Category Air Warfare

The Soviet General Staff study on Kursk compared to Unit Records (part 1 of 3 – Sortie Counts)

Yak-9 at war memorial, northeast of Yakovlevo, Belrorod-Oboyan road

For my on-going Aces at Kursk book I was asked by the publishers to include a Chapter on the air war in the north from 5-11 July 1943. For the original Kursk project we were able to access the Second and Seventeenth Air Army records in the south. We did not attempt to obtain the Sixteenth Air Army records at that time (1993-1995). Therefore I was forced to rely on the Soviet General Staff study on Kursk that was prepared in March-April 1944 for the count of sorties and losses. As the staff study also reported the sorties and losses from the south, and I had the records for the air armies involved in that, I decided to do a little comparison and added a write-up of this to an appendix of the book.

Sortie Counts (I left out the table of the sortie count from Soviet General Staff study) :

          The Soviet General Staff study data on sortie counts is similar to the data we have assembled. The data we have for the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies operations are taken directly from the daily air army reports as drawn from the archives. The Soviet General Staff study may used these same reports, or used higher level reports or other assembled reports for their study. But there are minor differences between ours and their reports, so most likely they used other higher level or assembled reports for their study. For example, we have the Second Air Army flying 1,296 daytime sorties on 5 July. The Soviet General Staff study has them flying 1,274. There are also minor differences the next two days, but the two sets of counts are the same for 8 and 9 July and then vary slightly for most of the subsequent days (except for the 15th and 16th, where they again match). After the 5th, the largest difference is on the 12th, where our reports record 10 more daytime sorties. These are very minor differences. The Second Air Army nighttime sorties match in all cases between the counts we assembled from the air army daily reports and what the Soviet General Staff study reports.

            The Seventeenth Air Army is a little more complex as some of their missions were flown into the battle area while other of their missions were flown completely out of the battle area defended by the Voronezh Front. For the Kursk database project, I ended up reviewing each reported mission as to where it operated and made a judgment as to whether this mission was in the area of the Belgorod offensive or not. It does not appear that the Soviet General Staff study did that. For the 5th through the 16th, their estimate more closely matches with the total number of sorties flown by the Seventeenth Air Army than it does with my lower count of the number of sorties flown in the battle area. On eight of those 12 days in question, their totals matches the total we drew from the Seventeenth Air Army daily reports. The day they most differ was on 7 July when they reported 50 more sorties than we counted. We did re-check the original report and our total is 639. Suspect their number of 689 is a typo. As the Soviet General Staff study may have been drawn from a later aggregate report, there are multiple opportunities for typos.

           On the other hand, in the table we assembled of Seventeenth Air Army daytime sorties we had a lower count for “only those that were in the Belgorod Area or attacked the VIII Air Corps” (see table in Chapter Four). It is consistently lower from the 5th through the 16th, which the worse variance being on the 7th, where we count 588 as valid sorties in the battle area, whereas the Soviet General Staff study reports 689. On the 17th we count none in the area and on the 18th we count 12 sorties.

           Still there are a couple of observations we can make from this comparison. First, is that the Soviet General Staff study reports of Soviet sorties flown is fairly accurate in that it matches with records we have from the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies. This is important to note as we rely on the Soviet General Staff study for the count of sorties for the Sixteenth Air Army.

Results from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

This six-week war is now over. It was effectively a two-week war with a four-week poorly maintained ceasefire. Now I gather a more permanent ceasefire is in place, with 2,000 Russian troops placed between the warring factions. Russia is not entirely a neutral player here, having somewhat favored Armenia while Turkey supported Azerbaijan. But as Azerbaijan clearly won this round (and this has been going of and on since 1988) and took territory, then I suspect it is resolved for now. The president of Azerbaijan is touring the battlefield (his conquests) while the government of Armenia is in turmoil with several ministers resigning. Most governments don’t do very well after they lose a war and are usually replaced.

The big story from this war was the extensive use of drones and loitering munitions. These things trashed dozens of tanks, probably well over a 100. There are multiple videos of them, and some people have assembled body counts based upon these videos. I gather Armenia has stated that their losses are 2,317 killed, with other reports indicating 21 captured and several hundred missing. There are also losses from the Republic of Artsakh. Azerbaijan also suffered hundreds of losses and it may have been as high as 1,500, based upon an interpretation of a statement from the President of Azerbaijan. There were also Syrian fighters or mercenaries, which an outside agency reported 293 deaths. There were also civilian casualties. Overall, it looks like this conflict resulted in the deaths of at least 4,000 people and maybe over 5,000.

Losses in latest Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

It does open a few questions. 

  1. Is that main battle tank antiquated?
  2. Are drones the air force of the future?
  3. Is this simply the result of conducting a war with air superiority?

This last point is important. Is what happened to Armenia in this war any different to what happened to Iraq in 1991? How does the efficacy and efficiency of the air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War compare to this conflict? The answer to this question certainly influences the answer to the first two questions. Is this just another example of the advantage of air supremacy, or is there a bigger lesson here?

The second point about drones also needs to be examined in some depth. It does not appear that Armenia had an effective air defense or good countermeasures against the drones. What would have been the difference if they did? Azerbaijan does have an air force, which took some loses, but their primarily prosecuted their air-to-ground campaign using drones. This may have been the poor mans or the cost-effective way of doing this. They could purchase a lot of relatively inexpensive drones and effectively prosecute and air-to-ground campaign to a degree that they could not have done using considerably less expensive manned aircraft. This does lead to the question, is an air force of drones much cheaper in the long run than an air force of manned aircraft? In the end, budget is always a limiting factor, so do drones simply give you more bang for the buck? So, from an analytical point of view, we are not just looking at a comparison of which is better, an air force of mostly drones or mostly manned aircraft; but also which is cheaper. This is potentially a fairly complex piece of analysis.

All this eventually gets to the first question, which is “Is the main battle tank antiquated?” I am not sure how you answer that question until you have answered the other two questions. 

 

Jeschonnek’s Suicide – 18 August 1943

General Hans Jeschonnek, the Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, committed suicide on 18 August 1943. This account has been garbled in a number of books, so here is my current write-up on the story:

Post-Mortem

General Hans Jeschonnek’s attempts to escape to the field by taking over command of the Fourth Air Fleet had failed. After the British bombing of Hamburg on 24/25 July, Goering decided that Jeschonnek would remain as chief of staff. Trapped in an impossible job, Jeschonnek was also affected by the recent loss of his father, brother, and brother-in-law. On the night of 17 August, the RAF bombed the missile base at Peenemuende.[1]

Jeschonnek had already displayed considerable sensitivity, having almost had a nervous breakdown in November 1941 and spending three days in bed after General Udet (the famous World War I ace) had committed suicide and General Wilberg and the famous ace Major Moelders had been killed in separate air crashes while flying to Udet’s funeral. He had also previously attempted suicide himself. During the day of 18 August, the young chief of staff wrote a number of suicide notes, including one short note that said “I can no longer work together with the Reichsmarschall [Goering]. Long live the Fuehrer!” He also wrote a memorandum to Hitler that was critical of his boss, Goering. He then shot himself in his office on the command train of the Luftwaffe, in what is now Goldap, Poland (at the time part of East Prussia). It was near Hitler’s command post, the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia.[2] He was 44 years old.

 

 

[1] There is a claim in many accounts that Adolf Hitler called Jeschonnek on the afternoon of 17 August or the morning of 18 August to again criticize the Luftwaffe, telling him “You know what to do” or “You know what is left for you to do now.” This story apparently comes from Field Marshal Erhard Milch, the Air Inspector General, who testified that Jeschonnek had a story stormy session with Hitler. This entire story is disputed and dismissed by Prof. Richard Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the German Air Force (USAF Historical Division, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, July 1969), page 288. Suchenwirth states “It is untrue, as Milch has claimed, that Jeschonnek had had a heated discussion with Hitler on the afternoon preceding his suicide, during which Hitler had told him that the failures were his responsibility and that he “ought to know now what was expect of him.” This account is denied by those who were best informed about the situation.”

[2] Suchenwirth, pages 284-290. Many accounts state that Jeschonnek committed suicide at Hitler’s command post, the Wolf’s Lair in East Prussia, on 18 or 19 January 1943. His gravestone gives his date of death as 18 January 1943 (see https://ww2gravestone.com/people/jeschonnek-hans/). The date of his death was officially posted as 19 January 1943 by Hermann Goering to disconnect it from the Peenemunde bombing so as to hide the manner and reason for his death. They also published that he died from a hemorrhage of the stomach.

 

One does note that some otherwise credible accounts still give the date of his death as 19 August 1943: for example:

http://www.ww2.dk/Lw%20Offz%20-%20G-K%20Apr%202020%20.pdf

Losses in latest Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Below is an article on the counts of losses from Nagorno-Karabakh. It is based upon viewing of drone footage, etc. by individuals some distance from the conflict. The numbers should be viewed with considerable caution. https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2020/09/the-fight-for-nagorno-karabakh.html

They state: “This list only includes destroyed vehicles and equipment of which photo or videographic evidence is available. Therefore, the amount of equipment destroyed is undoubtedly higher than recorded here.” 

 

Anyhow, their count is:

………………………….Artsakh/Armenia……..Azerbaijan
Tanks……………………………..177………….26

AFVs……………………………….34………….11

IFVs………………………………..42………….24

Aircraft and Helicopters…………..0…………..10

Towed Artillery…………………..138

SP Artillery………………………..17

MLRS……………………………..72

Trucks, vehicles and jeeps……408………….21

 

Tank losses in Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict

In case you have been distracted by all the U.S. news lately, there has been a significant conflict for the last month between Azerbaijan-Armenia over Nogorno-Karabakh that resulted in dozens of tanks lost, many due to drones and loitering munitions. This is conventional war. We have not done any systematic analysis of this, so I am hesitant to make any comments on it, but it is a significant event, in that a number of Armenian tanks were taken out by Azerbaijani drones. I have found the twitter accounts @RALee85 and @Rebel44CZ and @oryxspioenkop to be worth following. They tend to include a lot of the videos that have been released from this fight.

This is an article on the subject that came out this week:

https://www.yahoo.com/news/attack-drones-dominating-tanks-armenia-085624016.html

A few highlights:
.

  1. Armenia says it has lost around 900 servicemen.
  2. Actual casualties are probably higher.
  3. Open source analysis by Forbes magazine has tracked the destruction by drones of around 200 tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, plus 300 soft-skinned military vehicles.
  4. It is kind of one-sided, as Armenia does not have such a collection of drones (it helps to have oil).

Richthofen’s Cavalry Fight at Virton

Source: https://www.thebicyclingguitarist.net/studies/colorphotos.htm

 

Around the 22nd of August, Lt. Manfred von Richthofen with 15 Uhlans advanced into a woods near Virton, Belgium and when they got the other side of the woods, fell into a French ambush.

According to his account in his autobiography (pages 53-56), the horses of two of his Uhlans leaped the barricade blocking the path and and rode towards the French because the horses were in panic of the sound of all the gunfire.

His orderly’s horse was shot and fell down, trapping the orderly beneath it.

Richthofen and the rest of the Uhlans retreated back through the woods. The orderly returned two days later minus one of his boots, which was trapped under the horse. Richthofen claimed that there were about 100 rifles opposing them and they were firing from 50 to 100 yards. The orderly claims that “At least two squadrons of French cuirassiers had issued from the forest in order to plunder the fallen horses and brave Uhlans.”

This sentence gets my attention, as it tends to indicate that there were additional Prussian casualties besides the two men and horses who jumped the barricade and the orderly’s horse. As Richthofen’s autobiography was probably censored, it is possible that any reports of German killed might have been removed. Yet the sentence “…plunder the fallen horses and brave Uhlans” strongly indicates that there were indeed additional losses among the Uhlans and their horses that were not detailed in this book.

Has anyone examined this engagement in depth, checked the unit records, etc. and determined what actually occurred and what were the losses?

War Crimes and Richthofen’s autobiography

Source: https://www.thebicyclingguitarist.net/studies/colorphotos.htm

In 1917, Manfred Albrecht Baron von Richthofen (1892-1918), sometimes known as the Red Baron, wrote an autobiography. At that time he was Germany’s leading ace with 52 claimed kills. He later claimed 80 kills before he was shot down.

His autobiography was almost certainly reviewed and censored by German authorities, although to what extent is hard to say.

I was re-reading it recently (I last read it when I was a kid) and a few passages stood out to me. These all occurred while he was serving with the Uhlans first in Russia and then in France at the start of the war.

On pages 47-48 for their operations at the border village of Kieltze in Poland (part of the Russian Empire), probably around 2 August 1914, Richthofen writes:

What should I do in order not to be noticed by the villagers? My first idea was to lock up the “pope.” [Russian priest] We fetched him from his house, to his great surprise. I locked him up among the bells in the church tower, took away the ladder, and left him sitting up above. I assured him that he would be executed if the population should show any hostile inclinations. A sentinel placed on the tower observed the neighborhood.

and five days later, only Richthofen and one other man were in the village:

…for the street swarmed with Cossacks…Most of them had lanterns, and they acted very incautiously and were very noisy. I estimated that they were from twenty to thirty. One had left his horse and gone to the “pope. whom I had let off the day before. Immediately it flashed through my brain, “Of course we are betrayed!…After having rested a few hours, our visitors rode away.

It is not stated if the “pope” went away with the Cossacks or if anything was done after the Cossacks left.

On pages 52-53 while they were at Arlon, Belgium in August 1914 Richthofen writes:

At Arlon I climbed the steeple in accordance with the tactical principles which we had ben taught in peace time…When I came down again I was surrounded by a crowd of angry young men who made hostile eyes, and who talked threateningly in undertones. My bicycle had, of course, been punctured, and I had to go on foot for half an hour. This incident amused me. I should have been delighted had it come to a fight. I felt absolutely sure of myself with a pistol in my hand.

 

Later on I hear that the inhabitants had behave very treacherously several days previously toward our cavalry, and later on towards our ambulances. It had therefore been found necessary to place quite a number of these gentlemen against the wall.

 

I assume the most negative interpretation of “against the wall” is correct. According to Wikipedia on Arlon: “Arlon was one of the first victims of the German invasion in 1914 as 121 inhabitants were executed on 26 August, on the orders of Colonel Richard Karl von Tessmar.” and in the Wikipedia article on Tessmar: “On 26 August, 121 Belgian civilians were executed at Arlon railway station on his order.”

On page 57 while they on Virton on or after 22 August 1914 Richthofen writes:

So both Loen and I had quarters for ourselves and our men…The monks were extremely amiable. They gave us as much to eat and to drink as we cared to have, and we had a very good time…We settled down as if we were on manoeuvres, and as if we were in the house of a delightful host and friend. At the same time it should be observed that thee days later we hanged several of our hosts to the lanterns because they could not overcome their desire to take a hand in the war. But that evening they were really extremely amiable.

This last one is significant as there were several major war crimes conducted by the German Army in that area. Dinant with 674 executed by Saxon troops being the largest. According to Wikipedia article on Virton “On August 22, 1914, at the onset of World War I, hundreds of inhabitants were summarily executed by the invading German army…” This is worth looking at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rape_of_Belgium

So I assume I am correct in reading this account as an open admission that he knew of and participated in war crimes and then published them in a censored wartime autobiography?

Did Eddie Rickenbacker use a Ghost Writer for his Autobiography?

I was recently reading Rickenbacker: An Autobiography by top American World War I ace Eddie Rickenbacker.

Before Rickenbacker became an ace, he was a successful race car driver, having driven at Indianapolis from 1911-1916. He won a number of races on the circuit (but not Indy) and had a reputation as “fast Eddie.” His book describes his first major win of 1914 at Sioux City Iowa on pages 58-61, except the account appears to have been garbled.

To start with it says it was 1913 (there was no race in 1913), then it recounts they were at the race with Duesenbergs (which would have been 1914), then they describe that his teammates were Tom Alley and Ralph Mulford. Tom Alley was his teammate in 1914 with the Duesenberg team while Ralph Mulford was his teammate in 1915 with the Maxwell team. It then describes the race, including his encounter with and the fatal crash of “T. C. Cox.” This crash occurred in the 1915 race and the driver killed was Charles C. Cox.

He then wins the race in a Duesenberg, which would have been in 1914. He won the race in 1915 in a Maxwell. He does have his mechanic Eddie O’Donnell knocked out by a chunk of the dirt track during the race. Eddie O’Donnell was his mechanic in 1914, and was a driver in the 1915 for the Duesenberg team and placed second. He then has Tom Alley, his teammate in 1914, coming in 3rd (Tom Alley came in 5th in 1914, but came in 3rd in 1915, still in a Duesenberg but was not longer his teammate).

It does appear that the writer garbled the two accounts of his win in 1914 and his subsequent win there in 1915. I gather this account was supposed to be the 1914 race. Perhaps Eddie Rickenbacker confused the two races he won, but as he was involved in a fatal crash in 1915, I find it hard to believe that he would.

It is a very well written 443-page book for a guy who did not complete 7th grade. I do wonder if he had to hire a ghostwriter or if his editor took a heavy hand to the early chapters. In the front of the book he does thank Booton Herndon for his editorial assistance. There is no indication that a ghost writer was used.

Some links to the Indy Car results:
1. 1914 Sioux City: https://www.racing-reference.info/race/1914_Sioux_City_Race/UO
2. 1915 Sioux City: https://www.racing-reference.info/race/1915_Sioux_City_Race/UO

My articles on other blogs

Col. General Wolfram Baron von Richthofen, 1942 (Bundesarchive Bild 101I-452-0985-36)

While there are 783 blog posts that I have made to the Mystics and Statistics blog, I do have seven other articles written on other sites, all in 2015 and 2016.

History News Network

  1. How Military Historians Are Using Quantitative Analysis — And You Can Too
  2. Did the Pentagon Learn from Vietnam?
  3. Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever?
  4. Are Russians Really Long-Suffering?
  5. What Are Historians Supposed to Make of Quotes Reported by the Discredited Historian and Holocaust Denier David Irving?

While I was writing this blog post a week ago, I noticed a message from nine months ago on the History New Network to this last article. It was from Dr. Andrew Arthy of Australia. Turns out he has a copy of the Wolfram von Richthofen’s notes from a discussion he had with Generaloberst Jeschonnek on 25 May 1943. So finally got confirmation that this was indeed a valid quote from David Iriving.

Small Wars Journal

  1. Airpower: Just Part of the Counterinsurgency Equation

Aberdeen Book Store

  1. Did I Just Write the Largest History Book Ever?

This is the complete article. The article with the History News Network was abbreviated.

Looking for a publisher for Aces at Kursk

I do have a completed book of around 400 pages called Aces at Kursk: The Belgorod Offensive Air War.  It is a book about the actual air battles, as opposed to yet another picture book. The air battles at Kursk were larger than the Battle of Britain, yet there is not a single comprehensive book addressing it.

I have contacted a number of publishers and am still waiting for a response from some of them. A couple of them made a counter offer than I do picture book. But, it is probably time to go out and look for other publishers. If someone knows a publisher that this book is a particularly good fit for please let me know. If a publisher has a strong interest in this book, please contact me directly.

Thanks

Aces at Kursk – Chapters

Aces at Kursk – Summation