed in this post:

So What Were the LSSAH Tigers Doing?

According to Ben Wheatley, the Leibstandarte SS Assault Gun Battalion was in reserve south of the Stalinskii Sovkhoz and later supported the LSSAH Marders and 1st PzGrRgt around the farm area. This locale is a little over 3 kilometers from ht. 241.6 where the Tigers are. Waiting for the source on this, but if so, then the LSSAH assault gun battalion is accounted for.

The Das Riech SS Assault Gun Battalion was operating with Das Reich, so out of the area of our discussion right now (which is the XVIII and XXIX Tank Corps attack).

The location of the Totenkopf SS Assault Gun Battalion is not given in any of the material I have. It may have been on the north side of the Psel River. These panzer grenadier divisions often lumped the assault gun battalions with the reconnaissance battalion. The Totenkopf reconnaissance battalion was at one point on the division left (west) flank and south of the Psel, but not sure where it was on this day.

Also of note, the Leibstandarte reconnaissance battalion ended up defending (and being penetrated) by the attacking Soviet tanks of the XVIII Tank Corps.

You might want to pre-order the book

By the way, if you pre-order The Battle of Prokhorovka through amazon.com it is selling for $28.43: Buy from Amazon The list price on the hardcover is  $44.95. I do not know what price it will be listed at on 1 June 2019 (nor do I have any involvement or say in these matters).

The book can obtained from Stackpole at: Stackpole Books

Or from Amazon.com at: Buy from Amazon

The Battle of Prokhorovka book — why?

My original contract back in 1999 to prepare the Kursk book was for a single book of 450 pages. During the writing process….the book grew. This is discussed in this article: http://www.aberdeenbookstore.com/the-largest-history-book-ever

When I realized how large the book was, I contacted the publisher and discussed the issue with him. I suggested that we go ahead and complete the large book I was writing and then go back and do an abridged version. He graciously agreed, but unfortunately I was unable to complete the original book in 2003/2004 (although it was mostly done) due to my work at The Dupuy Institute, magnified by a war or two going on.

So, when I was finally able to get back to this book (thanks to government budget cuts and sequestration), I was left with an original book of 1,662 pages. Clearly there was a need for a smaller book.

This is not that book. This book is the updated chapters of the original book that focus on the fighting by the SS Panzer Corps, III Panzer Corps, parts of the Sixth Guards Army, Sixty-Ninth Army, Fifth Guards Army, Fifth Guard Tank Army and parts of the Seventh Guards Army from 9 to 17 July 1943. As such, it is 40% of the original book sectioned off as a separate stand alone book.

I could do four such books from my original book. This is the first of these books. I am currently finishing up a second such book (Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War). I could do two more books along that line (Battle of Tolstoye Woods and The Belgorod Offensive), although I am not sure that I ever will. It depends on demand, sales, the publisher’s interest, my time, and my mood.

I may also get around to writing a single 300-page book summarizing the offensive in the south. We shall see. There are a lot of other projects I am also considering.

The book can obtained from Stackpole at: Stackpole Books

Or from Amazon.com at: Buy from Amazon

The Battle of Prokhorovka — what does the book consist of

The book consists of:

  1. 638 numbered pages (and 14 pages of front matter)
  2. 75 Listed illustrations and maps
  3. Four photo sections
    1. 15 terrain photos
    2. 12 recon photos
    3. 64 battlefield photos
    4. 70 commander photos
  4. One map section with 17 maps
  5. 18 numbered tables
  6. 21 graphs
  7. 44 sidebars
  8. 76 engagement sheets

Just for the record, my original mega-book consisted of 192 engagement sheets. So one could make the argument that this book covers 40% of the Belgorod offensive (at least compared to the original book).

The book was edited by the same editor of the original book, Ariane Smith of Capital A: http://www.capitala.net/. Therefore, it is of a very similar format and style.

The book can obtained from Stackpole at: Stackpole Books

Or from Amazon.com at: Buy from Amazon

The Battle of Prokhorovka – 16 chapters

My new book The Battle of Prokhorovka consists of 16 chapters (the original mega-book had 27). The chapters are:

1. Preparing for the Showdown…..page 13
2. The Soviets Prepare…..page 35
3. The Belgorod Offensive: 4-8 July 1943…..page 51
4. The XLVIII Panzer Corps Heads West: 9 – 11 July 1943…..page 113
5. The Advance on Prokhorovka: 9-11 July…..page 133
6. The Advance on the Severnyii Donets: 9-11 July 1943…..page 203
7. The Situation as of 11 July 1943…..page 229
8. The Air War: 9-18 July 1943…..page 243
9. The Tank Fields of Prokhorovka, 12 July 1943…..page 291
10. SS Panzer Corps Attack Stalls, 13 July 1943…..page 359
11. Soviet Counterattacks against the III Panzer Corps: 12-13 July 1943…..page 375
12. Aftermath of Prokhorovka: 13 July 1943…..page 401
13. Cleaning Up the Donets Triangle: 14-15 July 1943…..page 475
14. The Battlefield is Quiet: 16-17 July 1943…..page 511
15. The German Withdrawal: 18-24 July 1943…..page 539
16. Post-Mortem…..page 559

There are only two short appendices in this book (the original book had 7 appendices totaling 342 pages):

Appendix I: German and Soviet Terminology…..page 615
Appendix II: The Engagements…..page 623

The book can obtained from Stackpole at: Stackpole Books

Or from Amazon.com at: Buy from Amazon