The U.S. Defense budget was signed into law on Monday. A few things that caught my attention:
- Increase of 5% (I guess we have to replace all that equipment left behind in Afghanistan).
- 2.7% pay raise (which I gather makes up around 2% or so of that 5% increase).
- Seems to be focused on keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia.”
- “The bill includes $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative and a statement of congressional support for the defense of Taiwan, measures intended to counteract China’s influence in the region.”
- “It also includes $300 million for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, a show of support in the face of Russian aggression, as well as $4 billion for the European Defense Initiative.”
Let’s look at what keeping “pace militarily with China and Russia” looks like in dollars and sense:
U.S. Budget: $768.2 billion (2022) or 3.42% of GDP in 2019.
Chinese (PRC) Defense Budget: $209.4 billion (2021) or 1.3% of GDP (2021)
Russian Defense Budget: 61.7 billion (2020-21) or 4.3% of GDP (2019).
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FYI – The opposing point of view.
http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/1229/c90000-9938692.html
Thanks. As expected.
Dear Christopher,
Sorry for off topic.
How I can contact you in private?
I have a few questions about aerial German photos of the battle field near Kursk. You published them in your book.
About 20 years we a looking for remnants of unburied Russian and German soldiers. 745 were found, about 40 – identified. One of them – my grandfather.
Yes. Email me at LawrenceTDI@aol.com.
Market exchange rates are problematic for comparative analysis:
https://voxeu.org/article/why-military-purchasing-power-parity-matters
ad 1) Is there any demand? That would result in additional upkeep.
ad 3) I would estimate Chinese and Russian spending at over 3.8 and 7% respectively (closer to Saudi Arabia).
Good article.
So how do you get to the figures of 3.8% and 7% respectively?
Based off SIPRI estimates (upper estimate being north of 1.8 trillion yuan) and observing the annual change in military expenditures to expenditures as a share of gross domestic product, or a comparison of expenditures (historical, time series, in this case the Cold War) as a function of world presence or conflict intensity, adjusted for upkeep of asset to troop ratio. Assessing the true size of forces is problematic but desirable. Non-transparent systems offer little insight, but in the Russian case there are probably 300-400,000 paramilitary forces not officially recorded.
Good indicators are also budget cuts, for instance in the medical sector/health care or on education, in favour of the military or space program.
More “transparent” Russian gazettes can also offer hints on the true extent of expenditures (e.g. Kommersant). Steel allocations, procurement, and shifts in outlay capacity are of particular interest, since they are a giveaway for military planning. To this has to be added that nations like China possess the ability to draw additional “labour” from concentration camps.
My estimate on China may be a bit too high, but it is definitely in the range of 2%, if not higher. The Russian figure is probably closer to the truth, whether they are going to have the stamina to continue operations in Syria, Africa and Ukraine will heavily depend on how much gas they will be able to sell to their neighbours.
I cannot make any statements on India.
The PAP and Coastal Guard under the CMC are not even included in the White Paper budget.