Month June 2019

The Population Situation in 2050

I got into doing posts on demographics on a whim. It was not something The Dupuy Institute or I have ever studied in any depth.

Still, it is hard not to notice that it is going to have a long-term impact on the world over the next decades. A look at the situation in 2020 vice 2050 shows the impact (population figures in millions):

………………………………….2020……………………….2050
United States…………………334…………………………389
China…………………………1,403………………………1,348
India…………………………..1,389………………………1,705

Russia………………………….143………………………….129

Japan…………………………..125………………………….107
Germany………………………..80……………………………75

 

Asia…………………………..4,598…………………………5,267
Africa…………………………1,340…………………………2,478
Europe…………………………740……………………………707

Latin American………………667……………………………784

     and Caribbean

Northern America………….371……………………………433

Oceania…………………………42……………………………..57

 

All these figures are from the website: https://www.populationpyramid.net/japan/2050/

Now, that site nicely also provides a population pyramid for each nation. One of the most unbalanced cases is Japan in 2050, where the population has been in decline since 2010:

In this case you have 46 million people age 60 or over, and only 44 million people between the ages of 20 and 59. Is this an economically sustainable scenario? It only gets worse over time. Does 80 become the new 30?

An older post on the same subject:

Population Now versus 2050

 

5th Guards Fighter Regiment, 7 July 1943

La-7, Kursk Battle Museum, Belgorod (photo by Christopher A. Lawrence)

The Fifth Guards Fighter Regiment was the highest scoring Soviet air regiment of the war with 739 victories claimed. It was lead by twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Major Vasilii Zaitsev (1911-1961) who was credited with 34 kills during the war (and 15 or 19 shared kills). The unit’s deputy command was ace Lt. Vatalii Popkov (1922-2010), also twice Hero of the Soviet Union who was credited with 41 kills during the war.

On 7 July the regiment’s records report the following kills:

Date    Pilot                            Plane               Time                           Notes

7 July   Lt. Shumilin                Me-109G          0710-0817

7 July   Jr. Lt. Belyakov          Me-109             0855-0945

7 July   Jr. Lt. Glinkin              Fw-190             0855-0945

7 July   Lt. Bayevskii               Me-109            1440-1610

7 July   Lt. Yaremenko            Ju-88               1730-1835

7 July   Jr. Lt. Glinkin              He-111             1730-1835

7 July   Captain Dmitriyev      Ju-52                1730-1835

7 July   Major Pindyur             Me-109             2000-2110

7 July   Lt. Stokolov                Me-109             2000-2110

7 July   Jr. Lt. Bugreyev          Me-109             2000-2110

7 July   Jr. Lt. Kalsin               Me-109             2000-2110

7 July   Jr. Lt. Sverlov             Me-109             2000-2100                   ***

 

It also reports the following losses:

Date    Pilot                            Plane               Time                           Notes

7 July   Lt. Shumilin                                         1730-1835                   *

7 July   Jr. Lt. Belyakov                                   1730-1835                   **

7 July   Jr. Lt. Sidorets                                    1730-1835                   Did not return

7 July   Jr. Lt. Sverlov                                      2000-2100                   ***

 

* Lt. Shumilin after an air battle made a forced landing on wheels in the area of Mikhailovka. The pilot was seriously wounded.

** Hit by fire from antiaircraft artillery and an Fw-190, pilot cross the front line and made a landing. Pilot was wounded in the legs. Plane was burned on the ground by German artillery and mortar fire.

*** but he himself was caught in fire by two Me-109s, as a result, the La-5 burned and the pilot died.

            So for 7 July, they claimed 8 Me-109s and four other planes at a loss of four planes, two pilots lost and two pilots wounded. On 7 July, the German VIII Air Corps lost 4 or 5 Me-109s (see Tables IV.27 and IV.28 of my Kursk book, page 1416). This was but one fighter regiment of the 26 fighter regiments in the Second and Seventeenth Air Armies on 7 July 1943.

U.S. Senate on Model Validation

This link is to report 116-48, The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 by the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, dated June 11, 2019: https://www.congress.gov/116/crpt/srpt48/CRPT-116srpt48.pdf

While this 609 page report is probably worth reading from cover to cover, that I have not done. On the other hand, pages 253-254 are worth quoting (the bolding in the text is mine):

Evaluation of modeling and simulation used for force planning and theater operational requirements

The committee notes that the Department of Defense uses a large number and variety of computer models and simulations to support decision-making about force structure, resource allocation, war gaming, and priority weapons platforms and technologies to develop and deploy in support of likely operational scenarios. These models are used to develop information to brief decision makers, including the Congress, about, for example, the current state of the balance of forces in the Pacific and European theaters, the outcomes of likely war scenarios, and the need for investments in advanced technologies and new warfighting capabilities.

The committee is concerned that the quality, accuracy, and dependability of these models, given their important role in decision making processes, has not been adequately validated. The committee notes that technical and engineering models used to develop systems such as body armor and missiles are rigorously verified and validated for veracity of assumptions and technical accuracy using real world data. Other models, such as those used in the financial sector, are developed using expertise from a variety of disciplines, including economics, sociology, and advanced mathematics. The committee is concerned that the models used by organizations including the Joint Staff, Office of Net Assessment, war colleges, and service-level planning entities are simplistic by comparison and not subject to the same level of scrutiny.

Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent team of academic and industry modeling and subject matter experts to review the quality of modeling and simulation used for force planning, war gaming, resource allocation, and other senior leader decision-making associated with implementation of the National Defense Strategy. The team shall review the technical quality of models currently in use, including their ability to simulate as required by application; physics and engineering, socio-economic impact, readiness, global financial markets, politics, and other relevant inputs and outputs. The team shall assess the quality of these models and make recommendations for investments or policy changes needed to enhance and continuously validate current and future modeling and simulation tools employed to enable senior-level decision-making.

The committee directs the Secretary to support the team with expertise as needed from the Joint Staff, Office of Net Assessment, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, and other relevant organizations. The Secretary shall ensure that the team has sufficient resources and access to all data and records necessary to perform its analysis. The committee directs the Secretary to deliver a report on the independent team’s assessments and recommendations with any additional comments, and a specific concurrence or non-concurrence for each recommendation, to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives no later than December 31, 2020.

A big thank you to the person who brought this to my attention.

Secretary of Defense – 3

Looks like we are on our third secretary of defense. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan has withdrawn his nomination due to domestic violence problems that apparently included a baseball bat. The current Secretary of the Army, Mark Esper will be nominated for Secretary of Defense. We have a brief bio of him in this post:

Secretary of the Army, take 3

The Secretary of Defense has existed since 1947, when James Forrestal became the first. He later committed suicide. There have been 28 men (no women) who have been Secretary of Defense (including 3 acting). Of those, ten served in the U.S. Army: Hagel, Panetta, Perry, Aspin, Weinberger, Clements, Richardson, McNamara (U.S. Army Air Forces), Marshall, Johnson (WWI). Nine have never served in the military (Shanahan, Carter, Cohen, Cheney, Taft, Brown, Schlesinger, McElroy and Wilson).

How Many Maneuver Brigades Does the U.S. Have?

The U.S. Army has 10 divisions, one spare division headquarters (7th U.S. Division), three corps headquarters (I, III, XVIII Airborne Corps) and one (or seven) army headquarters (First Army). The U.S. Marine Corps has three divisions.

The norm is that a U.S. Division has three maneuver brigades, one artillery brigade and one combat aviation brigade. A number of our divisions have two maneuver brigades with a third one often being a national guard brigade. Let us count up the number of active duty maneuver brigades were currently have:

……………………………….Armored..Stryker..Infantry..Artillery..Aviation..Sustainment

Unit…………………………..Bde………..Bde…….Bde………Bde……..Bde……….Bde

1st Armored Division………..2…………..1………………………1…………..1……………1

1st Cavalry Division…………3…………………………………….1…………..1……………1

1st Infantry Division…………2…………………………………….1…………..1……………1

2nd/7th Infantry Division………………….2…………0 + 1……..1…………..1……………1

3rd Infantry Division…………2……………………….0 + 1……..1…………..1……………1

4th Infantry Division…………1…………..1………….1………….1…………..1……………1

10th Mountain Division………………………………..2 + 1……..1…………..1……………1

25th Infantry Division……………………..1………….3………….1…………..1……………1

82nd Airborne Division………………………………..3………….1…………..1……………1

101st Airborne Division……………………………….3………….1…………..1……………1

2nd Cavalry Rgt……………………………1

3rd Cavalry Rgt…………………………….1

3rd Infantry Brigade……………………………………1

173rd Airborne Bde…………………………………….1

75th Ranger Rgt………………………………………..1

5 Special Forces Groups……………………………..(5)

1st Marine Division…………………………………….4…………..1………….1……………1

2nd Marine Division……………………………………4…………..1………….1……………1

3rd Marine Division…………………………………….2…………..1………….1……………1

Total…………………………10……………7…………25 + 3……13………..13………….13

 

So, the total count is 42 maneuver brigades (not counting the national guard brigades). The +3 Infantry Brigades are national guard brigades. For the sake of simplicity, are infantry-like units (airborne, marines expeditionary brigades, marine regiments, ranger regiments, etc.) are counted as infantry brigades. The two cavalry regiments are counted as Stryker brigades. The three Marine air wings are counted at aviation brigades. The Marine artillery regiments are counted as artillery brigades. Not counted are the five special forces groups, which each consist of 4 battalions and tend to be 3,000-4,000 strong.

An armored brigade in 2014 has 4,743 troops (90 Abrams tanks, 90 Bradley IFVs and 112 M-113s), A Stryker brigade in 2014 has 4,500 troops and 300+ Strykers. An Infantry brigade in 2014 has 4,413 troops. The 75th Ranger Regiment has 3,623 personnel authorized. A Marine Regiment has around 4,900 personnel. The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is around 2,200 personnel and there are one to three MEUs in each of the three Marine Expeditionary Brigades.

The National Guard has:

……………………………Armored..Stryker..Infantry..Artillery..Aviation..Sustainment

Unit…………………………Bde……….Bde…….Bde………Bde……..Bde……..Bde

28th Infantry Division……………………..1…………1…………………….1

29th Infantry Division………..1………………………2…………………….1

34th Infantry Division………..2………………………2…………………….1

35th Infantry Division………………………………….3…………………….1

36th Infantry Division………..1………………………3 + 1…………………1

38th Infantry Division………..1…………..,………….2

40th Infantry Division………………………………….3……………………..1

42nd Infantry Division…………………………………2……………………..1

Total……………………………5…………..1……….18+1………………….7

4th Marine Division (reserve)…………………………2………….1………..1

The +1 is the regular army 3rd infantry brigade, which is listed above.

So the National Guard and Marine reserve has 29 maneuver brigades (counting the three assigned to regular army units and not counting the regular army unit assigned to the 36th Infantry Division) and 8 combat aviation brigades and Marine Corps air wings. There are also two national guard special forces groups.

Current U.S. and Allied Forces in the Gulf (mid-June 2019)

USS Abraham Lincoln, May 19, 2019

Well, there has been a flare up in the Gulf of Oman yesterday. Don’t know if there has been any additional forces added over there. Nothing has been announced, although that does not mean additional forces have not been sent. The USNI Fleet Tracker for 10 June 2019 is still showing 21 ships there: https://news.usni.org/2019/06/10/usni-news-fleet-and-marine-tracker-june-10-2019

The destroyer USS Bainbridge (DDG-96) was in the news yesterday operating in the Gulf of Oman. As it was part of Carrier Strike Group 12, does that mean the carrier Abraham Lincoln is close by?

——old post from May 29, 2019————————————————————————-

Since 1990, the U.S. has always maintained a presence in and around the Persian/Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The UK also traditionally has a presence in the Gulf. Exactly what is there now?

In Iraq: 6,700+ U.S. and allied troops and supporting civilians

  1. Around 5,000 U.S. troops, primarily involved in training.
    1. As of 2017 the Pentagon has stopped providing the number of troops that are being deployed in Iraq citing security concerns.
    2. There are also probably U.S. civilians
  2. UK has 400 UK troops in non-combat roles and 1,000 civilians
    “supporting counter-daesh operations.”
  3. Germany has 160 soldiers
  4. Netherlands had 169 military and civilian staff
  5. Australia withdrew in 2018.

Kuwait:

  1. 10,000 troops in Kuwait (under CENTCOM?)

Bahrain:

  1. UK has a Type 23 frigate based there
  2. UK has four minesweepers based there.
  3. UK has a floating base.

Oman:

  1. Some British troops
  2. In March 2019, they performed a joint exercise with the Omani armed forces that included 5,500 British troops.

The Fifth Fleet:

  1. According to the USNI Fleet Tracker, they currently have 21 ships
    1. This includes the USS Abraham Lincoln and the Kearserge (see below).
  2. 10,000 troops in Qatar (command assumed to be Fifth Fleet)
  3. 1,000+ Marines aboard the Kearsarge
  4. There are probably a number of submarines in the area.

Sending to the Gulf as of new reports of 10 May and after:

  1. Carrier Strike Group 12
    1. USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72)
      1. 65-70 aircraft (Carrier Air Wing 7)
    2. USS Leyte Gulf (CG-55)
    3. Destroyer Squadron 2 with:
      1. USS Bainbridge (DDG-96)
      2. USS Mason (DDG-87)
      3. USS Nitze (DDG-94)
    4. sometimes submarines
    5. support vessels
    6. Passed through the Suez Canal on May 9.
      1. operating of the coast of Oman 16 May
  2. Amphibious Squadron 6
    1. USS Kearsarge (LHD-3)
    2. 22nd MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit)
      1. A battalion+ of Marines
    3. USS Arlington (LPD-24)
    4. USS Fort McHenry (LSD-43)
    5. Off the coast of UAE near entrance to Gulf on 16 May
  3. One squadron of B-52s
    1. At Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar
      1. Pictures of them landing on May 9
    2. Others elsewhere in “southwest asia” (Al Dhafra Air Base in UAE?)
    3. Maybe 12-24 aircraft
    4. Aircraft from the 20th Bomb Squadron, Barksdale AFB, Louisiana
  4. One Patriot Missile Battalion
    1. Originally a Patriot battery in the reports of 10 May.
    2. Appears to include forces that were already in the Gulf who extended their deployment.
    3. Maybe 16 launchers of 4 missiles
  5. Two U.S. destroyers entered the Persian Gulf on May 16
    1. USS McFaul (DDG-74)
    2. USS Gonzalez (DDG-66)
  6. Added to the deployed on 24 May
    1. One fighter squadron
    2. Reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft
    3. around 900 troops while another 600 are retained in the Gulf.

This listing was quickly cobbled together from open sources. It should not be quoted without verification.

Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War

I noticed that our blog was being pinged by a site I was not familiar with, so I took a look at it….and I don’t read Chinese Korean  (see: https://m.blog.naver.com/alsrb19/221127427656).

But the site had a link to a paper written by Dr. Phillip A. Karber of the Potomac Foundation. This is worth looking at:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwsSGlkg0LM2aVhrNXExQ2FVTngxbzhWYVFCSFpvNWNCdVFB/view

This was done as part of the “Historical Lessons Learned Workshop.” I gather Dr. Phillip Karber and retired Gen. Wesley Clark wandered around Ukraine a lot during 2014 and 2015. Mr. Karber was wounded in June 2015 in a MLRS strike at Bebedynsky during the process. While I have never met him, Phil Karber has been around for a while, having worked for Andy Marshall (OSD Net Assessment). A few highlights:

  1. “…the struggle in Ukraine has involved the largest scale battles in Europe since the end of the Second World War.” (page 2)
  2. “The Russo-Ukrainian War has been full of surprises. First, it was totally unexpected.” (page 2)
  3. “A third surprise is the relative lack of Western attention given to the military aspects of the Russo-Ukrainian War; particularly given the unexpected scale and duration of the conflict….” (page 3)
  4. Artillery: “In the Ukraine conflict the author has witnessed units firing 300-400 rounds per tube per day. This increased intensity of fire is both outgoing and incoming.” (page 16)
  5. “Data from the Ukraine conflict show that artillery is producing approximately 85% of all casualties on both sides.” (page 17)
  6. “In July 2014….In the space of six weeks, the Russians launched 53 fire strikes at 40 different locations, which decimated Ukrainian forces. For example, at Zelenopillya, in a combined MLRS fire strike that lasted no more than three minutes, two Ukrainian mechanized battalions were virtually wiped out with the combined effects of top-attack munitions and thermobaric warheads.” (page 18)
  7. “Since the end of the Cold War, armies around the world have given increased emphasis to light Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV), which prioritizes mobility and fire-power over survivability. The evidence coming in from the Ukrainian conflict seriously questions the validity of that emphasis.” (page 26)

There are probably a few other significant points that I passed on.

So did Kozhedub shoot down 62, 64 or 66 planes?

Ivan Kozhedub was the highest scoring allied ace of World War II, having been credited with 62 or 64 victories. Hard to nail down the exact number. Most sources say 62, including Wikipedia. Many sources also credit him with also shooting down two U.S. P-51s. The Wikipedia article then lists his victories based upon the book Stalin’s Falcons by Mikhail Bykov. That listing records 64 planes, but no P-52s. The Wikipedia article also has a section of the “Alleged shooting down of two USAAF P-51 fighters.” That write up does not appear to accept the story.

A number of other sources also credit him with 64 claimed kills, or 64 claimed kills and two P-51s. Sort of mystified why this is an issue. I assume there are records of his claims somewhere.

So….what do we have out there:

……………………….Claimed Kills

Source…………….62…….62+2……..64……..64+2………63…….and 29 group kills
Wikipedia………….Y……….?…………..Y………..?
Seidl…………………………..Y
Polak……………….Y
Bykov……………………………………….Y………..?
Hardesty……………………………………Y

Red Falcons……….Y…………………….Y……….Y…………Y………..Y

 

Seidl is Stalin’s Eagles by Hans D. Seidl’s, Polak is Stalin’s Falcons by Tomas Polak with Christopher Shores, Bykov is Soviet Aces 1941-1945: The Victories of Stalin’s Falcons by Mikhail Bykov, Hardesty is Red Phoenix Rising by Von Hardesty and Ilya Grinberg, and Red Falcons is the Red Falcons website here: http://airaces.narod.ru/all1/kojedub.htm. Maybe the title of this post should have been “bird droppings.”

It is, of course, a different issue than the validity of those 62+ claims, which can be justifiably challenged. I will post about that later.

What is the Level of U.S. Commitment to NATO?

The United States spends 3.2% of its GDP on defense (SIPRI 2019) or 3.57% in 2017 according the Secretary General’s Annual Report (2017). All the other 28 countries in NATO spend less than that. Only three or four NATO members spend more than 2% (Greece at 2.36%, UK at 2.12%, Estonia at 2.08%). There is a little confusion in these figures, for NATO records France at 1.79% for 2017 while SIPRI in 2019 has France at 2.3%). Germany spends 1.24% (1.2% according to SIPRI). Canada, which has a GDP almost as large as Russia spends 0.9% (SIPRI) or 1.29% (NATO). Russia spends 4.3% (SIPRI).

But the United States had multiple commitments around the world, and many of these have nothing to do with NATO (which is…the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). In fact, there is a geographic definition in their charter. Of course, the notable exception here is Afghanistan, where most nations sent troops as part of a NATO force there.

Not all of the U.S. forces are in Europe. For example, we have two maneuver brigades in NATO (Germany and Italy). We have 13 divisions in the U.S. Army and USMC (usually three maneuver brigades per division). Therefore, is U.S. ground commitment to NATO roughly 2/42nds of our ground forces? Or should we include all those units in Texas and Colorado and elsewhere who can be moved to Europe on short notice (I hope they can move…haven’t checked on that recently)?

So, for example, the U.S. forces in Korea are not a NATO asset. The Second Infantry Division has its division headquarters, its Combat Aviation Brigade, its sustainment Brigade, and an independent Field Artillery Brigade based in Korea, but its two maneuver brigades (both Stryker Brigades) are in Washington state. In 2015 we deactivated the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team and instead rotate a brigade from other divisions to Korea for nine month tours (3rd ABCT, 1st Armored Division is there now). The 3rd Marine Division HQ is in Okinawa. It is almost certainly not a NATO asset. Also, it is effectively only two brigades (the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade of only one MEU and the 3rd and 4th Marine Regiments). So are we really looking at 37/42nds of our ground forces committed to NATO?

The same goes with the Air Force which only has the Third Air Force in Europe with three fighter wings and three other flying wings. The U.S. Air Force as of 2015 had 57 active duty flying wings. So, is only 6/57th of the Air Force in Europe? Planes are quick to move. A lot could be moved there quickly, and we maintain multiple airfields.

The navy has only one fleet (the Sixth Fleet) that regularly operates in the north Atlantic with one carrier and one carrier that regularly operates in the Mediterranean. We have six numbered fleets (one is a cyber command), 11 carriers and 9 Marine amphibious assault ships (which are about the size of most other peoples’ carriers). Usually about two of those carriers and Marine amphibious assault ships are operating in and around Europe, although it is easy to move ships about. Still, between Korea, the Pacific, the Persian Gulf, not everything is available for Europe.

So clearly we are not spending 3.2% of our GDP on NATO. We do have some other commitments in the world (Korea, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Niger, etc.). As certainly more than 2/3rds of our army, air force and navy can be committed to Europe on short-notice then we can argue we are above 2% of GDP.

Dupuy’s Verities: The Complexities of Combat

“The Battle of Leipzig, 16-19 October 1813” by A.I. Zauerweid (1783-1844) [Wikimedia]
The thirteenth and last of Trevor Dupuy’s Timeless Verities of Combat is:

Combat is too complex to be described in a single, simple aphorism.

From Understanding War (1987):

This is amply demonstrated by the preceding [verities]. All writers on military affairs (including this one) need periodically to remind themselves of this. In military analysis it is often necessary to focus on some particular aspect of combat. However, the results of such closely focused analyses must the be evaluated in the context of the brutal, multifarious, overlapping realities of war.

Trevor Dupuy was sometimes accused of attempting to reduce war to a mathematical equation. A casual reading of his writings might give that impression, but anyone who honestly engages with his ideas quickly finds this to be an erroneous conclusion. Yet, Dupuy believed the temptation to simplify and abstract combat and warfare to be common enough that he he embedded a warning against doing so into his basic theory on the subject. He firmly believed that human behavior comprises the most important aspect of combat, yet it is all too easy to miss the human experience of war figuring who lost or won and why, and counts of weapons, people, and casualties. As a military historian, he was keenly aware that the human stories behind the numbers—however imperfectly recorded and told—tell us more about the reality of war than mere numbers on their own ever will.