Now, some of the data provided in the previous posts were muddied by the fact that there were serious differences in the performances of the opposing armies. This is true for the German Army versus the Soviet Army in 1943, the Israeli Army versus the Arab armies in 1956-1973, and for the U.S. Army, USMC and allied armies versus the Iraqi Army in 1991. To a much lesser extent, it is also true for the German Army versus the U.S and UK armies up through the middle of 1944. This is discussed in some depth in my book War by Numbers.
As such, this seems like also a good time to again briefly address this issue. We need to break down the force ratio tables by which nationality is attacking. First let us look at the Eastern Front World War II data:
World War II, Kharkov and Kursk 1943 (180 cases)
German Army attacking the Soviet Army – culled data set (100 cases)
Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins……………..Number of Cases
0.49………………………………..0%…………………………………………….1
0.58 to 0.95………………………90……………………………………………..10
1.01 to 1.49……………………..100……………………………………………..30
1.52 to 1.96………………………95……………………………………………..19
2.09 to 2.42…………………….100……………………………………………….6
2.57 to 2.87…………………….100……………………………………………….7
3.00 to 3.45…………………….100……………………………………………….8
3.60 to 3.79…………………….100……………………………………………….2
4.31 to 5.85………………………92……………………………………………..13
6.48 to 6.63…………………….100……………………………………………….2
8.60 to 11.41…………………..100……………………………………………….2
In these hundred battles, when the Germans are on the offensive, they win 96% of the time. That is a pretty impressive result. The full data set with another 28 cases that include “limited action” and “limited attack” are listed below.
German Army attacking the Soviet Army – complete data set (128 cases)
Force Ratio………………….Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases
0.49…………………………………….0%…………………………………………….1
0.58 to 0.95…………………………..47…………………………………………….19
1.01 to 1.49…………………………..88…………………………………………….34
1.52 to 1.96…………………………..77…………………………………………….26
2.09 to 2.42…………………………..86………………………………………………7
2.57 to 2.98…………………………100………………………………………………9
3.00 to 3.45…………………………100………………………………………………8
3.60 to 3.79…………………………100………………………………………………3
4.31 to 5.85…………………………..71…………………………………………….17
6.48 to 6.63…………………………100………………………………………………2
8.60 to 11.41……………………….100………………………………………………2
Out of these 128 battles, when the Germans attack they win 79% of the time. This is still impressive by any standard. Because of the additional cases being “limited action” and “limited attack” there are a lot of drawn engagements in this data set. The “culled” data set has three defender victories and one draw (and 96 attacker wins). This one has five defender victories and 22 drawn engagements. Now, let us look at how the Soviets do in response. These are the opposing forces on the same battlefield, similar terrain, similar weather, and often on the same day
Soviet Army attacking the German Army – culled data set (41 cases)
Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins…………………Number of Cases
0.40 to 0.43……………………..67%………………………………………………..3
0.51 to 0.99……………………..18…………………………………………………11
1.02 to 1.46……………………..25…………………………………………………16
1.53 to 1.96……………………..50…………………………………………………..4
2.08 to 2.31……………………..50…………………………………………………..4
2.79 to 2.89……………………..33…………………………………………………..3
This is a very different result than what we see for the Germans. Out of the 41 attacks, the Soviets win 13 times or 32%. If I compare the German results of their attacks at odds below three-to-one, I have the Soviets succeeding 32% of the time while the Germans are succeeding 96% of the time (70 out of 73 attacks). Hard to argue that there is not a performance difference as the two armies in 1943 were roughly equivalent in armament and the mix of armaments. Each of the engagements from Kursk are presented in considerable detail in my books on the battle.[1]
The same data, but including “limited action” and “limited attack” is shown below:
Soviet Army attacking the German Army – complete data set (52 cases)
Force Ratio…………………Percent Attacker Wins………………….Number of Cases
0.40 to 0.49……………………..50%…………………………………………………4
0.51 to 0.99……………………..14………………………………………………….14
1.01 to 1.46……………………..19………………………………………………….21
1.53 to 1.96……………………..40……………………………………………………5
2.08 to 2.31……………………..50……………………………………………………4
2.66 to 2.89……………………..25……………………………………………………4
With this data set, out of 52 engagements the attacker still only won 13 times, or 25%.
[1] See Lawrence. Kursk: The Battle of Prokhorovka (2015) and The Battle of Prokhorovka (2019). The first book lays out all 192 engagements from the offensive in the south while the second book provided the detailed data for 76 of the engagements. Each engagement has a separate engagement sheet that lays out the forces involved, their strength and their losses. There is a detail narrative of their operations in the text of the books. If anyone has any questions over the accuracy or interpretation of this data, it is presented in these books, developed primarily from the unit records of both sides (primary sources).
I have been reading Robert Forczyk ‘ s Case White: The Invasion of Poland 1939.
As the Poles were somewhat spread out, with their units often having open flanks to both sides, you could do some pretty clear analysis of the force on force issue.
One comment Forcyk made, without going into detail (or at least clear cut tabular style detail), is that the German units had more firepower than their Polish equivalents. And I have seen the firepower issue brought up before with reference to the Germans.
Personally, I think the Germans did a better job with their firepower than most, but from what I am seeing, the Germans were still pretty raw in Poland, so it might be a reasonable argument there.
The bloody Cas/day per Division sustained by a German Division during Fall Weiss were in the same range of the daily losses per Div sustained during the opening phase of Barbarossa (adjusted to force ratios and slices). The Armée de terre was able to impose a greater daily attrition on the Wehrmacht, so we can expect smaller firepower and capability differentials. On the other hand, the difference between the Polish and Soviet levels cannot have been that pronounced (although I would expect the Soviets to be better prepared from a tactical perspective). This is understandable, as both were developing systems, France was not.
It is the duration and scale that affected the outcome, so that the theory of both belligerents forces being “roughly equivalent in armament and the mix of armaments” may be ill-defined and does not explain possible differentials. That both sides have spears and swords may not make them equal, as it also ignores indepth qualitative factors, e.g. 75mm gun of faction A =/= the 76mm of faction B (this of course also depends on the payload delivered, the relative incapacitating effect and particle fragmentation). Assault Rifle of faction A =/= faction B. Grenade reliability factor of faction A =/= of faction B (for instance, less grenades will go off) or the projectile design of faction A >> of faction B. More sophisticaled bow of faction A > to the one of faction B. Arrow design and quality of manufacture of faction A > Arrow of faction B, etc. All this will influence casualty infliction and press them up or down.
Pretty interesting to read on the quantification of Divisional firepower during the war (Field Artillery Journal August 1941, p.602), although some calculations appear odd and on occassion utterly ridiculous (I would expect them to correlate with per capita GDPs).
https://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/1941/AUG_1941/AUG_1941_FULL_EDITION.pdf
“Pretty interesting to read on the quantification of Divisional firepower during the war ”
If you check WWI you get a ~50% higher tactical effectiveness of German forces in France, 2.1 million MIA/KIA allied soldiers vs 1.5 million German.
The share of losses caused by artillery was the same on both sides. This means that German artillery was much more effective than the allied counterpart. The number of German field guns was lower, therefore, we have other contributions.
If you check WWII, the structure of German infanty divisions was still very WWI like, therefore, a simple analysis of gun numbers may not be so useful.
Yes, in retrospect the constants in both World Wars were similar and aggregated models/firepower scores are superficial at best, but my objective was to point out that Divisions are not created equal and as a general rule of thumb, more developed nations appear to have higher scores than developing nations. More money = better training, higher education levels/institutions and better guns or at least more sophisticated guns.
Firepower levels were similar amongst the developed nations of WW1 (the effectiveness and Staff systems were not), as the conflict was confined to the most industrialized nations. WW2 was a reversal and occured mainly on the Eastern Front, there Imperial Russian and Soviet performance over three decades remained unchanged. Russia was always a very militarized system and competent in waging wars, which leaves us with the question: What defined the disparity and what was the fundamental difference between the US, UK, Germany and Russia or Japan? Their weakness was undoubtedly in the economic field, but nontheless during WW2 the Soviets dictated the outcome of the war, in the decisive battles from 41-43, they suffered from economic inferiority (even with external help, which also functioned as a stabilizer, but not necessarily a war winner).
What we can learn from this, is that there is not one decisive factor that determines the outcomes of wars and during WW2 certainly not to be found in the economic and technological field, at least for the initial phases. It seems that the evolution of warfare is much more influenced and dictated by the environment and nature of the respective conflict and to state that German and Soviet Divisions were equal is myopic. What changes if you compare a Romanian Division to a Soviet Division?
“Firepower levels were similar amongst the developed nations of WW1 (the effectiveness and Staff systems were not), as the conflict was confined to the most industrialized nations.”
But how do you explain a 40-50% higher effectiveness of the German artillery in France? Staffs cannnot be the reason IMHO.
Lower echelons, junior officers, structure/organization, training, discipline/morale, learning effects, better artillery crews etc. etc. 30-50% is not 250%.
“This is understandable, as both were developing systems, France was not.”
Whether a system was developing or not is IMHO not relevant, the quality is. A static bad system offers no advantages in comparison to a changing good system.
And if we are talking about tank warfare, all countries had to operate in a quite fluid scenario, the question is why some armies handled the changes better than others.
BTW: A good discussion of the German situation is found in Frieser’s “Blitzkrieglegende”, and Niklas Zetterling also has made really good arguments in the past.
Development levels shows a high correlation with casualty infliction potential, so I fundamentally disagree with your statement.
As for tanks, their relevance has been often overemphasized, especially in the early campaigns, but strangely that did not seem to bother the authors of the journal, as multiple of their articles seem to contradict each other.
“Development levels shows a high correlation with casualty infliction potential, so I fundamentally disagree with your statement.”
You sell a correlation as cause when the inteteresting question is why a UK system, which was quite developoed was clearly inferior tio the German, or you could make the same argument for the French.
In WWI you have claer differences at the tactical level, in WWII at the operationbal level.
I was always (even when I did not know it) in the Zetterling camp when explaining the performance differences in WWII with pre-WWI training of officers.
The differentials between the UK and Germany were not that pronounced (clearly not in the range of Poland and the USSR), so certainly not “far” and I already mentioned the Staff system and institutions, which you have apparently ignored.
Furthermore, Britain was experienced in Naval warfare, a seafaring nation so to speak. Germany already superseded Britain as the strongest economy in Europe at the dawn of the 20th century, while approximating their development levels, quite distinct from the constellation on the Eastern Front.
Regarding the German firepower superiority I have found an interesting article of Col. Kazimierz Glabisz from 1941. He calculated the “wspolczynnik sily”, loosely translated as power coefficient, of the involved “great units”: According to that, when one polish Infantry Division got the value 1, the other units got the following values:
Polish Cavalry Brigade 0.4 (=40% of a polish ID)
Motorised Cavalry Brigade 1,2
German PanzerDivision 3.6
Leichte Division 2.8
Inf.Div.(motor.) 2
Inf.Div.1st.wave 1.8
Inf.Div.Reserve 1 (maybe he ment 2nd Wave IDs)
Landwehr Div. 0.5
Kav. Brig. 0.7
slovak Inf.Div. 0.5
In regard to these estimations he concluded that from 1. to 17. September the german side had a power superiority of ca. 3.2 to 1. We cannot forget, that the polish army was due to several reasons not full mobilised and was steadily losing divisions due attrition, while new full/partially mobilised division got into action. Becasue of that, the polish side never had more than 80% of its troops at hand. Today, we know that the casualty exchange ratio was ca. 4:1 in favor of the Wehrmacht.
Unfortunately, Glabisz did not show how he calculated his values or if he incorporates the influence of the Luftwaffe, but I use them now in my project to calculate some OLIs for September 1939.
Very Interesting comment. Could I get a copy of that article?
I have sent you a copy on “contact@dupuyinstitute.org”
This does not look like a raw firepower comparison though, in a tactical and an organizational sense. The scores seem to correlate with the units ability to maneuver.
Yes, I thought that too. In 1939 the “foot” ID and the motorised ID had nearly the same establishment of weapons, anyway there is a difference of 11,1% due to the higher level of motorisation. The ID(mot.) were stripped of their third regiment only after the September Campaign. The same goes for the polish Cavarly Brigade, which was believed to have 1/3 of the firepower of a polish Inf.Div. So there is a surplus of 33%, but maybe it was only a calculation error.