Michael Peck made an interesting catch over at The National Interest. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is soliciting input on potentially disruptive technologies for future warfare. With regard to air warfare, the solicitation baldy states, “Platform stealth may be approaching physical limits.” This led Peck to ask “Did the Pentagon just admit that stealth technology may not work anymore?”
A couple of years ago, a media report that the Chinese had claimed a technological breakthrough in stealth-busting quantum radar capabilities led me to muse about the possible repercussions on U.S. military capabilities. This was during the height of the technology-rooted Third Offset Strategy mania. It seemed to me at the time that concentrating on technological solutions to the U.S.’s strategic challenges might not be the wisest course of action.
The notion that stealth might be a wasting asset seemed somewhat far-fetched when I wrote that, but it appears to have become a much more serious concern. As the DARPA solicitation states, “Our acquisition system is finding it difficult to respond on relevant timescales to adversary progress, which has made the search for next generation capabilities at once more urgent and more futile.” (p. 5)
Er, yikes.
Yes, this is concerning that the US and allies are just now ramping up bulk purchasing of the F-35, while China and Russia are investing in technologies that can mitigate the effectiveness of stealth. We’ve seen (and posted on) some skepticism by the US Navy, for example, on the effectiveness of stealth, and thus they have balanced purchases of the F/A-18E/F with the F-35C. One point from an Aviation Week podcast was really interesting … there is always a cycle of capability development and counter capability development in military matters. Just because sensors improve does not mean that camouflage is abandoned. Similarly, stealth may be eroded, but is continues to provide an advantage, giving the stealth the opportunity to get the “first look, first shot, first kill”. Before, the enemy got “no look”, now they might get a “second look, too late”.
Quality is a relative term. Assessing the suitability of a combat aircraft (or any asset for that matter) is not simple and as always contextual. The true question is: How much of an advantage does the F-35 C and F/A-18 E/F still retain in combat, measured against their adversaries in relation to the unit costs and individual personnel training involved? Is a replacement necessary in order to increase the combat rating or are completely new technologies available to replace the existing one, for a new “era” or generation of fighters?
My opinion? I think, judging by the great investemt into the aircraft sector and aggregated figures of flight hours there is still no match for the USAAF (ultimately not the problem of the forces), especially in view of a gradual shift towards UAVs. This is a question of national wealth – Naval and Airforces are generally expensive to maintain, should the US economy suffer and dwindle, so will the quality of their Airforces.
I think it is too early to panic (for the next 50-70 years their exchange rate may not be surpassed by potential adversaries), the only nations capable of fielding effective stealth and antistealth tech are allied to the United States.
The loss of supremacy without any act of aggression is a slow-going process.