More Conclusions on Scatterable Mines

Just wanted to pull up the rest of our conclusions from page 43 of the “Military Consequences of a Complete Landmine Ban” report. I had left this out of my last post for the sake of keeping the post sort. The entire report is here: http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/m-6mineban.pdf

There were seven conclusions and three recommendations in the original report. I shortened conclusion 3 in my write-up yesterday. The full conclusion is here:

3) The banning of antitank SCATMINE systems is a more difficult issue. There is no question that there will be some loss of capability, although the degree is not easy to measure.

a) US Army ground and helicopter-deployed SCATMINE systems (Volcano, Flipper, and MOPMS) are fundamentally defensive in nature and are only assigned to divisions and brigades which do not have a robust anti-armor capability. Banning them would effect the anti-armor defensive capability of those units. However, the capabilities of these systems may be replaceable by Hornet. The advantages gained would be a reduced logistical tail (definitely a critical issue for future Army planning), a reduced threat of fratricidal use, and a reduced chance of encountering the same or similar systems in the inventory of opposing forces, a very definite advantage.

b) US artillery launched SCATMINE systems (ADAM and RAAM) have both theoretical offensive and a practical defensive use. Since the rounds in the artillery basic load have a four-hour self-destruct, it is effectively an anti-armor system with a persistent effect, rather than a long-term barrier system. Its interdiction value is short-term. To be used most effectively it must be used in conjunction with other antitank weapons. Therefore, a complete antitank mine ban may result in some reduction in anti-armor capability. However, the actual armor killing capability of RAAM can be replaced by existing systems. The main advantages lost are the capability of temporarily freezing an opposing unit in place and persistence of its effect (up to 48 hours).

c) US airdropped SCATMINE systems (GATOR) have utility in interdicting an enemy. There does not appear to be another weapon system that would provide a complete substitute for that capability, especially for long term use (48 hours or 15 days). The downside of that capability, as was found in the Gulf War, is that this system interdicts both sides. GATOR may also be useful in freezing an opposing unit, which is then attacked with other assets in deep battle. However, SCATMINEs tactical defensive value is limited due to the method of deployment and the difficulty associated with marking and recording their location. They may also have some offensive value in protecting flanks.

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Again, this was a snap shot of the issue in 2001. We have not done any further work on the subject since then.