After a period of “operational refit,” Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) waging battle with Daesh fighters for control of the city of Mosul launched a new phase of their advance on 29 December. The initial phase of the assault, which began on 17 October 2016, ground to a halt due to strong Daesh resistance and heavy casualties among the Iraqi Counterterrorism Service (CTS) troops spearheading the operation.
For the new offensive, the CTS was reinforced with additional Iraqi Army ground units, as well as an armored element of the Federal Police. Additional U.S. combat forces and advisors have also been moved closer to the front lines in support.
Although possessing an enormous manpower advantage over the Daesh defenders, ISF had managed to secure only one-quarter of the city in two months of combat. This is likely due to the fact that the only ISF elements that have demonstrated any offensive combat effectiveness have been the CTS and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, or Hash’d al Shaabi) Iraqi Shi’a militia mobilized by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in 2014. PMF brigades hold the western outskirts of the city, but thus far have been restrained from entering it for fear of provoking sectarian violence with the mostly Sunni residents.
Daesh defenders, believed to number only from 3,000-5,000 at the outset of the battle, have had the luxury of fighting against only one axis of advance and within urban terrain filled with trapped civilians, which they have used as human shields. They mounted a particularly effective counterattack against the CTS using vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), which halted the initial offensive in mid-December. ISF casualties appear to be concentrated in the elite 1st Special Operations Brigade (the so-called “Golden Division”) of the CTS. An unnamed Pentagon source was quoted as stating that the Golden Division’s maneuver battalions had incurred “upwards of 50 percent casualties,” which, if sustained, would have rendered it combative ineffective in less than a month.
The Iraqi government has come to rely on the Golden Division to generate reliable offensive combat power. It spearheaded the attacks that recovered Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah earlier in the year. Originally formed in 2004 as the non-sectarian Iraqi Special Operations Forces brigade, the Golden Division was amalgamated into the CTS in 2007 along with specialized counterterrorism and national police elements. Although intended for irregular warfare, the CTS appears to be the only Iraqi military force capable of effective conventional offensive combat operations, likely due to higher level of combat effectiveness relative to the rest of the ISF, as well as its interoperability with U.S. and Coalition supporting forces.
Historically, the Iraqi Army has not demonstrated a high level of overall combat effectiveness. Trevor Dupuy’s analysis of the performance of the various combatants in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War ranked the Iraqi Army behind that of the Israelis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Syrians. He estimated the Israelis to have a 3.43 to 1.00 combat effectiveness advantage over the Iraqis in 1973. Dupuy credited the Iraqis with improved effectiveness following the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War in his pre-war estimate of the outcome of the 1990-91 Gulf War. This turned out to be erroneous; overestimation of Iraqi combat effectiveness in part led Dupuy to predict a higher casualty rate for U.S. forces than actually occurred. The ineffective performance of the Iraqi Army in 2003 should have not surprised anyone.
The relative success of the CTS can be seen as either indicative of the general failure of the decade-long U.S. effort to rebuild an effective Iraqi military establishment, or as an exemplary success of the U.S. Special Operations Forces model for training and operating with indigenous military forces. Or both.
This raises the question of whether the gains made so far (i.e. Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah) can be held in the medium to long term. In Syria, Palmyra has already been recaptured by ISIS. Clearly the locals are not interested in fighting for democracy, freedom etc as promised by the Coalition.A political solution that includes ISIS seems to be the only possible way to end the war on anything like favourable terms.I can see this ending up like the “Vietnamisation” of the Vietnam War with the insurgents winning.
This is a good question. It may be too soon to say whether the ISF lacks any combat effectiveness. The Iraqi Army 7th Division has performed creditably in Anbar. It held on to much of the ERV in the face of fierce Daesh attacks when other ISF divisions in the north fled. The PMF have had some success on the offensive, albeit at a stiff price in terms of casualties. Managing the post-combat stabilization in Mosul will definitely be tricky with PMF elements lingering nearby.
I think it is a near certainty that the ISF cannot function without American and Coalition support. What that means in the post-Mosul long term is anyone’s guess at this point. I cannot recall PEOTUS having mentioned anything in regard to Iraq policy. Even when Mosul is liberated, Iraq will continue to face steep existential challenges, of which Daesh is but one.
ISIS is just kept alive artificially as long as it serves the purpose, without any faction backing it up it would be already eradicated.
The question is which strategy the US will ultimately pursue, defend Afghanistan and (northern) Iraq (and potentially risk an expansion towards Saudi Arabia) or put pressure on the insurgent recruitment and logistics hubs. PEOTUS did state that a less active policy is desirable.
The IS itself is a counter (balance) to the “arabian spring” uprising movements, that is if we trace its foundation. Therefore it can be described as an instrument of authoritiarian states, this can be also deduced from studying the various factions participating in the conflict
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With a defense budget of about 6 bln USD and a labour force of about 8mln, the warmaking potential of Iraq should suffice to deal with future threats, however if we see the number of active recruits and the potential “loyal” units available this has to be adjusted accordingly.Forecasting Afghanistans future is more difficult and desillusional.
I agree that in theory, Iraq has the resources necessary to suppress Daesh in the country and maintain its own security. However, until and unless there is some sort of political settlement between the Shia government and the Sunni minority, there will be sufficient motivation to sustain some sort of insurgency.
I have long suspected that the main reason Daesh has not been suppressed (I doubt it can ever be eradicated) is because no state has made that goal a true strategic priority, and several states will continue to sponsor it. Many states would like to see Daesh defeated, but are unwilling to make the commitment necessary to achieve this.