How Much is U.S. intelligence helping Ukraine? – part 2

Posted this article up at the beginning of the month: How Much is U.S. Intelligence helping Ukraine? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)

The article stated that (in bold): “It does appear that Ukraine is getting significant help from the U.S. intelligence assets.” 

A few updates:

1. U.S. gave Ukraine exactly when and where Russian missiles and bombs were intended to strike, allowing Ukraine to move air defenses and aircraft out of harm’s way. See article: U.S. intel helped Ukraine protect air defenses. Also see: Mystery of early Russian failures in Ukraine explained with new revelations of US intelligence help
2. It does appear that U.S. intel notified the Ukrainians on 24 February (the first day of the invasion) about Russian attempts to reinforce the recently seized Hostomel airport and this resulted in the Ukrainians shooting down a reinforcing transport plane with hundreds of troops on board. We have no independent confirmation that this occurred but are guessing this is the case. We have also updated our account of The Assault on Kiev: The Assault on Kiev – part 1 of the discussion on the First Phase of the War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
3. Of course, my original blog post was based upon a number of other events I had seen, in particular the helicopter strike on the Russian depot near Belgorod.
4. I also noted in that blog post that this might include: “1) the picking off of six Russian generals, 2) the preplanned ambush that halted the Russian armored column at Brovary, and 3) the attack on the airbase near Kherson that took out at least ten Russian helicopters.”
5. I also flagged in my daily war posts that Ukrainian ability to resupply Mariupol with helicopters may have also been possible due to U.S. intel.
6. I also flagged in my daily war posts that the tracking and targeting of the sunk Russian cruiser Moskva may have also been done using U.S. intel.

Anyhow, I suspect there is more to come on this story.

It does appear that Russia is fighting at a disadvantage because of U.S. intelligence. We did do the only study on the subject I am aware of using real world data. It was based upon 295 cases of divisional-level combat. This was 149 division-level engagements from the Western Front in 1943-1945 and 146 division-level engagements from the Eastern Front in 1943. The Eastern Front consisted of 91 engagements from the Battle of Kursk and 55 cases from the battles in and around Kharkov in 1943.

This is discussed in depth in Chapters 10 and 11 of my book War by Numbers (“The Combat Value of Superior Situational Awareness” and “The Combat Value of Surprise.”). The entire report is available here: TDI – The Dupuy Institute Publications. It is SA-1. Measuring the Value of Situational Awareness (May 2004) (Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment) (2 Vol) – Pages: TBD. The report includes the data used for the analysis.