Tank Losses on 12/13 July 1943

13 Comments

1. Fascinating, is it also far to point to your post on repairs, summary below. Whilst a significant more tanks were lost by the Soviets, it was compounded by their doctrine to write of more. I suppose, the question is how many of the 308, could have been repaired using the German doctrine for reuse.

   “So, compared to the Germans, the Soviet unit wrote off a higher percentage of tanks written off as destroyed (13% versus 37%) and a lower percentage of damaged tanks repaired (57% repaired versus 25% repaired). This is pretty typical for all the German panzer and panzer grenadier divisions compared to Soviet tank and mechanized corps at Kursk. Also, most of the Soviet repaired arrived on the 15th and 16th, after the battle was winding down.”

   • I do have post on repair coming…but exactly.

     Although in this case, with a lot of Soviet tanks left on the field of battle, I am guessing that the Germans made sure they were not repairable.

     • Exactly. Control over the battlefield is of paramount importance.

   • Doctrine to write off more? You mean they had a doctrine to die more? Of course this depends on many factors such as repair services, availability of spare parts, battlefield control, exposure to the front, but write off figures are a product of the interaction of two forces on the battlefield and the potency of each belligerents weapon systems. AFVs were so badly damaged that repairing them was meaningless. There was no difference. The German system was more demand driven, opposed by the Soviet supply oriented refill, but even in the Soviet case most of the reinstated vehicles during offensive action came from short term repair (usually 50-66%). Many vehicles were damaged and sent into the battle multiple times. This is about survivability and sustainability.

   • Good remark.
     Repair units on the Soviet side had incomparably smaller capabilities. In the first place, this concerned the stock of spare parts.

2. What kind of losses does this refer to?

   • I guess it depends on how one defines the battle (usually referring to the 12th to 16th July), but if I recall correctly the text in the article mentioned the 12th and referred to vehicles which were completely lost to the units on that respective day (aside from Frieser, Dr. Töppel listed similar figures). Exact losses for this day cannot be given, as information does not exist, but if we specifically speak about the tank (and anti-tank) engagement at Prokhorovka on the 12th July 1943 (Hausser vs Rotmistrov), then the 18th Tank Corps and 29th Tank Corps lost about 150 AFVs (Tanks and SPGs, irretrievably lost), the others must have suffered about 50 (2nd TC and 2GDsTC). In fact, 18thTC listed 30 irrecoverable and 20 evacuated tanks and assault guns (for the 11th-14th), 29thTC 154 irrecoverable and 5 evacuated AFVs, Group Trufanov 29.
     “LSSAH” and “das Reich” (10.7-13.7) had 3 Totalverluste (OKH, Panzerlage Süd, BA-MA RH 10/64, p.22), but these are most likely incomplete.
     The entire Korps listed (5th -18th July, report dated 28th):
     1st SS: 1 Pzkpfw 1-B, 1 PzKpfw III, 9 PzKfw IV (2 sent away for repair), 1 Pzkpfw VI (also sent away), 3 Sturmgeschütze, 3 Panzerjäger (1 sent away), 2 SdKfz 250, 11 SdKfz 251, 1 SdKfz 222, 1 SdKfZ 261
     2nd: 2 PzKpfw III, 6 PzKpfw IV, 1 PzKpfw VI, 2 Sturmgeschütze, 1 SdKfz 250
     3rd: 6 PzKpfw III (one in depot), 7 PzKpfw IV, 1 PzKpfw VI, 1 Sturmgeschütz, 2 Lafetten/Panzerjäger, 9 SdKfz (2 of them sent away), 1 SdKfz 223, 1 SdKfz 263
     The vast majority of AP ammo consumed was 75mm PzGr. 39. No information on any 88mm ammo consumption.

     For the 12th the material losses were:
     1st: 1 leichtes Infanteriegeschütz 18, 1 20mm Flak 38, 2 75mm Pak40 SP, 4 Flammenwerfer 41
     2nd: 1 mounted schwere Feldhaubitze 18/1, the barrel shattered and 1 Granatwerfer Typ 34
     3rd: 1 leichtes Infanteriegeschütz 18, 1 75mm StuK 40 L/48 barrel shattered
     The Korps suffered approx. 1/3 of their killed, wounded and missing between the 10th and 16th July of the entire losses sustained during the operation. Based on this we could assume that of the 46 Totalverluste, 15-20 incurred between the 10th and 16th July. That is 3-5 average losses for the 12th, somewhat artificial though, since it factors out fighting intensity and frequency. On average, combat damage exceeded Totalausfälle by a factor of 5-6, which would result in over 20 damaged vehicles, so the loss range would be 20-25, to account for variability.

     „Totenkopf“ engaged the 5thGA, parts of the 1stTA and 6thGDA. 5th mechanized GDC affected the fight a day later. 2ndTA reported 2 losses for the 12th of July, but these were confined to 16thTC. 2ndTA suffered 12 irrecoverable losses between the 10th and 13th.
     Alternatively we could clean the losses for combat damage for the 10th-12th July (those are figures from the KTB, Anlagen zum Kriegstagebuch Nr. 6, Generalkommando II. SS-Pz.Korps, Feindlageberichte und Tagesmeldungen, 1.6.1943-2.8.1943, BA-MA RS 2-2/18, A 248-25):
     12 PzKpfw IV combat damaged, 1 PzKpfw VI, 11 Sturmgeschütze combat lost. 2 Marders, 1 StuG type III and 4 PzKpfw IV destroyed/abandoned.
     Opposed by (18th + 29th + 54th and 55th Guards Tank-Regiments): 81 T-34 out of action (81 burnt), 1 SU-122, 24 Churchills (8 abandoned or destroyed), and 36 T-70s out of action (39 destroyed).
     For the 12th July this gives us: 7 damaged and destroyed German AFVs and 114 combat damaged Soviet AFVs (132 destroyed or abandoned), for all possible units in contact near Prokhorovka. So LSSAH must have suffered up to 6 irrecoverable losses during those days, with 25 temporary losses (sent to repair shops), for a total of 31. That is 6 (of which 4 Pz IV) to about 150 Soviet AFVs for the 12th July. The figures stated in the BBC (or WELT) article are somewhat too high, it seems that they either summed up and compared different categories or also included all Soviet irrecoverable losses suffered before the 12th. If we factor in temporary losses we would arrive at a ratio of 30 to 260 in the vicinity of Prokhorovka.

     I assume approx. half of the targets would be actually engaged by armour, which delivers a more realistic figure. That would be 1:4-7 in combat (1:15-20 for irretrievables), similar to the daily casualty exchange rates (from the KDB). I think literature focuses too much on the engagement at Prokhorovka, it is somewhat meaningless to put such a high emphasize on armour. The heavies also played a subordinated role in this clash, there were like 2 KV tanks (1 of them probably a command vehicle) and only 3 to 4 PzKpfw VI available.

     • Thank you, I am presently reading the battle of Kursk David M Glantz and Jonathan M House. Also, I have got my hands on an original copy of Our Armoured Forces Lieut. General Sir G.leQ Martel 1946, He lead the British military mission during the Battle. His account is strategic, but talks about the successful attacking of the Haunches, the flanks, to prevent the Germans widening the base. Also that the Soviet airforce prevents the Luftwaffe obtaining air superiority. His analysis is close to that of historians once the Soviet recorded became available.

3. German losses taken from the comparison of reports on the number of combat-ready tanks?

   • A methodology which has it flaws, useful for an overview but of less value when assessing AT and tank combat.

     • As the database was developed for the purpose of validating a combat model, it was essential to have an reasonable count of all losses for both sides and that they were assembled consistently for both sides.

     • >>>A methodology which has it flaws
       I agree. Ten tanks went to repair, eight tanks came out of repair. Losses – two tanks 🙂

   • Yes the tank losses were mostly taken from the daily reports of number of ready for action…supplemented by other material, as not all daily reports report on all tanks.