Poking around the internet, I ran across an article from 1985 by the British journalist and historian Max Hastings, rather provocatively titled “Their Wehrmacht was Better than our Army.” It was published in the Washington Post. I had not seen it before (as I went to work for Trevor Dupuy in 1987):
A few highlights:
- The language in the first couple of paragraphs is also pretty provocative.
- The discussion then goes to Liddell Hart.
- The discussion then goes to Trevor Dupuy and Martin Van Creveld.
- From Dupuy: “On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.”
- From Hastings: “A spirit of military narcissism, nourished by such films as “The Longest Day,” “A Bridge Too Far” and “The Battle of the Bulge,” was perpetuated mythical images of the Allied and German armies.”
- From Hastings: “Yet to be a soldier in America has never been the honorable calling, outside a few thousand Army families. It has traditionally been the route by which young men of modest origins…may aspire to build a career.”
It is worthwhile to read the entire article.
Now, these claims were controversial in the 1980s, and a number of U.S. Army officers and people out at Leavenworth personally and professionally went after Trevor Dupuy over this issue. There was a long unpleasant discussion of that story written up by the lawyer Thomas Nutter. He was going to turn into a book, but I gather that effort was never completed.
I do address the subject of the relative performance of armies in combat in Chapters 4 through 7 of my book War by Numbers.
Hi Chris,
I found this statement interesting:
From Dupuy: “On a man for man basis, German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost.”
What follows is not mathematically rigorous by any means and is simplistic, but it sort of points to the 3:1 rule.
It takes 2 allied soldiers to kill 1 German, but that might end in a draw, so you really need at least 3:1 to be sure you get the guy?
I went back and looked at Numbers, Prediction, and War at Figure 7-2, on Page 99 of the 2nd Edition:
World War II (68 months)
Allies vs Germany
Mobilized: 40.4 million
Allied Casualties: 23.0 million/57%
Score: 0.25
Score Effectiveness: 0.25
German vs Allies
Mobilized: 12.5 million
Casualties 10.1 million/81%
Score: 1.84
Score Effectiveness: 0.25
When you divided the mobilized numbers you get: 3.232!
If you divide score effectiveness (probably not a valid operation) you get: 7.36
Separating out the Western Allies (7-6, page 104)
W. Allies
Total Engaged: 1,783,237
Total Casualties: 47,743
Score Effectiveness: 1.449
Germans
Total Engaged: 940,198
Total Casualties: 48585
Score Effectiveness: 2.247
Odds: 1.89:1
Figure 7-10 for the Soviet Front (p.110) is not in the same format as 7-9)
Russian Field Force Strength: 6,100,000
German Field Force Strength: 2,500,000 – 3, 500,000
Ratio: 2.44 – 1.74
Neither of the last two are 3:1, but still, they are above 2:1 in terms of raw numbers.
Your thoughts?
Actually, my thoughts on the subject are in chapters 4-7 of War by Numbers. I did re-shoot the data and analyzed it from scratch.
I will be posting up some material of force ratios and CRT (combat results tables) in the next week or two, depending on how my other work progresses.
German vs Allies
Mobilized: 12.5 million
Casualties 10.1 million/81%
Fyi: Those numbers are wrong. I don’t know if Mr. Lawrence updated the data at some point but in case he didn’t you can find the authoritative work on that subject matter here: https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/315224
Numbers, Predictions and War, which was published in 1979, is currently not in print.
Chris, thanks for directing us to a well-written article. (They don’t write like they used to write : – )
As a matter of personal curiosity, did leaders such as Gen. Patton achieve different results than did the average leader? Were certain leaders able to turn plow boys and factory hands into killing machines?
Chris, are there any analytical confirmations of mythical leadership actions (whether real or exaggerated) leading to better results against Germans such as as from the following “almost-unbelievable” 6/7/1944 action reported by Stephen Ambrose in Citizen Soldier (almost unbelievable because the reader has to believe that an assistant division commander was in the midst of infantry fighting on the front line)?
“Brig. Gen. Norman “Dutch” Cota, assistant division commander of the 29th, came on a group of infantry pinned down by some Germans in a farmhouse. He asked the captain in command why his men were making no effort to take the building. ‘Sir, the Germans are in there, shooting at us,’ the captain replied. ‘Well, I’ll tell you what, captain,’ said Cota, unbuckling two grenades from his jacket. ‘You and your men start shooting at them. I’ll take a squad of men and you and your men watch carefully. I’ll show you how to take a house with Germans in it.’ Cota led his squad around a hedge to get as close as possible to the house. Suddenly, he gave a whoop and raced forward, the squad following, yelling like wild men. As they tossed grenades into the windows, Cota and another man kicked in the front door, tossed a couple of grenades inside, waited for the explosions, then dashed into the house. The surviving Germans inside were streaming out the back door, running for their lives. Cota returned to the captain. ‘You’ve seen how to take a house,’ said the general, still out of breath. ‘Do you understand? Do you know how to do it now?'”
Well, Chris, is there any analytical evidence to suggest that any units of the Allies (besides units of Airborne or Rangers) learned enough over the course of time under certain leaders to reach the effectiveness of Germans?
We have never really done any analysis of learning over time. The closest I get is comparing the results from Italy (1943-44), in Chapter 5 of War by Numbers the results from the Ardennes engagements (1944-45) presented in Chapter 6. The results are greatly muddied by the fact that many of the German units had degraded towards the end of the war. So it is hard to say if you are seeing improvement in one side or degradation on the other side, as what we are measuring is “relative” combat effectiveness.
Now, it would be possible to take a number of units in Italy from September 1943 and measure their relative combat effectiveness in a series of engagements over time through the middle of 1944 or even much later. This would not be a small task and to have any meaningful result you would want to do it across a dozen or more units. Added to that, the opponents do change, often from one day to the next, and not all units are same in training, leadership, etc. So even if you are getting measurable results, there are some question as to what you are actually measuring.
Still, this would be useful to do, but I would not attempt such an effort without budget.
If I recall correctly then Nutter argued in his blog that their superiority was mainly attributable and a result of the defensive posture.
I don’t recall that. We have separately looked at the Germans in the attack and defense and it does show up whether they are attacking and defending. This is split out and demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6 of War by Numbers. Trevor Dupuy also showed the same thing in his writings.
You mention a Thomas Nutter. I believe he is actually coming out with a book on the subject shortly:
https://www.amazon.com/Eagle-Iron-Cross-American-Effectiveness/dp/0786493917/ref=mp_s_a_1_4?dchild=1&qid=1607023353&refinements=p_27%3AThomas+Nutter&s=books&sr=1-4&text=Thomas+Nutter
Thank you. Good for him. I had not talked to Thomas in a while. His link to his website has been dead for a while.
It doesn’t surprise me in the least that Hastings uses provocative language; he is, first and foremost, a journalist, and certainly a much better storyteller than historian. His job is to stir up controversy and provoke a reaction. Remember that journalism in the UK does not enjoy anything like the high repuation as a profession that it does in the US, and with good reason (“You cannot hope to bribe or twist/Thank God, the British journalist/But seeing what the man will do/Unbribed, there’s no occasion to”). Hastings merely makes a sharply-worded rearrangement of a bunch of pretty well-known tropes, and the ones chosen here seem to be of highly variable quality. Dupuy’s argument is at least a rational one, based on research and numbers. The same cannot be said of the tired old observation that Tiger and Panther were better tanks than Sherman. Being able to design a better tank in a weight budget of 60 or 45 tonnes rather than 30 tonnes is not really strongly suggestive of design genius. The idea that German anti-tank guns were better than Allied ones would, I think, be hard to maintain when one considers the quality of the 2-pdr, 6-pdr, and 17-pdr against their contemporaries, unless, of course, one admits the same line of argument, that being able to design a powerful heavyweight gun is somehow cleverer than designing a powerful light one.
An aspect that it might have been interesting to explore is the distinction between armies of continental powers, which tend to have a “high-low mix” of troop quality, and armies that must arrive at the seat of war by ship, where much greater homogeneity tends to be the rule. Whenever one thinks of WW2 Germans, it is much more usual to consider the elite Panzertruppen rather than the static or security divisions, and the Waffen-SS is usually imagined in terms of its late-war Panzer divisions rather than the rank amateurs of the early war or the unsavoury rabble of the “Freiwillingen” formations. As well as the matter of troop training, there were vast differences in the desgree of mechanization, which is an important tactical and operational factor. The Americans and British, on the other hand, could manage a much more even level of troop quality (despite the weird British tendency to spontaneously generate tiny “private armies” for special purposes), as well as effectively total mechanization; if one is limited by shipping capacity as to the size of force one can sustain, it makes little sense to send less than the best you can. But Hastings mentions none of this.
At least Hastings’ analysis is original in one respect; I don’t think anyone was ever previously aware of the presence of 6th Airborne Division at Arnhem.
Old hands will recall that Hastings’ reputation as a war correspondent (which, after being editor of the Telegraph, he parlayed into his third career of popular and lightweight military historian) was made as a result of some pretty questionable behaviour in the Falklands War. I recommend McGowan and Hands’ “Don’t Cry for Me, Sergeant Major” as providing a minor sidelight on Hastings at that time, as well as a wonderfully rude portrayal of life with the Task Force.
“Being able to design a better tank in a weight budget of 60 or 45 tonnes rather than 30 tonnes is not really strongly suggestive of design genius. ”
That is a not very intelligent strawman. Germans analysed the shortcomming of their equipment and tactics and changed them often, the problem of the allies was, that in case of ground forces that did not happen at the same rate.
“The Americans and British, on the other hand, could manage a much more even level of troop quality (despite the weird British tendency to spontaneously generate tiny “private armies” for special purposes), as well as effectively total mechanization”
What is your point here? If the allied average is clearly below the German the lower dispersion of quality is meaningless.
“Whenever one thinks of WW2 Germans, it is much more usual to consider the elite Panzertruppen,rather than the static or security divisions…”
Now you are projecting. The German infantry division with horse drawn artillery set the bar, if you are not able to defeat them with higher motorisation you have a problem. Average counts and here you lose your argument.