We have discussed on this blog before our analysis for the Gulf War, the casualty estimate for Bosnia peacekeeping mission, and the casualty and duration estimate for Iraq. In each case, we were either the closest public estimate or pretty much dead on. Just as a reminder:
Predictions | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Now, back in late 1990 Trevor Dupuy made his predictions on the Gulf War. They are discussed here:
Forecasting the 1990-1991 Gulf War | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Assessing the TNDA 1990-91 Gulf War Forecast | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Assessing the 1990-1991 Gulf War Forecasts | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
In 1995 we provided the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with our predictions for Bosnia. This was, as far as I know, the first formal attempt to make a prediction of casualties for an “operation other than war.” This prediction is in Appendix II of America’s Modern Wars and is discussed here:
Forecasting U.S. Casualties in Bosnia | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
In 2004 we provided the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) and OSD Net Assessment our predictions of casualties and duration for the war in Iraq. Again, as far as I know, this was the first formal attempt to make an analytically based prediction on casualties and duration for a insurgency. This prediction is discussed in depth in Chapter 1 and Appendix I for America’s Modern Wars and is discussed here.
Forecasting the Iraqi Insurgency | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
And then there are these posts:
President Obama’s Casualty Estimates | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for a War with North Korea | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
The CRS Casualty Estimates | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
How Common are Casualty Estimates? | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
Casualty Estimates for Conflict with Iran – Summation | Mystics & Statistics (dupuyinstitute.org)
I always like to claim that we are three-for-three, in that we have published three predictions before conflicts occur that are fundamentally correct. As significant, in my mind, is that we were correct, based upon historical analysis and using combat models build upon history for not only a conventional war, but for an unconventional or guerilla war and for a peacekeeping mission. This is a wide range of scenarios. We are not aware of anyone else who has done this.