A Comment on the New Russian Bombardment Strategy

It appears that the new Russian strategy includes trying to bomb Ukraine into submission. I do think this approach is a mistake (and this is ignoring the moral implications of such a strategy). While destroying Ukrainian infrastructure does increase the hardship on the people, they are 1) probably willing to temporarily endure such hardship, 2) are probably further unified as a nation and motivated by such shared hardship, and 3) over half of their economy is already foreign aid. As such, there is a limit to how much hardship can be imposed.

The bigger problem for Russia is the impact on world public opinion. Regularly shelling Ukraine 1) guarantees that this war remains on the front page of the news, 2) will result in civilian casualties, which will further alienate Russia from the Western world and increase support for Ukraine, 3) will help maintain western support for Ukraine, and 4) make it more difficult later on for a compromise settlement. For the Russian overall strategy to succeed (see: A Projected Plan for the Russo-Ukrainian War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)), they kind of need the world to forget about Ukraine. Regularly sailing missiles into Kiev does not do that.

There is also a long-term impact on Russia, both in its image and economics. The narrative of the bombardment of Ukraine will quickly become similar to the narrative of Adolf Hitler’s bombing of London. Russia will not be able to escape this narrative and the permanent stain on their international reputation. The Ukrainians will become the people who bravely stood up to this aggression while Russians will be reduced to being viewed as something Orc-like. As Putin was democratically elected, it will be hard for the Russian people to not share in the collective guilt. When this war ends, the return of Russia to the western world, including the return of business relations, will be slowed as a result.

Anyhow, hate to give advice to the Russian government, but I would strongly advise them not to pursue continual bombing of the Ukrainian infrastructure over the winter as a strategy. It will work against them on the long run.

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Christopher A. Lawrence
Christopher A. Lawrence

Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.

Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.

His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019)

Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.

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3 Comments

  1. Does the Russian strategy include an explicit off-ramp for the Ukrainians to avoid further hardship? Effective compellence usually needs explicit communication about “how to make the pain stop.” The “resistance is futile” approach probably would lead to greater resistance. Who volunteers to be assimilated into the Borg?

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