Expected first follow-up post to my previous post. I do have a chapter in my book America’s Modern Wars (2015) on Afghanistan. Most of our work on insurgencies was focused on Iraq. Several years after we did our Iraq casualty estimate (presented on pages 15-31 and 302-307) we were asked to do a briefing or two about Afghanistan. This was a little odd, as it was not something we had studied in depth and we never have. All of our work was on Iraq or on insurgencies in general. We never specifically analyzed on Afghanistan or had a contract to do so. Still, hard to ignore Afghanistan so I ended up with the chapter on it in my book (Chapter 21, pages 253-272).
The final paragraph in that chapter reads (pages 269-270):
Given our unwillingness to step up our commitment, then the only question is whether a slower withdrawal will provide more tangible benefits than a fast withdrawal. This we have not examined. Still, this is not “winning” the war in any sense of the word winning. It is withdrawing with the situation on the ground unresolved and a government that far from democratic or stable. We will be leaving behind trainers and other support people, but limited combat troops. If history is a guide, then this government will be replaced one way or the other several years after we withdraw. What will replace it is hard to determine, but will probably include a return to some extent of the Taliban, or perhaps with them leading the new government. It is also distinctly possible that the country will return back into civil war. None of this fulfills our objectives.
What more do I need to say? I wrote that in 2014 or so…..right now the current Afghan government consist of two people claiming to be the president and the U.S. had just negotiated a complete withdrawal over the next 14 months. The negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government start on 10 March 2020.
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