Now comes Phase III of this effort. The Phase I report was dated 11 January 2002 and covered the European Theater of Operations (ETO). The Phase II report [Part I and Part II] was dated 30 June 2003 and covered the Eastern Front (the three battles of Kharkov). Phase III was completed in 31 July 2004 and covered the Battle of Manila in the Pacific Theater, post-WWII engagements, and battalion-level engagements. It was a pretty far ranging effort.
In the case of Manila, this was the first time that we based our analysis using only one-side data (U.S. only). In this case, the Japanese tended to fight to almost the last man. We occupied the field of combat after the battle and picked up their surviving unit records. Among the Japanese, almost all died and only a few were captured by the U.S. So, we had fairly good data from the U.S. intelligence files. Regardless, the U.S. battle reports for Japanese data was the best data available. This allowed us to work with one-sided data. The engagements were based upon the daily operations of the U.S. Army’s 37th Infantry Division and the 1st Cavalry Division.
Conclusions (from pages 44-45):
The overall conclusions derived from the data analysis in Phase I were as follows, while those from this Phase III analysis are in bold italics.
- Urban combat did not significantly influence the Mission Accomplishment (Outcome) of the engagements. Phase III Conclusion: This conclusion was further supported.
- Urban combat may have influenced the casualty rate. If so, it appears that it resulted in a reduction of the attacker casualty rate and a more favorable casualty exchange ratio compared to non-urban warfare. Whether or not these differences are caused by the data selection or by the terrain differences is difficult to say, but regardless, there appears to be no basis to the claim that urban combat is significantly more intense with regards to casualties than is non-urban warfare. Phase III Conclusion: This conclusion was further supported. If urban combat influenced the casualty rate, it appears that it resulted in a reduction of the attacker casualty rate and a more favorable casualty exchange ratio compared to non-urban warfare. There still appears to be no basis to the claim that urban combat is significantly more intense with regards to casualties than is non-urban warfare.
- The average advance rate in urban combat should be one-half to one-third that of non-urban combat. Phase III Conclusion: There was strong evidence of a reduction in the advance rates in urban terrain in the PTO data. However, given that this was a single extreme case, then TDI still stands by its original conclusion that the average advance rate in urban combat should be about one-half to one-third that of non-urban combat/
- Overall, there is little evidence that the presence of urban terrain results in a higher linear density of troops, although the data does seem to trend in that direction. Phase III Conclusion: The PTO data shows the highest densities found in the data sets for all three phases of this study. However, it does not appear that the urban density in the PTO was significantly higher than the non-urban density. So it remains difficult to tell whether or not the higher density was a result of the urban terrain or was simply a consequence of the doctrine adopted to meet the requirements found in the Pacific Theater.
- Overall, it appears that the loss of armor in urban terrain is the same as or less than that found in non-urban terrain, and in some cases is significantly lower. Phase III Conclusion: This conclusion was further supported.
- Urban combat did not significantly influence the Force Ratio required to achieve success or effectively conduct combat operations. Phase III Conclusion: This conclusion was further supported.
- Nothing could be determined from an analysis of the data regarding the Duration of Combat (Time) in urban versus non-urban terrain. Phase III Conclusion: Nothing could be determined from an analysis of the data regarding the Duration of Combat (Time) in urban versus non-urban terrain.
So, in Phase I we compared 46 urban and conurban engagements in the ETO to 91 non-urban engagements. In Phase II, we compared 51 urban and conurban engagements in an around Kharkov to 49 non-urban Kursk engagements. On Phase III, from Manila we compared 53 urban and conurban engagements to 41 non-urban engagements mostly from Iwo Jima, Okinawa and Manila. The next blog post on urban warfare will discuss our post-WWII data.
P.S. The picture is an aerial view of the destroyed walled city of Intramuros taken on May 1945
Do you think that urban warfare might favour certain unit types, or loadouts, in the sense that Assault pioneers, (or increased employment of assault guns, flamethrower AFVs) would perform better or generally, elite units with increased MOUT/FISH experience (e.g. USMC performance over regular army troops)? Would this influence advance rates?
Regarding point 2.: Often, when reading articles featuring the battle of Stalingrad (this includes Russian literature as well), especially with a focus on street fighting (there is an analysis by Col. Glantz in the JOSMS), the battle is presented as if the Soviets would have been able to get the upper hand in confined areas, favouring their tactics and known environment, in which they heavily relied on subsurface approaches vs the Germans who favoured supersurface positions. This would contradict given theory, but one has to keep in mind that an encirclement results in an approx. 50% reduction of combat power, so maybe a differentiation is necessary between the phase of the city approach, initial fighting and later envelopment.
Recent military sims and also war gaming propagated this notion (some of them could even rely on information directly from the Wolgograd archives, such as Lombardys 3rd edition on the streets of Stalingrad) and I think the outcome of the battle, just as its political meaning, (as a “beacon”) may have contaminated their judgement.
I will be discussing Stalingrad in a couple of blog posts from now…but note your ending comment:
“…and I think the outcome of the battle, just as its political meaning, (as a “beacon”) may have contaminated their judgement.”
Note the 2nd and 3rd to last paragraphs in this blog post: https://dupuyinstitute.dreamhosters.com/2018/06/06/measuring-the-effects-of-combat-in-cities-phase-i/
I will put the two paragraphs in a follow-up comment.
The two paragraphs:
The alternate scenario is that created by an urban area that cannot be enveloped and must therefore be directly attacked. This may be caused by geography, as in a city on an island or peninsula, by operational requirements, as in the case of Cherbourg, Brest and the Channel Ports, or by political requirements, as in the case of Stalingrad, Suez City and Grozny.
Of course these last three cases are also those usually included as examples of combat in urban terrain that resulted in high casualty rates. However, all three of them had significant political requirements that influenced the nature, tempo and even the simple necessity of conducting the operation. And, in the case of Stalingrad and Suez City, significant geographical limitations effected the operations as well. These may well be better used to quantify the impact of political agendas on casualties, rather than to quantify the effects of urban terrain on casualties.