Month May 2023

Unstructured Comments on “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance”

Thanks to Russell1200 (see comments to Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)), I now found out about a report “The Relationship of Battle Damage to Unit Combat Performance” by Leonard Wainstein of IDA prepared back in April 1986. Both the report and Wainstein are unknown to me.

The abstract of the report says

The purpose of this study is to investigate the historical basis for the assumption that a military formation will cease to be effective after having lost a pre-ordained percentage of its strength. Battles from the First World War to the 1982 Falklands campaign are reviewed for insight into the validity of this assumption.

The effect of heavy battte damage on units has been both variable and unpredictable. There is a relationship between losses and the continued willingness to fight, but it defies precise definition. So long as some men in the formation continue to fight as an organized entity, either in attack or defense, for whatever reason, the formation they represent cannot be termed ‘ineffective.”

 

My notes made while reading it:

  1. Page v: Contents: section on earlier studies references ORO report of 1954 (known to me… the Dorothy Clark report on Breakpoints) and an RAC report of 1966 (not known to me).
  2. Page 1: “The battle cases cited run from army level to battalion level, from single day engagements to those lasting several months” – my bias is to collect and analysis data based upon the same level of combat, i.e. division-level, battalion-level, etc.
  3. Page 1: Only 54 actions were examined (this seems small) and “only 11 represent cases where a formation collapsed, surrendered, was repulsed, was stalemated, or had to be taken out of the line after suffering some degree of damage.” (this seems like a really small sample).
  4. Page 2: “Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, in describing the 1973 Middle East War, has written ‘The human element has always been important in war, and despite the technology available to both sides, the human element was undoubtedly the most significant feature in this war.’ The same comment could obviously be made about all the actions described in this paper.”
  5. Page 3: “There is no agreement among national armies, combat commanders, military historians or defense analysts as to the point when battle damage renders a formation impotent.”
  6.  Pages 1-5, Summary: This is worth reading in its entirety.
  7. Page 6: “The modeling community have developed a set of formulae for use in this determination, but it is not clear to what extent these formulae reflect actual battle experience.” (stated in 1986… pretty certain the “modeling community” has not taken significant corrective action).
  8. Page 8: Paragraph on perceived resistance is interesting.
  9. Pages 1-10: No mention of artillery.
  10. Page 11: “Despite the interest in and significance of the subject, relatively little research has been done across the years on casualty-effectiveness relationships.”
  11. Pages 11-12: Description of the Dorothy Clark 1954 ORO report, measuring 44 battalions. To quote Clark “the statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data.”
  12. Pages 12-13: Description of Robert Best 1966 RAC report.
  13.  Page 23: Trevor Dupuy quoted again.
  14. Page 24: “Oriental fanaticism.”
  15. Page 44: HERO report from 1967 is referenced (HERO became TDI).
  16. Page 69: Trevor Dupuy is referenced.
  17. Page DL-2: A copy of this report went to CAA (Concepts Analysis Agency, now Center for Army Analysis).
  18. Page DL-3:  A copy went to HERO. I was there in 1987, do not recall seeing this report.

The IDA report is here: TheRelationshipBetweenBattleDamageAndCombatPerformance.

 

A few related past posts:

Count of Opposing Forces | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Breakpoints | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Historians and the Early Era of U.S. Army Operations Research | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Count of Opposing Forces

In the classified Joint Staff briefing slides there is an accounting of the strength of both sides as of the end of February (status report as of 1 March). It shows:

Ukrainian:

34 Maneuver Brigades

13 Fire Units (9 brigades, 3 regiments, 1 battalion)

27 TDF Brigades (territorial defense forces)

 

Not sure which brigades are counted in the army maneuver brigades and which are TDF (Territorial Defense Forces) brigades. Not sure if the nine new brigades are counted in this list. See: How many brigades did Ukraine start with war with? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and What Brigades has Ukraine added since the war started? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Russian battalion count (as reported in the briefing slides):

Potential Maximum Combat Power: 544 battalions

Committed to Conflict: 527 of 544 battalions (97%)

Regular MVR Bns: 218

Reserve Bs: 41

Artillery Bns: 268

Located Inside Ukraine: 474 of 527 (90% of committed)

Regular MVR Bns (combat effective): 94 (+1)

Deployed combat Ineffective: 72

Reserve Bns: 29

Deployed Combat Ineffective: 11

Artillery Bns: 241

Deployed Combat Ineffective: 27

 

This probably opens as many questions as it answers. For the Ukrainian army brigades, they usually have at least three infantry-type battalions and tank battalion per army brigade. Some have more (for example 82nd Air Assault Bde). So, Ukraine has 34 x 4 + 27 x 3 (do TDF Bdes have tank battalions?) =  217 + 1 + ??? = at least 218 maneuver bns.

Ukrainians bdes have one artillery bn, the 7 artillery bdes probably have 4, and the 3 regiments probably have 2, and 1 separate battalion or 34 + 27 + (7 x 4) + (3 x 2) + 1  = 96 artillery bns

So…

Maneuver Bns    Artillery Bns

Ukraine                                     218                          96     

Russia (total)                            206                         268

Russia (combat effective)        123                         241

 

Now, not sure what to make of this. A few other issues here:

  1. What is the size difference between a Ukrainian Bn and a Russian Bn?
  2. That is a lot of Russian artillery bns. Not sure what make of that.
  3. What does combat effective mean?

To briefly address the subject of combat effective:

  1. I have never seen a study defining what is combat effective versus combat ineffective.
  2. I have never seen a study that establishes if combat ineffective is actually a real condition and how it is measured.
  3. I have never seen a study that establishes the combat power of a combat effective unit vice a combat ineffective unit.
  4. While the term is commonly used… and apparently innately understood, I have never seen any studies on the subject or any analytically based definitions.
  5. By default, a lot of people say a unit becomes combat ineffective when it has taken 30% or 40% casualties. I gather this is related to having its infantry depleted.
  6. I have never seen anything that shows how quickly a combat ineffective unit can be returned to combat effectiveness.
    1. If it is fundamentally related to infantry losses, then does it become effective once it receives infantry replacements?
    2. Does this means that they can go from ineffective to effective in a matter of weeks (this report is dated 1 March)?
    3. Needless to say (and I do think it is important to repeat this point ad nauseum), I have never seen a study on this either.

 

Update 5/15/23: UK intelligence as of 5/14/23 is saying the Russian army in Ukraine “…is similarly organised to the invasion force of 446 days ago. It still likely consists of over 200,000 personnel organised into around 70 combat regiments and brigades divided into five Groups of Forces.”

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – organization

In the classified Joint Staff briefing slides, there was a listing of the ready status as of 28 February for nine new Ukrainian brigades. One of those was a reserve brigade that existed (at least on paper) when the war started. The other eight were new brigades. Another chart shows how each brigade is structured. That chart also shows some additional MRAPS and APCs:

  1. 116th MBde: 3 mechanized bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  2. 47th MBde: 3 mechanized bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  3. 33rd MBde (reserve unit): 3 infantry (MRAP) bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  4. 21st MBde: 3 infantry-type bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  5. 32nd MBde: 3 infantry (MRAP) bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  6. 37th MBde: 3 infantry-type bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  7. 118th MBde: 3 mechanized bns, 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  8. 117th MBde: 2 mechanized bns, 1 infantry-type bn (shows 30 MRAPs vice 10), 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.
  9. 82nd Air Assault Bde (symbol shows a mechanized bde): 3 infantry-type bns, 1 mech bn (with an additional 40 Marders (GER)), 1 tank bn, 1 artillery bn.

The charts do list the equipment being prepared for them. To summarize from the first chart:

Summation:

116th MBde: 30 tanks (T-64 and ???), 90 IFVs (BMP) and 22 SP heavy artillery (AS-90s and 2S1).

47th MBde: 28 tanks (T-55S), 99 IFVs (M-2 Bradley) and 24 heavy artillery (M-109s and D-30s).

33rd Bde: 32 tanks (Leopard II), 90 MRAPs (MaxxPro) and 12 towed Artillery (M-119). 

21st Bde: 30 tanks (T-64), 101 AFVs, (20 CVRTs, 51 MRAPs, 30 APCs) and 10 towed heavy artillery (FH-70).

32nd Bde: 30 tanks (T-72 and ???), 90 MRAPS (MaxxPro) and 12 towed heavy artillery (D-30).  

37th Bde: 30 tanks (AMX-10 and ???), 70 MRAPs and 12 towed heavy artillery (D-30). 

118th MBde:  28 tanks (T-72s), 90 APCs (M-113) and 8 towed heavy artillery (FH-70).

117th Bde: 31 tanks (PT-91s), 58 APCs, 10 MRAPs and 16 heavy artillery (D-30 and 4 AS-90).

82nd Air Assault Bde: 14 tanks (Challenger), 90 APCs (Stryker) and 24 towed artillery (M-119).

 

This is the last of four posts on the subject. The charts show the vehicle type and in parentheses the country they are from. Tanks are discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – tanks | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org), IFVs and APCS here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – APCs and IFVs | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and artillery is discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – artillery | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

 

I am assuming that if I have these documents, then the Russian FSB also has them. I gather they are still officially classified. So far, no one from the FBI has been knocking on my door.

Test-Firing Early Modern Small Arms

Someone just brought this article to my attention: View of Material Culture and Military History: Test-Firing Early Modern Small Arms | Material Culture Review (unb.ca).

It is about a test firing of modern small arms conducted by the Austrian provincial armory in Graz, done in 1988-1989. They test fired 14 weapons from 1571 to 1750 and later, including 3 rifles. They used a standardized modern black-powder gunpowder in an amount determined during testing. They also tested three modern weapons for comparison.

A couple of tables from the article:

They also fired the guns into blocks of soap or gelatine, modern steel plate and 16th -century armor plate. For example, one flintlock musket left a cavity of 530 cm3 (cubed?) while a 5.65mm assault fire left a cavity of only 101 cm3 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 in the article).

They did fire a pistol at a part of the horse’s breastplate from 1570-1580, 2.8-3.0 mm, and it penetrated (paragraph 13) but the bullet was effectively stopped from injuring the wearer. The old breastplate performed better than 3mm of modern steel plate (see paragraph 12).

The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 436



Spring is arriving, no spring offensive yet. Weather will probably be good enough next week. Near Kharkov, 0.05″ of rain expected today and partly cloudy for the rest of the week. Has been dry most of this week, so ground it already probably in pretty good shape. When, where, how or even if the Spring Offensive will occur in spring is unknown, but everyone is waiting for something to happen any day now.

The classified Joint Staff briefing book did talk about 12 “combat credible” brigades being generated for the “spring counteroffensive.” They report on the status of 9 new brigades being raised (“trained and equipped by US, Allied and Partners”). Six will be ready by 31 March (page was dated 23 February) and 3 by 30 April. Eight of these newly raised brigades are mechanized-like brigades, which nominally have one tank battalion of 31 tanks per brigade. A NATO rep. last week said that 98% of the vehicles scheduled are now in Ukrainian hands. This is a very qualified statement.

The status of these nine new brigades is discussed here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – tanks | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and here The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – APCs and IFVs | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – artillery | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Basically, eight of them have 28 – 32 tanks, seven have 90 to 101 other AFVs, IFVs, APCs and MRAPs, and six of them have between 8 to 16 artillery pieces and three have between 22 to 24 artillery pieces. Three other brigades will be added to offensive force, although there are no reports on their status. 

The U.S. has announced on 21 April that it will began training Ukrainian forces on their new Abrams tanks. The 31 tanks will arrive in Grafenwoehr at the end of the May and the training will last for around 10 weeks. On 28 April the Germans are saying that over 100 Ukrainians are now training on Leopard Is (the older version). That does indicate that some of these newly raised Ukrainian brigades are still going to receive more equipment. So while the weather may be clear in early May, that does not mean that Ukraine will initiate a major offensive operation in May.

The Russian have only made limited advances this week in Bakhmut and there has been some pushback by the Ukrainians. Russia clearly controls over half the town. On 11 April, Wagner sent out photos of them controlling Metalurh Stadium in central Bakhmut. Still, Ukraine continues to hold onto part of the town. They are also holding onto the route to the west of the town. There were some interesting videos released of the infantry fighting along this route: Video of Infantry Fighting near Bakhmut | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The head of the Wagner Group is now threatening to withdraw from Bakhmut on 10 May, as he is claiming he has not gotten enough support from the Russian Army. Don’t think that will happen, but it is weird to watch all this public airing of dirty laundry. 

I gather Ukraine has limited the forces inside the city because of the danger of encirclement and the problems of resupply through a narrow, well-beaten corridor. This has allowed the Wagner Group to finally make progress. It did take them a few months to get over halfway into Bakhmut. We shall see how long it takes them to take it all. It is not a very significant town (58th largest city/town in Ukraine according to one twitter post), although it has become the primary story now for more than four months.

There has been some increase in airstrikes this week, partly in response to Ukrainian strikes. Haven’t gotten a good count of them. The last major Russian airstrike was on 9 March. The previous one was on 10 February. Not sure when the next one will occur, but it is no longer related to any military objectives. Ukraine is exporting electricity to its neighbors, so clearly the Russian campaign to shut down the power grid has failed.

The Ukrainians in this last week have hit three oil tanks in and around Crimea (one near Sevastopol early in the week, one in Krasnador province on 2 May that was only 7 km from the bridge to Crimea, and another attack on 3 May in Krasnador near the bridge). Also on 29 April it is claimed that the Russian village of Suzemka was shelled. It is 6 miles (10 kilometers) from the border in Bryansk province. The Russians report two, and later four civilians killed. On 2 May a train was derailed by a bomb near Bryansk. Finally, two drones attacked the Kremlin in Moscow on 4 May, with one hitting a flag on a dome. 

I will put any changes/updates since my last post in italics. A link to a blow up of the map is here: Wikipedia mapIt is dated 5 May. The last dated update on the map is Soledar on 16 January.

Map from 6 March 2023 of Bakhmut from @War_Mapper:

Just to compare: 14 April 2023 map of Bakhmut from @War_Mapper:War Mapper is graciously providing some maps for my upcoming book The Battle for Kyiv.

Russia currently occupies five cities: Lysychansk (pop. 95,031), Severodonetsk (pop. 101,135), Mariupol (pop. 431,859), Berdyansk (pop. 107,928) and Melitopol (pop. 150,768). Kherson (pop. 283,649) was retaken by Ukraine on 11 November.

 

We have been looking at six major areas of operations. Only the Donbas appears to be active right now. 

1. Kyiv (pop: 2,962,180): It appears that Kyiv is secure.

2. Odesa (pop: 1,015,826): Appears to be secure. Russia has renewed the grain deal for at least another 60 days.Since the start of these deals, the shipments have resulted in over twenty-nine million tons of grain shipped by sea. As of 4 May, the amount of grain shipped from Ukrainian ports and across the Black Sea under this initiative was 29,437,381 metric tonnes carried in 932 ships according to posts on twitter by @exit266. There are 14 or 74 days left to the agreement. 

3. Kharkiv (pop: 1,433,886): Kharkiv looks to be secure. Still, it is near the Russian border, so this can change suddenly. Ukraine did bombard Russian troops in the village of Tsapovka, in Russian territory in the Belgorod Oblast. Ukraine published pictures of this. It is right on the border, due south of Borisovka. The village is reported to be unpopulated since 2013.

On 17 April, the Ukrainians did attack two Russian power stations in Belgorod oblast using drones. This last week the Russians also accidently dropped two bombs on Belgorod.

4. The Donetsk and Luhansk provinces (the Donbas): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) is reporting as of 16 December that they had 4,133 soldiers killed and 17,379 wounded (4.20-to-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). This includes the 13 killed and 50 wounded reported from 01.01.22 to 02.25.22. For the period of 16 – 22 December (overlapping dates on 16 December) they report 43 killed, but do not report the wounded. Through the 16th, this is 108% casualties out of an estimated initial force of 20,000. Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR) is reported as of 5 April to have had 500-600 killed out of an estimated force of 14,000. This is 21% casualties, assuming a 4-to-1 killed ratio.

5. Mariupol (pop: 431,859): Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Google maps has updated its images of Mariupol to show the city as it is now (extensively shelled) vice how it used to look before the war.

Prisoner Exchanges: Russia has claimed that they captured 2,439 prisoners from the siege of Mariupol. Russian claimed on 30 June that they held 6,000 prisoners. Ukraine stated in early July that they had more than 7,000 missing. Now Ukraine is stating as of 30 December that Russian holds 3,400 prisoners and 15,000 Ukrainians are missing.

In 2022 there were 1,447 prisoners of war exchanged, 112 civilians and five foreigners. Of those, at least 427 were from Mariupol/Azovstal and up to 53 others were killed in captivity. Latest prisoner exchange on 8 January was for 50 prisoners. Another prisoner exchange on 4 February of 116. Some of these Ukrainian prisoners had been in captivity for almost a year. Latest prisoner exchange, on 16 February, was for 100 soldiers and one civilian for 101 Russian soldiers. 94 of them were defenders of Mariupol, including 63 soldiers from Azovstal. There was another prisoner exchange on 7 March with 130 Ukrainians exchanged for 90 Russians. This included 87 Mariupol defenders (71 from Azovstal). 35 of them were soldiers captured in Bakhmut and Soledar. Most of the Ukrainian and Russian prisoners were seriously injured.

The Ukrainian Omsbudsman has stated in late January that 800 severely wounded Ukrainians are held as POWs. He also stated that they hold 200 severely wounded Russians.

There was a prisoner exchange last week of 42 soldiers and two civilians for what I assume was a similar number of Russians.

6. Crimea & Kherson (pop: 283,649): Kherson is now back under Ukrainian control as of 11 November. Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The early morning on 22 March (at 04:43:58 according to videos), there was another attack on Russian ships in Sevastopol harbor using seaborne naval drones. The last time they tried this (29 October 2022), they (lightly?) damaged the 4,035-ton frigate Admiral Makarov. It appears that one got close to one rather large ship and exploded near its rear. Not sure if a Russian ship was damaged. At least three drones were used in the attack. One was stopped by the booms at the entrance to the harbor, and two were destroyed in the harbor.

There was also a car blown up on 23 March in Melitipol that injured a Ukrainian accused of collaborating with the Russians. There was an IED exploded in Melitipol on 3 April.

Apparently, back in October, in conjunction with the Kherson offensive, there was a failed attempt by Ukraine to retake Zaporizhia nuclear power plant with an amphibious operation across the large reservoir there.

There was Ukrainian crossing on 20 or 21 April at the village of Dachi. This is just across the Dnipro near Kherson where the damaged Antonivka Road Bridge crosses. 

I do think this is a diversion, vice the preparation for a major offensive. The problems with conducting operations across the Dnipro work both ways. The Russians were forced in November to withdraw from north of the river because of supply issues. There are only three bridges across the river in the best of times. If the Russians could not support 20,000 troops to the north of the river, I suspect the Ukrainians will have a similar problem south of the river, especially as Russia has air superiority.

 

Weather: Kharkiv at 7 PM: It is 61 degrees (16 Celsius) and showers. It is not expected to rain for the next nine days. Sunrise is at 5:03 and sunset is at 7:59, giving them almost fifteen hours of daytime to operate it. 

Kherson is 68 degrees (20 Celsius) and sunny. Rain expected on Tuesday, otherwise clear for the next ten days.

Looks like weather will be clear enough next week for operations.

 

Ukrainian Army Build-up: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Do not know the current strength of the deployed Ukrainian Army but am guessing that it is over 300,000 deployed troops. They clearly are going to have to build it up to 400,000 or more in response to Russia’s partial mobilization. There is a Ukrainian Territorial Defense Force of 100,000 to 200,000. Wikipedia was reporting 209,000 in their armed forces and 102,000 paramilitary. They were reporting their ground forces at 198,000 in July 2022. 

Do not have a good estimate of the total number of foreign volunteers now in Ukraine, although it is clearly thousands.

The U.S. and many countries in and around Europe are now providing tanks to Ukraine. This includes 31 Abrams (M1A2) from the U.S. that were not expected to arrive until 2024, but the U.S. has now announced that they will be in Germany as of the end of May. It also includes the previously announced 40 AMX-10 light tanks from France, the previously announced 14 Challengers from the UK and 14 new Challengers from the UK, 14 Leopards (2A6) from Germany announced on Jan. 25 plus they are going to provide 14 more later, 14 or so Leopards (2A4?) from Poland, maybe 20 Leopards (2A4) from Spain, but so far only 6 have been confirmed (they are planning to train 55 Ukrainian crew members), no Leopards from Netherlands (previous rumors said 18), Portugal is sending 4 (2A6) out of their 37, 8 (2A4) from Norway out of their 36, and 8 2A4 Leopards from Canada out of their 80. The 8 Canadian Leopards have already arrived in Poland. Non-NATO members Finland is providing 3 Leopards and Sweden is providing 10 2A6s along with 8 Archer 155mm SP Artillery. Also, Morocco is providing Ukraine with 173 T-74s EA, 70 are already in Ukraine. It does appear in a number of cases the announcements are lagging behind the actual shipments of tanks. Poland is providing Ukraine with another 60 upgraded T-72s. It has already sent Ukraine some 260 or more tanks. 

Twelve countries in NATO have Leopards. Germany is saying that a total of around 80 will be sent between them all. My count currently shows at least 77 Leopards from eight different countries (two not yet in NATO). It now looks like many of the older 40-45 ton German Leopard Is are being refurbished and will be sent. Germany has 88 of them it could send and Belgium has 50. Between Denmark, Netherlands and Germany, they are putting together a package of 100 1A5s, although the details of the deal keep changing.  It will be a while before most of them arrive. An initial package of 29 is being refurbished and are supposed to arrive in the summer (enough for one more brigade). There are a lot of them out there, with Greece supposedly having 520 (and 392 U.S. M-48s and 100 U.S. M-60s) and Turkey having 355 or 397 (and 750 M-48s and 785 M-60s). Opportunity to replace old stocks. Switzerland has 230 Leopard 2 tanks of which 96 are not in operation (in storage). Germany has asked for them but on 7 March the Swiss Parliament voted not to export tanksMeanwhile reports are saying some of the 100+ Leopard Is will still arriving in Ukraine starting May. Meanwhile, the U.S. is now planning on providing older M1A1s instead of M1A2s are it can be arranged to get there this fall. Not sure if the count of tanks provided will remain at only 31 (one battalion’s worth).

Meanwhile, Russia has been seen transporting T-54Bs from Siberia to somewhere (probably Ukraine). That particular model dates from 1955, so a little older than a Leopard I or M1A1. On 30 April, T-55s and T-62 were reported in the Berdiansk area.

From a practical point of view, it means that around four or so Ukrainian tank battalions will be armed up with Abrams/Leopard 2/Challengers. Ukraine has over 30 tank battalions. Some should probably be in place for the spring offensives. Some of the Canadian Leopard 2s have already arrived in PolandAt least 18 of the Leopard 2A6s have arrived in Ukraine. Challengers will be arriving in Ukraine during March.

Slovakia announced on 23 March that they have transferred 4 MiG-29s to Ukraine. It now appears that all 13 Slovak MiG-29s have been handed over to Ukraine. 

Some weapons have been supplied that have not been announced. For example, Finnish ex-Soviet 152K89 152mm field guns recently have showed up on the battlefield in Ukrainian hands, even though Finland has never announced that they were being provided.

Russian Army Build-up:  

In the fall of last year, Ukraine was reporting that around 280,000 Russians were deployed in Ukraine. This seems a reasonable estimate. On 4 November Putin stated at 318,000 reservists and “new volunteers” have been mobilized and 49,000 are in combat zones. I assume the Russian army in Ukraine was at about 200,000 at the start of this mobilization.

The U.S. and UK estimate that the Wagner Group had 50,000 people in December 2022. Have no idea if this estimate is accurate. John Kirby (U.S. DOD spokesman) said that Wagner has lost 30,000 people, at a wounded-to-killed ratio of maybe 2-to-1, implying 10,000 deaths. Have no way to confirm or contradict such claims, but I remain guardedly suspicious as always. How did the DOD come to the count of 30,000? 

Ukraine stated on 22 Feb. that Russia has deployed more than 350,000 troops to Ukraine. This sounds about right.

Russia is now starting its spring conscript draft of 147,000. It does this twice a year. Conscripts are for one year and are not allowed to serve outside of Russia.

The Russian defense budget for 2023 is $159 billion, up from $111 billion in 2022. This appears to now be around 9% of GDP.

According to one article, which I suspect is a little biased, Russian tank production at Uralvagonzavod is currently over 900 armored vehicles a year, including 35-40 T-90s a month. In contrast, the U.S. is producing two M-1A2 a month in Lima, Ohio. The German Leopard 2 is also still in production. 

Russia is getting some support from China, possibly spare parts and more important, microchips. They are reportedly not currently providing Russia with weapons. This is a source of discussion between the U.S./EU and China.

As of 26 February, Russia has announced that the DPR has raised a new battalion entirely composed of Ukrainian prisoners of war, called the Bohdan Khmelniksky Battalion. It was claimed that the unit consists of 70 Ukrainians. 

Opposing forces: Ukraine had before the war an army (ground forces) of 169,000 in 2016. The Russian army (not armed forces) was 280,000. The current Ukrainian army is now probably over 200,000. The Russian army (ground forces) in and around Ukraine is probably around 150,000 (up to 190,000). Donetsk PR is estimated at 20,000 and Lugansk at 14,000. Russia has added at least 41,000 troops to the front line from their new partial mobilization effort and will be adding more. Potentially up to 300,000. Most likely by the spring, both armies will be sporting 400,000 or more troops. It does appear that by spring, the level of intensity and casualties from this war will be a count twice as high as it currently has been.

Economics and the Home Fronts: The complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)Price of oil (Brent Crude) was declined to 75.02 as of 12:11 PM EST. Ruble has stabilized at 77.40 to the dollar.

The latest “political” person assassinated in Russia is Vladlen Tartarksy, 40, a pro-war Russian blogger. The accidental assassin, who was also wounded, was Darya Trepova, 25. She is in custody. This occurred in St. Petersburg on 2 April. Not sure who was responsible. The previous war-related assassination was of Darya Dugina, 29, back on 20 August 2022. This one has also still not been resolved.

Casualties: The commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian miliary, Valerii Zaluzhny, on 21 August stated that almost 9,000 Ukrainian military have died in the war. This is a lower estimate than most people have given (although we have leaned towards the lower estimates). Not sure if these figures included militia losses (like Azov Regiment). If Ukraine lost almost 9,000, then hard to believe the Russian losses are that much higher. On 1 December a presidential advisor stated that Ukraine has lost between 10,000 and 13,000 troops killed. On 17 March, the Ukranian Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council argued that total Ukrainian losses are less than 100,000 killed and wounded. As of 24 March 1,509 bodies have been returned to Ukraine. 

The U.S. estimate is that Russian casualties are now at 220,000 (killed and wounded). The U.S. estimate provided on 9 November was “well over 100,000.” Did they really loose another 100,000 troops in the last five months? For 18 November BBC/Mediazona reported that 9,001 Russians had been killed based upon media accounts, obituaries, funeral notices, and so forth. Now their count is 18,023 as of 24 March. This is a doubling of their recorded count of people who have died. This is still considerably lower than the Ukrainian claims of 173,360 Russians killed as of 31 March (which would imply 693,440 to 866,800 total casualties, which does not mesh well with the reports of forces deployed). I do have some doubt about this suddenly increase in U.S. claims, see BBC/Mediazona Figures Over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org) and Russian Losses over Time | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). Needless to say, if I have doubts about the U.S. DOD estimates, then I don’t buy into the Ukrainian claims of Russian casualties, or the similarly high Russian claims of Ukrainian casualties.

The various versions of the briefing books did have Ukrainian and Russian casualty figures. They estimated that Ukrainian losses were 15,500 – 17,500 killed and 124,500 – 131,000 total casualties. This estimate may be a little “light,” but it is certainly within the ball park. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 7.5-to-1 for this. This is kind of high. These figures may also include missing and captured (at least 6,000 were captured).

The Russian estimates are 35,500 – 43,000 killed and 189,500 – 223,000 total casualties. This may be on the high side. Ukraine is claiming over 180,000 Russians killed, which I think can be dismissed. BBC/Mediazona reports as of 7 April are counting 19,688 Russian killed by name. They appear to be using a wounded-to-killed ratio of around 5-to-1 for this. 

Mediazona, through Dr. Olga Ivshina (BBC) @oivshina stated on 25 April that “…if we have 20,000 names we think the real toll may be around 40,000 KIA.” The exchange is here: The Dupuy Institute (TDI) on Twitter: “@oivshina Question: Do you mean that you suspect the actual count of dead is 1.5 times the count on your list, or is it 2.0 times the count on your list?” / Twitter.

These wounded-to-killed ratios open up a lot of questions. 1) why are they different for the Ukrainian vice the Russians, 2) I have been saying it is at least 4-to-1. They are using figures higher than that. What is that based upon?, and 3) some people on the “twittersphere” have criticized me for even using a 4-to-1 ratio and have used lower figures than that. Is it time for them to revise their estimating practices?

John Kirby, the NSC spokesman, said on 1 May that Russia has suffered 100,000 casualties since December, including ove 20,000 killed (implying a 4-ot-1 wounded-to-killed ratio). Half of the killed are from the Wagner Group.

The previous, more detailed older casualty write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 394 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

The UN is reporting as of 2 May at least 8,709 civilians confirmed dead in the war. This was a large leap of almost a thousand killed since the report of 13 February (7,199) and I assume is due to upgrading of the records, as they only reporting 138 civilians killed from 1-28 February and 178 for 1-31 March and 169 killed from 1-30 April. See: Ukraine: civilian casualty update 27 February 2023 | OHCHR vice Ukraine: civilian casualty update 13 February 2023 | OHCHR. Not sure why the reporting has suddenly gotten “squirrelly.” One wonders how many of the claimed Mariupol casualties are included in these figures.

Of those 3,986 of the civilian deaths are in Ukrainian controlled territory in the regions of Donetsk and Luhansk with 679 killed in territory controlled by Russian separatists. They are also now reporting in other regions 1,276 killed in Russian Federation occupied territories (including Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Sumy and Zaporizhzhia regions). 

On 5 December, the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Yevhen Yenin, said that according to National Police over 9,400 civilians have been killed in Russian shelling.

The UN provided the following chart showing civilian losses by month:

More than 50,000 people have died in this conflict: 19,688 or more (Russian Army – Mediazona count) + 16,000 or more (Ukrainian Army – U.S. DOD estimate) + 8,709 (Civilians) + 4,176 (DPR in 2022) + 600 (LPR) = 49,273. It is probably in excess of 60,000 total deaths depending on Ukrainian and Russian military deaths and the real count of civilian losses. Suspect the BBC/Mediazona count is off (undercounted) by at least 50% and they say it is by a factor of two. The last figure from Ukraine of 13,000 was dated 1 December, so is also now probably off by at least 50%.

Ammo: The second and third to last paragraphs in The Times (UK) article referenced in the Day 394 blog post says:

However, Barrons argues that Ukraine needs ammunition even more than it needs soldiers. It fires 90,000 155mm shells a month and sometimes 6,000 shells a day but combined US and European production is less than 30,000 a month. “There is a mathematical mismatch,” he says. The US is tripling its output but “Europe has been too slow”.

Russia, which has been firing 20,000 shells a day and is thought to have used up ten years’ worth of production in 12 months, has the same problem. In recent weeks they have reduced the numbers by 75 per cent.

So 6,000 shells a day vice 20,000 shells a day, have no idea if that is true or what percent of the rounds fire are “smart” versus old style. One would expect the side firing the most rounds would be causing more causalities. On the other hand, if U.S. production is less than 30,000 a month Ukraine will be forced to eventually reduce their expenditures to 1,000 or 2,000 shells a day. If Russia has to reduce their numbers by 75%, then they are firing 5,000 shells a day. Don’t know if any single number in this discussion is close to reality but suspect that both sides will have to reduce their artillery expenditure at least until May. This war could be very quiet for a couple of months.

Anyhow, Ukraine is requesting 250,000 shells a month from the EU.

Air Power: The Pentagon on 12 March is reporting that Russia is flying about 200 sorties a day. The Ukrainian air force has 56 operational jets flying 5 to 10 hours a day. March 22 it was reported by the U.S. that Russia flew more than 300 sorties into Ukraine. March 24 it was reported that more than 250 Russian sorties were flown, mostly around Kiev and Kharkov. On 12 May, the U.S. was claiming that the Russians flew 300 sorties over Ukraine in the last 24 hours. On 14 May they were claiming 250 Russian sorties. It has been pretty consistent reporting of 250-300 sorties a day for quite some time now. For 24 August Ukraine reported 200 Russian sorties over Ukraine. 

On 3 September is it stated that Ukraine did 40 sorties, which is a record. On 18 September they claimed to have launched 20 air strikes, on 22 September launched 25 and on 11 October launched 15 air strikes. This is a fairly low level of air activity.

@Oryx, which is a twitter account worth following, is reporting as of 14 September that since the start of the war 53 Russian aircraft have been destroyed as have 42 Ukrainian aircraft. This is all counted by photo confirmation. On 19 September, U.S. General James Hecker stated that Ukraine has shot down 55 Russian aircraft in the war. He stated that he was pretty sure that all of those losses were due to surface-to-air missiles, SA-10s and SA-11s. This count does not include non-battle losses and accidents (of which there are some). It appears no Russian planes have been shot down in air-to-air combat and maybe only a handful of Ukrainian planes.

The Russians are now reported to be using loitering munitions. Ukraine has been using them since the start of the war. There are also reports of drone-on-drone engagements and have been 9 such cases reported. So drone vs drone combat is now a thing. 

A Ukrainian deputy prime minister is saying on 12 February that Ukraine has already “contracted” 1,765 drones. It has spent more than 85.5 million Euros on the drones and more than 3,500 servicemen have been trained to operate them. 

Poland will be providing Ukraine with 4 MiG-29s. F-16s are still up in the air, so to say. 

Missile Defense: In his 5 July video, Denys Davydov states almost 80% of Russian missiles are being intercepted by anti-missile defenses. I have seen this claim repeated elsewhere but have no idea as to its validity. On 10 October, Ukraine intercepted only 43 out of the 84 missiles (51%) fired at it. On 11 October, they intercepted 20 out of 28 (71%). On 16 October there was another wave of missiles targeting Ukraine’s energy structure. The Mayor of Kiev (heavy weight world champion Vitali Klitschko) said that 23 of the 28 drones fired at Kiev were intercepted. Overall, 42 drones were fired at Ukraine and they claimed to have shot down 36 of them. 

The bombardment on 31 October consisted of over 50 Russian missiles/drones, of which 44 were claimed to have been shot down. Ukraine claims to have shot down 73 of the over 100 missiles fired in the bombardment of 15 November. Fragments of one Ukrainian air defense missile landed in Poland killing two. The missile that landed in Poland on 15 November was probably a Soviet-era S-300 surface-to-air missile, of which most versions have a range of less than 100 miles. Pretty hard for this to be anything other than Ukrainian. On 23 November, there was a large missile attack where Ukraine claimed 51 out of 70 missiles shot down. This attack shut down all the power in Kiev and killed four civilians there. The large attack on 5 December claimed around 60 missiles shot down out of around 70 fired, which is 86% intercepted. This is particularly good. On 16 December, they claimed to have intercepted 60 out of 74, or 81%. 

For the attack on 29 December, Ukraine does report shooting down 54 out of 69 cruise missiles and 11 Iranian drones. This comes out to 81% intercepted except other reports are saying over 120 missiles were fired. So, is the interception rate more like 54%? Anyhow, it does look like the Russians overloaded the Ukrainian missile defense this time. As this is supposedly their tenth such strike (I have not verified the count), then it is about time Russia figured this out. The question is: does Russia have the resources to keep doing this?

This was followed up with an attack on New Year’s Eve of about 20 cruise missiles and further attacks on 1 and 2 January. For the attack on New Year’ Eve it looks like they shot down 12 out of 20 cruise missiles (60%). In the attack of 1 and 2 January by 39 or 45 Iranian-made Shahed drones, Ukraine claims it shot them all down. They have power outages in Kyiv as a result of the attack on 2 January. This strongly indicates that not all the drones were shot down.

There was another missile attack on 14 January of only 38 missiles that was effective. Ukraine only shot down 25 of them (only 65%), so power infrastructure was hit, as was several apartment buildings. On 25 January they shot down 47 out of 55 or 85%, which is better than they have been doing recently. The effectiveness of this missile strike against infrastructure was limited. Russia’s last big aerial bombardment attack was on 10 February using 71 missiles. Ukraine claimed 61 downed (86%).

On 9 March the Russians finally delivered their first major air strike since February 10. Clearly doing a major air strike once a month is not going to permanently shut down the Ukrainian power grid. This attack was in response to the several attacks that occurred in Russian territory the previous week. The Russia Defense Ministry specifically stated that it was a retaliatory strike for the attack on Bryansk region on 2 March. This strike was 81 missiles targeted in 10 regions. Ukraine claimed to have shot down 34 cruise missiles and 8 Shahed drones on Thursday. Russia also used 6 ballistic missiles, which Ukraine does not have the capability to shoot down. At least six people were killed.

The U.S., Germany and Holland have agreed to provide Ukraine with Patriot air defense missile systems. Should be interesting to see how well they do. The U.S. Patriot battery is expected to be in Ukraine in the coming weeks, as the training of 65 Ukrainian troops at Fort Sill, Oklahoma is now wrapping up. The training for the German Patriot battery has been occurring in Poland. The Dutch are providing additional missiles and launch systems that will be incorporated into the German Patriot battery. The final deployment over the next couple of months appears to be two batteries of Patriot missiles. I gather a Patriot missile battery consists of six launchers. Each launcher contains four missiles.

End of the War: Looks like this war will be continuing onto until at least fall of 2023. Completer write-up of this section is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 380 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

Atrocities: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

Russia continues their display of Orc-like behavior with a video coming out of the execution of the POW tentatively identified as Oleksandr Ihorevich Matsievskiy of the Territorial Defense Forces. His last words were “Slava Ukraini.”  This execution probably occurred sometime in early February.

Another video was released on 11 April of a Russian-speaking Ukrainian soldier being beheaded, ISIL-like. This appears to have occurred last summer. I gather this was done by Wagner.

You would think at some point the Russian senior command would understand that this is working against them politically and is resulting in wide-spread international support for Ukraine, which is resulting in increased shipment of arms and ammunition. It also continues to show a real lack of discipline among the rank and file. In addition to being an inhumane war crime, it is just plain stupid. 

Ukrainian reforms: Complete write-up is available in this post: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 355 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). The Ukranian defense minister appears to be staying.

Other Issues: 

U.S. Support for Ukraine: I sort of hate to get into discussing this as it invariably gets divisively political, but it is a significant issue. Half of the aid to Ukraine comes from the U.S. If the U.S. wavers, then this poses real challenges for Ukraine’s defensive efforts. The latest Gallup poll (3-22 January) says that 65% of Americans support the war in Ukraine. 31% clearly do not. This is pretty much the same figures as in August 2022 (66% vs 31%). Among self-identified Democrats the split was 81% to 16%, among independents it was 59% to 38% and among Republicans it was 53% to 41%. So, according to the Gallup poll, the majority of Republicans support Ukraine. On the other hand, 47% of the Republicans polled said that the U.S. is doing too much to help UkrainePrevious polling from Washington Post shows that 52% of Republicans want to reduce aid to Ukraine or “…want their member of congress to opposed additional funding.” 

The leading two contenders for the Republican presidential nomination are both opposed to extensive aid for Ukraine. Rick Desantis said that it was a not a “vital” U.S. interest. He got immediate pushback from six U.S. Republican senators, but it is clear that there is a very definite split in the Republican Party on this issue. It is a long way until November 2024, but right now it looks like the main leaders for the nomination are in place (Trump and Desantis) and I don’t see a third person that is going to displace them at the top of the ticket. We will have to see how this develops.

The United States passed the fiscal year 2023 budget before the new congress was seated. The Democrats/Independents control the Senate 51-49 and the Republicans now control the House 222-213. The U.S. budget is in place through September 2023 and cannot be overturned or cut by the new Republican majority House, if they so desire. 

I am pretty certain that come October 2023, the United States will be struggling to approve a budget for fiscal year 2024. This is going to complicate things. The Republican controlled House did raise the debt ceiling this week with a vote of 217-215, so that problem is going to be averted for a while longer.

Eleven Republican members of the House did propose in February a resolution (“Ukraine Fatigue Resolution”) to cut aid to Ukraine. There is a clearly a vocal minority that is opposed to supporting Ukraine, along with both leading Republican presidential candidates. The “Ukraine Fatigue Resolution” is worth a read. It is here: Text – H.Res.113 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Ukraine Fatigue Resolution | Congress.gov | Library of Congress.

A letter was issued on 20 April (Hitler’s birthday) calling for an end to unrestrained U.S. aid to Ukraine. It was signed by three senators (out of 100) and 16 members of the house (out of 435). There is a vocal minority opposed to this war, but it is clearly a minority. 

Meanwhile, a Republican House member submitted a resolution this week recognizing the borders of Ukraine as being the 1991 borders. This was supported by 13 Democrats and 5 other Republicans. 

Also, the most watched supporter of Russia on U.S. cable news, a man who said “I root for Russia,” has been fired.  His firing was probably not related to his support of Russia, but he certainly will not be missed by the majority of Americans who do support Ukraine. Russian FM Lavrov did mention his firing, stating “The First Amendment of the United States Constitution apparently means nothing in practice.” It is good that he is aware of the first amendment, freedom of speech is not protected in Russia. News companies can fire their employees. That employee is still free to say what he wants, which I assume he will continue to do so in a smaller forum.

The defense budget for 2024 proposed by President Biden is $842 Billion. This is a 3.2% increase over the $816 Billion budget for last year. It includes a 5.2% pay raise for the troops, vice 4.6% in 2023. It does not include aid for Ukraine. 

Belarus: I still doubt that they will join the war. Belarus has 60,000 troops and now they are trying to recruit another 20,000. This is from a country that the government was almost overthrown two years ago by popular acclaim. Ukraine has an 891-kilometer border (554 miles) with Belarus, so Ukraine must maintain some forces there. Belarus has stated on 16 October that a little less than 9,000 Russian troops will be stationed in Belarus to protect it borders. Reports are now saying that only about 4,000 Russian troops are in Belarus, and no nuclear forces are there. It turns out the Russian AWACS plane attacked in Belarus was probably done by Ukrainian security service forces (SBU).

EU: Ukraine has been made a candidate member of the European Union as of 23 June. It still means that it will be years before Ukraine becomes part of the EU, but this is a big first step. The Ukraine government applied for EU membership less than week after Russia first invaded them. Moldova was also granted candidate membership. Georgia has not (and it is not on good terms with Russia).

This was the issue that started all the turmoil in 2013. This is the issue that fueled all the conflict over the last nine years, for the Euromaidan revolt occurred when Ukrainian President Yanukovich decided to join Putin’s Eurasian Union vice the EU. The subsequent conflicts included the whole three-month Euromaidan revolt in the dead of winter of 2013-2014 that led to over 100 Ukrainians being killed, many protesters shot in the street by President Yanokovich’s security forces; the seizure of Crimea; the creation of LPR and DPR; the subsequent war; and now this war. Ukraine certainly has paid a much higher cost to join the EU than anyone else ever has. Current polling (Reuters April 5) shows that 91% of the Ukrainians support joining the EU. 

NATO: As of 4 April, Finland is a member of NATO. Sweden is still awaiting approval from Hungary and Turkey. It does add an 810-mile (1300 km) border with Russia, but NATO already abuts Russian and Belarussian territory in the Baltic states and Norway abuts Russia above the arctic circle. Also, Denmark has joined the common EU defense cooperation, something which it has stayed out of for three decades. 

They officially applied to join NATO on May 18. Finland and Sweden signed the accession protocol to join NATO on 5 July, along with all 30 members of NATO.  As of 1 October, 28 NATO members have ratified the accession protocol. It does require unanimous consent of all 30 members for them to join NATO. The United States voted on 4 August to the accession of Finland and Sweden into NATO by 95-1. On 31 March, both Hungary and Turkey approved Finland joining NATO. 

The other 28 members approved their accession by October 2002. Turkey has said it still has issues with Sweden and their Kurdish refugees. It appears that Sweden has made all the “reforms” that it is going to make. Specifically, it has rejected the request to extradite four people. The U.S. in the past has made similar refusals. It is now up to Turkey to decide if this is enough. The U.S. is apparently negotiating selling F-16s to Turkey. This may be the quid-pro-quo that makes this happen. In October 2021 Turkey requested to purchase 40 F-16s. Congress has resisted approving the sale, but it appears it will go through if Turkey approves Sweden to join NATO. Turkish elections are scheduled for 14 May, so this issue may not get resolved until after that. Right now, U.S. Turkish relations have been a little contentious. Turkey was also just hit with a massive earthquake on 6 February near Syria. Around 57,000 dead in Turkey and Syria, around 50,000 of them in Turkey.

Meanwhile, on 30 September 2022, the president of Ukraine formally applied to join NATO. 

Also, the United States will be establishing a permanent troop presence in Poland, maintain a rotational brigade in Romania, and enhance its rotational deployment in the Baltic States, among other expansions. As of December, the United States has a total of 100,000 troops across all of Europe (including Germany and Italy). Canada is leading a NATO battlegroup of Latvia of around 2,000 soldiers, including troops from Canada, Albania, Czech Republic, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. Germany is to lead a combat brigade in Lithuania of 3,000 – 5,000 soldiers. The command unit of around 100 soldiers arrived on 4 September. A NATO battalion of about 1,500-1,600 has been stationed there since 2017 and is under command of a German officer. There are also NATO battle groups in Estonia and Poland. Germany is also now talking about an armored division for protection of NATO’s eastern border.

Poland has completed on 30 June a steel wall on its border with Belarus to curb the flow of asylum seekers from Belarus. The wall is 115 miles long (186 km), 18 feet tall (5.5 meters) and cost $407 million to build (353M Euros). Poland is also building a fence along its border with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which has irked Russia. Work began in late February. The Polish border with Belarus is 258 miles long (416 km). Poland also announced around 15 July that it will be increasing its defense budget to be 5% of the GDP and building up its army to 300,000 troops. Poland is currently spending 2.4% of its GDP on defense. It is going to increase it next year to 3%. The U.S. currently spends 3.5% of our GDP on defense.

Lithuania has also completed a barrier between itself and Belarus. It is mostly a 4 meter (13 foot) tall steel wire fence topped by concertina barbed wire. It covers approximately 550 kilometers (342 miles) and costs 152M euros. See twitter @LinasKojala post for 29 August for a picture of the fence.

Finland is now also talking about starting to build a barbed-wire fence along its long border with Russian starting early next year. They are looking at it covering 124 miles of the 832-mile border. Estimated cost is $393 million with a completion date of 2026.

Georgia: Georgia was back in the news with four days (6-10 March 2023) of large demonstrations (looks like tens of thousands) in Tbilisi and attempts to suppress them using water cannons. The current government has now withdrawn the Russian-like “foreign agents” bill that they were protesting against. The current government of Georgia has been Russian-leaning since the brief war there in 2008. I gather a significant portion (maybe the majority) of the population do not share their sentiments. We shall see how this develops. In 2003 Georgia dumped out their leadership (Gorbachev’s foreign minister Shevardnadze) with massive protests in what was called the Rose Revolution (and then the Orange Revolution occurred in Ukraine in 2004). If it happened once, it can happen again.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Artillery fire was exchanged on 5 October between Azerbaijan and Armenia, as a result of their continuing conflict that Russia is supposed to be policing. There are also now credible reports and videos of Azerbaijanis executing Armenian prisoners. Significant fighting has erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia on 13 September. There has been a cease-fire as of 15 September. Armenia has said that at least 49 of its soldiers have been killed since fighting erupted early Tuesday. They are now saying 105. Azerbaijan has said it has lost 50 troops. Russia is serving as the peacekeeper force with about 2,000 troops. I gather most of the fighting is artillery shelling. There have been large protests the last few days in the capital of Yerevan, Armenia against the prime minister. Meanwhile, U.S. Speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, is in Yerevan as of 18 September. This visit was then followed by protests in Yerevan against the Russian dominated military alliance CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), which Armenia, Russia, Belarus and three other post-Soviet states are members of.

Previous recent fights have resulted in at least 2 Armenians killed and more than a dozen wounded and 1 Azeri killed and 3 wounded. Azerbaijan took the border position. Russia is the Armenian-leaning peacekeepers in this area. One wonders if many of the outlying areas of the Soviet empire are going to turn into disorder over the next few months. The Azerbaijan embassy in London was also seized a few months ago by Muslim fundamentalists. Azerbaijan is a secular state. The Muslim fundamentalists may be supported by Iran. On 14 November, there was another round of shelling reported by Armenia at the border. On 26 November, there was another clash along the border, but no losses and then more firing on 27 November, with two Armenians reported wounded. There was another shelling by Azerbaijan reported on 23 December by Armenia. No casualties reported. It appears that Azerbaijan is trying to cut off the Lachin corridor, which connects Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh.

Another exchange of fire in in Nagorno-Karabakh on 11 April with Armenia reporting 4 killed and 6 wounded. They are now reporting that one Armenian serviceman was killed last week by a sniper. On 29 April another Armenian was wounded. At this point, it appears that the Lachin Corridor is effectively under Azerbaijaini control, and the Russian peacekeepers have been marginalized. On 30 April, Azerbaijan arrested 16 Iranians.

Sections on Kazakhstan, European Support, Iran and Miscellaneous were last reported in the blog post for day 408 here: The Russo-Ukrainian War – Day 408 | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org). They have been removed from this post.

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – artillery

In the classified Joint Staff briefing slides, there was a listing of the ready status as of 28 February for nine new Ukrainian brigades. One of those was a reserve brigade that existed (at least on paper) when the war started. The other eight were new brigades. They are:

  1. 116th MBde (new unit),
  2. 47th MBde (new unit),
  3. 33rd Bde (reserve unit, mechanized?),
  4. 21st Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  5. 32nd Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  6. 37th Bde (new unit, mechanized? Not listed on militaryland.net),
  7. 118th MBde (new unit),
  8. 117th Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  9. 82nd Air Assault Bde (new unit).

The charts do list the equipment being prepared for them. To summarize:

Artillery:

116th MBde: 30 tanks (T-64 and ???), 90 IFVs (BMP) and 12 AS-90 (GBR 155mm SP Artillery) and 10 2S1 (UKR 122mm SP Artillery).

47th MBde: 28 tanks (T-55S), 99 IFVs (M-2 Bradley) and 12 M-109s (U.S. 155mm SP Artillery) and 12 D-30 (UKR 122mm Towed)

33rd Bde: 32 tanks (Leopard II), 90 MRAPs (MaxxPro) and 12 M-119 (U.S. 105mm Towed) 

21st Bde: 30 tanks (T-64), 101 AFVs, (20 CVRTs, 51 MRAPs, 30 APCs) and 10 FH-70 (???and ITA 155mm Towed) 

32nd Bde: 30 tanks (T-72 and ???), 90 MRAPS (MaxxPro) and 12 D-30 (EST 122mm Towed)  

37th Bde: 30 tanks (AMX-10 and ???), 70 MRAPs and 12 D-30 (EST 122mm Towed) 

118th MBde:  28 tanks (T-72s), 90 APCs (M-113) and 8 FH-70 (EST 155mm Towed).

117th Bde: 31 tanks (PT-91s), 58 APCs, 10 MRAPs and 12 D-30 (EST 122mm Towed) and 4 AS-90 (GBR 155mm SP Artillery)

82nd Air Assault Bde: 14 tanks (Challenger), 90 APCs (Stryker) and 24 M-119 (U.S. 105mm Towed)

 

The charts show the vehicle type and in parentheses the country they are from. Tanks are discussed here and IFVs  The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – tanks | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org), and APCS here: The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – APCs and IFVs | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org).

I am assuming that if I have these documents, then the Russian FSB also has them. I gather they are still officially classified.

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – APCs and IFVs

In the classified Joint Staff briefing slides, there was a listing of the ready status as of 28 February for nine new Ukrainian brigades. One of those was a reserve brigade that existed (at least on paper) when the war started. The other eight were new brigades. They are:

  1. 116th MBde (new unit),
  2. 47th MBde (new unit),
  3. 33rd Bde (reserve unit, mechanized?),
  4. 21st Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  5. 32nd Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  6. 37th Bde (new unit, mechanized? Not listed on militaryland.net),
  7. 118th MBde (new unit),
  8. 117th Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  9. 82nd Air Assault Bde (new unit).

The charts do list the equipment being prepared for them. To summarize:

APCS and IFVs (and MRAPs and AFVs):

116th MBde: 30 tanks (T-64 and ???) and 90 BMP (POL/CZE – Soviet-era IFV) = 90 IFVs

47th MBde: 28 tanks (T-55S) and 99 M-2 (U.S. – these are Bradleys IFVs) = 99 IFVs

33rd Bde: 32 tanks (Leopard II) and 90 MaxxPro (U.S. – these are 4-wheeled MRAPs) = 90 MRAPs

21st Bde: 30 tanks (T-64) and 20 CVRT (GBR – AFV), 30 Senator (CAN – 4-wheeled MRAP), 20 Bulldog (GBR – FV432 APC), 21 Husky (GBR – 4-wheeled MRAP), 10 M-113 (U.S. APC) = 20 AFVs, 51 MRAPs, 30 APCs

32nd Bde: 30 tanks (T-72 and ???) and 90 MaxxPro (U.S.) = 90 MRAPs 

37th Bde: 30 tanks (AMX-10 and ???) and 30 Mastiff/Husky (GBR – 4-wheeled MRAP), 30 Mastiff/Wolf (GBR – 6-wheeled MRAP), 10 Senator (CAN – 4-wheeled MRAP) = 70 MRAPs

118th MBde:  28 tanks (T-72s) and 90 M-113 (U.S. APC) = 90 APCs

117th Bde: 31 tanks (PT-91s) and 28 Viking (NLD – 8-wheeled APC), 20 XA185 (8-wheeled APC), 10 M-113, 10 Senator (CAN – 4-wheeled MRAP) = 58 APCs and 10 MRAPs

82nd Air Assault Bde: 14 tanks (Challenger) and 90 Stryker (U.S. wheeled APC) = 90 APCs

 

The charts show the vehicle type and in parentheses the country they are from. Tanks are discussed in yesterday’s posting.

I am assuming that if I have these documents, then the Russian FSB also has them. I gather they are still officially classified. Will address artillery in subsequent posts.

The nine new brigades for the spring offensive – tanks

In the classified Joint Staff briefing slides, there was a listing of the ready status as of 28 February for nine new Ukrainian brigades. One of those was a reserve brigade that existed (at least on paper) when the war started. The other eight were new brigades. They are:

  1. 116th MBde (new unit),
  2. 47th MBde (new unit),
  3. 33rd Bde (reserve unit, mechanized?),
  4. 21st Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  5. 32nd Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  6. 37th Bde (new unit, mechanized? Not listed on militaryland.net),
  7. 118th MBde (new unit),
  8. 117th Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  9. 82nd Air Assault Bde (new unit).

The charts do list the equipment being prepared for them. To summarize:

Tanks:

116th MBde: 13 x T-64 (UKR), 17 x Tanks (XXX) = 30

47th MBde: 28-T-55S (SLV) = 28

33rd Bde: 14 x Leopard 2A6 (DEU), 4 Leopard 2A4 (CAN), 14 Leopard 2A4 (POL) = 32 

21st Bde: 30 T-64 (UKR) = 30

32nd Bde: 10 x T-72 (NLD), 20 x Tanks (XXX) = 30

37th Bde: 14 x AMX-10 (FRA), 16 x Tanks (XXX) = 30

118th MBde:  28 x T-72 (POL) = 28

117th Bde: 31 x PT-91 (POL) = 31 (a PT-91 is a Polish upgrade of the T-72)

82nd Air Assault Bde: 14 x Challenger (GBR) = 14

 

The charts show the tank type and in parentheses the country they are from. So for example, the 33rd Bde is getting 14 Leopards from Germany, 4 from Canada and 14 from Poland. A Ukrainian tank brigade is nominally 31 tanks (3 companies of 10 and one command tank). 

I am assuming that if I have these documents, then the Russian FSB also has them. I gather they are still officially classified. Will address other AFVs and artillery in subsequent posts.

What Brigades has Ukraine added since the war started?

Now, Ukraine started the war with at least 18 active Army maneuver brigades. The Army had at least 9 reserve brigades ready to be activated. They started with war with 11 artillery brigades, two Army artillery brigades in reserve, and one Naval Infantry artillery brigade. The airborne forces provided 5 more brigades put two in reserve and there were two naval infantry brigades. This gave them a total of 25 maneuver brigades at the start of the war and as the other reserve brigades were activated (if they all were) at least 11 more for a total of 36 maneuver brigades. But Ukraine has since, over the last year, raised a number of other brigades. This possibly includes:

Status uncertain:

Separate Presidential Brigade – Separate Presidential Brigade | MilitaryLand.net

1st Special Purpose Brigade – 1st Special Purpose Brigade | MilitaryLand.net

2 International Brigade

3rd Assault Brigade Azov – 3rd Assault Brigade | MilitaryLand.net. 3rd Assault Bde created on 1 January 2023, using elements from the Azov Rgt.

5th Assault Brigade – 5th Assault Brigade | MilitaryLand.net. 5th Assault Rgt was upgrade to a brigade on 24 Feb. 2023, and the Aidar Bn (24th Assault Bn) was attached to it.

 

Regular Army units:

13th Jager Brigade – status uncertain – 13th Jager Brigade | MilitaryLand.net

21st Mechanized Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

22nd Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – 22nd Mechanized Brigade | MilitaryLand.net

23rd Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 23 окрема механізована бригада | Facebook and 23rd Mechanized Brigade | MilitaryLand.net

31st Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 31 окрема механізована бригада | Facebook

32nd Mechanized Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

37th Mechanized? Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

41st Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 41 окрема механізована бригада | Facebook

42nd Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain

47th Mechanized Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

65th Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 65 окрема механізована бригада ЗСУ | Facebook

66th Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 66 окрема механізована бригада Сухопутних військ ЗС України | Facebook

67th Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 67 омбр ДУК | Facebook

68th Jager Brigade – status uncertain

88th Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 88 окрема механізована бригада | Facebook

110th Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 110 окрема механізована бригада імені генерал-хорунжого Марка Безручка | Facebook

115th Mechanized Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 115 окрема механізована бригада ЗСУ | Facebook

116th Mechanized Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

117th Mechanized Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

118th Mechanized Brigade – raised and ready for offensive.

142nd Reserve Rifle Brigade – status uncertain – 

 

Air Assault:

71st Jager Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 71 окрема єгерська бригада Десантно-штурмових військ ЗС України | Facebook

77th Airmobile Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 77 окрема аеромобільна бригада ДШВ ЗС України | Facebook

82nd Air Assault Brigade – raised and ready for offensive

 

Naval Infantry:

37th Marine Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 36 окрема бригада морської піхоти імені контрадмірала Михайла Білинського | Mykolaiv | Facebook

38th Marine Brigade – status uncertain – (20+) 37 окрема бригада морської піхоти | Facebook

 

International Legion (under TDF) – International Legion | MilitaryLand.net

 

This is up to 26 more Army brigades, up to three more air assault brigades, two Naval Infantry Brigades and the International Legion. This is assuming they have all been raised and manned. We know for sure that only 8 of them have. I am not sure that any brigade has been eliminated from combat or made “combat ineffective” (a term I have some issues with). Certainly the 128th has taken a couple of hits over the last year.

Now, the classified joint staff handbook for 1 March stated that Ukraine has 34 Maneuver Brigades, 13 “Fires” brigades/regiments (meaning artillery), and 27 Brigades of the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF). Do not know how to match that count to the counts I have. I am counting more than 34 maneuver brigades, 13 artillery brigades/regiments sounds about right (I have 11 Army, 2 reserve and 1 Naval Infantry Bde). I have no idea what makes up the 27 TDF brigades and suspect some of them are the reserve brigades I am counting with the Army.  

They show the 34 maneuver brigades as 3 armor (I count 5, including 3 reserve), 13 Mechanized infantry (I count 9 regular and 5 reserve at the start, not counting newly raised), 7 other infantry (I count 4 regular motorized infantry and one reserve), 7 other infantry (I can’t read the symbol, air Assault? – I do have 5 regular air assault bdes and 2 reserve), 2 mountain (I count 2 regular), and 2 others (I can’t read the symbol, marine? – I count 2 Naval Infantry Bdes). So, their count of 34 maneuver bdes is similar to my count of 36 brigades (25 regular, 11 reserve) at the start of the war. Not sure where all these newly raised brigades are counted.

Among the fire units, they count only 9 brigades and 4 regiments. All 27 TDF brigades are marked as infantry. 

They specifically listed 9 brigades as being prepared for the spring offensive. This includes:

  1. 116th MBde (new unit),
  2. 47th MBde (new unit),
  3. 33rd Bde (reserve unit, mechanized?),
  4. 21st Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  5. 32nd Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  6. 37th Bde (new unit, mechanized? Not listed on militaryland.net),
  7. 118th MBde (new unit),
  8. 117th Bde (new unit, mechanized?),
  9. 82nd Air Assault Bde (new unit).

Other newly raised or being raised units include 5 various brigades, 2 Jager bdes, 11 MBde, 1 reserve rifle bde, 2 air assault bdes, and 2 naval infantry bdes.

How many brigades did Ukraine start with war with?

According to my count, at the start of the war, the Ukrainian Army had around 18 activated maneuver brigades and up to nine reserve brigades ready to be activated.[1] It appears that four or five of these brigades had three maneuver battalions per brigade while 13 or 14 of them had four or more maneuver battalions.[2] This then this gives them at least 74 or so maneuver battalions.[3] Added to that was some five regular airborne, air assault and air mobile brigades and two naval infantry brigades and other such forces which added at least another 30 maneuver battalions.[4] So the Ukrainian armed forces could deploy at least 104 maneuver battalions at the start of the war.  It was estimated at the time that they were about to be invaded by 150 Russian maneuver battalions or battalion tactical groups (BTGs).[5]

The Ukrainian Army started with war with at least 18 maneuver brigades mobilized that we have identified. It was primarily a mechanized infantry army. According to the list we have assembled below, Ukraine started with war with two regular and one active reserve tank brigades and two more reserve tank brigades that were not fully deployable in the first six weeks of the war. A tank brigade has four maneuver battalions, three tank and one mechanized infantry.[6] It also had an artillery and air defense battalion along with support troops. Ukraine started the war with at least 892 tanks, including 720 T-64s.[7]

The army had nine active mechanized brigades. It also had five reserve mechanized brigades of which three may have been deployed in the first six weeks of the war.[8] Each regular mechanized brigade had at least three mechanized infantry battalions and probably a tank battalion.[9] A tank battalion usually consisted of 31 T-64. They also had a collection of infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs). The infantry fighting vehicles were usually Soviet-era BMP-2 or BMP-2Ks. The BMP-2 was introduced in the early 1980s, weighs around 16 tons, carries 3 crew and 7 passengers, has 1.3” (33 millimeters) of armor and carries a stabilized 30mm autocannon, a 9P135m ATGM launcher able to fire Konkurs 9M113 (AT-5) or Kornet-M 9M133M (AT-5B) missiles, a 7.62mm coaxial machinegun and an AGS-30 grenade launcher. The BMP-2K is the command version of this vehicle, with six crew.

The armored personnel carriers were usually Soviet-era MT-LBs. This is a 1950s Soviet-era design made at the Kharkov Tractor Plant. It weighs around 12 tons, carries 2 crew and 11 passengers, has 14mm of armor and usually carries a 7.62mm machinegun. The Kharkiv Tractor Plant, which is over 90 years old, was still producing MT-LBs in the 2000s. It was a public company that became majority owned by the Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska in 2007. Control was regained by Ukraine in 2016 when it appeared that parts of the factory was going to be dismantled and transferred. In November 2018, Russia imposed sanctions on the factory and its new owners. The factory was reported destroyed by extensive shelling in late February 2022.

The inventory count of IFVs and APCs, according to open sources was 1,510 IFVs or which 890 are BMP-2s and BMP-2Ks and well over 2,000 APCs, which includes at least 2,090 MT-LBs.[10] They also have artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank weapons and the entire range and mix of weapons.

The Ukrainians has two mountain assault brigades which had three mountain assault battalions and perhaps a tank battalion. This includes the 16th Tank Battalion assigned to the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade.

Finally, they had six motorized and foot infantry brigades, four regular and two reserve. These had three infantry battalions and a tank company.

This is a total of 18 active brigades deploying at least 892 tanks.[11] This is still an armor moderate force with 5.3 tanks per thousand soldiers.[12]

List of Active Ukrainian Ground Forces Brigades[13]

Unit Name                                          Type

1st Tank Brigade                                 Regular

4th Tank Brigade                                 Reserve

17th Tank Brigade                               Regular

 

10th Mountain Assault Brigade           Regular

14th Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

24th Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

28th Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

30th Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

53rd Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

54th Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

56th Motorized Infantry Brigade         Regular

57th Motorized Infantry Brigade         Regular

58th Motorized Infantry Brigade         Regular

59th Motorized Infantry Brigade         Regular

72nd Mechanized Brigade                   Regular

92nd Mechanized Brigade                   Regular

93rd Mechanized Brigade                    Regular

128th Mountain Assault Brigade         Regular

 

List of Other Ukrainian Ground Forces Brigades[14]

 

3rd Tank Brigade                                 Reserve[15]

5th Tank Brigade                                 Reserve

 

11th Motorized Infantry Brigade         Reserve

15th Mechanized Brigade                    Reserve

33rd Mechanized Brigade                    Reserve

 

60th Mechanized Brigade                    Reserve

61st Jager Infantry Brigade                 Reserve[16]

62nd Mechanized Brigade                   Reserve

63rd Mechanized Brigade                    Reserve

 

It is uncertain if the 60th, 61st, 62nd or 63rd brigades were active in the first six weeks of the war. Pretty certain the 11th, 15th and 33rd were not. The 3rd Tank Brigade did not arrive in the area of Izyum, near Kharkiv until mid-April. The 5th Tank Brigade was only partly manned and held in the area of Odesa for the first part of the war. The 14th Tank Brigade (reserve) is not listed as it is currently still inactive.

Other separate maneuver battalions include:[17]

12th Tank Battalion

54th Reconnaissance Battalion

74th Reconnaissance Battalion

130th Reconnaissance Battalion

131st Reconnaissance Battalion

143rd Reconnaissance Battalion

 

The Ukrainian Army consists of eleven artillery brigades, with two of them reserve. Most brigades consist of four artillery battalions and an additional antitank battalion with the 26th, 40th, 45th and 55th Artillery Brigades. The 44th Artillery Brigade had only three artillery battalions and an antitank battalion. They are:

15th Artillery Recon Brigade

19th Missile Brigade

26th Artillery Brigade

27th Rocket Artillery Brigade

40th Artillery Brigade

43rd Artillery Brigade

44th Artillery Brigade

55th Artillery Brigade

107th Rocket Artillery Brigade

 

Reserve:[18]

38th Artillery Brigade

45th Artillery Brigade

 

There are three other services that provide ground forces, the Navy, the Air Assault Forces and the Special Forces. The Air Assault Forces consists of five mobilized airborne, air assault and air mobile brigades, two reserve brigades, and their support units. Most brigades consist of three battalions and a tank company. It was reported to have a strength of 20,000 in February 2022. These forces include:

25th Airborne “Sicheshalska” Brigade

79th Air Assault Brigade

80th Air Assault Brigade

81st Airmobile Brigade

95th Air Assault Brigade

 

Reserves:[19]

45th Air Assault Brigade[20]

46th Air Mobile Brigade

 

The Ukrainian Air Assault Forces also include:

132nd Separate Reconnaissance Battalion

148th Howitzer Self-Propelled Battalion

 

Each brigade is between 1,000 to 2,200 people, ideally including three infantry battalions, three artillery battalions, a tank company and a reconnaissance company.[21]

The Air Assault Forces add up to another 16 maneuver battalions to the Ukrainian Army, if the brigades were fully up the strength (which may not have been the case).

The Special Operation Forces are 4,000 strong and includes two units that may add two or more battalions to the maneuver forces.:

3rd Special Purpose Regiment “Prince Sviatoslav the Brave”

8th Special Purpose Regiment “Iziaslav Mstislavich”

 

The Ukrainian Navy also provided amphibious ground forces, which also had significant combat capabilities:

35th Naval Infantry Brigade (Odesa)

  • 2nd Tank Battalion with T-80BVs.[22]

36th Naval Infantry Brigade (Mykolaiv)

  • 1st Tank Battalion with T-80BVs.[23]

These two Marine or naval infantry brigades consists of three infantry battalions, a tank battalion, an artillery brigade with three artillery battalions, an air defense battalion and other supporting units including a reconnaissance company and a sniper rifle company. Other naval ground units of significance include the 406th Artillery Brigade (Mykolaiv) of four field artillery battalions, the 140th Reconnaissance Battalion, and the 32nd Rocket Artillery Regiment.

Active militia units that were developed during the first war (2014-2015) include:

Donbas Battalion – demobilized September 2016

Dnipro Battalion

Azov Regiment – active in 2022

 

The Donbas Battalion, or the 2nd Battalion of Special Assignment “Donbas” was created in 2014 as is part of the National Guard of Ukraine. It was originally formed by Russian-speaking Ukrainians from Donbas. The battalion was demobilized in September 2016 and the majority of their personnel went into the reserves. They formed a public organization called the Internal Corps of the Donbas Battalion which has operated from October 2016 to the present. They are no longer a combat unit.

The Dnipro Battalion, or the Dnipro-1 Regiment, reports to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine as a Special Tasks Patrol Police. It also was created in 2014 and hired Romanians and Georgian military advisors to train their troops. It is still supposedly active, but we have not heard anything from it during this war.

The Azov Battalion, which then became the Azov Regiment, is still active and was heavily involved in defending Mariupol from February through April of 2022. They provided a large battalion-sized force for Mariupol and has forces deployed elsewhere in Ukraine in 2022 including at Brovary near Kyiv and a new unit raised in Kharkiv. It was formed in May 2014 and was incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine in November 2014. It has ties to far-right wing groups, connections to neo-fascist ideologies and has made use of symbols borrowed from Nazism. Russian designated them a terrorist organization in August 2022. It was based in Mariupol. Most of members are drawn from Russian speaking regions of Ukraine. It also has a number of foreign fighters.

 

—–footnotes———–

[1] The 2022 IISS listing had 4 tank brigades, 9 mechanized brigades, 2 mountain brigades, 4 motorized infantry brigades and one light infantry brigade. This is total of 20 maneuver brigades, which does not match the listing below.

[2] As of 2017, the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, the, 24th, 28th, 30th, and 72nd Mechanized Brigades were reported with three mechanized battalions and an unnamed tank battalion. As of 2017 the 17th Tank Brigade is reported with three tank battalions and an unnamed mechanized battalion. As of 2017, the 53rd Mechanized Brigade is reported with three mechanized battalions, an unnamed tank battalion, and the 24th Motorized Infantry Battalion “Aidar”. As of 2017, the 54th Mechanized Brigade is reported with three mechanized battalions, an unnamed tank battalion and the 25th Motorized Infantry Battalion “Kyivan Rus” and the 46h Motorized Infantry Battalion “Donbas-Ukraine.” As of 2017, the 92nd Mechanized Brigade is reported with thee mechanized battalions, an unnamed tank battalion and the 22nd Motorized Infantry Battalion “Kharkiv.” As of 2017, the 93rd Mechanized Brigade is reported with three mechanized battalions, an unnamed tank battalion and the 20nd Motorized Infantry Battalion “Dnipro.” As of 2018 the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade was reported with the 16th Tank Battalion. As of 2019 the 61st Jaeger Infantry Brigade was reported with an unnamed tank battalion. We suspect some of these are “on-paper” organizations or errors in the sources.

[3] A maneuver brigade or battalion is an infantry, mechanized infantry, armor or cavalry unit. It is not an artillery unit, helicopter unit, or air defense unit. These are the units that make up the front line combat units of an army. The count of total maneuver battalions is 67 battalions, plus the 12th and 16th Tank Battalions and the five separate reconnaissance battalions for a total of 74 plus any fifth or sixth battalion under these brigades. It is uncertain if the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade had a fourth battalion (a tank battalion), and is not counted as such.

Some brigades may have more than four battalions. the 14th (1st Motorized Battalion), the 28th (5th Reserve Battalion formed February 2022), the 30th (2nd Motorized Battalion), the 53rd (24th Mechanized Battalion “Aidar”, 43rd Mechanized Battalion), the 54th (25th Separate Motorized Battalion, 45th Separate Assault Battalion), the 72nd (12th Motorized Battalion), the 92nd (22nd Separate Mechanized Battalion), the 93rd (20th Separate Motorized Battalion, 49th Motorized Battalion ‘Carpathian Sich’), and the 128th (15th Separate Mountain Assault Battalion) brigades. For the 128th Brigade, this is in addition to the 16th Tank Battalion that we do count part of the 128th. In some cases, these were battalions added in 2014-2015 and were possibly later disbanded. In some cases, they are battalions that have been added since the current war has started. The Ukrainian brigades have grown in size as the war has continued. This would potentially add up to another 12 battalions to count of Ukrainian battalions.

The 24th Separate Assault Battalion ‘Aidar” with the 53rd Mechanized Brigade is referenced in a video posted on twitter on 18 January 2023: see: Dan on Twitter: “80. Moving quickly south of Optyne. Earlier in January,?️released (likely earlier filmed) of 24th Separate Assault Battalion ‘Aidar’, 53rd Mechanised Bde taking out a Russian at the former fruit processing plant at 48.547679, 38.017045 h/t @azyakancokkacan https://t.co/VMIeTHoFhS” / Twitter.

[4] Each of the five regular airborne brigades have three maneuver battalions, plus there is one independent maneuver battalions (132nd Recon), the two naval infantry brigades have four maneuver battalions plus there was an independent recon battalion (140th Recon), the special forces can be counted as two more battalions, plus there is the Georgian battalion, the Chechen battalion, the Azov Battalion and perhaps others.

[5] The Russian battalion tactical group or BTG is a reinforced maneuver battalion. They are described in more depth in the next chapter. Because a BTG often includes a tank company, then they are not always the equivalent of a Ukrainian maneuver battalion as the tank battalions with the mechanized brigades are counted separately, when they were often divided out with one tank company with a maneuver mechanized battalion.

A later count in January 2023 by Sasho Todorov of battalions from his reconstructed order of battle gave the Russians up to 130 BTGs and maneuver battalions and the LPR and DPR a total of 37 maneuver battalions.

[6] In 2017, the 1st Tank Brigade is reported with three tank battalions with 56 T-64BM “Bulat”

[7] 410 T-64BV, 210 T-64BV mod 2017, 100 T-64BM Bulat, around 133 T-72s and between 34 to 134 T-80BV and 5 T-84Us. See: Wikipedia: “List of Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine” and David Axe, Forbes, 15 December 2021, “Ukraine’s Tanks Could be Better Than Russia’s. It Might Not Matter” at Ukraine’s Tanks Could Be Better Than Russia’s. It Might Not Matter. (forbes.com). Global Security “Ukraine – Ground Forces Equipment” at  Ground Forces Equipment – Ukraine (globalsecurity.org) is showing 620 T-64s, 100 T-64 BM Bulat, 133 T-72s, no T-80s and 5 T-84 Oplat.

The T-64 was built at the Kharkiv Tank Factory. In the 2021 IISS listing for Ukraine it was reported to have only 34 T-80s. Other sources report about 100 T-80BVs were restored to service in 2015. We do have a report from personal conversations that the 1st Tank Battalion of the Naval Infantry was armed with only 22 T-80s, because of a shortage of the tank.

[8] The 60th, 62nd and 63rd Brigades.

[9] This exact organization of the army in February 2022 has yet to be revealed. This is our best guess based upon multiple sources.

[10] Counts are from Wikipedia: “List of Equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine,” which is primarily based upon the 2021 IISS listing. The Wikipedia listing is being updated to include equipment received since the war started.

[11] The actual count of deployed tanks works out to be: nine tank battalions with tank brigades (9 x 31 = 279), nine tank battalions with mechanized brigades (9 x 31 = 279), 12th and 16th tank battalions (2 x 31 = 62), four tank companies with the motorized infantry brigades (4 x 10 = 40), five tank companies with air assault divisions (5 x 10 = 50), 1st Tank Battalion with the naval infantry (22 tanks) and 2nd Tank Battalion with the Naval Infantry (31). This is a total of 763 tanks out of estimated 892 tanks available.

It is possible that the 5th Tank Brigade had around 30 T-72s and the 3rd Tank Brigade had around 100 T-72s. Uncertain if the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade had a tank battalion and is not counted as such. Some of the other reserve units may have also had tanks assigned to them at the start of the war. The same with some National Guard units like the 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade.

[12] 892 tanks versus 169,000 people. According to definitions created by Trevor Dupuy, force can be considered armor-heavy in the proportion of tanks exceeds 6 per 1,000 troops. See, Col. T.N. Dupuy, Attrition: Forecasting Battle Casualties an Equipment Loses in Modern War (NOVA Publications, Falls Church, VA., 1995), page 89.

[13] This listing is assembled from various secondary sources, so is far from definitive. It is drawn from a tweet by Paris Paroinen @Inkvisiit dated 22 June. The Ukrainian Military Pages at Ground Forces (ukrmilitary.com) provides a listing for December 31, 2021 that matches the listing of these 27 brigades. That listing also includes in the Reserve Corps a 66rd Mechanized Brigade, a 68th Jaeger Brigade, 71st Jaeger Brigade, 110th Mechanized Brigade, and 115th Mechanized Brigade that are not listed elsewhere. It does not list the 11th Motorized Infantry Brigade, the 15th Mechanized Brigade, 33rd Mechanized Brigade and 62nd Mechanized Brigade. All four of these brigades are listed in Wikipedia: “Mechanized Infantry (Ukraine).’ In the Wikipedia article “Ukrainian Ground Forces” does list 25 of the 27 brigades listed here, omitting listings for 4th Tank Brigade and 11th Motorized Infantry Brigade. The Military Land website provides a listing of all Ukrainians brigades and many smaller units at Armed Forces | MilitaryLand.net.

[14] The 3rd Tank Brigade was first mentioned in action on 11 April 2022 near Izyum (https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/status/1513609624410284042).

The 5th Tank Brigade was first mentioned in combat at the end of August 2022 near Kherson (https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1564713937073049602), but we do believe it was deployed near Odesa and partly activated before then.

The 60th Mechanized Brigade was first referenced with a missing serviceman on 4 April 2022 near Kherson (https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=1003960436914465&set=g.679413519875806). This does not mean the brigade was deployed there as the serviceman could have been with another unit, including a TDF unit.

The 61st Jager Infantry Brigade was first mentioned in action on 24 June 2022 near Kherson (https://www.facebook.com/61opbr/videos/815760919408467). At this point, it has been reorganized as a mechanized brigade.

The 62nd Mechanized Brigade was first mentioned in action on 14 October 2022 near Donets (https://www.victims.memorial/people/serhii-byba).

The 63rd Mechanized Brigade was first mentioned in action on 30 April 2022 near Kherson (https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=120597320604131&set=pb.100079508485716.-2207520000).

We have found no references in 2022 to the 11th, 15th or 33rd Mechanized Brigades being in action.

On the other hand, the Ukrainians stood up the 110th and 115th Mechanized Brigades by April, which were new combat formations created after the war started. According to Militaryland.net the 110th has been active since 10 April 2022 while the 115th has been active since 1 March 2022. The 115th Mechanized Brigade’s Facebook page was created 31 July 2020 although the name was not changed to the brigade’s name until 4 August 2022. The first posting to that page was from well before the war started, although they appear to be mostly political.

This is all preliminary work, and we are sure more specific data will be available over time.

[15] This brigade may not have been active in the first six weeks of the war. See David Axe, “Ukraine had Mobilized its Tank Reserves. They’re Already on the Attack,” Forbes, April 18, 2022 at Ukraine Has Mobilized Its Tank Reserves. They’re Already On The Attack. (forbes.com).

[16] This brigade was converted to a mechanized brigade in 2022.

[17] Other units that may now be active include: Separate Presidential Brigade (with five battalions), 1st Special Purpose Brigade active as of 4 March, 2022, 65th Mechanized Brigade active as of 1 April 2022, 66th Mechanized Brigade active as of 18 April 2022, 68th Jager Infantry Brigade active as of 8 April 2022, 110th Mechanized Brigade active as of 10 April 2022, 115th Mechanized Brigade active as of 1 March 2022, the 129th Reconnaissance Battalion, 71st Jager Infantry Brigade active as of 24 February 2022, and 77th Airmobile Brigade.

Also listed on the Military Land website are ten separate rifle battalions (4th, 6th, 12th, 14th, 19th, 23rd, 41st, 42nd, 45th and 214th). Do not know the status of them.

Also six battalions were formed as part of the 7th Center of Volunteer Corps activated as of 27 March 2022.

[18] The 45th Artillery Brigade appears to have been activated in late February and initially was deployed near Kyiv starting 4 March 2022. See:  In Ukraine time to kill, not die, — interview with the commander of the 45th brigade Oleg Faidyuk — News Agency Aloud/Vgolos.

The prisoner of war from the 38th Artillery Brigade was interviewed in the Russian video released 30 May 2022.

[19] The 45th Air Assault Brigade was first mentioned in action on 17 May 2022 near Zaporizhzhia (https://twitter.com/Newsweek/status/1526653455103930369).

The 46th Air Mobile Brigade was first mentioned in action on mid-July as Kherson based upon an email with a Ukrainian service member.

[20] According to MilitaryLand.net, this unit was demobilized December 31, 2020.

[21] See the 2017 organization chart for the Ukrainian Airborne Force.

[22] See MilitaryLand.net at: https://twitter.com/militarylandnet/status/1579919692525080577.

[23] The Naval Infantry tank battalions had 31 tanks. In the case of the 36th Naval Infantry Brigade before the start of the war had only 22 tanks because it had T-80s and Ukraine was struggling to get enough serviceable. Source is a Ukrainian Naval Infantry officer contacted in January 2023.