Christopher A. Lawrence is a professional historian and military analyst. He is the Executive Director and President of The Dupuy Institute, an organization dedicated to scholarly research and objective analysis of historical data related to armed conflict and the resolution of armed conflict. The Dupuy Institute provides independent, historically-based analyses of lessons learned from modern military experience.
Mr. Lawrence was the program manager for the Ardennes Campaign Simulation Data Base, the Kursk Data Base, the Modern Insurgency Spread Sheets and for a number of other smaller combat data bases. He has participated in casualty estimation studies (including estimates for Bosnia and Iraq) and studies of air campaign modeling, enemy prisoner of war capture rates, medium weight armor, urban warfare, situational awareness, counterinsurgency and other subjects for the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, the Joint Staff and the U.S. Air Force. He has also directed a number of studies related to the military impact of banning antipersonnel mines for the Joint Staff, Los Alamos National Laboratories and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation.
His published works include papers and monographs for the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and the Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, in addition to over 40 articles written for limited-distribution newsletters and over 60 analytical reports prepared for the Defense Department. He is the author of Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (Aberdeen Books, Sheridan, CO., 2015), America’s Modern Wars: Understanding Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam (Casemate Publishers, Philadelphia & Oxford, 2015), War by Numbers: Understanding Conventional Combat (Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE., 2017) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (Stackpole Books, Guilford, CT., 2019)
Mr. Lawrence lives in northern Virginia, near Washington, D.C., with his wife and son.
The need for more infantry was a pretty common theme for the Western Allies of WW2. I am sure it was true for the Germans, but they generally were short of lots of things throughout the war. Soviets…I don’t know.
With most Western countries, and many Asian as well, in negative population growth, it is hard to see how how the combined arms warfare doctrine is going to work going forward. If it was hard to do in WW2, it isn’t any easier now.
It is my understanding that Russian conscripts can only be used in defensive battles. The Russians have admitted that this rule has been violated in places, but that they will investigate those situations. In other words, they don’t feel that they can ignore the requirement.
So you have a combination of long term enlisted and mercenaries being used. They could presumably get more mercenaries, but the quality is going to go down fast, and most mercenaries/contractors don’t operate on the battalion (or combat group) level. The enlisted folks, those not already involved, are likely being used in roles that require technical training and such: not infantry.
The Russian response seems to be to regroup and go into artillery battle mode. I am not sure what they will get out of flattening the Eastern Ukraine, but they probably can grab off bites at a time.
FWIW – on the point about the Russians tactical competence. The Russian’s road-bound invasion really reminded me of the Italian’s invasion of Greece in WW2: and appears to be getting about the same results.
Point 10 is way off… BMP Battalion doesn’t have anywhere near that many troops who dismount… 31 vehicles – HQ vehicles = 27 infantry squads, x 6 men dismounting = 162 grunts on the grounds… with crews still at their vehicles…
You want 1,000 soldiers, you need an Inf Division… of three Inf Regt… 162 x 9 Bn’s… then add a Tank Regt too!
So, we are no longer talking a BTG… now we are at a reinforced Mech Inf Div!
BTR Bn/ Regt used to have more troops in them… 2 man crew plus 10 dismounts.
The @1,000 refers to the total strength of a BTG. BTGs have around 200 infantry.
Morale and training are two other components of this observable BTG failure. At this time the Russian junior officers and conscripts who represent the bulk of forces have realized fully that promises of fast victory were false. Facing a far better trained and relentless adversary must be demoralizing, to say the least.
Superb points all by Chris Lawrence of TDI.
The original twitter post was done by one of the associates of TDI, not me. I just reposted it.
I doubt the Ukrainian forces are “far” better trained and that the “bulk” of the Russian forces were initially basic conscripts. Aside from the Chechen breed, the Wagner contractors, the attack in the northern sector involved the equivalent of Airborne formations.
Likewise, a higher quality force would have not sustained the same levels of attrition. Aside from technological constraints, the real obstacle is undeniably the ineffectiveness of artillery and air support, a signal of poor firepower, coordination, precision, and protection. Only artillery would allow them to prevail (in ambushes).
Now we can experience the full extent of the Russian military’s corruption…